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Preface 
About a hundred years ago occupational and environmental health became an 
increasingly urgent topic in Western societies. Today’s perceptions and organi-
sation for the prevention and treatment of occupational health problems are to a 
great extent historical products of a specific regime of work during the classical 
industrial era. For several reasons occupational health and safety became a field of 
its own, involving medical and technical expertise, politicians, public administra-
tions, trade unions and employers associations. Its roots, however, are also to be 
found in the general history of public health. In the context of the evolving wel-
fare state the two fields of occupational and of public health have developed as 
overlapping, though separately organised, social and scientific concerns. The 
affinity of the histories of the two fields was the main reason for organising “The 
2nd International Conference on the History of Occupational Health and Environ-
mental Prevention” and “The 4th International Conference of the International Net-
work for the History of Public Health” as a joint effort with a view toward casting 
light on their relationship and to promote collaboration between the two. 
The conference under the title Occupational Health and Public Health: Lessons 
from the Past – Challenges for the Future took place in the old industrial city of 
Norrköping in southern Sweden in September 2001. It was organised by the 
Swedish National Institute for Working Life (NIWL) in co-operation with the 
Clinica del Lavoro Luigi Devoto, Italy, the ICOH Scientific Committee on the 
History of Prevention of Occupational and Environmental Diseases, the Inter-
national Network for the History of Occupational and Environmental Prevention 
(IHOEP), International Network for the History of Public Health (INHPH), The 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Prevention (ISPESL), Italy, the 
National Institute of Public Health, Sweden, the Wellcome Trust and the Swedish 
Council for Work Life and Social Research. 
The members of the organising committee were Svante Beckman (chair), 
Gunnel Färm, Antonio Grieco, Bengt Knave, Antonio Moccaldi and Inger 
Ohlsson. Members of the scientific program committee were Jan Sundin (chair), 
Giovanni Berlinguer, Bernadino Fantini, J. Malcolm Harrington, Sergio Iavicoli, 
Dietrich Milles and Annette Thörnquist. The conference secretariat comprised 
Anita Andersson, Maria Arvidsson, Daniela Fano, Gudrun Jungeteg and Marga-
reta Lensell. Marie C. Nelson has been responsible for the editing and the intro-
duction of this conference volume and Eric Elgemyr of NIWL for the production 
of the book. We warmly thank all sponsors, partners, collaborators and contri-
butors to the Norrköping conference and to this book. 
On April 30, 2003 one of the key figures in promoting the international scien-
tific interest in the history of occupation health, Professor Antonio Grieco of 
Milan, died. He was also an enthusiastic co-organiser of the Norrköping con-
ference and has made a prominent contribution to this book. In honour of Antonio  
 Grieco a short obituary written by former ICOH President Bengt Knave has 
been added to this preface. 
 
Svante Beckman   Jan Sundin  
Chair Organising Committee   Chair Scientific Program Committee 
  
In memoriam 
Antonio Grieco 
1931–2003 
Professor, MD, PhD 
Clinica del Lavoro Luigi Devoto, Milan University, Italy 
 
Professor Antonio Grieco spent his entire professional career at the Clinica – the 
oldest institution in the world for the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of work-
related diseases – finally as its Director 1985–2001. A vast and internationally 
appreciated scientific production included studies on respiratory and lung disea-
ses, ergonomical prerequisites for different occupations, ageing at work, and work 
organisation. With his knowledge and experience he was appointed member of 
many international bodies in the field, such as, WHO, EU, ICOH (The Inter-
national Commission on Occupational Health) and IEA (International Ergono-
mical Association). 
In the 1990’s Antonio Grieco felt the need for an increased focus on the history 
of occupational and environmental prevention and started an international network 
entitled The International Network for the History of Occupational and Environ-
mental Prevention (INHOEP), that included historians, architects, ergonomists 
and psychologists. The main outcome was a founding seminar (Milan, 1996) and 
a book on the historical development in Italy (1997). This network initiative called 
for a pendant “oriented to occupational medicine”, and in 1996 the ICOH Scien-
tific Committee “History of Prevention of Occupational and Environmental Dis-
eases” was founded with 52 members from 12 countries and with Antonio Grieco 
as chairman. The INHOEP network and the ICOH Scientific Committee then 
jointly organised two International Conferences, the first in Rome (1998), and the 
second in Norrköping (2001). 
Antonio Grieco died on April 30, 2003, at a time when he was still actively 
engaged in different projects and plans. His interests and activities in history were 
unbroken. He spoke from this conviction: “He who ignores the past has no roots 
and he who has no roots has no future.” 
 
Bengt Knave 
President of ICOH 2000–2003 
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Introduction 
Marie C. Nelson, University of Linköping 
 
Recent decades have seen an explosion of interest in the area of the history of 
medicine in the broadest sense of the word. The field has grown to include a 
multitude of disciplines and orientations. Not least, studies now routinely include 
the social and political context, and questions are approached from a variety of 
disciplines. It is these very qualities that make the field dynamic and lend it a 
sense of exploration. At the same time the high profile of health questions in 
today’s world gives the field an actuality and a sense of urgency. Many argue that 
the historical perspective may provide a base for a better understanding of today’s 
world. 
In the recent volume Locating Medical History Frank Huisman and John Harley 
Warner have discussed the character and nature of the field, both in light of its 
history and its current diversity.1 They eloquently plead for tolerance in an 
“eclectic” field, arguing that the opportunities for productive and open debate are 
often lost in the simple disparagement of “other” approaches than the current 
vogue. These points are well taken, and something that should be kept in mind in 
reading this volume, the product of cooperation between a variety of organizations 
promoting history of public health and occupational history that came together in 
the September 2001 conference that bore the same name as this volume, “Occu-
pational Health and Public Health: Lessons from the Past – Challenges for the 
Future”. While some of the authors might identify themselves with one field or 
the other, it became apparent in editing the volume that erecting such a boundary 
would be a disservice to the authors, to their contributions and to the vitality so 
evident at the conference. 
Seldom do circumstances become so instantly outdated as those under which 
that conference was held. Scarcely had the long-distance participants arrived 
home when the first watershed of the 21st century occurred, 9/11. The contents of 
some papers must be interpreted in this light; other papers were presented in 
preliminary form and were later substantially revised.  
The papers in this volume include most of the contributions to the plenary 
sessions with some additions. Part I, “The Role of Health in a Changing World – 
Perspectives on Medicine, Politics and Society”, includes the introductory and 
concluding lectures and addresses issues of history and its eventual relevance for 
politics and policy-making, while Part II, “The Growth and Definiton of Ideas of 
Health”, provides historiographic glimpses of varying depth into the growth of the 
field. Part III, “Health and Industry: Politics and Practice”, contains three chapters 
dealing with the growing awareness of industrial hazards and the power struggles 
between various groups of actors in the process of developing policy and making 
                                                
1 Frank Huisman and John Harley Warner, ”Medical Histories,” pp. 1–30 in Frank Huisman and 
John Harley Warner (eds.) (2004) Locating Medical History: The Stories and Their Meanings. 
The Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London. 
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industry safe for the workers and the rest of society. The section concludes with a 
personal portrait of one of the Swedish pioneers of occupational health and an 
early international figure in the field. The final section is entitled “Global Per-
spectives on Health, Old and New” and is indicative of much work being done 
today that crosses international borders, looking at health from an international 
perspective. In this sense, the contributions to this volume provide a good over-
view of work in the field past and present and points toward the future. 
  
Part I 
The Role of Health in a Changing World 
– Perspectives on Medicine, Politics and Society 
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1: Politics as a Tool of Public and Occupational Health Practice 
Daniel M. Fox, Milbank Memorial Fund, New York, NY  
 
I make four points as a result of listening to as many papers as I could during this 
meeting. The first three points explain why the quality of the scientific papers and 
discussion were so satisfying to a speaker who has spent thirty-five years as both a 
public official and counsellor to officials and a student of history and political 
economy. The final point is a challenge to professionals in public health and per-
haps – I know less about occupational health – to persons in that field as well.  
The challenge is this: Professionals in public and occupational health who want 
to improve the health of populations must become sufficiently expert in the 
politics of policy making to communicate with persons who stand for public 
office and their closest staff members. 
The first point: The authors of many papers presented at this meeting appreciate 
the problems of making policy in government and in the institutions of the eco-
nomy. More than a few authors addressed these problems as well as appreciated 
them. This embrace of the politics of policy is, in my experience, unusual at 
meetings about research in public health.  
Moreover, and to the credit of the authors, I heard very little advocacy. The 
word advocacy has many meanings. People in high public office in the United 
States usually define advocacy as special pleading on behalf of a particular group. 
Advocacy in public health is the righteous advice that many public health officers 
bestow on elected officials and members of their staffs, whom they mistakenly 
believe to be, as a group, under-informed, and short-sighted and crass. The ab-
sence of such advocacy at this meeting is evidence of respect for the frustrating if 
sometimes satisfying responsibilities of governing. 
The second point: Your appreciation of the analytic work as well as the art of 
policy making demonstrates growing international support for a critique of 
dominant themes in public health theory and practice during the last half century. 
Many speakers at this meeting contributed to the critique and offered persuasive 
evidence in support of it. 
According to the critique, many public health researchers and practitioners, 
worldwide, have made over-simple assumptions about the process of adapting the 
findings of science and technology to the economic, political, and social systems 
in which they work. Foremost among these over-simple assumptions has been 
insistence that health is an absolute goal, perhaps the foremost goal of public 
policy. A goal that is absolute cannot be compromised. However, negotiating 
compromises – that is, the engineering of equal sharing of disappointment – is the 
basic method for solving political problems in democracies. 
Moreover, maximizing health status for everyone cannot be the highest priority 
of public policy makers because most citizens of most countries prioritize health 
only when they or someone they love is desperately sick or when many people 
seem to be at risk of severe illness. Because most citizens accord higher priority 
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most of the time to peace, economic security, improving their incomes, education, 
and recreation sometimes to revenge and war over health, the people whom these 
citizens choose or permit to govern them do not accord the highest priority to 
health. That is, not giving absolute top priority to health is a rational decision for 
politicians to make. They have learned that effective leadership requires them to 
remain, at most, only a small distance ahead of their constituents. 
Another major point in the critique is that many public health researchers and 
officials have ignored the lessons of historical research. Not paying attention to 
history creates three impediments to making policy that improves the health of 
populations. 
The impediments: (1) People who disregard history are frequently impatient 
with the contingency of health status; that is, with how health status is effected by 
the culture, economy, society of every country and region within countries, as 
well as by interventions intended to improve the health of individuals and popu-
lations. (2) They underestimate the difficulty of interpreting data about the 
determinants of health of any population and then of acting on those interpreta-
tions. (3) They are naïve about the difficulties of intervening in the lives of 
individuals and institutions of the economy and society to improve health.  
The third point: The purpose of the critique of public health research and 
practice to which many of you are contributing is to achieve better health status 
for populations. Speculating about policy that is not feasible wastes time and 
effort. Improving health status requires tough-minded analysis of what policies 
can be made in a particular country or subunit of it at a particular time, and then 
arraying the best possible evidence about which of these policies are likely to 
contribute to the greatest improvement in health status. 
Discovering what policy is practicable requires many tools, among them, the 
methods and findings of historical research. Competent action in the future is 
rooted in competent analysis of the past. I heard many talks at this meeting in 
which speakers analyzed the past in order to make and implement more effective 
policy for population health. 
The fourth and final point: I urge you to find ways to make your critique of 
public health practice, your sensitivity to contingency in history, and your evi-
dence about effective interventions convincing to leaders of government and the 
economy. I call government officials who make policy leaders of general govern-
ment; these officials either run for office or report directly to elected officials. 
Public (and occupational) health officials are, in contrast, members of specialized 
government, like their colleagues in, for example, agriculture, education, housing, 
or transportation. Leaders of general government decide how to allocate resources 
among the competing units of specialized Government. Persons in general govern-
ment have expert knowledge about the interests of the many groups that promote 
the interests of each area of specialized government.  
There is a private sector analogue to general government that I call general 
economic life. The leaders of this sector are senior managers of corporations and 
elected officials of labor unions. The former are accountable to shareholders to 
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maintain and increase earnings; the latter to their members for job stability, and 
for maintaining and improving wages, benefits and working conditions. Within 
private corporations there are also analogues to specialized government. 
Leaders general government are hardly ever accountable for the health status of 
individuals. They are very clear about their accountability because they are expert 
consumers of the contemporary techniques of communication that have been 
described so lucidly in talks at this meeting. As a result of applying these techni-
ques, these leaders know how most voters rank priorities. I spoke earlier of citi-
zens’ priorities. Because they are important to understanding what policies can 
and cannot be made, I restate them more in the language of polls and focus groups 
rather than of policy analysis: the top priorities for most people most of the time 
are jobs and prosperity, peace and public safety, housing, education, and roads.  
These preferences also drive the priorities of generalists in economic life, 
though in slightly different ways. The top priority for generalists who manage 
business corporations is almost always assuring the highest earnings for share-
holders in the short term. The highest priority for labor union generalists is maxi-
mizing job security and achieving gains in wages and working conditions. Achie-
ving and maintaining earnings targets, job security, and better wages often re-
quires attention to some of the same issues that voters tell politicians they care 
most about. Health is always on the list of concerns of leaders of business but it is 
rarely on top of their lists.2 
Am I offering you an impossible challenge when I urge you to involve leaders 
of general government and economic life in defining the future of public health 
and occupational health? Not at all: I know from long experience that generalists 
respond positively to good evidence that better health leads to social stability, 
higher productivity, or sustained profits. Persons in specialized government are 
understandably disappointed when generalists respond positively to evidence but 
then refuse to risk their political capital in a losing cause. But generalists are paid 
to understand political timing better than specialists do.  
Here is an historical analogy in point: about a century ago generalists in govern-
ment and economic life in most industrial countries became convinced that there 
was evidence that education improves social stability, productivity and profits. 
Evidence only drove policy for education when the persons to whom the genera-
lists were accountable became convinced of its validity. 
A word of caution: Generalists frequently formulate issues differently than 
specialists do. For example, some recent efforts to shift the boundaries of public 
health policy to “population health” use the concept of multiple determinants of 
health. Advocates of a population health perspective often accord particular 
                                                
2 Note to Readers: I gave this talk on September 9, 2001 and returned from Sweden to New York 
City on September 10th. Since September 11th, the highest priorities in my country have 
changed; I suspect temporarily. The priorities are now preventing biological, mechanical and 
chemical terrorism, protecting and creating jobs during a recession, and taking revenge on 
religious totalitarians who commit and condone murder. In New York City, and especially in 
Lower Manhattan where I live, the list of priorities includes rebuilding at Ground Zero and 
recreating the downtown economy. 
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emphasis to the determinants of health disparities by socio-economic status and 
race.  
Most leaders of general government and economic life think, however, that they 
already know something about multiple determinants of health. To them the deter-
minants of health are whatever their constituents, employees and members say 
they are. The most important determinants to generalists are, therefore, economic 
security, health care, violence, clean water, safe food, land use that doesn’t kill by 
increasing danger from vehicles or toxics, and the safety of travellers. 
Many specialists in population health have told me that this definition dis-
pleases them. These specialists want generalists to address inequality in wealth 
and class that seems to be correlated with disparities in health status. Most gene-
ralists understand, however, that a politics of redistribution is also a politics of 
disruption; and they are convinced that a politics of disruption is rarely in the 
public interest. 
In summary, I have made four related points. I praised the participants in this 
meeting for their serious and sophisticated embrace of the problems of governing 
political and economic institutions. I acknowledged the constructive critique of 
public health theory and practice that was a text or a sub-text of many of the 
papers. I noted that historical science is an essential source of the insights on 
which to create a theory and practice of population health that is appropriate for 
our new century. Finally, I encouraged you to share your work and your wisdom 
with generalists in government and economic life, with, that is, the only people 
who have the authority to allocate resources to maintain and improve the health of 
populations.  
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2: Public and Private Collaboration – A Necessary Way Forward 
Brian K. Atchinson, Executive Director, Insurance Marketplace Standards 
Association, Chevy Chase, MD, USA 
 
The conference presented a fascinating array of topics, interwoven like a tapestry 
of many colors. The complimentary roles of public health and occupational health 
were readily apparent. However, the perspectives varied greatly among those from 
different professional disciplines. Each forum represented a unique and often 
compelling exchange of information and experiences. In many respects, the con-
ference represents a continuing dialectic that serves to advance the exploration for 
innovative solutions to shared challenges in many different places occurring at 
varying degrees of intensity. 
The many lessons shared and learned throughout the conference extended 
beyond convenient categories and often defied neat compartmentalization, as 
illustrated in discussions so diverse they extended from asbestos and carbon disul-
fide to banana harvesting to seafaring Liverpudlians of past centuries. 
One participant noted, “Equality in health is the goal”. The meaning of this 
statement changes significantly depending on whether it is “Equality” around the 
world, within a region, a nation, or a community. The demographic, economic and 
political pressures are forcing vigorous debate in many places around the world 
regarding the best approaches to address these pressures and, in some instances, 
redefine concepts concerning health. The debate has clearly commenced between 
what is desirable versus what is practical and possible. If the focus is to be on 
healthy populations, there may be inherent tensions where the interests of the 
public good and the public sector meet the private marketplace. There are many 
variations on this theme currently occurring, including the debate about social 
security systems in the many countries. (One acknowledges that the United States’ 
system is a different model from that in most countries.) Incrementalism is the 
common approach in most countries. Nonetheless, the debates raise fundamental 
issues concerning “values” that necessarily confront systemic integrity in public 
health policy towards populations. This conference has presented numerous 
examples of this dialogue occurring around the globe.  
The lessons to be learned are not simple, but some general themes emerged. 
The marketplace fixation on profit margin maximization sometimes can impede or 
prohibit the delivery of optimum occupational health. As a natural consequence, 
public health can only then react in an imperfect manner. We have learned how 
occupational health professionals are a growing and significant presence in much 
of the world, particularly in certain countries that have established credible and 
transparent certification processes. The enhanced credibility of health professio-
nals that accompanies certification or licensure is generally a positive develop-
ment in discussions and negotiations intended to bring about better outcomes in 
both occupational and public health. During the conference there emerged a 
shared realization in the almost unique ability of health professionals to advocate 
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for those dependent on others to make informed decisions. Though advocacy itself 
was never the catalyst or goal, the need for those credible voices in decision 
making is key. 
Occupational health takes many forms – changing as the world changes. The 
emerging recognition of “life long employability”, as reflected in the work of the 
International Institute of International Insurance Economics, will dramatically 
alter the terms and scope of discussion in the future. Many of the challenges 
confronting governments and individuals are premised on arguably antiquated 
definitions of the nature of the problem. Redefining the scope of the challenge is a 
broadly shared undertaking in both developed and emerging economies around 
the world. As public health officials and experts debate and occasionally celebrate 
the many advances in demographic sustainability, the role of individuals in the 
workplace may be extended and modified while moving away from the long held 
perspective that one works until one retires – when one ceases to work. Partial 
productivity may become an essential part of many societies and public policies as 
the concept of “middle age” evolves beyond the ages of 45 and 55 to 65, 75 and 
beyond. Much of the world will be challenged by changing demographic condi-
tions. This conference touched on this topic in many ways but may wish to 
explore it further in the future. 
The wonderfully inclusive approach in Sweden towards defining the scope of 
public health is not emulated in many countries, yet most aspire to a similar, less 
refined vision. The conference did demonstrate that for every enthusiast, there is a 
countervailing skeptic. The foundation of our public health and social security 
systems will be under siege in many countries that will find it difficult (and occa-
sionally impossible) to sustain these systems. This conference has demonstrated 
that this forum has the capability to serve as a significant positive force in the 
multidimensional effort to confront this challenge. 
Around the globe, there is significant concern that some of the advances of the 
past one hundred years may be compromised in light of projected demographic 
trends. Yet, some believe that a solution is within reach once a problem has been 
identified and defined. For those, there can be cautious optimism as a result of the 
melding of theorists, analysts, participants and leaders in Norrköping. 
In the United States, there exist certain distortions in the health system(s), occu-
pational and generally, when contrasted with other countries. These aberrations in 
the United States are partially the result of the federal – 50 state – government 
structure, the free market economy, as well as, the hyper-litigious nature of 
persons in the United States. Many issues in the US are framed as “legal,” often 
prompting differences of opinions and curious public policies concerning public 
health and private interests. These debates may resonate for those in other coun-
tries who find themselves in the future debating and discussing these same thorny 
issues. In the United States’ fragmented health care system, most people receive 
their health insurance coverage through their employer as a benefit, as part of a 
compensation package. Most do, but many do not. Individuals whose incomes are 
below a certain low annual salary level are eligible for government-sponsored 
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medical care. However, in the middle of the US population economic stratification 
there are approximately 50 million US citizens with no health insurance. Many of 
these uninsured work for employers that choose not to provide health insurance. 
The public health issues are enormous and, because of its employer-basis, the 
occupational issues are equally daunting. 
The US federal system often results in inconsistent approaches among the 
different states, but also allows for the sharing of “best practices” among those 
who share similar responsibilities and common goals. One example of systemic 
tension exists in the United States where the workers’ compensation system is 
designed to compensate injured or disabled employees. Its design is intended to 
limit the legal exposure and liability of employers. In recent years, there has been 
more emphasis on the health workers within the workers’ compensation system. 
This is another example of the importance of being an informed participant in the 
health care delivery system. For the past six (6) years in the United States, the 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Workers’ Compensation Health Initiative has 
undertaken a program to promote the improvement of health outcomes and 
contain costs by promoting innovative initiatives to better collect and use data. 
This is merely one example of a country struggling to establish a semblance of 
organization in an area that is a creation of circumstances – not a product of 
inspired policy making.  
The challenge of Norrköping is to share insights, experience, and best practices 
so that we may all view our own world through another’s eyes and examine the 
worlds of others from different perspectives. The participants in Norrköping have 
demonstrated that there is no monopoly on enlightened public policy making. This 
conference has demonstrated that there are major limitations to insular policy 
making and implementation. The study and crafting of future solutions to occupa-
tional and public health challenges need to embrace all those who are affected or 
can affect the process or outcomes. This should necessarily lead to some challen-
ging areas of exploration where long held beliefs need to be revisited, old allian-
ces questioned and presumed opponents reexamined.  
Good public policy cannot be made in a vacuum. Occupational health is a key 
component within the overall public health. This conference demonstrated the 
essential nexus between these disciplines. For those confronting these challenges 
around the world, it may be helpful to weave into this tapestry additional perspec-
tives that can meaningfully contribute to the search for solutions and make the 
tapestry even more bright.  
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3: The History of Public Health in Industrial and Post-industrial 
Societies 
Dorothy Porter, Department of Anthropology, History and Social Medicine, 
School of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco, California, USA 
 
Populations were industrious long before the period identified by historians as the 
modern industrial revolution and the consequences of industry for the health of 
workers have been observed from antiquity. As the great historian of public health 
George Rosen pointed out, Ancient Greek flute players wore leather mouth bands 
to protect their facial muscles from becoming too relaxed, and even though very 
few Hippocratic references to occupational health exist, some observations were 
made about a possible relationship of lead poisoning to pneumonia experienced by 
miners (Rosen 1958, p. 13). During Roman times Galen observed the suffocating 
conditions in which Cypriot copper sulfate miners tried to protect themselves with 
primitive respirators (Rosen 1958, pp. 21–22). However, concern for workers’ 
health did not figure significantly in an epoch of public health administration that 
was largely orientated to the creation of salubrity for the comfort of patrician 
élites (Porter 1999a, pp. 19-20). The health of workers became a far more pressing 
issue for collective action regarding health when the economic value of labor 
power exponentially increased with the development of mechanized factory pro-
duction at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century 
(Porter 1999, pp. 49–52).  
Public health actions undertaken from the late medieval to the early modern 
period had been largely concerned with the control of epidemic diseases – or 
rather one disease, i.e. plague – but by the end of the eighteenth century new 
efforts were being made regarding the chronic illnesses developed by workers in a 
variety of new working conditions. Eighteenth century collective efforts regarding 
occupational health were not undertaken by political states but by the people most 
affected by the cost of occupational diseases, employers and workers. Recent 
work by Brian Dolan has highlighted the efforts made by pioneer employers of the 
English industrial revolution, Josiah Wedgwood and Matthew Bolton, to organize 
systems of health insurance amongst their workers for the purchase of medical 
services both for themselves and their families (Dolan 2004). Being true believers 
in Enlightenment science and members of the little club of natural philosophers, 
the Luna Society, Bolton and Wedgwood also experimented with the idea of pro-
viding bottled pure oxygen within their factories to ensure their workers breathed 
“good” air. They believed that if their workers breathed pure oxygen it might 
prevent some of the respiratory diseases that increasingly claimed workers as 
victims. Of course, another member of the Luna Society, Thomas Beddoes, was 
experimenting at the same time with the use of nitrous oxide for the cure of 
consumption offered freely to the poor in a public dispensary set up in Bristol 
(Porter 1992). But perhaps Wedgwood and Bolton foresaw the kind of problems 
that might be created for productivity if their workers were belly laughing all day! 
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These early efforts made by English industrialists and workers were indepen-
dent initiatives that did not involve central or local governments. Occupational 
health did not figure as an issue for state legislation in England until the first 
factory acts were passed in the 1830s. However, for contemporary historians 
collective action in the context of mutual aid organizations, the voluntary sector or 
commercial enterprise is an equally important source for reconstructing past rela-
tionships of population health (Porter 1998, pp. 83–93). Because, contemporary 
historians of public health are interested in collective action in relation to the 
health of populations, whether this was undertaken by local or central political 
states, by voluntary organizations or the commercial market place. And collective 
action in relation to occupational health is likely to be found in many more histo-
rical arenas than public administration because of its central role in the reproduc-
tion of economic structures and relationships (Porter 1999a, Introduction). 
It was for this reason that George Rosen, in an article published in the Bulletin 
for the History of Medicine in 1937, emphasized the singular importance of occu-
pational health within the history of public health (Rosen 1937, pp. 941–46). 
Rosen argued that occupational health highlighted the centrality of economic 
structures in historical transformation. As Ed Morman has pointed out, for Rosen 
the history of occupational health was pivotal to the establishment of medical 
history as a discipline of social history, because occupational diseases were so 
evidently caused by social circumstances (Morman 1993). More recently social 
historians of medicine and public health, such as Charles Webster and Virginia 
Berridge, have echoed Rosen’s concerns in focusing on the extent to which 
political states and public administrations have considered or have ignored the 
role that economic inequality plays in determining population health (Berridge & 
Blume 2002). Contemporary historians focus on issues such as health inequalities 
because, as the recent book by John Welshman on Municipal Medicine in 
twentieth century Britain points out, the history of public health policy making, 
especially of the recent past, has significant implications for policy making in the 
present and for the future (Welshman 2001). I would argue that the recent concern 
amongst public health historians with the relationship between the history of 
public health and contemporary policy making marks a return, to some extent, to 
the values which underlay an earlier historiography. 
After the Second World War public health historians examined the role that 
public health policy had played in the administrative growth of modern states and 
the development of social welfare systems. Historians and practitioners of social 
medicine such as René Sand, professor of social medicine at Brussels University, 
George Rosen from Yale and Thomas McKeown, professor of social medicine in 
Birmingham, used history as part of their mission to identify the role that compre-
hensive economic planning and preventive medical administration could play in 
creating not only healthier but also more egalitarian societies. Sand and Rosen 
incorporated the growth of the administrative state into grand narratives of pro-
gress, arising from the technological advance of science and medicine and its 
capacities to combat endemic and epidemic disease (Sand 1952; Rosen 1958). 
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This vision was reinforced in 1976 by the conclusions of Professor of Social 
Medicine Thomas McKeown. Clinical medicine, he claimed, had played no part 
in the Modern Rise of Population, which had largely resulted from improved 
nutrition that was a consequence of the broader distribution of higher standards of 
living and environmental reforms such as the creation of clean water supplies 
(McKeown 1976a, b). Sand, Rosen and McKeown linked historical transforma-
tion to increased social and health egalitarianism to what they believed was the 
emancipatory power of positivist knowledge. Like the Marxist historian of medi-
cine, Richard Shryock, Rosen and Sand considered the vital role played by the 
impact of laboratory and experimental science on the understanding of disease 
(Shryock 1979). Thomas McKeown shared the belief of his mentors, Lancelot 
Hogben and Francis Crew, in the power of quantitative methods for revealing the 
relationship between economic inequalities upon the differential relationships of 
health, morbidity and mortality (Crew & Hogben 1947). 
A new generation of public health historians in the 1960s and 1970s may have 
shared some of the political values of the post-war historiographers of health and 
practitioners of social medicine but challenged their faith in scientific progress 
and the politically emancipatory power of positivist knowledge.  
Between the 1960s and 1980s a wealth of new historiography on the role of 
epidemics in social transformation appeared, perhaps stimulated by Asa Briggs’ 
suggestion that the story of cholera had been overlooked as a major factor in 
historical change in Victorian society (Briggs 1961, pp. 76–96). But the work of 
Margaret Pelling (1978), William Coleman (1982), Charles Rosenberg (1962), 
Carlo Cipolla (1979), Paul Slack (1985) and Richard Morris (1976), to name but a 
few, highlighted the historical contingency of rationalism and mirrored what their 
contemporary historians of science were arguing about the social construction of 
knowledge (see also Barnes & Shapin 1979; Barnes & Edge 1982). The work of 
the Marxist William McNeill and the historian Alfred Crosby stimulated the 
investigation of the role of disease in imperial expansion (McNeill 1976; Crosby 
1986), a theme explored further in an examination of the migration of peoples, 
diseases and cultural exploitation by Philip Curtin (1989). In the historiography of 
epidemic disease the role of rationalism in the re-enforcement of political domina-
tion was being examined both in the context of class and racial relations in domes-
tic and imperial theatres of power (Porter 1999b). 
The collected essays in Kenneth Kiple’s huge edited encyclopaedia, The Cam-
bridge World History of Human Disease, reflect the intellectual route taken by a 
generation of historians from the history of bacteria in social transformation to the 
anthropology of belief (Kiple 1993). When Irwin Ackercknecht argued that a clear 
dichotomy between contagionist and miasmatic theories of disease determined the 
quarantine and sanitation policies of early nineteenth-century European state, he 
launched a significant interrogation of the relationship between the operation of 
political and epistemological power (Ackerknecht 1948). Margaret Pelling, how-
ever, led the way to a more challenging view of the contingency of rationalist 
theories and social policy-making by illustrating the pluralistic and protean-like 
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nature of disease theory within the context of shifting social, economic and demo-
graphic circumstances. Her arguments about Cholera Fever and English Medicine 
in the early nineteenth century echoed what Carlo Cipolla had pointed out when 
he argued that the apparent triumph of reason over faith in the operation of plague 
controls in seventeenth century Florence was inherently bound to changing rela-
tions between ruling élites (Pelling 1978; Cipolla 1979). 
Exploration of the relationship between knowledge and social power expanded 
significantly in the 1980s, stimulated by the work of earlier twentieth century 
philosophers such as the Hegelian-Marxists of the Frankfurt School and the 
French “archaeologist” of knowledge, Michel Foucault. Both the Critical Theo-
rists of the Frankfurt School and Foucault highlighted the authoritarian potential 
of Enlightenment rationalism and its offspring, positivism, as an inherent contra-
diction within the liberal tradition in Western thought (Foucault 1970; Hork-
heimer & Adorno 1972). Historians influenced by these theoretical perspectives 
cross-examined the ways in which public health regulation contributed to the rise 
of a “disciplinary culture” which Foucault argued was the defining characteristic 
of modern society (Armstrong 1983). At the same time the impact of rationalist 
knowledge on the development of the modern bureaucratic state was interrogated 
by Marxist historians who questioned the role played by public health admini-
stration in the growth of government and the rise to power of what Harold Perkins 
had called “professional society” (Porter 1994; Weindling 1989). These concerns 
fed into a wide variety of new perspectives that began to redefine the parameters 
of what constitutes the history of public health, which now includes a hugely rich 
diversity of subjects and inquiries from the multicultural politics of the body to the 
changing structure of modern welfare states and social policies. 
A recent illustration of this new diversity is the volume of essays on urbanism 
and public health edited by Sally Sheard and Helen Power (2000). The essay 
collection represents many of the new discourses within the history of public 
health. The collection includes demographic studies, histories of local and central 
governance, the historical anthropology of public health rituals and languages of 
disease and the history of experience, or public health from below. As Sheard and 
Power point out in their introduction, these new approaches emerge out of a 
multiplicity of new historiographical definitions of what constitutes the “urban” 
and what constitutes “public health” in different periods and cultural contexts. If, 
as Sheard and Power suggest, the establishment of cities from earliest times was 
only made possible through a tacit agreement by urban dwellers to “living in 
proximity by consent”, then they are right to promote a definition of urban public 
health as the relationship between Body and City (Sheard & Power 2000, pp. 1–
17). Because as one of their contributors, Gerry Kearns, has pointed out else-
where, the relationship between health, disease and urbanization reveals the way 
social conflict permeates the biological basis of society and also promotes a biolo-
gical view of social and political relations (Kearns 2000). Examining the history 
of urbanization and public health from this perspective makes Kearns, Sheard and 
Power argue, together with Andrew Lees, that towns, like E.P. Thompson’s con-
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ception of classes, are perhaps best perceived as happenings, rather than things, 
with a momentum that is in a constant state of flux between biology and culture 
(Sheard & Powers 2000). 
The relationship between biology and culture has led the historiography of 
public health to explore the effects of collective action upon individual lives and 
bodies. The work of Flurin Condrau and Jakob Turner has begun to construct a 
history of public health from below by examining working class experiences of 
cholera and public health reforms in nineteenth-century Switzerland (Condrau & 
Turner 2000). Amongst my own research students, some are beginning to investi-
gate the impact of public health reforms on the lives of communities through an 
examination of working-class biographies and working class political literature. 
The recent investigations by Susan Lederer, Mark Parascandola and Alan Brant 
into mid-twentieth-century health education campaigns to prevent venereal 
disease and promote the Salk vaccine in the United States reflect, on the one hand, 
the actions of the state but also offers a chance to read the responses of individuals 
and of communities to state action (Lederer et al. 2001). 
The extensive new historiography on the “body” unpacks some of these rela-
tionships at a more intimate level. According to the Foucaultian inspired argu-
ments of the historical sociologists David Armstrong and Bryan Turner, the public 
health “body” is one which is determined by the rise of a disciplinary rationalist 
culture (Armstrong & Turner 1997). It is controlled, cajoled and constrained by 
the logic of domination into the service of the efficiency of production. Being fit 
to live in advanced or post-industrial societies involves the adoption of a set of 
cultural pejoratives that define the healthy life-style which characterizes a post-
modern agenda for the care of the self. Elsewhere, I have agreed with Armstrong 
and Turner that a newly defined somatic citizenship is a critical qualification for 
entry and participation in the cosmopolitan heart of post-modern society (Porter 
2000). The dialectics of somatic citizenship, however, is that the rationalist culture 
of the healthy life-style produces irrational health obsession and neurosis. Edward 
Shorter has described this as a late-twentieth century disease of somatization. 
Elaine Showalter has identified health neurosis as a set of new hysterias (Shorter 
1986; Showalter 1997). Both would agree with the journalist James Le Fanu when 
he argues that a new culture of health obsession has produced a worried well 
society (Le Fanu 1999). Michael Fitzpatrick, a general practitioner from Stoke 
Newington in London, suggests that the worried well society has resulted from 
public health becoming a new form of political tyranny, not only over the lives 
and consciousnesses of the well but also as a new form of authoritarian gover-
nance of the lives of medical practitioners (Fitzpatrick 2000).  
David Armstrong was the first to suggest that public health began to expand the 
social space of illness when it turned into a form of social scientific management 
of risk, making everyone a potential patient and creating a culture of patienthood 
(Armstrong 1997). Along the same lines, I have argued that the rise of new acade-
mic disciplines such as social medicine and medical sociology shifted the focus of 
collective actions in relation to health from structures to behavior, re-enforcing the 
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belief in disease as deviance carrying the social stigma of disobedience (Porter 
2000), disobedience, that is, to the political directive to be well. The cultural 
imperative to be well has been engendered, not only by the collective actions of 
the state or even voluntary organizations. It has also been a commercial enterprise 
throughout the twentieth century which has often represented imperialist notions 
of racial supremacy as muscular strength and physical fitness and making health a 
commodity fetish (Porter 2000). 
Full social status in post-industrial society requires you to strive for health. The 
directive of both the state and the commercial health-promotion industries is that 
achieving health, beauty and desirability is your own responsibility and your 
social duty. The responsibility to remain well has always been part of the social 
contract of health citizenship ever since the French revolutionaries invented the 
idea at the end of the eighteenth century. However, the social responsibility to be 
healthy has taken on a new urgency and a new political authoritarianism at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century because the economic élites of the most 
affluent societies in history and their political servants can, or will, no longer pay 
for health for all. As demographic shifts in post-industrial societies produce ever 
greater proportions of unproductive populations dependent upon the wealth pro-
duced by a shrinking productive majority, the modern state is redrawing the boun-
daries of its obligations to provide health as a social right of citizenship especially 
to its most vulnerable populations. “Be well or go to the wall” is relentlessly 
communicated through the political scaling down of public health care and service 
provision (Porter 2000).  
The redrawing of the boundaries of health citizenship is one reason perhaps 
why it is time for public health historians to revisit some of the politicized intelle-
ctual goals of that early post-war generation of historians, such as Rosen, Sand, 
Shryock and McKeown, and their focus on the economic distribution of health 
and wealth. There has never been a more appropriate time for making public 
health history politically relevant both at the level of policy-making and in terms 
of the politics of knowledge, belief and culture as the definition of health citizen-
ship remains open to question in the midst of rapid economic, social and cultural 
transformations. Beginning with the engine of economic and social reproduction, 
that is work, and its consequences for the health of workers, is an excellent place 
to start, regardless of whether it is work in manufacturing or the service industries 
or whether sociologists identify the workers as blue or white collared, laborers, 
artisans – if there are any of those left – or professionals. The history of occupa-
tional health and public health offers a wide canvass of opportunity for exploring 
the history of public health as everything from a tool of public policy to a determi-
nant of the somatic experience and the social and cultural status of individuals. 
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What patterns can be seen in the disappearance of the great epidemics? Did the 
poor die younger than the rich, the men more frequently than the women, the 
townsmen more often than the inhabitants of the countryside? Historically, at 
which ages did mortality first decline? These are some of the questions for which 
the demographic approaches in particular and quantitative methods in general 
provide the possibility of advancing precise answers. Although often at the price 
of reducing the choice of the indicators of health to mortality alone, such studies 
nevertheless resulted in the painting of a first preliminary factual picture from 
which it was possible to seek more relevant causes for the evolution observed. It 
might even be said that the factors associated with the true revolution of mortality 
and health have developed in the rich countries since the eighteenth century. Since 
the eighteenth century the complex bonds between demography and health 
questions have been brought closer. Initially, it appears significant to return to this 
exceptional characteristic of such long duration. Work of the last forty years in 
historical demography has made it possible to better understand the breach in the 
field of health which separates the present from the past. Lastly, the new dialogue 
that has recently opened among demographers, historians, sociologists and anthro-
pologists seems favorable for a better analysis of the logic of the formation of 
health inequalities.  
The Measurement of Mortality and the Royal States 
One of the initial works in demography related to the measurement of mortality is 
found in John Graunt’s Natural and Political Observations upon the Bills of 
Mortality (Graunt 1661), as well as in the development of enumerations in many 
European countries (Italy, France, Great Britain) or in their colonies in European 
colonial territories (the Antillas, Guyana, Quebec, Capetown) (Bourdelais 1997). 
The centralized states subsequently showed great interest in the characteristics and 
status of their populations. The first, Sweden, after 1749 required the clergy to 
submit the annual data concerning baptisms and deaths, as well as the age struc-
ture, by sex, marital status and profession to the central level, the Tabellkommis-
sion. Thus in 1766 P. Wargentin could construct the first mortality table by sex, 
founded on the relationship between deaths and groups of corresponding ages.  
 At the end of eighteenth century, Moheau was very sensitive to differential 
mortality according to occupational categories (Moheau 1778). This tract devotes 
one of the longest “questions” in the chapter on mortality to this topic, and the 
injustice in the “sharing of the most invaluable of all the goods is strongly under-
lined, that by which one enjoys all the others, duration of the life”. This may also 
be interpreted as a secularization of the attitudes toward life. The long chapter on 
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mortality explored in detail, above all, differential mortality. Eight of its nine 
sections relate to variations in mortality according to age, sex, country, climate, 
month of the year and social classes, as well as causes of death. One innovation 
should be emphasized: throughout this chapter, Moheau stresses the diversity of 
the conditions of mortality and not, as was often done in the eighteenth century, 
its supposed uniformity at all times and in all places. In contrast to Buffon and 
Süssmilch, Moheau did not subscribe to the illusion of a “universal” or “general” 
mortality table applicable to all humanity.  
On the contrary, Moheau gathered as much data as possible and as varied as 
possible and presented them in the form of comparative tables. The remarks that 
follow these tables underline the inequality everywhere observed concerning 
people faced with death, but the work does not propose any new measuring 
instrument.  
For Moheau, the interest was not purely scientific. The knowledge on mortality 
he considered as useful for “the individual as for the State”. He thought that better 
knowledge of mortality conditions would be useful before taking measures to 
prolong life. Moheau specified the questions on mortality that he addressed:  
precisely, what is the age, the time when the services [works] of the man must 
be spared, and even means of prolonging his existence by the improvement of 
its treatment and the healthiness of his lodging (Moheau 1778, p. 154).  
As regards the vicissitudes of the human life, “to know them is the first means of 
preventing them” (Moheau 1778, p. 211). Knowledge of mortality was thus of 
public utility. The answers to the questions which he raised on mortality well 
provide “some information on its random convention where the play is established 
over a person’s lifespan” (Moheau 1778, p. 154). But Moheau wanted the results 
used “less for financial goals and more for respectable ones” (Moheau 1778, p. 
154). He marked his disapproval of the use of the data on mortality for actuarial or 
financial aims. He felt reluctant to see these essential truths concerning the human 
lifespan used for gain. This may also be seen in the extreme care that he took to 
stress their lack of representativity each time that it was necessary to do so in the 
chapter on mortality, and to use as well the implications that data had for groups 
of rentiers or the subscribers to tontines. Within the framework of the political 
philosophy of eighteenth century, when the richness of a State was still measured 
by the number of its inhabitants, he clarified the very harmfulness that misery 
exerted on the mortality of the very young in particular. Moreover, the knowledge 
of mortality by profession would allow the State, he wrote, to have knowledge of 
the healthiness of each trade and to decrease as much as possible the number who 
worked in the most unhealthy trades.  
Environmental Conditions or Wealth?  
This question of the unhealthiness of the working conditions becomes one of the 
essential stakes of the development of the new system of the factories, first in 
England, and then on the European continent. In England, the medical and social 
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situation had degenerated before the arrival of the cholera. Many doctors who 
were politically very radical and sometimes close to the Chartists brought to light 
the harmful consequences of the new industrial engineering on the health of 
children as well as on that of adults. During the 1830s, several commissions were 
charged with studying the reasons for the “fevers” that became prevalent ende-
mically in certain districts, in particular those that were populous. In a complex 
social and political context wrought with conflict, Chadwick explained the 
persistence of the epidemic fevers by a unique cause: filth, the absence of draining 
of ponds, and the absence of draining of waste and wastewater. The medical 
thought of Chadwick, formerly secretary to Jeremy Bentham, was that of a 
hygienist of the end of eighteenth century: it was a question of making significant 
flows of water circulate in the city in order to remove filth. Thus the gigantic 
effort to route clean water toward the cities and the construction of sewerage 
systems was justified, making it possible to eject sewage at a distance, charged 
with all the urban refuse and effluents. This project, which appealed to political 
leaders, led to the creation, in 1848, of the first central institution in charge of the 
questions of public health in Europe, the General Board of Health, that Chadwick 
directed for six years. By that time accumulated enmities, the technical difficulties 
involved in the realization of these networks and the fast clogging of many sewers 
that had been built according to the instructions of Chadwick’s official engineers 
caused him to leave that position in 1854.  
It is certainly wise, however, to integrate this medical project within a broader 
political framework. If one follows the interpretation of Christopher Hamlin, 
Chadwick provided the Royal Commission with an additional opportunity to seek 
an outlet from their policies and from the social crisis then shaking England 
(Hamlin 1998). The medical reform made it possible to ameliorate the frontal 
shock of social contradiction, very sharp since the reform of the Poor Law in 
1834. This reform removed any possibility for help at home and forced the poor to 
enter workhouses, whereas the opinion spread among many doctors that, although 
temporary, unemployment, malnutrition and indigence could cause disease. In 
1838, Chadwick, secretary of the Poor Law Commission, together with two of his 
friends, doctors from Bentham’s network and a police chief, requested permission 
to carry out an investigation into the causes of the epidemic which had raged in 
the poor East End of London for a year and emptied the coffers of the relief insti-
tutions. The report of Neil Arnott, Southwood Smith and Philipp Kay confirmed 
that stagnating water ponds, filth that had not been removed, and rubbish were the 
origins of the epidemic. Following this report, Queen Victoria asked that a 
national survey be undertaken. Chadwick, who was charged with this task, then 
systematically joined the documents of the investigation to the local scale Arnott-
Smith-Kay report and directed it toward the expected conclusion: the correlation 
of the fevers with the dirtiness of the zones that were not drained. Moreover, in his 
summary he eliminated the medical considerations of the local reports and of the 
industrialists, who did not abound in his organization. He insisted on their lack of 
statistical rigor, certain statements in particular, as well as the inaccuracy of the 
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evaluation of the populations at risk used in each situation, a condition that was, 
of course, very difficult to fill. Lastly, in a systematic way, the richness and the 
variety of the medical theories are used in order to emphasize, within each report, 
the parts that highlight the medical aspects rather than those placing blame on the 
working conditions. Many small “offences” are thus put at the service of the 
greatness, not only of medical theories, but also the economic intentions and 
policy of Chadwick. His quarrel with another significant character of English 
statistical and medical history, William Farr, illustrates the roughness of the fight. 
Farr, in the service of the recently established General Registrar, retained 
“hunger” as a cause of death, whereas Chadwick disputed the relevance of such a 
cause of death and detailed the causes of the 63 cases allotted to hunger. Farr 
answered that, as a cause of death, “hunger” represented a broad economic cate-
gory because, when one lacked food, one also lacked heating, clothing and all that 
is necessary to life. Everything is abandoned in the search for food, an interpre-
tation that implicitly affirmed the failure of Poor Law Commission! Nevertheless, 
Chadwick succeeded in reducing the policy of public health to “cleansing,” using 
the argument of the bad quality of the statistics to invalidate certain local contri-
butions to his national report!  
 Thanks to the political operation led by Chadwick, which reduced various 
dimensions of the public health to only one, that of the cleaning up the cities, the 
General Board of Health was created. The French configuration was very diffe-
rent. During the same period, the Medical School of Paris experienced one of the 
famous periods of its history. The professors, specialists in anatomic pathology, 
made profitable the concentration of patients in vast public hospitals to multiply 
their observations of corpses by practicing systematic autopsy. The consequent 
leap in knowledge of the human organism and the seat, or the causes, of diseases, 
attracted many foreign students to their dissection amphitheatres. The Ecole 
numérique, inspired by Dr. Louis, argued in favor of the statistical processing of 
the symptoms and effectiveness of treatments, which caused the theoretical and 
practical debates to become more and more complex. In addition, even if the 
chronology and patterns of French industrialization are different from those of the 
industrial pioneer, England, the social question was broached in France, both by 
reformers and by those who never accepted the French Revolution and swore by a 
return to the old agricultural mode of production. Among the reformers, the 
socialist Catholics counted on benevolence and private initiatives in contacts with 
the poor, whereas economists turned to the State for control of social conditions 
associated with industry. In this debate, the demographic data gathered (vital 
statistics and quinquennial censuses) made it possible to test some of the assump-
tions advanced by neo-Hippocratic medicine as well as by the Republicans con-
cerned with the fate of the poorest. The Academy of Medicine, very interested by 
the results of the shift in population from 1817 to 1821 worked out by the statis-
tician Villot, entrusted a report on this subject to Villermé.  
Villermé tried to classify districts according to their mortality and the propor-
tion of poor families in order to compare the classifications by location. The diffi-
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culty was to find a suitable indicator of poverty and wealth: he chose the propor-
tion of non-taxed rented flats in each district. This first exercise led to compari-
sons with other populations that formed the starting points of the Academy of 
Medicine Report on the mortality in the leisure class and the poor class in 1828 
and the Report on mortality in France. Thanks to the new documents produced by 
the administration, he could devote himself to detailed analyses which exploited a 
scaling of observation. He compared mortality in two Parisian districts (the 1st and 
the 12th , and two streets of the 9th district) with 27 French departments (Villermé 
1828). After having scrupulously reconstructed mortality in residences and in 
hospitals using explicitly clarified assumptions (the deaths in the hospitals and old 
people’s homes would be, for each district, proportional to the number of patients 
sent to the hospitals, and the number of the old men of the old people’s institu-
tions would be proportional to that of the patients), he showed that between 1817 
and 1822 mortality was one person per 58.24 residents living in the 1st district and 
one person per 42.63 inhabitants in the 12th district. If one takes into account 
mortality in the hospitals and old people’s institutions, the figures become 1 per 
42.20 and 1 per 24.21, respectively. It was possible to make the objection that the 
variation that Villermé found was simply a difference in “healthiness” in the 
districts as much as social inequality.  
He thus undertook the comparison of two districts whose “healthiness” was 
analogous, but where “the ease” of the inhabitants differed; thus, two streets were 
compared, one exclusively inhabited by poor families and the other by rich 
families. In the rich district of Saint-Louis Island, he obtained a figure of one 
death per 46.04 inhabitants, and in the poor district of Arsenal, the result was one 
per 38.36. Healthiness being identical, argued Villermé, it was really “the ease” of 
the inhabitants that made the difference. He forgot the effects of age structures, 
which were undoubtedly different. It is not the exactitude of calculations that 
counts here, but rather their reception at the time. He also compared mortality in 
Mortellerie Street and the four embankments of Saint-Louis Island. Inequality in 
the face of death was found wherever human groups had different resources; it 
became as obvious as the misery was enormous. The example of mortality in the 
prisons in 1819 reinforced the established fact: there was one death per 40.88 
inmates in the prison of the Great Force, where the prisoners almost all had a 
fortune and help from the outside, while the death rate was one per 3.45 in the 
depository established in Saint-Denis for the repression of begging and vagrancy.  
 Villermé tried to find some relationship for the whole scale of the French 
departments. After having excluded those in which migration was too significant 
and those with extensive unhealthy marshy zones, he found 13 “wealthy” depart-
ments and 14 “poor” departments. (The departments were categorized according 
to the average territorial income per hectare land, the personal and movable 
average contribution per capita, and the distribution of wealth.) The comparison 
provided very clear results: mortality proved, again, more prevalent in the group 
that was characterized by the opposite of ease.  
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When he received information on the death rates of the Parisian districts for the 
years 1822–1826, he endeavored to highlight the agreement of the classification 
with the period 1817–1822 and published his study in the new Annals of Public 
Health and Forensic Medicine. He showed there that none of the reasons to which 
the observed differences in mortality between the districts were commonly attri-
buted actually played an essential role.  
He argued that inequality in the face of death depended neither on the proximity 
of the Seine, the height of the land, nor its nature, a view contrary to the accre-
dited opinions of the eminent doctors, all adherents of the neo-Hippocratic school. 
Neither could these differences be attributed to the concentration of buildings nor 
population density. For him, the principal cause lay in the unequal distribution of 
wealth. His studies on mortality by occupation supplemented his demonstration 
(Villermé 1830).  
Villermé was a pupil of Dupuytren, one of the founders of the French “anatono-
pathologic school”. Significant for the formation of this school was the eleven 
years spent in the service of the armies of the Empire on all the battlefields, from 
Spain to Central Europe. Villermé focused the direction of its observations, 
adopted an experimental step, and showed himself attentive to the effects of living 
conditions on illness and death. This organization succeeded in diffusing the 
thesis that social disparities are essential factors in accounting for the differences 
in mortality among politicians as well as among those in charge of the economy. It 
was thus not enough to bring water into the city and to multiply the sewers to 
solve the severity of urban epidemics. The 1850 law on unhealthy residences 
stated that property owners could not lease buildings that would be detrimental to 
the maintenance of the good health of the occupants.  
But in England as in France or in the Germanic regions, “the rise of statistical 
thinking” characterized the nineteenth century in the field of the public health 
(Ted Porter), so much so that even local initiatives were affected. For example, 
the creation of a municipal office of hygiene at the end of the 1880s in Grenoble 
was based on the statistical report that epidemic mortality was declining in the 
cities equipped with offices of hygiene (Paquy 2001).  
Moreover, at least in France, the anguish over the demographic decline of the 
country caused by reduced fertility due to birth control, led the elites to try to 
implement policies of reduction of mortality and infectious diseases. Thus casiers 
sanitaires of the houses allowed not only supervision of the extension of the 
epidemics in the city, but also, in Paris, the declaration of houses as meurtrières as 
soon as the number of cases of tuberculosis among the residents exceeded a given 
threshold. The observation of several contiguous or neighboring maisons meur-
trières led the authorities to declare the entire area îlot insalubre (an unhealthy 
block), and it was designated for destruction (Fijalkow 1998). In the program of 
urban restoration, demography was used as a tool first of an epidemiologic app-
roach. The fight against tuberculosis or syphilis was founded on the quantified 
estimate of their devastation. It is also known that from the moment when the 
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systems of social security were set up, epidemiology tried to test the reigning 
epidemics, as well as the effectiveness of the drugs administered to the patients.  
Demographers, Historians and Health  
During the last twenty years thousands of articles have been published by histo-
rians and demographers on these questions of mortality, morbidity and health, 
calling for increasingly refined methods. It is only possible to mention some of the 
principal results here.  
First of all, at the very start of twentieth century, focusing on the connections 
between the mortality levels and the birth rate in the various European countries, 
Adolphe Landry formulated for the first time the idea that a new demographic 
regime had succeeded a traditional regime (Landry 1934). Among the various 
theses then current on the relations between the level of the population and sub-
sistence, he chose that of Cantillon which stated that, in order to judge adequacy 
of the relationship between manpower in the population and the volume of subsis-
tence, it was necessary to take into account the way of living of each population 
(Cantillon 1755). So, for him the variable of adjustment was not mortality, but the 
marriage rate, which made it possible for each generation to preserve the usual 
way of life. Landry noticed at once that this theory was not verifiable in all 
societies:  
it is enough to compare the French society of the eighteenth century – to which 
the theory of Cantillon applied and contemporary French society to which it no 
longer applies,  
to be convinced. For Landry the characteristics of the two populations differed on 
three points. First of all, the independence that the demographic variables acquired 
compared to production, the improvement in the fate of the greatest number of the 
people allowed by population movements, and finally the change in the means of 
the regulation, that is, the restriction of births having succeeded the prolongation 
of the celibacy. Landry concluded, “Here are thus two demographic regimes, if 
one can employ this expression, which followed one another in France [...] as in 
many other countries”. The expression régime démographique was born, and its 
success is well-known. In his conclusion, he stressed that a new demographic 
regime called for a new theory of the population which “will aim to summarize 
and to explain what occurs before our eyes”. This new theory was that of the 
“demographic transition” developed after the Second World War by Blacker and 
Notestein (Blacker 1949; Notestein 1945, 1953). Demographers then analyzed the 
elements of this great general theory. One proposed modification was to speak 
about the “epidemiologic transition”, which stressed the point at which mortality 
changed, not only in level, but also by causes. After this shift, in the rich countries 
deaths from infectious diseases or epidemics declined and were much more often 
from diseases related to advanced age (cardiovascular diseases and cancers) and 
way of life (Omran 1971).  
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From this point of view historical demographers took part in understanding the 
process that developed in Europe between the end of the eighteenth century and 
today. They brought to light the progressive attenuation of the mortality crises 
which, in the old regime, carried off a large part of the population, and which in 
their extreme form were no longer visible beyond the end of the nineteenth 
century. They were gradually modulated, before disappearing in the 1960s, 
marked by the last great epidemics from fatal influenzas (before vaccinations of 
the weakest people began). Often starting from the study of mortality or statistical 
series of causes of death, historical demographers could show that, overall, the 
earliest progress concerned young people, and that as one moves toward the 
present day, groups of more advanced ages profited, making more spectacular 
progress (Bourdelais 1998).  
Historical demographers have taken part in many controversies where the 
stakes have been significant for the public health policies. One of the foremost has 
been the reaction against the theses advanced by McKeown (McKeown 1976, 
1979). This English professor of social hygiene is famous for having argued that 
medicine and medical policies were not at all responsible for the disappearance of 
the great infectious diseases, showing, for example, that mortality among tuber-
cular patients decreased before treatment by antibiotics was made available after 
the Second World War (Bourdelais 2003). Much research has made it possible to 
show the errors made by McKeown in the treatment of causes of death. For histo-
rians diseases related to a bad environment and water (typhoid, gastro-enteritis, 
cholera) became much more significant than respiratory diseases, which were the 
dominant diseases for McKeown. Analyses relating to various age groups also 
made it possible to better understand what became called the “urban penalty” 
(Kearns 1986, 1993). In the English cities, the growth of the population, its accu-
mulation, its poor conditions of habitat and the great number of children led to a 
rise in mortality, in particular up to age ten. The years of whooping-cough 
succeeded those of measles, scarlet fever and the epidemics of mumps so that the 
level of mortality was high every year (Woods & Shelton 1997). In the rapidly 
growing industrial towns the same phenomenon was observable throughout 
Europe. Control of the environment, collection of wastewater, education of the 
population and construction of housing managed to restore the initial situation 
(which had not been good) in a twenty-five year period for a French industrial city 
(Bourdelais & Demonet 1996). The importance of the medical and social munici-
pal policies was stressed for England, Germany or France (Szreter 1988). It has 
even been possible to confirm that local municipal policies constituted many 
laboratories for experimentation before laws were passed on the national scale 
(Bourdelais 2003).  
Little by little, the historians and demographers have examined various ele-
ments of extreme mortality in the past, the causes for its decline and those of its 
aggravation. In the often discussed question of the effectiveness of smallpox 
vaccination, multiple observations have been made concerning the retreat of the 
epidemics during the nineteenth century in areas where the population was largely 
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vaccinated, as well as the gravity of smallpox mortality in the years 1860–1870. 
Most now plead in favor of the practical effectiveness of vaccination rather than 
the thesis that argues for decreased virulence of the virus (Sköld 1996).  
For certain Swedish areas, it has been shown that the foundry communities had 
lower infant mortality than the surrounding countryside, because the women, not 
finding work there, could breast-feed their children. Moreover, the employment of 
the men was more stable there than among landless rural males, and a strong reli-
gious paternalism was exerted as well. The excessive mortality of the smiths 
between 30 and 50 years of age compared to the other categories of workers em-
ployed in these foundries was also discovered (Sundin & Tedebrand 1981). 
Complex mechanisms were at work in which the stability of the incomes of the 
family, the better availability of the mothers, but also all the lodgings and living 
conditions intervened. A lot of work has been done, with positive results. 
Health at the Crossroads of the Social Sciences 
The demographic approaches, however, have been criticized by sociologists and 
anthropologists who argue that quantitative analyses and qualitative approaches 
are two methodological choices leading to a focus on different levels of social 
reality (Fassin 2000). These critics emphasize that the efforts made to find corre-
lation between variables have resulted in the selection of indicators that are easy 
to measure and the neglect of others, especially the process causing domination of 
the poor. It has been argued that, regarding the behavior of workers or social 
inequalities in health, the most sophisticated questionnaire is not able to trace 
what is usually invisible or hidden and what is immeasurable. Because the 
psychological dimension is one of the main factors in health inequalities, as 
shown recently by Brunner and Marmot, it is very important to know how we 
have to understand these categories health and inequalities (Brunner & Marmot 
1999). For instance, in France, a survey, conducted by S. Paugam, of people who 
received unemployment compensation from the state pointed out that the number 
of persons saying that they have health problems that constitute a handicap in 
finding a new job is twelve times higher than the number given by medical and 
social institutions. He showed, after long interviews with these people, how unem-
ployment leads to the social “disqualification,” which amplified their own judg-
ment about their bad health and led them to think that they had real incapacities. 
On the other hand, employers use the manifestation of the incapacity to push them 
outside of the labor market. For the official institutions, they have no incapacity. 
The position of unemployed persons is as real as a pathogenic one. The subjective 
dimension has now been recognized as a very important health component, but it 
is very difficult for demographers to integrate it into the quantitative data (Aiach 
& Curtis 1990; Elstad 1998). 
Another criticism is that, in the epidemiological and demographic surveys, the 
social variables are simplistic and static, especially the processes of the inscription 
of social context and position, the social world, in the bodies that underlie the 
variables and the models, are too often a space for the interaction of individual 
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experiences. For instance, how would it be possible to build data and tables to 
take into account Norbert Elias’ theory: what is the social significance of each 
individual characteristic in a dynamic perspective, the individual trajectories, and 
the contextualization? Moreover, an occupational category does not have the same 
place in society today as it did twenty years ago.  
It has been suggested that three notions are more efficient for understanding 
how inequality is incorporated in the body. First, the “defensive ideology” in the 
occupations when the constraints or the risks are very high and when the denial of 
illness symptoms is a way to expel anxiety (Dejours 1993). The concept of 
“habitus” developed by Pierre Bourdieu defines the complex social cultural links 
that explain how the social category of a person determines her/his social behavior 
(Bourdieu 1979). Finally, there is the interactionist approach: the individual 
arrangements are non-permanent and dependent on the context. Here, subjectiva-
tion finds a place (Lahire 1998). It is probably a major point, because we also 
have to understand the meaning of the facts for the people themselves, how they 
use the “objective” data, how they live their personal history, and how they 
include it in collective history. 
These criticisms are not of such recent vintage, and historical demographers 
have tried to take into account a multitude of different dimensions and theories in 
their works. For a couple of decades they have criticized the categories used in the 
archives. They have modified their methods, using the individual and nominative 
scales to look for their different characteristics and by using longitudinal analysis, 
following trajectories. Some sophisticated methods, such as event history analysis, 
allows the testing of many factors and their part in a situation, building a link 
between individuals and the context. Health is a very attractive field for multi-
disciplinary collaboration, and one where it is possible to have a genuine dialogue 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
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Introduction 
With this conference the networks dealing with occupational health and public 
health have started for the first time to jointly outline a common scenario at the 
international level in order to analyze, discover and interpret analogies, discre-
pancies and possible synergies between them. This was an opportunity not pro-
vided by the First International Conference on the History of Occupational and 
Environmental Prevention (Grieco et al. 1998) in which researchers from the 
International Network for the History of Public Health also participated. In all 
likelihood, it is the historical perspective that allowed this confrontation and gave 
birth to a common venture. 
Historical Method 
We have recently encountered a small book on historical knowledge by a great 
author (Marrou 1954) that provides useful spurs in considering historical method 
as a tool to achieve knowledge of the human past. Such knowledge is not a tale of 
the past, perhaps it is not even study or research or erudition. It is the scientific 
processing of relationships between two planes of mankind: the past lived by 
human beings a long time ago, and the present lived by the historian who may 
recall this past so that it may be of help to forthcoming generations. 
These levels are obviously far distant from one another, two detached realities. 
This should not be considered as an “empty gap”, but as something likely to be 
filled by the “historical sense”, that is by the capability of feeling, in an equally 
alive way, “reality” and “distance”. Marrou, by an analogous extension of the 
term, proposed the concept of the “evolution” of historical knowledge, that is, the 
total of causal relationships chronologically connecting human beings. 
This approach is particularly suggestive and useful for analyzing the occupa-
tional health-public health binomial (similarities and discrepancies) which should 
not neglect historical reflection, or, better still, the historical knowledge of the two 
concepts and the two related areas, that have changed fundamentally over time. 
Then we have to fill the distance between past reality, as lived by our forerunners, 
and the present reality, as it is lived by us, trying to outline those evolutionary 
lines that allow faraway and present times to seem equally alive. Thus, we can 
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escape the obsolete and anachronistic research of differing priorities of occupa-
tional medicine and public health, which, especially in this case, have no historical 
sense whatsoever. Where are the origins of occupational medicine and of public 
health to be found? We also refer to the traditional principles of heuristics (Artelt 
1949). 
Occupational Medicine 
We will start first from the sources dealing with occupational medicine, which is 
more appropriate, historically speaking, as it was the first to appear on the stage as 
a discipline. Illness, which was born with human beings, has always had a close 
relationship with working conditions (Busacchi et al. 1967). It is worth recalling 
the major clues in Corpus Hippocraticum concerning skin diseases of washmen 
and dyemen (Vegetti 1976) and in several classical authors, such as Caius Plinius 
Secundus, Claudius Galenus, Decius Junius Juvenalis and Titus Lucretius Carus 
(Penso 1985, p. 436). In modern times the remarks made by Paracelsus and Agri-
cola (Buess 1961), as well as a whole series of notations on occupational diseases 
published in the first editions of Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 
are worth mentioning (Wightman 1961). They are, however, just anecdotal 
descriptions. It is then of utmost importance to again state here that occupational 
medicine as a scientific and modern discipline has it origins in De Morbis Artifi-
cum Diatriba by Bernardino Ramazzini (1700). 
All researchers at the international level identify this book as the source of 
modern occupational medicine, including all the specialties of occupational medi-
cine: observation and clinical description of diseases; analysis of working condi-
tions related to the disease/work connection, and therefore etiological diagnosis 
and etiopathogenetic interpretation of diseases; the preventive mission and rele-
vance of workers’ information; relationships between workplaces and the surroun-
ding territory in connection with the origin of environmental pollution. 
The scientific path that Ramazzini’s book and the ensuing debate of his theses 
within the medical community of the time had their origins within internal medi-
cine. So, too, did the research and actions of occupational physicians during the 
centuries that followed, especially the twentieth, first in the field of occupational 
medicine and later occupational health. It was this thoroughly original field of 
scientific research, sprung from internal medicine, that the physician of internal 
medicine, Bernardino Ramazzini, opened in the second half of the seventeenth 
century. This research path, lasting over three centuries and going through count-
less stages, has produced a common goal promoted by hundred or even thousands 
of researchers in the interim. This goal has been proving to other physicians that 
some diseases, not very different clinically speaking from similar ones, are not of 
unknown origin, but rather are directly produced by work-related chemical, 
physical or psychosocial agents. Here are a few examples: the chronic bronchitis 
that may affect a welder who extensively inhales irritating fumes and dusts is 
similar to the one found in a strong tobacco smoker from clinical, radiological and 
spirometric viewpoints. The same can be said for lung fibrosis caused by silica, 
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hemolytic anemias from lead intoxication, leukemias from benzene, etc. What we 
can do now is just suggest that the “empty gap” does not exist and emphasize that 
the medical, humanitarian and social intentions of Ramazzini are still relevant.  
Public Health 
Let us now consider the origins of public health. In the case of both public health 
and hygiene concepts we have to go back to remote times, especially when 
referring to health as a “right” of the citizen. It brings to mind even the motto “ubi 
societas, ibi jus” or, vice versa, “ubi jus, ibi societas” (Romano 1951, p. 25). It is 
even possible to start from Hammurabi’s Code (Castiglioni 1948, p. 37) or Salus 
populi suprema lex esto (Guarino 1987, p. 34). Nor should monastic medicine and 
medieval religious orders, corporations in the Age of Communes, and “confrater-
nities” in the Renaissance (Park 1985) be forgotten. The attention paid by “autho-
rities” to the health problems of citizens progressively increased with the approach 
of the modern era. The existence of, albeit primitive, health organization is evi-
denced by some magistracies in Italy: for example, in Venice, Turin and Naples 
(Alessi 1967). Their measures were often ad hoc, mainly aimed at preventing the 
spread of epidemics of infectious diseases and ensuring, through appropriate 
provisions, the good quality of food, for example. Health organization that in-
cluded the social concept of health appeared on the stage only during the Enlight-
enment, the ideas coming from various sources and for numerous reasons 
(Cassirer 1932).  
This era was an extremely original period in which new social models were 
born. The human being – in a biological sense – required new evaluation and new 
attention. The necessity and urgency to make human beings healthy and protect 
them from illnesses prevailed, a concept derived from confidence in spiritual and 
material forces. This led to the establishment of the close connection evident in 
the relationships between the historical era and the development of medical 
science. 
Some scientific and social outcomes in the service of the collective good and, 
following the conception of “hygiene from below”, the “ideas” of occupational 
medicine (Carnevale 1986) have chronological origins: orthopedics in the etymo-
logical sense of the term (Valentin 1961), psychiatry (Berti Bock 1971–72) and 
vaccine prophylaxis (Belloni 1980). 
Finally, let us consider Johann P. Frank, Stadtarzt in Rastatt, Landphysicus in 
Bruchsal (qualifications of significance), and professor of practical medicine, first 
in Pavia and then in Vienna (Lesky 1973). He was author of System einer Voll-
staendigen Medicinischen Polizey, a huge work written between 1779 and 1819. It 
is worth recalling Frank’s mission to investigate the nature of places, the status of 
illnesses, going back to causes and calculating their incidence. This amounted to 
nearly drawing a geographical map! 
Here is the first public health “manifesto” with the intent, as was the case of 
Ramazzini, of starting a new and independent discipline. But nearly one century 
had elapsed. At a first glance, the two works show several similarities, at least as 
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regards methodology. Despite the century separating the two publications, in both 
of them clinical observation, a scientific approach and means prediction are basic 
issues. In the broad introduction by Frank, the concept of “medical police” is 
placed in focus and identified as part of a “universal police science”. It was not 
sufficient to entrust the care and “well-being” to a given category of people 
(statesmen), but there should be wise laws, regular orders of service, and the 
possibility for any operation to be easily and practically be executed.  
The content of System… covers subjects and problems which are now all 
included in public health. These problems can be solved (at least theoretically) by 
means of general norms involving the whole community and health education of 
the population. The topic “work” or, better, “work-related pathology”, appears 
only in the quite general framework of hygiene in relation to the physical and 
social environment and all is components in healthiness of residences and work-
places: the primary ones (atmosphere, soil, climate) and the more specific ones 
associated with causes of “air confined corruption”. On the other hand, even at 
first glance, the occupational medicine and public health literature illustrates the 
dividing line between the two sectors. For example, a highly reputed historical-
medical bibliography, such as that of the Wellcome Institute, is definitely in line 
with this rationale. On the one hand, the topic of occupational medicine (where 
the figure of Ramazzini fills three closely printed pages), while, on the other hand, 
there is public health (where the figure of Frank fills an equal number of pages) 
(Wellcome Institute 1980). Let us now consider more in detail the similarities and 
differences that emerge when these two disciplinary areas are compared. 
Similarities and Differences – Occupational Health and Public Health 
Similarities 
Both occupational health and public health appear to comply with the definition 
stated in 1920 by Winslow: 
Public health is the science and art to prevent illnesses, prolong life and 
improve individuals’ health and mental and physical vitality through an 
ordered collective action, aimed at healing the sick, struggling against social 
diseases, teaching individual hygiene care, organizing medical and nursing 
services in view of early diagnosis and disease preventive treatment as well as 
implementing social measures in order to provide a life standard in accordance 
with health maintenance to all community members, the final aim being to 
allow each individual to enjoy the natural right to health and old age (Viseltear 
1982). 
Both occupational health and public health show the same strong objective of 
unveiling the social matrices and environmental constraints that facilitate the 
onset of individual and community diseases. This global approach goes beyond 
the mere physician-patient relationship that generally inspires measures derived 
from internal medicine. In both disciplinary areas, attention is focused on groups 
of risk subjects and less wealthy social populations, taking into account their 
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vulnerability in the aims of preventive actions. Actions that support social move-
ments for the improvement of living and working conditions are constant and 
lasting, as well as the proposals for issuing laws and regulations in order to 
establish such improvements as acquired rights. 
Differences 
The first stage of the development of occupational medicine lasted up to the end 
of the 1950s, and during this phase the interpretation of etiopathogenesis of work-
related diseases was nearly totally governed by the mono-factorial model, accor-
ding to which one cause produces one effect, and only one. This conceptual model 
gained strength throughout the nineteenth century, the era of the great bacteriolo-
gical discoveries that provided the scientific ground for the development of a 
nosology of infectious diseases. Some well-known examples are abdominal 
typhus/salmonella typhi, lung tuberculosis/mycobacterium tuberculosis, cholera/ 
choleric vibrio. Thus, following a similar neo-positivistic philosophical strain, 
“infectiously oriented” occupational medicine was developing that produced 
similar mono-factorial causes: silicosis/silica dust, asbestosis/asbestos fibers, lead 
poisoning/lead vapor or fumes, etc. Starting from the early 1960s, this conceptual 
framework has been progressively enriched with the transition towards a more 
coherent multi-factorial model to interpret the origin of widespread diseases, from 
occupationally specific diseases to work-related diseases. To illustrate this point it 
should suffice to mention muscular-skeletal disorders, chronic bronchitis, cancer 
and stress. 
Major differences between occupational medicine and public health have their 
origins in past centuries, but also today various social reactions give rise to the 
formulation of which goals should characterize the preventive actions of occu-
pational medicine and public health. Since infectious and contagious diseases may 
affect all social classes, rich and poor, society has always been extremely willing 
to identify and eliminate the sources of contagion. Even today the periodical pro-
grams for distribution of anti-influenza vaccine, aimed at reducing sick-leaves in 
winter, are readily accepted by working communities. Instead, in the past as well 
as the present, attempts by occupational medicine to identify and prevent occupa-
tional hazards and diseases are often followed by strong conflicts that cause 
delays in the implementation of appropriate preventive measures. It is common 
knowledge that most hygienic and ergonomic deficiencies that affect the work-
place today could be prevented by correctly using the scientific know-how already 
provided by occupational medicine. The most relevant discrepancies that have 
emerged in the second half of the twentieth century are concerned with two major 
cultural and social aspects: first, the theoretical and methodological approach for 
describing and interpreting working conditions and, secondly, workers’ partici-
pation. 
Let us look at the theoretical and methodological approaches. Throughout his-
tory in different countries public health measures have paid attention to and made 
interventions aimed at identifying and assessing the quality and magnitude of risks 
in bacteriological and/or physical working environments (climate, noise, ionizing 
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radiation, etc.), as well as the consequent effects on workers’ health. Thus, 
proposed measures have been primarily aimed at prevention. However, men’s and 
women’s relationship to work and their working conditions have been always 
described and interpreted with positivistic and neo-positivistic theories and con-
ceptual frames, often borrowed from other disciplines, especially from the field of 
engineering. In various countries policies have also been influenced by cultural 
issues associated with the Industrial Revolution and, at a later stage, by social 
psychology. 
Research within ergonomics directly implemented at workplaces (e.g., the 
metal, mechanical and electronic sectors), starting in the 1960s in France and then, 
independently, in Italy, since the 1980s have led to an interdisciplinary confron-
tation between organizational knowledge and knowledge of occupational health. 
This has provided a remarkable turning point both culturally and in its application, 
making contributions that are now peculiar to the occupational health area. 
If special attention is paid to Italian research contributions, it can now be said 
that occupational health avails itself of an original multidisciplinary method for 
analyzing working conditions. This Method of Organizational Congruencies 
(MOC) was launched by Bruno Maggi in the early 1980s and is an original elabo-
ration of the theory of organizational action. The different biomedical, social, 
economic, psychological and polytechnic disciplines involved for this analysis are 
integrated into the MOC after an inter-theoretical exchange of organizational 
knowledge on an interdisciplinary basis. 
There have been significant cultural and methodological differences as regards 
workers’ participation in various countries in the second half of the twentieth 
century (with particular reference to Italy, France, Scandinavia, and, in some 
respects, the USA). In Italy, although the public health school of Perugia has 
produced valuable results, it has been mainly in the area of occupational health 
that cultural and methodological innovations have been assimilated since the 
1960s. Workers’ and trade-union initiatives have underlined the importance of 
workers’ participation in identifying and preventing risks at workplaces. Recent 
health regulations in Italy (in the 1990s), adopted in accordance with European 
directives in the field of occupational health and safety, have led to a widespread 
mobilization of occupational health in defence of workers’ participation in the 
program for accident and work-related disease prevention. 
Future Challenges and Perspectives 
It is highly desirable for the future that closer contacts or better synergies are 
developed between public health and occupational health. Without going into 
further details, we will just mention three areas of intervention and research where 
synergic actions of occupational health and public health would be extremely use-
ful and desirable. 
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At the Workplace 
The interest and willingness of entrepreneurs and trade unions to implement 
health promotion initiatives in medium and large enterprises of developed 
countries have increased remarkably in the past ten years, thanks to the progres-
sive decline of risks and of traditional occupational diseases. Valuable contribu-
tions in theory and application of health promotion program implementation and 
the training of skilled personnel (not only health specialists) were provided in the 
1980s and 1990s by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions of Dublin. This program proves that such initiatives are more 
effective when a multidisciplinary approach and direct implementation at work-
places are involved (Wynne 1994). Well-established know-how has provided 
positive results for prevention of health damage from obesity (Tsai et al. 1988; 
Hennrikus & Jeffrey 1996; Muto & Yamauchi 2001), arterial hypertension (Fogari 
et al. 1995; Fouad et al. 1997), dyslipidemias (Wilson et al. 1992; Rudd 1994; 
Glanz et al. 1996), and neoplasias of the female genital apparatus (Nedic et al. 
1999; Ku 1999; Zanotti & Kennedy 1999). 
Collaboration – Occupational and Environmental Health 
There has been some overlapping between occupational and public health in 
dealing with problems such as outdoor air pollution produced by the presence of 
asbestos fibers, pesticides and noise. Such issues have been scientifically investi-
gated and results applied at workplaces. On the other hand, public officers 
charged with inspection and regulations concerning air, water and food pollution 
often have a public health oriented professional background. Both fields use an 
epidemiological approach to these problems, and therefore their mutual collabo-
ration could provide valuable contributions in terms of application and research. 
Migration 
Migration, a problem of paramount importance since globalization of the eco-
nomy, productive processes and labor market, has in recent years led to significant 
increases in the flux of migrating workers. Multi-ethnic societies have been on the 
rise in several parts of the world, especially in developed countries, and the 
number and complexity of such societies will increase progressively in the near 
future. Different genetic patrimonies produce quantitative and qualitative diffe-
rences among workers in their susceptibility to occupational hazards. In addition, 
the hygienic conditions in the workplace are generally deficient for migrated 
workers. This new scenario offers opportunities for relevant research and stringent 
preventive actions. As far as we know, it is just in Sweden, which is kindly 
hosting the present conference, that the SALTSA program is starting one of the 
first and more original multidisciplinary research projects on “migration,” an 
effort that we congratulate and wish the best success. In light of all that has been 
said, we really do believe that occupational health and public health synergies can 
make decisive contributions. 
 41 
References 
Alessi R. et al. (eds.) (1967) L’amministrazione sanitaria. Atti del congresso celebrativo del 
centenario delle leggi amministrative di unificazione. Vicenza: Neri Pozza. 
Artelt W. (1949) Einführung in der Medizinhistorik. Stuttgart: Enke. 
Belloni L. (1980) “Luigi Sacco e la diffusione del vaccino in Italia” In: Per la storia della medi-
cina. Pp. 79–86. Bologna: Forni.  
Berti Bock G. (1971–72) “Ancora su Vincenzo Chiarugi – Revisione bibliografica e breve analisi 
critica del suo pensiero” Acta Medicae Historiae Patavina, XVIII:17–37.  
Buess E. (1961) “Paracelsus und Agricola als Pioniere der Sozial und Arbeitzmedizin” Deutsch 
Med. Wochsr, 86:2335–2340. 
Busacchi V. & D’Antuono G. (1967) “La medicina del lavoro nei suoi sviluppi storici” In: Atti 
XXIII Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Storia della medicina. (Modena 22–
24/09/ 1967). Pp. 329–345, Roma: Cossidente. 
Carnevale F. & Moriani G. (1986) Storia della salute dei lavoratori. Verona: Cortina. 
Cassirer E. (1932) Die Philosophie der Aufklärung. Tübingen: JEB Mohr. 
Castiglioni A. (1948) Storia della medicina. Vol 1 Milano: Mondadori. 
Fogari R., Marasi G., Zoppi A., Malamani G.D., Vanasia A. & Villa G. (1995) “Community 
control of hypertension at work-site: Epidemiological data of the Agusta project” Eur J 
Epidemiol, 11(5):591–5. 
Fouad M.N., Kiefe C.I., Bartolucci A.A., Burst N.M., Ulene V. & Harvey M.R. (1997) “A hyper-
tension control program tailored to unskilled and minority workers” Ethn Dis, 7(3):191–199. 
Frank J.P. (1779–1788) System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey. Vol. 1–4. Mannheim: 
Schwan & Goetz.  
Frank J.P. (1813) System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey. Vol. 5. Tübingen: Cotta. 
Frank J.P. (1817–1819) System einer vollständigen medicinischen Polizey. Vol. 6. Wien: Schaum-
burg. 
Glanz K., Sorensen G. & Farmer A. (1996) “The health impact of worksite nutrition and 
cholesterol intervention programs” Am J Health Promot, 10(6):453–470.  
Grieco A., Iavicoli S. & Berlinguer G. (eds.) (1998) Contributions to the History of Occupational 
and Environmental Prevention. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Guarino A. (1987) Storia del diritto romano. Napoli: Jovene. 
Hennrikus D.J. & Jeffery R.W. (1996) “Worksite intervention for weight control: A review of the 
literature. Review” Am J Health Promot, 10(6):471–498.  
Ku N.N. (1999) “Automated Papanicolaou smear analysis as a screening tool for female lower 
genital tract malignancies” Curr Opin Obstet Gynecol, 11(1):41–43.  
Lesky E. (1973) “Johann Peter Frank and social medicine” Annales Cisalpines d’Histoire Sociale, 
4:137–144. 
Marrou H.I. (1954) De la connaissance historique. Paris: du Seuil. 
Muto T. & Yamauchi K. (2001) “Evaluation of a multicomponent workplace health promotion 
program conducted in Japan for improving employees’ cardiovascular disease risk factors” 
Prev Med, 33(6):571–577. 
Nedic B., Ravic J., Loncar S. & Cuk D. (1999) “Counseling protocol for early cancer detection at 
the Women’s Health Center in Ruma” (Roman) Med Pregl Serbo-Croatian, 52(3–5):162–
164. 
Park K. (1985) Doctors and medicine in early Renaissance in Florence. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Penso G. (ed.) (1985) La Medicina Romana. Origgio: Ciba-Geigy. 
Ramazzini B. (1700) De Morbis Artificum Diatriba. Mutinae: Antonii Capponi. 
42 
Romano S. (1951) L’ordinamento giuridico. Firenze: Sansoni: 25. 
Rudd C.L. (1994) “Cholesterol intervention in the workplace: successful integration with other 
risk reduction programs” AAOHN J, 42(3):113–116. 
Tsai S.P., Lucas L.J. & Bernacki E.J. (1988) “Obesity and morbidity prevalence in a working 
population” J Occup Med, 30(7):589–591. 
Valentin B. (1961) Geschichte der Ortoepaedie. Stuttgart: Thieme. 
Vegetti M. (ed.) (1976) Opere di Ippocrate. Torino: UTET: 335. 
Viseltear A.J. (1982) “C.E.A. Winslow and the early years of public health at Yale, 1915–1925” 
Yale J Biol Med, 55:137–151. 
Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine and Related Sciences, London (1980) Subject 
Catalogue. Biographical Section 4, Ramazzini: sect. 4:372–375. Frank Sect. 2, 286–288. 
München: Krans Intern. Publ.,  
Wightman W.P.D. (1961) “Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society” Nature, 192:23–24. 
Wilson M.G., Edmunson J. & DeJoy D.M. (1992 ) “Cost effectiveness of work-site cholesterol 
screening and intervention programs” J Occup Med, 34(6):642–649. 
Wynne R. (1994) “Workplace health promotion: a specification for training” Working paper: 
WP/94/ 22/EN. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. 
Zanotti K.M. & Kennedy A.W. (1999) “Screening for gynecologic cancer. Review” Med Clin 
North Am, 83(6):1467–1487.  
 43 
6: The Role of Industrial Pathogenicity as a Causal and Final 
Argument for the German Social Insurance System 
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This is an attempt to discuss a central issue in the historic experience and future 
tasks of public health, and especially, occupational health. This central point con-
cerns the responsibilities for work-induced health dangers and the workers’ role in 
this responsibility. 
Modern social security not only demands increasing responsibility from each 
individual citizen for his or her socialization and safety. The modern organization 
of work and its realization counts on both participation and an acceptance of one’s 
own responsibility. From an historical perspective, this is a continuation and 
further development of the basic conceptions of work and health protection that 
were developed by Max Pettenkofer 150 years ago. It is therefore interesting to 
compare today’s tasks with the positions the famous German hygienist took. 
When Pettenkofer died 100 years ago, however, little evidence of his work was 
left. The essential elements were barely discernable in work protection, bacterio-
logy, social policy and racial hygiene. Thus his positions will be introduced and 
discussed in relation to important problems that are relevant today. 
Max Pettenkofer and the Scientific Rationale of Work Protection 
Pettenkofer stands at the beginning of public health in Germany. He focused on 
two basic problems of industrial development: firstly, urban development, also 
known as Assanierung, and secondly, industrial pathogenicity, mainly factory 
hygiene and the worker’s insurance. Both problems contributed to the importance 
public health gained in the young German state (Pettenkofer 1871, 1873). 
While Assanierung came into force in the cities in the first half of the nine-
teenth century, industrial hygiene was a neglected part of medical science. 
Bernardino Ramazzini’s work still set the tone and was furthered by various 
translations, such as the one provided by Johann Christian Gottlieb Ackermann 
between 1780 and 1783. This work was extended by Benjamin Gottlob Heben-
streit, a physician from Leipzig, by the chapter “On the concern for the safety of 
means of purchase”. Even A. C. L. Halfort’s great work of 1844 was still based on 
Ramazzini.  
Public health had difficulties dealing with the area of industrial productivity 
from the start. This area had gained in social importance and influence due to the 
heavy-iron industry in the late 1860s and the 1870s. Within factory walls the basic 
rules of public health were split into technological problem-solving, on the one 
hand, and individual, pedagogical rules of behavior on the other. An important 
factor in Prussian Germany was that the unsuccessful civil revolution of 1848 had 
moved the “medical revolution” of socially engaged physicians, such as Rudolf 
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Virchow and Salomon Neumann, close to the revolutionary movements (Milles 
1991). As a consequence, medical science attempted to repudiate this political 
closeness and suspicions with scientific methods. Physiological conceptions, as 
developed by Hermann Helmholtz, were decisive in this development. According 
to these ideas, the human body has to be understood as being functionally analo-
gous to a machine and therefore had to be examined in a scientific way (Rabin-
bach 1990). 
Max Pettenkofer was born in Donaumoos in 1818 and came to Munich in 1826. 
In 1837 he started to study pharmacology in order to take over his uncle’s position 
as Hofapotheker (pharmacist to the Court). Max Pettenkofer was educated in the 
era of holistic and romanticist natural science, but, at the same time, used the 
methodology of the emerging technological natural science. An important physio-
logist of that time, Johannes Müller, believed in an integrative “life ability”, but 
demanded methodologically precise procedures. So, too, did Justus Liebig, 
Pettenkofer’s famous teacher in Gießen. Pettenkofer himself placed emphasis on 
chemistry and physiology, and developed experimental hygiene. In 1847 he was 
awarded a chair in medicinal chemistry and, in 1883, he established hygiene as 
part of the requirements for a degree in medicine. He is an impressive example of 
the scientific view that not only included social responsibility, but also sought 
scientific explanation. Conclusions on public health measures were to be based on 
objective and analytical findings and were to be made available to the authorities. 
Pettenkofer’s concept, which was called “conditional hygiene”, emphasized the 
importance of the biographical and the working environment for diseases. This 
included the belief that the environment was increasingly created by people who 
therefore had to accept responsibility for it. His scientific methodology, however, 
aimed at replacing political responsibility with “measurements and figures” and 
scientific evidence. The problems that were visible coincided with Pettenkofer’s 
strengths: the research on the first maximum allowable concentrations for health-
damaging gasses and smoke, for example, or on the pollution of rivers. What he 
saw as limiting regulations acted as liberating regulations. Health dangers were, to 
a certain extent, permissible and endurable. 
This thinking influenced the early institutionalization of public health in Ger-
many. As a result of a proposal by Max Pettenkofer, in 1867 the hygienic section 
of the Congress of German Natural Researchers and Physicians was founded in 
Frankfurt. The Niederrheinische Verein für öffentliche Gesundheitspflege, the 
most important of a string of regional initiatives, was established the same year 
(Fischer 1933). Prussian authorities were not very pleased about this and blocked 
the attempts for action because of the high costs. The early demands were often 
insufficiently explained and were deemed to go too far. 
In the opinion of the medical professor Carl Reclam from Leipzig, the main 
task of health care was to provide legislators with the “missing knowledge of the 
extent of the natural need in measures, figures and weights”. The “urge to influ-
ence public life because of the knowledge gained”, as can be read in a written 
addition to the text of the first gathering in Frankfurt on September 15 and 16, 
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1873, led to the founding of the German Society of Public Health. It aimed to 
appeal not to the medical profession but mainly to “the civil servants and the 
elected representatives of large cities [...] on whom, practically, most depends 
concerning the improvement of the public state of health”. The initiative was 
mainly taken by the city councils: of the 39 signatories of the “invitation for a pre-
discussion on the founding of a traveling meeting on public health” in the early 
summer of 1873, there were 15 mayors, three senators and seven high-ranking 
civil servants. The driving force behind it was Berlin’s town council James 
Hobrecht. On September 15, 1873 the founding meeting took place in Frankfurt. 
Among the 230 members present, there were 113 physicians (including many 
medical civil servants), 28 mayors and 15 high-ranking communal civil servants. 
Thus this public health institute, which was aimed at general (practical) experts 
and people with positions of responsibility, was inter-disciplinary and generally 
rooted in politics (Göckenjan 1985). 
The main objective of the growing attempts in the early 1870s was the unifi-
cation of scientific findings with its feasibility. This objective, however, had a 
political dimension that caused difficulties in the German Empire. Mainly due to 
the Social Democratic labor movements, work dedicated to the “social question” 
was immediately regarded suspiciously as an attempt to overthrow the state. In 
addition, the emphasis on scientific methods and the analytical presentation of 
findings in figures, professional expertise needed to be developed. These experts 
were to be educated at the universities and would then work for the authorities, 
especially in cities. This aim was related especially to the development of the 
Reichsgesundheitsamt (the pre-war German National Health Authority).  
During its first meeting in 1873, the German Society for Public Health negoti-
ated the organization of the Reichsgesundheitsamt. Max Pettenkofer had been 
asked to take on the administration of the Reichsgesundheitsamt, but he declined, 
citing his age as well as academic responsibilities. In a thesis that took stock of the 
development of the Reichsgesundheitsamt programmatically, the appointed admi-
nistrator at the Reichsgesundheitsamt, Hermann Struck, put high demands on 
public health research and its practice.  
In his work Struck expressed the conviction that among representatives of 
medical science more precise methods of research had gained in importance, but 
that dealing with diseases from case to case with the intention of finding a cure 
was insufficient. Instead, it was the causes and distribution of the determinants of 
general health conditions, with implications for continuing changes in people’s 
social conditions, that demanded close examination and efficient action (Struck 
1878, p. 1). 
The Health Office was to provide uniform methods as well as an ensured level 
of knowledge and, therefore, prepare decisions regarding social policy. In addition 
to the standardization and processing of other research, the main independent 
instrument was to be medical statistics in a broad sense. People’s relationships to 
one another, their age, their environment, their geographical distribution, the soil 
they lived on, the water they drank, their prosperity, their diets, etc. were to be 
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examined. All this was to be seen in relation to the diseases occurring in their 
proximity, their life expectancy and their mortality rates, so that the causes could 
be found which resulted in the diminished strength and health of the population 
and lead to a shortened life-span (Struck 1878, p. 4). 
Assanierung in the Cities and Factory Hygiene 
Whereas there were no significant political difficulties regarding water-supply and 
sewage disposal, industrial hygiene found itself wedged between the profoundly 
contrasting interests of industrial society (Milles 1994). Not only did Max Petten-
kofer set up the glut sewage system and the central water-supply system in 
Munich; he also started studies into health-damaging factory work. He ensured 
further treatment of this problem, as, for example, during the fifth meeting of the 
German Society for Public Hygiene in Nuremburg in 1877. The “practical 
realization” was discussed in a manner which was mindful of the organized labor 
movement (Die Zukunft 1877/78, p. 88f). The first attempts at trade regulations 
were listed for further development. They included regulation of child labor; a ban 
on night labor and labor on Sunday; regulations concerning breaks, minors, 
women’s labor, the normal workday, required licenses for facilities; inspections 
dealing with construction and fire-safety, etc. The meeting deemed “a certain 
supervision of the trade regarding hygiene as necessary”, though it was “to avoid 
taking on the character of the police”. It recommended: 
• local, mixed factory commissions for the supervision and the consultation 
of the authority 
• technical supervision associations 
• “the proper organization of the medical service. It is not sufficient that the 
health insurance funds grant their members medical treatment in cases of 
disease; the physician has to be familiar with the member’s kind of occu-
pation and the resulting health risk and has to visit the workplace during a 
certain period of time and the like. Also, he has to be granted a sufficient 
prophylactic influence”.  
 
The meeting saw the employment of a few high-ranking civil servants as neces-
sary in order to bring about the program’s realization. These civil servants were to 
possess the appropriate technical-hygienic, medical-hygienic education in addition 
to the required common knowledge. They were also responsible for the realization 
of supervision by the state (Milles 1997).  
The proximity to the labor movement and the state’s control of factory inspec-
tion proved to be the decisive difficulty. Bismarck was against patronizing and 
burdening industry on which the state’s power had become increasingly depen-
dent. Thus the socialist law was an attempt to suppress all Social-Democratic 
organizations, whereas the factory inspectors received only advisory tasks. 
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The Contradictions of the Public Health Conception 
Under Pettenkofer’s influence, hygiene in Germany concentrated on two tasks 
which had implications for social policy: on the one hand, the support for techni-
cal measures and, on the other hand, pedagogical measures. Hygiene was to aim at 
the “well-being of the people” in the form of applied physiology. That well-being, 
however, was increasingly dependent on economic growth. This belief would lead 
to progress, but also to profound restrictions (Eckart 1998, p. 277ff). 
Pettenkofer developed the concept of “framing” from this perspective: since 
nature possessed the ability to purify itself (Selbstreinigungskraft), it was thus 
necessary to determine the extent of possible health risks in regard to the pollution 
of rivers and the concentration of hazardous gases. Thus the frame in which 
economic growth could take place had to be set.  
Pettenkofer understood the concept as scientific and as a way of precisely deter-
mining protection. Its consequence, in practice, meant a gradual distancing from 
the political implications of public health. 
In industrial hygiene, Pettenkofer’s students, such as Max Gruber and Karl 
Bernhard Lehmann, were less concerned about the attainment and extension of 
workers’ protection than with the legitimization of non-harmful health strains. 
They explored “efficiency thresholds”, and the proposed limits for gases and 
fumes had been derived mainly as levels for releasing rights. These hygienicists 
acted mainly as industrial lawyers, as can be seen in the so-called “zero hypo-
thesis”, according to which no health risk is assumed as long as no exact cause 
can be proven. Especially in regard to workers’ insurance, their work blocked the 
opportunity for negotiation of a social agreement on reasonable health risks and 
on industrial pathogenicity. They were also a hinder for the teamwork between the 
various insurance branches in Germany, where accident insurance was ascribed a 
responsibility for prevention which could be largely transferred to the statutory 
health insurance. 
The Tragic Controversy of Cholera 
An especially problematic development of the connection between industrial 
hygiene and public health can be illustrated by another central concern of Max 
Pettenkofer’s work: the fight against cholera. Pettenkofer’s stance in this problem 
was also bound to the hope of economic growth and the entailing improvements 
regarding the prevention and cure of major health risks. Pettenkofer therefore 
believed that, for the sake of the development of free civil communication, even 
cholera and many other diseases had to be risked: “A ban on traffic up to the point 
where cholera cannot be spread by it would be a much bigger disaster than cholera 
itself.” On the one hand, this understanding was quite modern and corresponds 
with the meaning we nowadays ascribe to the improved conditions for a healthy 
life. On the other hand, it subordinates itself too readily to the conditions of 
capitalistic interests of utilization. This conception contained a social-political 
dimension which cannot be traced easily during those years. Thus concepts which 
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appeared to reject social-political dimensions received a higher amount of benevo-
lence from the authorities and representatives of the economy. The triumphant 
advance of clinics and of bacteriology fall into this period. 
It is due to tragic circumstances that, at the end of his life, Pettenkofer suffered 
his greatest defeat concerning that aspect of his hygiene concept that is the most 
important for us today: the emphasis on social conditions regarding epidemics. 
This has been described in great detail by Richard Evans (1987) in his study on 
Hamburg’s cholera epidemic in 1892. Thus, we will mention only some high-
lights. 
Until the 1880s, Pettenkofer was seen as the leading expert on epidemics in 
Germany. Though he did not deny the existence of cholera germs, he nevertheless 
stressed other contexts of impact, especially the importance of the “host”. After 
the discovery of the cholera germ by Robert Koch in 1883/84, Pettenkofer 
watched the triumphant advance of bacteriology with envy, as well as rejection. 
The cholera epidemic in Hamburg in late 1892 provided clear evidence that 
assured bacteriology’s triumph. This unexpected and grave epidemic that caught 
everyone by surprise was neglected by Pettenkofer’s followers and was tackled 
successfully only because of Koch’s intervention. The boiling of water, which 
Pettenkofer saw as useless, turned out to be the most effective method of fighting 
the disease. After the epidemic faded, there was a serious controversy between the 
two at the Reichsgesundheitsamt in September 1892. Koch emerged the victor and 
determined “the scientific standpoint of today”. Pettenkofer consequently drank a 
cholera culture in front of students on October 10, 1892. The culture had been 
obtained from the institute founded by Koch’s student Georg Gaffky in Hamburg. 
As a result, Pettenkofer showed some symptoms of the disease, but recovered and 
saw this as proof of his convictions. Gaffky, however, reported that, out of consi-
deration for the old and honorable man, he had sent Pettenkofer a mild and non-
dangerous culture. Thus even this experiment did not receive the recognition that 
he expected from the authorities, medical science and the general public. After 
these events and the death of his wife, Pettenkofer became ill, was affected ment-
ally and finally shot himself on January 10, 1901. The event was symbolic in its 
tragic failure to promulgate scientific arguments for measures regarding social 
policy and their acceptance.  
Developments of Responsibility for Industrial Pathogenicity in Germany 
Pettenkofer’s achievement lay especially in having provided the analytical foun-
dations of public health measures without neglecting social objectives. He 
targeted the responsibility of the authorities regarding the political structures, 
especially that of the cities’ health offices and of the authorities of the German 
Empire. He supported economic growth and the improvement of living condi-
tions. However, the implications of his public health concept for social reform 
was pushed into the background in the politics of the German Empire, and scien-
tific methods replaced political aims. 
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The rising labor movement, which was seen as dangerous, contributed in some 
ways to the increased importance of public health in communities as well as in the 
central state. At the same time, however, its political treatment was strained by 
power interests and economics.  
During the 1870s special social security systems were developed in Germany 
which dealt with health dangers related to workers’ protection and work insu-
rance. These political constructions came into being under the influence of a grave 
and long-lasting economic crisis, the threat of strikes by unified Social Democrats 
and the menacing ideas of the Paris Commune. The development of the social 
insurance system in the 1880s (health insurance in 1882, accident insurance in 
1884, pension insurance in 1889) took place in an attempt at social and political 
integration and the acceleration of national efficiency in the competition with 
England. Security benefits had to be justified causally with industrial pathogeni-
city and, at the same time, with the promise of integration and strengthening of 
performance. 
Within this social embedding, a “clinical look” in occupational medicine and a 
“hygenization” of work and life environment was more supportive of the state 
than public health care developed politically or medicine’s social aspects. Yet, 
fatally, the distance created by scientific and analytical methods concerning the 
social, political and moral questions at that time led to a stabilization of the natural 
sciences and to practical influence as well as success. As Alfons Labisch con-
cluded, “the ethical and political components were sacrificed willingly” (Labisch 
1992, p. 122). 
Security and Health Today 
Today, security and health accentuate the central challenge to social policy, and, 
thus to the German and “European” welfare state. Because of Europeanization, the 
objectives are being newly focused. 
Health, in other words, physical, mental and social performance capability, 
became the single valid constant for us humans during the development towards 
modern industrial societies, and especially in today’s post-modern age. This is 
especially true in a society where the large majority no longer believe in eternal 
life after death. Against this background, health is seen as the highest good in the 
public’s esteem and is undoubtedly a central value in industrial societies. Health is 
not only seen as an individual and private, but also as a public and common, good. 
This double aspect of being a private but also a public, meritocratic good makes 
up the basic interpretation of public health. 
Public health tendentiously penetrates all social areas and cannot be reduced to 
scientific analysis, to treatment provision and, least of all, to medicine. Public 
health is implicit in all social areas, such as education, work, the family, mobility, 
nutrition or urban life. Health is therefore penetrated by aspects of power and 
control, of interests and conflicts. Thus health is subjected to political processes, 
arrangements and decisions. This also holds true for the area of health and work. 
The political interspersing of public health in private companies or, in other 
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words, the realization of public, social responsibility in businesses is the story of 
health protection. 
Models of Social Development 
Health protection in the German or European context, as a supplement to the 
citizen’s civic, (economic) and political rights, is part of human rights as formu-
lated for the first time in the UN Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 and in the 
EU Social Charter of 1961. 
Social responsibility aims at inclusion, at social integration, at the participation 
of all people as members of one social context. Every person, therefore, has to 
have access to all areas of society’s functions, such as the law, education, health 
care, and the opportunity to start a family as well as economic life (Kaufmann 
2000, p. 176). 
A new model of work has to integrate central dimensions of industrial and 
public health. These are: 
• Reduction of work’s share of life-time 
• More variety in and discontinuity of work biographies 
• Consideration for care work (such as nursing or the upbringing of children 
in families) as well as community and individual work in addition to paid 
work 
• Equality for men and women (gender democracy) 
• The knowledge that ecological, healthy and socially aware activities out-
side work are connected to corresponding experiences within the work 
sphere. 
 
However, due to the dynamic changes within the work sphere, the connection 
between work and everyday life will become more complicated and diverse for 
many people, and it increasingly demands a more active individual organization 
of everyday life. 
Chances of Politicization in the European Context 
Europeanization has provided the concept of “public health” in the area of indus-
trial businesses with an essentially stronger legitimization than previously. This is 
especially true concerning regulations on work protection, which follow a new 
model. Instead of an orientation towards technology, authoritarian control, a 
passive role for the employees and damages understood as accidents and occupa-
tional diseases, there is now a shift towards an industrial law where dangers are to 
be comprehensively understood, tackled early or prevented, and where all invol-
ved in business are to act upon the humane arrangement of work and its condi-
tions. 
Whereas work protection used to be oriented toward damages and physical, 
chemical and biological hazards, there is now a normative orientation in the new 
regulations on work protection. Health, health promotion, maintenance of pro-
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ductivity and personal disposition must be compatible with the demands of work. 
The new regulations strengthened the rights of the employees in a civil and demo-
cratic sense. Employees have the right to information on risks and opportunities 
for health promotion as well as the right to advice on health problems in connec-
tion with their work. To a certain extent, the right to participation and to share in 
businesses has been strengthened. The extension of the principle of public health 
in the sphere of productivity, including the service sector, is further expressed by 
the extension of the EU’s and thus Germany’s regulations concerning work 
protection for the entire working population. 
The new demands on work protection can be summed up as follows: 
• An extended understanding of health; not only purely physical damages 
but also psycho-social aspects are included as well as aspects on health 
promotion (holistic work protection) 
• Health policies aimed at prevention are understood as a cross-section task 
of business policy (safety management) 
• Work protection is seen as a dynamic challenge. It has to adjust to the pro-
gress of technological development and to the newest findings of ergono-
mics (adjustment duty) 
• Reduction of the executive deficit, especially concerning smaller busi-
nesses, employer’s responsibility (business orientation) 
• Cooperation between skilled safety experts and company medical officers 
(principle of cooperation) 
• Active involvement of individual employees in the perception and mana-
gement of hazards and risks as well as healthy behavior; employees are to 
be respected and accepted not only as objects of considerate protection but 
also as representatives of interest of their own health (principle of partici-
pation)  
• Uniform and transparent standardization of legal demands and duties 
(uniform right to work protection) (Bücker et al. 1994, p. 43–44). 
 
Not only the public work protection law but also the legal regulations concerning 
public health insurance and accident insurance in Germany outline new activities 
aimed at prevention and humane arrangements of work conditions. Paragraph 20, 
“Prevention & Self-help”, of the Social Security Code, Book V may be cited. 
Accordingly, public health insurance funds have to cooperate with the providers 
of the statutory accident insurance for the prevention of work-related health 
dangers. They have to provide services for primary prevention in order to deliver 
a contribution for the reduction of social inequalities regarding health opportu-
nities. Prevention has been extended in the new accident insurance with §1 and 
§14. This relates not only to work-related accidents and occupational diseases but 
also to work-related health danger that may threaten life and health. There must be 
an investigation into the causes for these dangers and cooperation with public 
health funds. 
52 
Thus a central element of modern labor and health policy is the promotion and 
the qualified organization of the citizen’s participation in- and outside the work-
place in the interests affecting them. This further develops a problem seized upon 
by Max Pettenkofer. Yet, whereas he aimed at objectifying, seeking mainly analy-
tical criteria for health protection, the emphasis is nowadays on a broader politici-
zation. Pettenkofer aimed at an official expertocracy (technicians, physicians) and 
pushed aside a politicization “from below”; today there is an opening towards the 
affected citizens and employees. To a certain extent, we are able to link up with 
the old positions of Pettenkofer and to develop them further. 
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7: “Plastic Coffin”: Vinyl Chloride and the American  
and European Chemical Industry3 
David Rosner, Columbia University 
Gerald Markowitz, City University of New York, New York, USA 
 
In the mid-1960s, the international chemical industry discovered a terrifying fact: 
vinyl chloride monomer (VCM), the basis for polyvinyl chloride (PVC), one of 
the most widely-used plastics, was linked to a degenerative bone condition called 
acroosteolysis that was affecting workers in a number of its plants. In the early 
1970s the Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA), the industry association 
representing close to 200 companies, received even more troubling news: secret 
animal studies performed for European chemical manufacturers showed cancers at 
surprisingly low levels of exposure to VCM as well. Industry leaders became 
terrified. Industry was faced by the question of what would it mean for the vinyl 
industry if the public knew that vinyl chloride, the basis for Saran Wrap and 
hundreds of other consumer products such as hairsprays, car upholstery, shower 
curtains, liquor bottles, floor coverings and wiring, was linked to cancer? Would 
the public begin to view all plastics as threats to their health? To avoid public dis-
closure of industry sponsored research indicating cancers caused by vinyl chloride 
monomer, the chemical industry planned and executed an elaborate scheme to de-
ceive the American government, and mislead the workforce and the public. The 
MCA closed ranks to protect the image of its product as safe and to hide informa-
tion about its health costs. As more data emerged from European investigators, 
confirming and even extending the findings of cancer, the Manufacturing Che-
mists Association (now the Chemical Manufacturers Association) privately ex-
pressed extreme distress though it continued to show a calm and reassuring face to 
the government and the general public. The industry considered such deceit neces-
sary in light of the unlimited liability it could face from lawsuits that might be 
brought by millions of Americans who used vinyl chloride every day.  
Plastics had emerged in the 1950s as a mainstay of the petrochemical industry. 
In 1953 the US industry employed 200,000 people and boasted annual sales of 
over $23 billion. It produced 3.5 billion pounds of plastics and resins per year 
(Kent 1954, p. 53; “Chemical Field…”, p. 90).4 Polyethylene, polypropylene, 
polystyrene and polyvinyl chloride among others were all synthetic materials. But, 
some, particularly polyvinyl chloride, were unusual in that they were created from 
chemical combinations that did not exist naturally. Chlorine-carbon molecules do 
not exist in nature and therefore, their impact on the environment and on human 
                                                
3 This article is based on material in our book, Deceit and Denial: The Deadly Politics of Indus-
trial Pollution, (Berkeley: University of California Press/Milbank Fund, 2002). We gratefully 
acknowledge the support of the Milbank Memorial Fund and the National Science Foundation. 
4 For the most part, this section depends upon Doniger 1979; Spitz 1989, p. 24. 
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health is completely untested.5 Production skyrocketed during World War II, 
going from one million pounds per year to 120 million pounds per year; by 1952, 
production had grown to 320 million pounds (Spitz 1989, p. 24; Commoner 1977, 
p. 70). By 1973, 27 billion pounds of plastics were produced. Polyvinyl and vinyl 
chlorides accounted for 5.4 billion pounds, behind polyethylene with 8.4 billion 
pounds and more than polystyrene with 5 billion and polypropylene with 2.2 
billion pounds.6 With the addition of plasticizers that increased flexibility and 
durability, polyvinyl chloride was extremely adaptable to a variety of uses, especi-
ally in construction (40% of consumption); in wire and cable, (10%); manufacture 
of pipe (25%); film and sheet for packaging and coated fabrics (15%); flooring 
(10%).7 Because of its low cost and great durability, it became a widely used sub-
stitute for woods, metals, glass, rubber, ceramics, and other plastics (Doniger 
1979, p. 23; Blackford & Kerr 1996, p. 239). By the 1960s, VCM gas was also 
used as an aerosol propellant in beauty aids and cosmetics, drugs, pesticides, and a 
variety of other products.  
There are four broad stages in the production of polyvinyl chloride plastics. 
First, salt is broken down through an electrolytic process to release chlorine as a 
greenish gas. Inherently unstable, chlorine does not naturally exist in nature; about 
three-quarters of all chlorine produced is presently used in the chemical industry 
as a feedstock (i.e., component material) in the production of plastics, pesticides, 
solvents, and other products unknown in the natural world (Thornton 2000, p. 3). 
In the second stage, chlorine, combined with a variety of hydrocarbons, produces 
vinyl chloride monomer. (In the late 1940s it was used as an anaesthetic, but was 
ultimately discarded because of dangerous side effects.) In the third stage, the 
monomer is formed into a polyvinyl chloride resin and finally, in the fourth stage, 
it is fabricated into finished products. Vinyl chloride monomer plants are often 
huge open-air complexes of metal and steel tubing connecting large and small 
tanks to one another, much like oil refineries. By and large, they are located in 
southern and western states, especially Louisiana and Texas. PVC plants are 
                                                
5 “Union Carbide Corporation Chronology of PVC Activities”, in R. N. Wheeler, Jr., “Literature 
Survey and Engineering Options” Peterson vs. Union Carbide Corporation, Oct. 1989, p. 
43; Blackford & Kerr 1996, p. 239. Ralph L. Harding, Jr., President, The Society of the 
Plastics Industry, Inc. says first production was in 1939, but he was probably referring to Dow 
Chemical’s first entering into the field in Midland Michigan. See: Ralph L. Harding, Jr., 
Testimony at OSHA Hearings, “Official Report of Proceedings Before the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor in the Matter of a Proposed 
Permanent Standard for Occupational Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, June 26, 1974, Washing-
ton, D.C. p. 330–331;  See also, statement by V.K. Rowe before U.S., DOL, OSHA, 
“Transcript of Informal Fact-Finding Hearing on Possible Hazards of Vinyl Chloride 
Manufacture and Use,” Feb. 15, 1974, Washington, D.C., p. 162.  
6 Ralph L. Harding, Jr., President, The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. “Testimony at OSHA 
Hearings”, Official Report of Proceedings Before the Occupational Safety and Health Admi-
nistration of the Department of Labor in the Matter of a Proposed Permanent Standard for 
Occupational Exposure to Vinyl Chloride, June 26, 1974, Washington, D.C. p. 330–331. 
5 Ralph L. Harding, Jr. President, SPI, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Sub-
Committee on the Environment, Hearing on the Dangers of Vinyl Chloride, 93rd Cong. 2nd 
Sess., Aug. 21, 1974, (Serial No. 93–110, U.S. GPO, 1974). 
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somewhat more enclosed and are located in a variety of states in addition to Loui-
siana and Texas, principally New Jersey, Ohio and Massachusetts.8  
While relatively few workers are employed in the production of VCM and 
PVC, the consequent fabrication processes employ many more. In the mid-1970s 
only about 1,000 workers were employed by the vinyl chloride industry and 
another 5,500 workers in the PVC industry. (In total, from 1939 through the mid-
1970s, only about 30,000 were involved in VCM and PVC production.) But many 
more were engaged in the fabrication of finished consumer goods or construction 
materials. In the mid-1970s there were nearly 350,000 workers using PVC in the 
fabrication of the wide variety of finished products (Doniger 1979, p. 26). 
The Hazards of Vinyl Chloride 
For much of the twentieth century, Americans took solace in the notion that 
industry and science used refined methods to ensure that workers in dangerous 
trades were not exposed to harmful levels of toxins. Because Americans believed 
in the ability of technicians and scientists to understand what constitutes danger 
and how to guarantee safety, they did not worry much about the chemical 
industry. They felt assured that there were levels below which danger from expo-
sure to chemicals and other substances did not exist – and that industry observed 
these strictures.  
Through the 1950s and 1960s, and even into the early 1970s, vinyl chloride was 
said to present “no very serious problem in general handling aside from the risk of 
fire and explosion” but vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) was known to pose a 
potential danger when workers were exposed to extremely high quantities, causing 
faintness, disorientation, drowsiness, and other acute, but passing, effects. In 1954 
the MCA set an upper limit of safety at 500 ppm (parts per million), a figure that 
would stand as a measure of safety for the next two decades.9 Prior to the estab-
lishment of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) most 
standards from chemical exposure were arrived at in the same loose and often 
arbitrary manner that vinyl chloride standards were set. As Henry Smyth of Union 
Carbide stated in an internal memo, the 500 ppm Threshold Limit Value (TLV) 
for vinyl chloride was “based largely on single guinea pig inhalation studies by 
the Bureau of Mines” during World War II.10  
The producers of vinyl chloride had a sense that vinyl chloride could possibly 
cause chronic conditions for the workers even before it was linked to any specific 
                                                
8 Doniger  1979, p. 26. By the 1970s there were ten companies producing vinyl chloride monomer 
in fifteen plants throughout the nation. Shell, Dow, and Goodrich alone controlled approxima-
tely 56 per cent of vinyl chloride monomer production. About 23 companies, operating 37 
plants nationwide, controlled the production of PVC. Finally, there were about 8,000 com-
panies of a wide variety of sizes using PVC in the fabrication of consumer goods. David 
Doniger explains that the highly concentrated VCM and PVC industry “has made it easy for 
the industries to speak with one voice in regulatory proceedings regarding the limits of their 
technological and economic capabilities to control VC exposures” (pp. 25–26). 
9 MCA, Chemical Safety Data Sheet, SD-56, “Vinyl Chloride,” 2.3.1. MCA Papers. 
10 Henry F. Smyth, Jr. to T.W.Nale, attn: Weidlein, November 24, 1959, MCA Papers. 
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disease in the mid-1960s. In May 1959, Dow Chemical’s V.K. Rowe worried 
about the fact that there was “no good toxicological data […] of the chronic 
toxicity of vinyl chloride”.11 In a correspondence with William E. McCormick, 
Manager of the Department of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology at B.F. Goo-
drich, he admitted privately that the 500 ppm TLV “cannot be relied upon to [sic] 
strongly when considering chronic exposures”. He had “been investigating vinyl 
chloride a bit and [found] it to be somewhat more toxic when given by repeated 
daily inhalations”. It was “too early yet to tell what vapor concentrations will be 
without adverse effect”. Although he did not inform anyone outside the industry, 
he expected that the current TLV would produce “appreciable injury” to full time 
workers.12  
This study indicated that “vinyl chloride monomer is more toxic than has been 
believed”,13 and that repeated exposures at 200 ppm resulted in micropathological 
changes in the livers of rabbits. As a result of these experiments, in 1961, Dow 
recommended a 50 ppm TLV, but the American Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), failed to change the TLV for more than a decade 
(Torkelson et al. 1961, pp. 354–361). 
“Bracketing the Trouble Area” 
When the industry learned in the mid-1960s about vinyl chloride workers who 
suffered from acroosteolysis (AOL), a strange and previously undefined condi-
tion, it developed a strategy regarding health issues that it would use over the 
coming decade. While privately seeking to understand the source of the problem 
and by funding research that would give them the information they needed to 
devise a response, the industry would release to the public only such information 
as would reassure people as to the essentially benign nature of their finished 
products; they would also work to forestall any regulatory action.  
The industry learned that a few of their workers who entered the polymerizer 
vats (where polyvinyl chloride was synthesized from vinyl chloride monomer) in 
the Louisville, Kentucky plant of B.F. Goodrich, were developing hand and other 
systemic health problems. The problem was discovered in 1964 by Dr. John 
Creech, who conducted physical exams of the Goodrich workforce. One day, one 
of the workers came to Dr. Creech in the dispensary, “complaining about his 
tender fingers and asked me ‘what’s going on […] with my fingers?’” Creech 
noticed that the skin on the man’s fingers, as well as elsewhere on his body, was 
thickened and he asked him “if he knew of anyone else over at the plant [who] 
was having this type of problem”. He learned that another worker couldn’t even 
open up his lunch box because his fingers were so tender. Subsequent x-rays and 
examinations of this other worker showed that he had a condition similar to that of 
                                                
11 V.K. Rowe to W.E. McCormick, May 12, 1959, MCA Papers. 
12 V.K. Rowe to W.E. McCormick, May 12, 1959, MCA Papers. 
13 Henry F. Smyth, Jr. to T.W.Nale, attn: Weidlein, November 24, 1959, MCA Papers. 
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the first worker. Over the next six weeks Creech accumulated a few more cases 
and reported his observations to the plant management.14  
Shortly thereafter, Rex Wilson, head of Goodrich’s Medical Department, wrote 
to the physician of another Goodrich plant asking him “to determine as quietly as 
possible whether similar disabilities” existed at his plant. It was clear that he did 
not want the employees to know the reason for any examinations. He told the 
doctor,  
I would appreciate your proceeding with this problem as rapidly as possible, 
but doing it incidentally to other examinations of our personnel. We do not 
wish to have this discussed at all and I request that you maintain this informa-
tion in confidence.15  
Monsanto sought to gather information about the extent of the disease in one of its 
plants without telling the workers the cause of the company’s concern. The 
workers were to be x-rayed, but the Monsanto official wrote,  
I am sure Dr. Nessell can prepare these people with an adequate story so that 
no problem will exist. Depending upon what happens following this x-raying, 
we will have to see what our next step is.16  
Noting that it was not just polymerization workers who were coming down with 
the disease, Goodrich and Monsanto worried that this issue could become public, 
to the detriment of the industry.  
In an attempt to forestall any disclosures, a curtain of secrecy began to descend 
over the diseases that were appearing in the various polymerization plants around 
the country and around the world. In January 1966, Harry Warner, Corporate 
Vice-President of B.F. Goodrich, learned of a physician with the Solvay Chemical 
Company in Brussels who reported seeing at least two workers in a Solvay plant 
who exhibited the same bone destruction that was seen in the Goodrich cases and 
who was planning to publish a report about them.17  
Goodrich was concerned enough about the response to such a published article 
that Mr. Warner attempted to have one of [Goodrich’s] representatives, who 
was in Europe, stop by and try to discourage or to influence the wording of 
such an article to ensure that it didn’t condemn PVC in general.  
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The attempt was unsuccessful, but Goodrich, with the help of Monsanto, which 
had its European headquarters in Brussels, made plans to send a team to Brussels 
in another effort to “discourage or edit the publication”.18 
In June, Goodrich presented its findings to representatives of six major US and 
European companies at a private meeting.19 At the conclusion of this small 
meeting, the MCA was asked to organize a larger meeting of all the chemical 
companies to decide on a common course of action regarding the medical and 
public relations dangers that lay ahead.20  
The growing plastics industry was terrified about the effect any public dis-
closure of a problem with an essential ingredient in their product would have on 
this market. At the meeting a representative from Airco noted what was obvious 
to all – namely that “any action at the plant must be properly handled to avoid 
labor relations and publicity problems”.21 The problem went beyond labor rela-
tions and union issues, however, and B.F. Goodrich hoped that other companies 
would “use discretion in making the problem public”, because of the need “to 
avoid exposes like Silent Spring and Unsafe at Any Speed”, which had publicized 
the worst kind of nightmare faced by major industrial executives in the mid-
1960s.22 Union Carbide’s Robert “Nick” Wheeler emphasized the need for secrecy 
in light of the “definite health problem related to polyvinyl chloride manufac-
turing”.23  
While the PVC manufacturers were concerned about the potential dangers from 
VCM exposure to the workforce, they were more concerned about the negative 
publicity. In the words of Wheeler’s follow-up memo relating to a meeting of the 
MCA’s Occupational Health Committee,  
the need for bracketing the trouble area was essential. Unfavorable publicity 
with regard to exposure of finished products to the human anatomy could be 
very damaging to the industry.24  
If plastic products, particularly those that wrapped or came in contact with food, 
were implicated, the industry would find itself besieged not just by workers and 
their unions, but by the general public and federal authorities. The MCA also 
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agreed to fund an epidemiological study of PVC workers to be conducted by 
epidemiologists at the University of Michigan’s Institute for Industrial Health.25  
Meanwhile, at the end of the summer of 1967, almost three years after the first 
reports of vinyl chloride-related disease had been noticed in the Goodrich plant, 
researchers from B.F. Goodrich published in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association a report of 31 cases of acroosteolysis among vinyl chloride workers 
(Wilson et al. 1967, pp. 577-581). A year and a half later, in February 1969, the 
results of the University of Michigan study were presented confidentially to the 
MCA’s Medical Advisory Committee. The report acknowledged that AOL 
involved connective tissue as well as bony structures, and that an earlier assum-
ption that AOL was a localized problem involving just fingers was incorrect. Up 
until this time it had been assumed that only when workers could smell vinyl 
chloride was there a possibility of overexposure. But the report indicated that the 
“odor threshold” of vinyl chloride was about 4,000 ppm, not 400 ppm as pre-
viously believed and well above the existing threshold limit value of 500 ppm. 
More importantly, the document noted that it should not be assumed that vinyl 
chloride workers were safe from disease even at the 500 ppm TLV. The study 
suggested that “sufficient ventilation should be provided to reduce the vinyl chlo-
ride concentration [to] below 50 ppm” so that workers could be protected.26  
When the members of the MCA’s Occupational Health Committee read the 
report, they were particularly troubled by this recommendation. To propose re-
ducing exposure to 50 ppm implied that vinyl chloride was the direct cause of 
disease. The members, by a vote of 7 to 3, refused to accept the report as written 
and unanimously voted to accept the report only if it was changed to avoid any 
implication that the 50 ppm was “a threshold level for general safety when 
exposed to VCM”.27 The MCA’s PVC resin producers agreed that the wording 
must be changed to read thus: “Inasmuch as the etiologic agent of the disease is 
unknown, a level of vinyl chloride below 50 ppm should be used as an index of 
adequate ventilation.”28 Their object was that there should be no implication that 
exposure to vinyl chloride monomer at such low levels could cause disease. 
Secret Agreements: The Evolution of the Cancer Debate over Vinyl Chloride 
The reactions of the industry to the link between vinyl chloride and acroosteolysis 
were a mere preview to how the industry would react when faced with a much 
larger and uncontainable problem – the link between vinyl chloride and cancer. 
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When cancer became an issue, industry took more extreme and potentially explo-
sive actions to cover up the danger. Industry moved from denial and obfuscation 
to outright deception. Motivated by money and power rather than health, the 
industry was largely successful in hiding its information about cancer from the 
government and in deflecting national attention away from the potential hazards 
of thousands of mostly untested new chemicals and of vinyl chloride in particular. 
In the years to come the nation would learn the serious pitfalls that result when 
regulation of an industry is left in the hands of that very industry. 
In 1970, the American industry learned that an Italian researcher, Dr. Pierluigi 
Viola from the Regina Elena Institute for Cancer Research in Rome, had pre-
sented a paper on the carcinogenic effects of vinyl chloride exposure in animals at 
the International Cancer Congress in Houston. Dr. Viola reported that rats expo-
sed to 30,000 ppm of vinyl chloride monomer gas developed tumors of the skin, 
lungs and bones and that his research would soon be published.29 In May 1971, the 
same month that Viola published his paper in the journal Cancer Research (Viola 
et al. 1971), he was invited to Washington by the MCA’s Occupational Health 
Committee to present a summary of his work. While executives were upset by his 
findings, they hoped that his results would be deemed not applicable to other 
animals or to humans who were exposed to far lower levels of vinyl chloride. As a 
result of the meeting, the MCA began to develop a research protocol aimed at 
evaluating the carcinogenicity of vinyl chloride and to consider conducting an 
epidemiological study.30 They hoped that, since the cancers showed up in the rat’s 
zymbal gland, a gland in the animal’s ear that did not exist in humans,31 the cancer 
might not show up in humans. Industry decided not to make any revisions to the 
Chemical Safety Data Sheet, the document used by producers to establish safe 
practices in their plants.32  
A few months later the MCA learned that “further studies [by Viola] on the 
toxicity of vinyl chloride have confirmed the carcinogenicity of this monomer” 
even though it “has not been confirmed in the human body”. Viola suggested, on 
the basis of his research, that a safer TLV would be 100 ppm, for he found that the 
“danger of a toxic action of the monomer on nervous apparatus, bones and liver is 
negligible if concentrations are no more than 100 ppm”.33 Viola also reported to 
the MCA that he had found tumors in 10 to 15 per cent of rats at 5,000 ppm.34 He 
suggested that animal studies of vinyl chloride’s carcinogenic properties be 
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conducted at low concentrations, down to 50 ppm.35 Union Carbide’s Robert 
Wheeler understood that “Publishing of Doctor Viola’s work in the U.S. could 
lead to serious problems with regard to the vinyl chloride monomer and resin 
industries…”. Wheeler was concerned about this link to cancer because “the 
Delaney amendment bans the use of any material in food that can cause cancer” 
and, more broadly, that “the present political climate in the U.S. is such that a 
campaign by [Ralph] Nader and others could force an industrial upheaval via new 
laws or strict interpretation of pollution and occupational health laws”. 36  
Viola’s finding of tumors at 5,000 ppm, and his recommendation that a 100 
ppm threshold would probably avoid future problems, were tough enough for the 
industry to swallow. But the reports of research done in 1972 by another Italian 
researcher represented a potential catastrophe. PVC was now central to the econo-
mic viability of a number of critical American chemical companies. Between 
1966 and 1971, PVC production in the United States doubled from 1.2 billion to 
2.4 billion pounds; in the case of B.F. Goodrich, for example, their chemical divi-
sion was replacing rubber as the most profitable sector, and PVC accounted for 
half of the chemical division’s sales (Blackford & Kerr 1996, pp. 321, 324). Late 
in 1972 the American chemical industry received a series of reports from Euro-
pean vinyl manufacturers who had, in the wake of Viola’s reports, hired Cesare 
Maltoni, Director of the Bologna Centre for the Prevention and Detection of 
Tumours and Oncological Research, to investigate whether Viola’s findings had 
any merit. During the summer of 1972, the Europeans began receiving prelimi-
nary results of Maltoni’s confidential work that indicated cancers appearing in rats 
exposed to lower levels of vinyl chloride than in Viola’s studies and in sites other 
than their zymbal gland. Almost immediately, the European producers began to 
enlist their American counterparts in participating in secrecy agreements aimed at 
preventing any public discussion of this work.37 According to the Americans, the 
European chemical companies were especially insistent on the need for a secrecy 
agreement. “[A]pparently, Dr. Viola’s presentation at Houston about 2 years ago 
was made without Solvay’s permission”, reported Allied Chemical’s W.A. Knapp 
to his superiors.38  
The secrecy agreement demanded that  
the members of our task group as listed on the attached sheet, are the only ones 
entitled to receive information about the European project. In turn, they should 
feel honor bound to make sure that such information remains within their own 
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companies unless and until formal permission has been granted for its re-
lease.39  
Dow felt “honor-bound to make sure that information received from the European 
producers remains within our own company until formal permission has been 
granted for its release”. To accomplish this, Dow instructed that no one “discuss 
the European work”, even within the company, unless such persons “have a need 
to know”. Even then, such discussion should be cleared in advance.40 While it is 
common practice for researchers to jealously guard their findings until they are 
published, in cases where human lives are at stake, most researchers accept that 
they have an obligation to share knowledge about potential harm. Further, the 
insistence on confidentiality was not coming from the scientific researcher, but 
from the vinyl manufacturers. The secrecy was not entered into at the beginning 
of the experiments, but only when it became apparent that vinyl chloride mono-
mer was carcinogenic at half the accepted TLV. Secrecy, in this case, was not to 
protect product information, patent secrets, or even innovative experimental pro-
cedures. Rather, its sole aim was to avoid a public relations and legal nightmare. 
In October 1972 Dr. Walter Harris, representing the MCA, visited Maltoni in 
Bologna, and concluded that the MCA’s plans to study high dosage exposure were 
irrelevant since Maltoni was already finding carcinogenicity at lower levels of 
exposure.41 Maltoni’s results were revealed to American producers of PVC and 
VCM at a confidential meeting at the MCA headquarters in Washington on 
November 14, 1972. Members at the meeting were requested not to take notes; in 
fact, the European representative, D.M. Elliott of the British vinyl manufacturer, 
ICI, “insisted that the work tables be swept clear of paper for note taking before 
he would discuss anything regarding the European group’s efforts. Such was 
done…”.42 The most disturbing fact that Duffield presented to the group was that 
Maltoni had discovered “the occurrence of primary cancers in both liver and 
kidneys with one positive at 250 parts per million,” half the long held 500 ppm 
threshold value that ostensibly protected workers from AOL and other toxic 
effects of vinyl chloride. 43 By January 1973, company representatives were given 
a chart that showed that angiosarcomas of the liver were reported at as low as 250 
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ppm. Maltoni was finding cancers in a variety of sites and at very low dosages. 
The MCA did not doubt the accuracy of this data.44 
By the early 1970s it was becoming more difficult for the industry to keep 
information about carcinogens secret within the industry than it had been earlier. 
Previously, what happened in the workplace remained largely a private matter, of 
concern to the employer, the employee and, perhaps, a union. Only when a prob-
lem escaped the private sphere of the factory and ended up as an issue in a liabi-
lity lawsuit or on the front pages of a newspaper did an occupational health issue 
become a source of potential harm to a company’s well-being.  
Growing environmental awareness among consumers in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s resulted in new liability issues. Because of workers compensation, it 
was extremely difficult for workers to sue employers who had exposed them to 
dangerous chemicals. Workers Compensation had been enacted in the early 
twentieth century as a means of providing workers with compensation for injuries 
incurred on the job – and, later, for work-related health effects. But it also was a 
means of protecting industries from lawsuits brought by injured or diseased 
workers. Workers were assured a small sum of money, but in return they gave up 
the right to sue their employer in court. Industry was not protected, however, from 
consumers who could, under product liability laws, sue manufacturers for defec-
tive products. The need to protect industry from suits by users of vinyl chloride 
products was foremost in the minds of executives as they considered the implica-
tions of Maltoni’s, Viola’s, and even their own research. What was the potential 
exposure for their industry from possible suits by consumers? Which products 
were worth continuing to produce and which were too risky? Which products 
could be abandoned without financial loss to the growing plastics industry? From 
the minutes of a December 1971 “planning group”, we learn that this ad hoc body 
developed a set of “principles” for its research in which the search for truth was 
secondary to protecting the industry: First, there was “the need to be able to 
reassure the public that polyvinyl chloride entails no risk to the user”. Second, that 
workers needed to be reassured “that management was concerned for, and diligent 
in seeking, the information necessary to protect their health”. Third, research had 
to serve the purpose of developing “data useful in defense of the industry against 
invalid claims for injury for alleged occupational or community exposure”.45 
In the aftermath of Maltoni’s research discoveries, industry had to do something 
about its potential liability if its products were proven dangerous. The industry’s 
actions with regard to aerosol propellants are an interesting case in point. Vinyl 
chloride monomer was used not only to create polyvinyl chloride plastics but also 
as an aerosol propellant in a variety of consumer products. Vinyl chloride was 
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first used as an aerosol propellant in Japan in 1958.46 By 1959, the Dow Chemical 
Company was considering using VCM as a propellant in hairsprays, insecticides, 
room deodorants, and spray paints. Dow expected that its market for vinyl 
chloride monomer in aerosols to be about 10 million pounds annually and did not 
believe that the current TLV of 500 ppm would be problematic for them.47 But, 
ten years later it was becoming clear that 500 ppm could pose a danger. B.F. 
Goodrich, after the experience with acroosteolysis, acknowledged privately that 
“the people in the cosmetics trade have been concerned about the possible 
toxicity” of vinyl chloride propellants. Measures of vinyl chloride in the air of hair 
salons had indicated that the “average concentration of VCl monomer is 250 ppm 
by volume”. While this was bad enough in light of earlier recommendations by 
Dow that the TLV be lowered to 50 ppm, Goodrich worried that “in some cases 
where the duration of spraying is long (3 minutes) the concentration may be as 
high as 1,400 ppm”. The implication was frightening. Both beauticians and their 
customers were being “exposed to concentration of VCl monomer equal to or 
greater than the level in our [polyvinyl chloride plants]”.48  
Nonetheless, vinyl chloride was used as an aerosol propellant at least until 
sometime in 1974. Only then, after Maltoni’s research, did the MCA’s research 
coordinators argue that “serious consideration should be given to withdrawal from 
this [aerosol] market since value of the product was limited and potential for liabi-
lity great”.49 One participant at the meeting stated the issue succinctly:  
If vinyl chloride proves to be hazardous to health, a producing company’s 
liability to its employees is limited by various workmen’s compensation laws. 
A company selling vinyl chloride as an aerosol propellant, however, has 
essentially unlimited liability to the entire U.S. population.50  
Awareness of evidence of the dangers of chemicals to the broader public was 
becoming more widespread as reflected by actions on the part of the government. 
In May 1973, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) suspended approval of 
the use of PVC bottles for packaging whiskey and wine. Because of the Delaney 
clause, the FDA, which had previously not regulated the use of vinyl chloride in 
food packaging, was forced to address the issue posed by the Viola studies and 
their indication of carcinogenic and other health effects.51 In January 1973, the 
FDA obtained information that the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, 
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Tobacco and Firearms, which had been testing liquor bottles since November 
1968, had found that plastic bottles were leaching vinyl chloride monomer, 
creating an unpleasant taste in alcohol products. When the FDA followed up with 
more sophisticated tests, they confirmed that “vinyl chloride monomer migrates to 
alcohol in PVC bottles used to package distilled spirits and wine”.52 In the end, the 
FDA established a much more stringent safety standard for consumer food 
products than existed for the safety of workers in the factory or among community 
residents subjected to environmental pollution. The FDA’s regulation placed the 
burden of proof on industry to show that food additives were non-carcinogenic. In 
the case of the workplace and in the case of toxins released into the ground, air, 
and water, industry was held to no such standard. Workers and neighborhood 
residents had to prove a substance dangerous. The FDA ultimately banned the use 
of vinyl chloride for liquor bottles because it knew “of no studies which establish 
a safe level of consumption when this monomer is leached from containers into 
alcoholic foods”.53 
The chemical industry’s commitment to objective science and public access to 
information was tested in January 1973 when the National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (NIOSH) published a “Request for Information” on the 
potential hazards of vinyl chloride in the Federal Register. NIOSH was preparing 
a document on the appropriate and safe exposure levels to vinyl chloride and 
sought information about the potential health hazards of this product from all 
quarters – scientists, corporations, public health officials, and others.54 This re-
quest for information put tremendous pressure on the MCA members as they 
sought to develop a common position concerning the health risks of vinyl chlo-
ride. NIOSH was a relatively new government agency and its mandate to establish 
“Criteria Documents” that would guarantee a safe work environment meant that 
safety and health standards, previously a private matter for individual companies 
and their trade association, were now in the public sphere. Industry faced a serious 
dilemma over NIOSH’s request for information. In order to maintain its influence 
with the agencies that regulated it, industry would need to comply with the request 
but would be providing NIOSH with information that would lead the agency to 
recommend regulations that were anathema to industry. In this context, Dow’s 
vice-president, George J. Williams, believed that the information should be re-
vealed to the government because  
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it would be extremely damaging to the chemical industry reputation if some-
one should discover that we have this information and have not disclosed it to 
the government.55  
The MCA, as an organization, even acknowledged that it had a “moral obligation 
not to withhold from the government significant information having occupational 
and environmental relevance”, specifically Maltoni’s new findings, in a detailed 
memo to all its management contacts on March 26, 1973. It also recognized that 
by taking the initiative in sharing information the MCA could forestall the 
embarrassment that would result if the information eventually became public and 
caused a scandal.56  
But the MCA also recognized that the confidentiality agreement it had recently 
made with the Europeans inhibited any free interchange of scientific findings with 
government. This posed a moral and political dilemma for the industry. Would the 
American industry be willing to fulfill what they considered to be their moral 
obligation by revealing Maltoni’s findings to the United States Government, even 
if it meant violating the trust between the American chemical companies and their 
European brethren?57 Or would it keep vital information secret from the govern-
ment and the public, and thus prevent public health authorities from having the 
information they needed to pursue a rational public policy?58  
In the Spring of 1973, the MCA agreed on a plan that would both maintain their 
secrecy agreement with the Europeans while, at the same time, giving the appea-
rance of responding to NIOSH’s request for information. Rather than waiting for 
NIOSH to contact the organization, the MCA called to set up a meeting with 
Marcus Key, NIOSH’s new administrator, whose role was to provide OSHA with 
state-of-the-art scientific information that could be used to establish regulations to 
insure safe and healthy working conditions.59  
In May 1973, the MCA began to plan for its meeting with Key and the NIOSH 
staff, now scheduled for July. The pressure on the MCA was enormous because at 
that very moment OSHA was announcing emergency standards for fourteen other 
potential carcinogens, and industry had initiated a suit to forestall its implemen-
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tation.60 From the first, its Task Group on Vinyl Chloride Research and the Vinyl 
Chloride Research Coordinators were aware that  
a significant element for consideration […] was the development of an alter-
nate presentation in the event that the release of European data cannot be 
negotiated with reasonable dispatch.61  
The MCA lawyers briefed the members “on their responsibilities and obligation 
under the confidentiality agreements…”. The lawyers’ “admonishments” were 
that the American companies “should not volunteer reference to the European 
project or substantive data derived therefrom”, but if asked a direct question, they 
should answer it.62 Given that the European experiments were not known to 
NIOSH, there was little danger that a question could be formed that required such 
an answer. They also decided that the MCA Research Group would not volunteer 
information regarding “potential hazards” that involved consumer safety since 
NIOSH was “concerned with employee health matters” alone.63 It appears that all 
references to consumer safety issues, particularly aerosol propellants, were re-
moved “at the insistence of UCC [Union Carbide] and Allied [Chemical] because 
it was not ‘a worker-exposure problem except for beauticians and can-fillers’”.64 
As Robert Wheeler of Union Carbide explained:  
Hazard to UCC’s interests exists if vinyl chloride is declared to be a carci-
nogen or if vinyl chloride monomer is detected by FDA in food exposed to 
vinyl chloride monomers as film, coatings, or gasketing.65  
Perhaps most troubling to the MCA representatives was the realization that the 
March 26th MCA letter “to Company Contacts” which acknowledged “a moral 
obligation” to inform NIOSH about Maltoni’s studies was a legal minefield. They 
feared the letter could be interpreted to indicate that the industry was planning to 
mislead the Government. According to Wheeler, the memo “could be construed as 
evidence of an illegal conspiracy by industry if the information were not made 
public or at least made available to the government”.66  
The industry was not only concerned about Maltoni’s results leaking out. They 
also planned not to tell NIOSH about their own information that indicated that the 
threshold limit should be reduced well below the 500 ppm recommended in the 
Material Chemical Safety Data Sheet, and even below the 200 ppm level recom-
mended by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists. At 
the meeting the MCA decided to remove references to Dow’s recommendation 
that the TLV be reduced to 50 ppm for fear that the government would reduce the 
TLV even further.67  
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The policy to keep quiet about Maltoni’s studies influenced the plastics in-
dustry’s public statements as well as their private preparations for the NIOSH 
meeting. As these preparations were in progress, Modern Plastics, the industry 
trade magazine, published an article about the potential problems that industry 
could face from NIOSH’s program to develop new criteria for testing the dangers 
posed to workers by various chemicals. In a long review of potential problems for 
the chemical industry, the article noted that vinyl chloride monomer had come 
under new scrutiny as a result of “recent animal studies conducted in Italy (at an 
elevated exposure level of 30,000 ppm)” that had led the MCA to study VCM’s 
“potential hazards”. Nowhere in the article is there reference to Maltoni’s discove-
ries of angiosarcomas in animals at 250 ppm (“What’s next…” 1973, p. 56).  
Throughout the early summer of 1973, the Americans continued to meet among 
themselves and with the Europeans to plan the presentation to NIOSH, scheduled 
for July 17th. On June 15, 1973, the Europeans met and “agreed that the MCA 
would be given permission to reveal to NIOSH data arising from the Bologna 
study”. But, three weeks later, Montedison, the Italian producer of vinyl chloride, 
let its European counterparts know that this was unacceptable.68 Dr. David P. 
Duffield of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) came to the United States to 
inform the American producers that the Europeans decided to keep the informa-
tion secret. Whatever moral qualms some of the American vinyl producers had 
had, evaporated. The Europeans and Americans decided on a much more prag-
matic plan for protecting the industry. They would “comply” with NIOSH’s 
request for information but do so in a way that was less than thorough and 
diverted attention from the seriousness of what was known. If pressed by the 
NIOSH people, they should “acknowledge Maltoni’s data” but point out that 
“Maltoni had done his work only with rats, whereas [future research by] the MCA 
[…] calls for mice and hamsters as well”. The American chemical industry 
planned to provide NIOSH only with information about what they were finding in 
their own animal and epidemiological studies “in very general terms without 
leaving any written information”.69 The goal of the meeting was to make sure that 
the agency would “take no precipitous action now”. Furthermore, “We should 
recommend no shift in priorities” and at the meeting “our people [should] get off 
the topic of animal work as quickly as possible”.70 
The July 17th meeting took place at 1 p.m. at the NIOSH offices in Rockville, 
Maryland. Five industry representatives met across the table from five govern-
ment scientists. Dr. V.K. Rowe of Dow, Dr. William E. Rinehart, of Ethyl, Robert 
N. Wheeler of Union Carbide, and George E. Best of the MCA represented the US 
industry. Dr. David P. Duffield of ICI represented the Europeans. (Dr. Tiziano 
Garlanda of Montedison, the Italian vinyl producer, was unable to attend.) Dr. 
Marcus M. Key, the Director of NIOSH, and members of his staff, Dr. Keith 
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Jacobson, Richard B. James, Dr. Donald Lassiter and Dr. Frank Mitchell repre-
sented the US government. The meeting was polite, collegial, and seemingly 
open. The American and European vinyl producers presented an apparently com-
plete and forthright description of the industry and any potential problems. In fact, 
only the industry knew how skewed, deceptive and distorted the presentation was. 
Dr. Rowe made the formal presentation, speaking from pencilled notes. He began 
by emphasizing the size and scope of the vinyl chloride industry and described the 
industry’s efforts to address the health concerns about acroosteolysis and cancer. 
Dr. Duffield went on to describe the “exhaustive” studies of vinyl chloride and 
polyvinyl chloride workers at ICI’s European plants that revealed no “indication 
of hazard”. He also described Dr. Viola’s published research that had identified 
cancers in the rat’s zymbal gland – a gland that did not exist in humans – and in 
the lung; he reassured NIOSH that “none of the observed lung tumors were 
primary tumors”. He also referred to other on-going research that confirmed 
Viola’s studies while pointing out that “the program is still in progress and no 
firm conclusions [were] yet drawn”. No mention was specifically made of Maltoni 
and no mention was made of kidney or liver cancers. According to the MCA, 
when NIOSH’s Lassiter asked about the lowest concentration at which tumors had 
been observed, Duffield answered that nothing had been found below 250 ppm.71 
According to the notes taken by NIOSH’s Richard James, however, although the 
industry told of Viola finding cancers at 30,000 ppm, there was no mention of 
tumors at 250 ppm.72  
Of special note was a question raised by Dr. Jacobson of NIOSH. Jacobson had 
received a phone call asking him why it seemed so hard “to purchase vinyl chlo-
ride for use as an aerosol propellant”. Avoiding any indication that concerns about 
liability from its use in consumer products like hair sprays had led to its removal, 
Dr. Rowe of Dow and Dr. Rinehart of the Ethyl Corporation simply stated they 
were “no longer selling it for this purpose”. They implied that the use of VCM in 
aerosol cans was not very important because it had “been used in this way only in 
relatively small quantities in paint and lacquer spray cans” and that it was likely to 
be “discontinued altogether by the end of the year”.73 In truth, however, vinyl 
chloride was used much more widely. At least 3.5 million cans of aerosol pro-
ducts, including drugs, pesticides and cosmetics “containing VC [were] in the 
possession of manufacturers, distributors, and consumers’ in January, 1974”.74 
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Although the manufacturers did not admit it to NIOSH, they understood that the 
potential liability problem was truly immense. True to their earlier plan, the com-
panies left little other than previously published or reported materials: a single 
sheet summary of the vinyl industry; the single sheet ACGIH TLV report; the 
MCA’s Material Safety Data Sheet for vinyl chloride (an 18-page booklet); the 
condensed protocols for the MCA’s animal and epidemiological studies; and the 
MCA’s news releases on these studies.75  
At the close of the meeting, Dr. Rowe went off to a separate office and spoke 
with Marcus Key. According to Wheeler, “this private discussion of the carci-
nogen problem was worth the whole effort”.76 NIOSH asked “to be kept fully 
appraised of the on-going work both the US and the European industries have in 
progress” believing that they had been brought up to date on the status of know-
ledge up to that point.77 
At the end of the day, the MCA and its various companies were ecstatic about 
the meeting and reported that “the chances of precipitous action by NIOSH on 
vinyl chloride were materially lessened”.78 The word that spread to member com-
panies whose representatives had not attended the meeting was that “no problems 
were encountered” and the “presentation was well received and appreciated”.79 
Leaving the government with the impression that the companies were on top of 
the issue and that research up to that point had not indicated any serious problem 
with cancers among workers, the industry had accomplished its most difficult 
objective. It had appeared forthcoming and responsible to NIOSH officials with-
out violating the agreement of secrecy with their European counterparts regarding 
the Maltoni studies. The industry had avoided the issue of environmental danger 
in consumer products, remained silent on the primary liver and kidney cancers 
observed in the European experiments, and not mentioned the industry’s own 
concern that the 200 ppm threshold value for vinyl chloride exposure was not 
adequate, while raising questions about the significance and even the integrity of 
Viola’s work and reassuring NIOSH that there was no indication of danger to 
workers. In short, the industry had managed to completely pull the wool over the 
eyes of NIOSH regarding the dangers to workers and consumers alike from vinyl 
chloride. 
Almost immediately following the meeting, however, the industry’s position 
that vinyl chloride was safe began to erode. Newspapers in Europe, and later in 
the United States, spoke of a very different reality. An article published in an 
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Italian newspaper quoted Dr. Caputo, one of Dr. Viola’s collaborators in the 
original cancer studies, as saying that vinyl chloride was responsible for the recent 
concerns among some 40,000 workers in European vinyl chloride plants. Caputo 
said that dozens of workers had already died as a result of exposure and that it was 
potentially a huge environmental as well as occupational hazard. Responding to 
the view that “only” 40,000 workers were at a small risk of developing disease, 
Caputo had replied that “the menace applies to everybody […] and [is] particu-
larly hazardous in containers for foodstuffs […] in filters for artificial kidneys, in 
cardiac valves”. The MCA translated the article and circulated it to its Task Force 
on Vinyl Chloride as a way to alert the industry to the fact that information about 
the dangers of vinyl was leaking out.80 
Around this time the MCA, recognizing that the issues of occupational and 
environmental cancers were not going away and that it was only a matter of time 
before events might occur which could threaten the industry’s careful manage-
ment of the problem, wrote to its member companies that a greater level of coordi-
nation of the entire industry, both American and European, was necessary.81  
“Plastic Coffin” 
In January 1974, the nation learned that vinyl chloride monomer, an essential gas 
used in the production of polyvinyl chloride, had been implicated in the deaths of 
four workers. A rare cancer, angiosarcoma of the liver, had struck down the 
workers at the B.F. Goodrich plant in Louisville, Kentucky. Throughout the 
nation, newspapers reported that polyvinyl chloride, a seemingly benign and inex-
pensive replacement for wood, metal, and even wax paper in the homes and work-
places of millions of Americans, was now a possible deadly threat. Joe Klein, 
writing on the discovery of angiosarcoma in Rolling Stone, called the PVC plant a 
“Plastic Coffin” (Klein 1976).  
Dr. John Creech, who was still doing exams at the plant where he first 
identified acroosteolysis, had reported his concern over employee liver problems 
to Dr. Maurice Johnson, Goodrich’s Director of Environmental Health.82 After 
reviewing plant records, Creech discovered that four workers had died from 
angiosarcoma of the liver, among the rarest of cancers, a disease previously asso-
ciated with heavy metal poisoning and arsenic. Usually accounting for fewer than 
two dozen deaths in the entire United States in any given year, the occurrence of 
four deaths from angiosarcoma of the liver in a population of less than a few 
hundred workers at one plastics plant was truly alarming. These deaths were 
especially worrisome because this rare cancer was “identical to that seen in the 
European rat feeding studies” conducted by Maltoni, something that the industry 
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had failed to let NIOSH, or even Dr. Creech, know about. Dr. Creech and Dr. 
Johnson met with Dr. Tabershaw of Tabershaw Cooper Associates, then in the 
midst of an epidemiological study of vinyl workers for the MCA.83 The informa-
tion that Creech had revealed was terrifying to Goodrich’s management. On a 
Sunday afternoon, top executives met in Akron in what was described as “absolu-
tely [a] crisis”. All day lawyers, management, and physicians discussed the vast 
implications of the medical findings, including the company’s liability. Finally, at 
7 PM, President Thomas of Goodrich decided that the only thing to do was to let 
the information out immediately (Blackford & Kerr 1996, p. 333). According to a 
private memo by another company’s official, “At the insistence of Dr. Creech, 
[they] decided to reveal the information [about the angiosarcoma deaths] to the 
authorities and the industry”.84 On January 22, Goodrich informed NIOSH of the 
deaths, and NIOSH then informed OSHA.85 In all, Creech and his associates 
documented eleven cases of hepatic disease, including seven cases of angio-
sarcoma of the liver identified among the men employed at the plant, with the 
earliest diagnosis dating to almost ten years earlier, in April, 1964.86 Four of the 
workers died between 1968 and 1973, the very period when the decision to 
mislead the government was taking shape.87 All the victims had been “pot 
cleaners” in their careers at Goodrich. Pot cleaners climbed into tanks no more 
than six feet across and ten feet high “to chip polymer residue off the inside 
surfaces. Their only source of fresh air was a 2-foot opening at the very top of the 
deep tanks” (Schanche 1974, p. 19).  
The industry responded to the crisis by preparing “a low key statement for the 
press”, to be released if pressed, and drafting a letter to Marcus Key of NIOSH 
“reaffirming industry support and cooperation as offered in the meeting with 
NIOSH last summer”. 88 Initially, the reaction of Goodrich was to report that their 
practices at the Louisville plant were unexceptional and that the air in the plant 
and, hence, the exposures to vinyl chloride, were “generally 15-20 ppm with 
excursions above 50 ppm”, levels well below the existing TLV.89 Later this 
estimate would change dramatically. 
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But within three weeks, the vinyl chloride producers gathered together in 
Cleveland under the auspices of the Vinyl Chloride Safety Association to assess 
the problems facing the industry.90 According to Goodrich’s officials, other 
chemical companies were not pleased with the company’s decision to reveal the 
information to NIOSH. One official recalled that “Goodrich was not a hero in the 
chemical industry” and was “given a fair amount of harassment”.91 The companies 
discussed means to limit the amount of VCM workers were exposed to and to 
more closely monitor VCM levels in the air of its plants.92  
It would not be until months later that the hint of scandal and cover-up would 
be raised. Six months later, government officials came forward with information 
that they had been deceived by the industry in its meetings the previous July. 
NIOSH Director, Marcus Key, reported that he had personally been misled by the 
MCA at the critical July 1973 meeting set up by industry to appear compliant with 
NIOSH’s request for information. The MCA had led him to believe that the only 
information it possessed regarding cancer was that derived from the Viola studies 
which indicated that tumors were only “induced at very high levels of vinyl 
chloride” and primarily affected “the Zymbal gland”, which did not exist in 
humans.  
At this meeting, [Key asserted] there was no mention of angiosarcoma of the 
liver in humans or animals, no reference to production of liver tumors in 
animals by another Italian investigators and no reference to Professor Cesare 
Maltoni by name.93 
Industry knew that Key’s statement could mean that the industry would lose any 
influence it had in the developing controversy over the angiosarcoma deaths. The 
statement implicitly accused the MCA of having conspired a year earlier to deny 
critical information regarding vinyl’s toxicity to NIOSH, the federal agency 
responsible for establishing safe work practices. Although members of the vinyl 
industry wanted to refute and argue with Key about the meeting, they feared such 
a debate would bring attention to the issue. They decided to avoid a fight and hope 
it would just go away. A.W. Barnes of ICI was explicit in not wanting “any more 
public commotion over this…”.94  
But NIOSH officials were unwilling to let the matter drop, for with the Water-
gate scandals and the impeachment hearings of Richard Nixon playing out in the 
background, the public was more than ready to see corruption and scandal at 
every level of government. According to J. William Lloyd, NIOSH’s Director of 
Occupational Health Surveillance and Biometrics, there was a pervasive “ques-
tioning [of] the integrity of our public officials and scientists who are deeply 
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dedicated to protecting the health of the worker”. Lloyd believed that industry 
took advantage of the public’s heightened skepticism about government to attempt 
to deflect attention from themselves by circulating rumors that government offi-
cials had kept secrets. In an angry letter to A.W. Barnes of ICI, Lloyd accused the 
chemical industry of misstating the facts regarding the meeting with NIOSH on 
July 17, 1973. He was particularly irked that the British chemical trade association 
maintained in a press release that “American industry and government (NIOSH) 
were told” of Maltoni’s work. He argued that  
as best as I could determine no representative of NIOSH was ever made aware 
of these findings prior to January 22, 1974, and even on that date, they were 
transmitted with the stipulation that they be kept confidential.  
He believed that the British chemical industry release had been “intentionally mis-
leading since it was at variance with the facts as I knew them”. Further, he be-
lieved that the MCA was also trying to avoid responsibility by releasing a 
“chronology of events that also inferred that NIOSH had been given the same 
information”. He was, “to say the least, very upset”, and when asked by a British 
television interviewer his “reaction to the [British] statement that NIOSH had 
been informed”, he responded “I would characterize those making such statements 
as ‘damn liars’”.95  
Because of continuing pressure from Key and Lloyd, Barnes finally responded 
privately to Dr. Lloyd with a long, convoluted argument. He acknowledged that 
the industry had not revealed the critical information from the Maltoni studies, but 
insisted it had acted in good faith. He asserted that the British had gone to the 
NIOSH meeting fully intending to reveal any information they had about 
Maltoni’s studies, but since NIOSH had not asked about the studies, they assumed 
that NIOSH was not interested. Barnes maintained that Duffield, the European 
representative at the meeting,  
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was a guest at a formal meeting between NIOSH and MCA and, as such, it 
would have been improper to force the meeting into detailed discussions 
which it appeared not to want.96  
Barnes rejected Lloyd’s assertion that anybody had knowingly misled the US 
government and insisted it was all a big misunderstanding. Barnes asserted that 
the Europeans had “attempted to get the right actions taken throughout Europe 
and the USA as soon as the possible significance of Maltoni’s findings were 
appreciated”,97 although he offered no explanation of what the Europeans had 
done to accomplish this. Whatever his intent in sending this response to Lloyd, 
Barnes’ letter was an admission that the vinyl industry had failed to mention at the 
meeting with NIOSH what it knew from Maltoni’s studies – that primary angio-
sarcomas and other tumors had been caused by vinyl chloride. 
The story of vinyl chloride is a cautionary tale of industry’s duplicity and mani-
pulation. It shows that only after the issue had become national news did the 
industry act to protect workers by reducing their exposure to vinyl chloride 
monomer. At last the story is out. But it is unfortunate that it took almost thirty 
years for the true dimensions of its history to emerge. 
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8: The Identification and Regulation of Asbestos as a Hazard  
of Insulation Work in the USA 
Peter Bartrip, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford, UK 
 
In recent years, a number of myths have held center stage in the history of occupa-
tional health in the asbestos industry. For example, some observers have 
suggested that the danger of asbestos was obvious even before the material came 
into widespread use (Kotelchuk 1987; Castleman 1996). It has also been claimed 
that obvious hazards were ignored because industry sought commercial success 
heedless of the cost to workers’ health. Business was allegedly aided in this ende-
avor by unscrupulous doctors and incompetent, if not callous, regulators and 
politicians (Greenberg 1994). Furthermore, such were the profits to be derived 
from asbestos that the industry supposedly could not be bothered to develop sub-
stitutes even though it was well aware of the havoc wrought by its raw material 
(Jeremy 1995). Without claiming that all companies and individuals behaved 
impeccably at all times, this chapter maintains that the version of history outlined 
above deserves to be regarded as little more than a caricature. Although this argu-
ment cannot be fully developed and documented in the space available here, it is 
one of the main themes of this chapter. The other is to demonstrate that the USA, 
though often considered slow to introduce occupational health reform, was actu-
ally a trailblazer in some areas. 
In order to provide an international context for American developments, the 
chapter begins by summarizing the history of asbestos-related disease and its 
regulation in the United Kingdom. First, though: what is asbestos? Such is the 
extent to which the material has been demonized that it might be thought that it 
could only be a product of the laboratory. In fact, although it exists in several 
different forms, all are naturally occurring minerals. These minerals possess many 
unique properties, including resistance to water, heat, fire, corrosives and electri-
city. They can be spun into thread and woven into cloth. Above all, asbestos is a 
superb insulator, fire retardant and ingredient of many automobile components, 
including brake linings. Consequently, for much of the twentieth century it was a 
highly useful, not to say indispensable, material that found its way into literally 
hundreds of different products. Consumption rose accordingly including in the 
USA (Table 8.1). 
Table 8. 1. Raw Asbestos Consumed in the USA (short tons, ten-year intervals) 1919–79. 
Year Consumption 
1919 139,312 
1929 264,873 
1939 255,547 
1949 532,708 
1959 754,045 
1969 784,321 
1979 560,600 
Source: US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbooks. 
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Although repeated suggestions have been made that the ancient Romans knew 
about the danger of asbestos, such suggestions have been shown to be fanciful 
(Browne & Murray 1990). In reality, the first suspicion that asbestos dust might 
be hazardous to the health of workers in asbestos factories arose in a few reports 
of the British factory inspectorate in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Subsequent inquiries failed to substantiate these suspicions. As a result, 
it was only in the mid-1920s, with the publication of a handful of articles in the 
medical press and the occurrence of several fatalities that the possibility of an 
occupational health problem for asbestos factory workers was seriously enter-
tained (Bartrip 2001). In 1928–29, an inquiry undertaken by two British factory 
inspectors found that exposure to high concentrations of asbestos dust over a 
protracted period could produce a fatal form of pulmonary fibrosis known as 
“asbestosis.” One of these inspectors, Charles Price, proposed a range of engi-
neering solutions to prevent such exposure. After consulting asbestos manufac-
turers and the Trades Union Congress, the British government enacted the Asbes-
tos Industry Regulations in 1931. These regulations, which remained in effect 
until 1970, sought to ensure that workers deemed to be at risk, that is, asbestos 
factory workers whose employment regularly brought them into contact with high 
dust concentrations, were safeguarded (Bartrip 1998). Some observers have 
alleged both that these regulations were introduced after protracted delay and that 
they were almost worthless because manufacturing interests unduly influenced 
them (Wikeley 1992; Greenberg 1994). 
In fact, for many years it appeared that the 1931 Regulations had effectively 
“solved” the asbestosis problem in Britain. In 1955 Donald Hunter, one of the 
leading figures in occupational medicine in the second half of the twentieth 
century, wrote that the 1931 Regulations had “been effective in controlling” 
asbestosis (Hunter 1955). In the same year, the medical statistician, Richard Doll 
(now Sir Richard), wrote of the “infrequency” of asbestosis and of the “great 
reduction in the amount of dust in asbestos works” since the regulations were 
implemented (Doll 1955). Also in 1955, Georgiana Bonser et al. pointed to the 
impact of the 1931 Regulations and recorded their expectation that severe cases of 
asbestosis, and perhaps associated cancers, would cease to occur (Bonser et al. 
1955). 
The year 1955 was significant in the history of asbestos related-disease, because 
it was then that Doll established that a second disease, lung cancer, could be a 
consequence of asbestosis (Doll 1955). Although there had been suggestions of a 
causal link between lung cancer and asbestosis before this date, Doll’s study pro-
vided confirmation. This was alarming, for it now appeared that not one but two 
diseases were associated with asbestos work. However, Doll’s paper was also 
reassuring for it pointed out that in the asbestos factory studied it was “clear […] 
that the incidences both of asbestosis and lung cancer [author’s emphasis] have 
become progressively less” since introduction of the 1931 Regulations. Doll 
thought this especially significant given the huge growth in lung cancer rates in 
the general population in the course of the twentieth century (Doll 1955). 
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In the late 1950s and the 1960s, two new variables entered the asbestos/health 
equation. First, it began to appear that the population at risk included not only 
people who worked in dusty occupations in asbestos factories but other workers, 
including those who did not work in factories at all, for example, shipyard 
workers (Selikoff et al. 1964; McVittie 1965–6). Although there had previously 
been isolated suggestions that such workers might be at risk, only towards the end 
of the 1950s did the evidence begin to look persuasive. Then, in the 1960s it was 
shown that even members of the public who lived close to asbestos factories faced 
an excess risk of incurring an asbestos-related disease (Newhouse et al. 1965). 
Therefore, it became clear that the 1931 Regulations did not go far enough. 
This brings us to the second of our new variables, for in the 1960s it was also 
established that asbestos dust was causally linked to a third disease, mesotheli-
oma, a cancer of the pleura or peritoneum (Bartrip 2001). Painful and always 
fatal, mesothelioma may be associated with brief and light exposure to asbestos 
dust.  
Because of these developments, the British government set about revising the 
1931 Regulations with a view to protecting all workers – principally by seeking to 
reduce dust exposure to safe levels. Although one scientist described the resulting 
Asbestos Regulations, 1969 as “the strictest in the world”, asbestos regulation was 
extended in the 1980s and 1990s – partly in response to media pressure. By the 
end of 1999 virtually all remaining uses of asbestos had been banned in Britain 
(Bartrip 2001). 
In Britain, central government regulation of occupational health and safety goes 
back at least as far as the first half of the nineteenth century. This long tradition 
contrasts with US experience. Before the passage of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act in 1970, “American occupational safety and health policy […] empha-
sized voluntary action” (Noble 1986). Employers set standards and workers parti-
cipated, if at all, by engaging in collective bargaining, taking industrial action or 
changing jobs. The role of labor unions was minimal. Some states intervened in 
matters of industrial safety as early as the nineteenth century, but “[c]overage was 
uneven” and “comparatively primitive.” In these circumstances reliance was 
placed on an “insurance system [that] was supposed to create incentives for em-
ployers to prevent hazards and provide injured employees with financial com-
pensation”. It is now widely agreed that this system did not “function as inten-
ded.” Anyway, in all of this, little emphasis was placed upon health, as opposed to 
safety (Page et al. 1973; Ashford 1976; Noble 1986; Aldrich 1997).  
With some exceptions, the federal government’s pre-1970 role was modest. In 
the 1930s, under Roosevelt’s New Deal, the Bureau of Labor Standards was 
established to promote health and safety at work. The 1935 Social Security Act 
provided the Public Health Service with funds to allocate to states and cities for 
research and other purposes. The one example of federal regulation was the 1936 
Walsh-Healey Act. Though mainly concerned with wage rates, this act specified 
that materials and equipment supplied for the performance of government con-
tracts valued at over $10,000 were not to be manufactured under unsanitary or 
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hazardous working conditions. Dust standards were even promulgated under the 
Act in 1942 (Berman 1978; Corn 1988; Rosner et al. 1989). Then, in January 1943 
the federal government established a set of Minimum Requirements for Health and 
Safety for civilian workers in naval and maritime shipyards. Although these re-
quirements ended soon after the Second World War, they are important as the first 
major attempt by the federal government to improve occupational health and 
safety for a mass workforce (Minimum Requirements 1943). 
Among other things, the Minimum Requirements addressed the question of 
asbestosis among insulators. The Requirements did not emphasize asbestos 
hazards; they placed far more stress on accidents and such dangers as welding. 
But they were the first regulations anywhere in the world that sought to protect 
workers not employed in an asbestos factory from contracting asbestosis. Before 
their enactment little concern had been expressed anywhere that insulation 
workers might be at risk of contracting asbestosis. So, why did this code include 
measures to protect such employees? The answer is provided by America’s 
involvement in the Second World War. 
America’s war effort entailed unparalleled expansion in naval construction and 
an expectation that “new problems in industrial hygiene” would emerge due to the 
employment in dangerous trades of a vast and inexperienced workforce of some 
1.75 million people or more. In some yards, 90 per cent of the workers had no 
shipbuilding experience; many were women who had never before worked outside 
the home (Drinker 1943; Selikoff et al. 1979; Corn 1992). The war also involved 
an enormous expansion in asbestos use – especially following the loss of the air-
craft carrier Lexington, when it caught fire in the Battle of the Coral Sea in 1942. 
Efforts to improve industrial hygiene in the shipyards by means of the Minimum 
Requirements were motivated partly by humanitarian concern and partly by a 
desire to protect “human capital” at a time of national crisis. 
In 1942, a hygiene survey of shipyards uncovered a number of potential health, 
welfare and safety problems including, in a very few cases, concerns about asbes-
tos (Drinker 1943). Following this survey, the Maritime Commission and US 
Navy convened a conference in Chicago. This was attended by union officials, 
shipyard owners, medical experts from universities, and navy specialists (Steno-
grapher’s minutes 1942). The conference resulted in unanimous agreement on 
minimum requirements of health and safety for shipyards holding government 
contracts. One union representative termed these requirements “the finest things I 
ever read” (Official Transaction 1944). 
A few of the Requirements focused upon asbestos. It was agreed that jobs 
involving use of asbestos could “be done safely” provided three precautions were 
observed. These suggestions included the “segregation of dusty work”; local 
exhaust ventilation or the wearing of respirators; and periodic medical exami-
nation. Assistance in applying the Requirements was provided by safety and 
medical consultants who inspected shipyards. These inspections generated 
hundreds of reports, most of which have been preserved in the US National 
Archives (Minimum Requirements 1943). 
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The reports placed little emphasis on asbestos. In a few instances potentially 
hazardous conditions and even a few cases of asbestosis were discovered. 
Although these discoveries were thought to provide “no cause for alarm,” four of 
the consultants carried out a study towards the end of the war to ascertain whether 
shipyard insulation work involved an asbestosis risk. The resultant paper, pub-
lished in 1946, was the first epidemiological study anywhere in the world into 
asbestos-related disease in a non-manufacturing context. Its main finding was that 
insulation work in the shipyards surveyed was safe, provided that workers did not 
stay in the same job for too long and provided those exposed to heavy concentra-
tions (even comparatively briefly) were protected by exhaust ventilation and 
respirators (Fleischer et al. 1946). Only in the 1960s did it become clear that these 
conclusions were over-optimistic. 
During the 1950s, with the exception of a handful of references worldwide, the 
published medical literature remained largely silent about asbestosis among 
people not employed in asbestos manufacture. It is likely that this silence reflected 
a continuing consensus that the disease was rare and associated only with lengthy 
exposure to high levels of dust. As late as 1968 a British medical inspector of 
factories observed not only that asbestosis was “not a common disease,” but that it 
was usually associated with workers who had been “substantially exposed” (Doig 
1968). If asbestos-related disease was caused by heavy and prolonged exposure, 
as many suggested, insulation workers apparently had little to fear, particularly if 
they wore masks or worked with dampened materials. As Irving Selikoff et al. 
noted in 1964, not only did much insulation work take place in the open air, but 
also insulation products normally contained either small quantities of asbestos or 
no asbestos at all. In consequence, insulator exposure was “limited” and “inter-
mittent” (Selikoff et al. 1964). Only in the 1960s – partly as a result of large-scale 
epidemiological research undertaken by Selikoff and his colleagues – were the 
hazards of asbestos outside of asbestos factories established. Before discussing 
Selikoff’s work, which focused more on lung cancer and mesothelioma than 
asbestosis, let us consider the question of cancer, asbestos dust and insulation 
work before and during the 1950s. 
Richard Doll’s work in the mid-1950s demonstrated a causal relationship be-
tween asbestos dust and lung cancer, but only in the case of heavily exposed 
asbestos factory workers. Suspicions of a causal link between mesothelioma and 
crocidolite asbestos were first raised by researchers in South Africa in the 1950s 
(Wagner 1960; Wagner et al. 1960; Wagner 1991). In 1963 one of these resear-
chers, J.C. Wagner, spoke about the “incrimination of crocidolite asbestos as a 
cause of mesothelioma” (Wagner 1963). Although profound skepticism persisted 
in certain quarters (Willis 1967), Wagner’s opinion had been widely accepted by 
the end of 1965 (Cancer and Asbestos 1968). However, the work of Wagner and 
his colleagues focused on one type of asbestos in the particular region of South 
Africa where it was mined. No crocidolite was mined in the United States, and 
little was ever imported. As far as insulation workers were concerned, a few case 
studies of lung cancer were published in the 1940s and 1950s. However, no signi-
 83 
ficant epidemiological study of this workforce took place until Selikoff studied 
members of the Asbestos Insulators’ Union in the 1960s. This should not be con-
sidered “late” for such research to have been conducted. As Selikoff himself 
explained, it was difficult to study a relatively small workforce scattered amongst 
hundreds of employers spread throughout North America in groups averaging 
only some 17 workers per company (Selikoff 1970). Before Selikoff’s appea-
rance, even the insulators’ union had shown little interest in the health hazards 
faced by its members. 
In 1964 Selikoff, Churg and Hammond demonstrated “that asbestos insulation 
workers employed in the construction industry were subject to a significant cancer 
hazard” (Selikoff et al. 1964). A 1965 paper by the same authors showed that 
mesothelioma was “a significant complication of such exposure” (Selikoff et al. 
1965). The question then arose: what could be done to deal with the problems 
newly uncovered? 
Although there were some suggestions for the development of alternative 
insulation materials, the consensus in the 1960s and 1970s was for the intro-
duction of precautions that would allow asbestos to be used safely. This emphasis 
reflected the widespread opinion that asbestos was an indispensable material. 
Selikoff himself held this position long into the 1970s. In 1972, for example, he 
referred to “engineering procedures [that] will allow asbestos to be used safely” 
(Insulation Hygiene Progress Reports 1972). What he did not do was propose a 
ban on asbestos. Even as late as 1976, he described asbestos as irreplaceable 
(Duluth Herald 1976). 
In 1968, following meetings with representatives of organized labor and the 
asbestos industry, Selikoff secured substantial grants from the asbestos giant 
Johns-Manville and the union to establish an Insulation Industry Hygiene Re-
search Program (IIHRP). The program sought: 
1. “To develop improved methods for minimizing exposure of insulation 
workers to dusts and fumes” and 
2. “To disseminate knowledge of […] improved methods of dust control […] 
and to offer […] assistance toward their universal adoption” (Insulation 
Hygiene Progress Reports 1969). 
 
Selikoff was enthusiastic about the program. He welcomed the co-operation of 
labor, industry, medicine and government in tackling an industrial hygiene prob-
lem. He praised the insulation industry and in 1971 predicted that the “serious 
problems in the insulation industry […] can be solved” (Insulation Hygiene 
Progress Reports 1971). 
With the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act in 1970, the federal 
government assumed a central role in all of this. At the end of 1971 the Depart-
ment of Labor issued an Emergency Temporary Standard for asbestos. Among 
other things, this specified a Permitted Exposure Limit (PEL) of five fibers per 
milliliter of air (Federal Register 1971). Although some union leaders regarded 
this as “stringent,” organized labor pushed for a standard of 2ff/ml. In June 1972, 
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following investigations by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and 
Health and by an Advisory Committee of the Department of Labor, as well as 
extensive public hearings, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) set the “permanent standard” at 5ff/ml. Simultaneously, it announced that 
the PEL would be reduced to 2 ff/ml in July 1976. From the outset, no employee 
was to be exposed, for any period of time, to asbestos dust concentrations in 
excess of 10ff/ml (Federal Register 1972). 
In view of the division of medical opinion that existed, this outcome might be 
viewed as a reasonable compromise between the demands of business and organi-
zed labor. OSHA believed that any “conflict in the medical evidence is resolved in 
favor of the health of employees” (Federal Register 1972; Mintz 1984). Not all 
parties agreed with this appraisal. Paul Brodeur, a journalist who wrote a series of 
exposés about the asbestos industry in the New Yorker, considered that OSHA’s 
final decision favored business (Brodeur 1972; Brodeur 1974). On the other hand, 
the academic Steven Kelman has argued that “OSHA decided for the threshold 
limit value that labor favored but chose to delay the effective date by three years” 
(Kelman 1981). Although organized labor challenged the 1972 decision, the 
courts substantially affirmed OSHA’s standard. Therefore, both this and the 1976 
standard went into effect as planned. Only in the 1980s, as in the UK, were these 
standards subject to further revision. 
In conclusion, in the early 1940s the United States pioneered the protection of 
insulation workers in shipyards. Some cases of asbestos-related disease occurred 
in insulation workers in the 1940s and 1950s and some of these were published, 
but only in the mid-1960s did a major epidemiological study show that insulation 
workers risked incurring asbestos-related diseases. The leading researcher in this 
work, Irving Selikoff, believed that precautions could be devised to deal with 
these hazards. Neither he nor the union wanted to ban asbestos. From 1968, with 
funding from business and organized labor, Selikoff directed the IIHRP. During 
the late 1960s and 1970s this seemed to be producing good results in terms of 
tackling health hazards. Many observers considered that OSHA regulations intro-
duced in 1971 would reduce asbestos dust exposures to safe levels. Whether, in 
these circumstances, the insulation industry merits criticism for failing to intro-
duce substitute materials or to take other steps at an earlier stage is a moot point. It 
seems fair to conclude that the industry should not be viewed in monolithic terms. 
In other words, the actions of individual firms need to be separately assessed. 
Some insulation companies were also major producers of insulation products – 
Johns Manville is the prime example. Large-scale producers employed medical 
and industrial hygiene personnel, whereas firms that operated on a relatively small 
scale or exclusively as insulators did not. In the absence of federal intervention 
until the early 1970s, there is an argument that asbestos producers, if not the 
union, should have alerted the insulation industry at large to the occupational 
health hazard that it faced. 
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9: From Balloons to Artificial Silk: The History of Carbon 
Disulfide Toxicity 
Paul Blanc, Division of Occupational and Environmental Medicine,  
University of California, San Francisco, USA  
Background 
In 1892, Dr. Frederick Peterson, Chief of Clinic of the “Nervous Department” of 
College of Physicians and Surgeons, published a report of three cases of carbon 
disulfide-caused delirium in the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (later re-
named the New England Journal of Medicine). He concluded his paper with the 
following critique (Peterson 1892):  
I have delayed in publishing these cases for some years, thinking that I might 
hear of other similar ones, or that I might acquire more information from the 
owners of the factory or from doctors in attendance upon their employees, but 
it is astonishing what a large amount of ignorance and secretiveness develops 
among the authorities connected with any factory, when questions arise as to 
the unhealthful conditions under which the operatives pursue their vocations. 
More than one hundred years after Dr. Peterson’s observations were published, 
the degree of ignorance related to carbon disulfide is as pronounced as ever. The 
history of carbon disulfide has been the story with a recurring theme: an episode 
of concern emerges as the dangers of carbon disulfide are recognized. Then, over 
time, fears are allayed by a false sense of security that the exposure either has 
been brought under strict control or even that it has been eliminated altogether. 
Later, new concerns are brought to the forefront again by another outbreak of 
disease. Much of the cyclical nature of carbon disulfide exposure and accom-
panying disease has been dictated by changing use patterns driven by technologic 
innovation. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the technologic applications 
of carbon disulfide and the changing patterns of illness that these applications 
have brought. 
Early Chemistry 
Carbon disulfide was, at first, a mere laboratory curiosity noted by the founding 
generation of organic chemists in the eighteenth century. Carbon disulfide is a 
relatively simple molecule comprised of carbon and sulfur, but its structure con-
fused early investigators because of the absence of hydrogen, oxygen, or nitrogen, 
at least one of which was usually present in carbon-based substances. Although 
carbon disulfide does exist in nature in trace amounts, it was unknown until first 
synthesized by Lampadius, a German chemist, who reported his findings in a brief 
letter published in 1796 (Lampadius 1796). He described the newly discovered 
substance as an alcohol of sulfur, so denoted because of its volatile, liquid form. 
This novel material proved difficult to reproduce experimentally, but remained 
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intriguing to investigators (Chenevix 1805). It caught the attention of Humprhy 
Davy, who later interested one of his young protegees, Alexander Marcet, in 
analyzing its structure (Davy 1808; Berzelius & Marcet 1813; Marcet 1813). In an 
important collaboration with the Swedish chemist Berzelius during his pivotal 
visit to England in the summer of 1812 (Leicester 1970), Marcet and Berzelius 
conclusively worked out the elemental constituents of carbon disulfide, which 
they termed “sulphuret of carbon”. In this series of experiments, the potent solvent 
properties of the compound became evident. Moreover, its propensity to vaporize 
was also manifest. This property was later to prove essential to the toxicity of 
sulphuret of carbon. In a footnote to their paper in the journal Philosophical 
Transactions, Berzelius and Marcet remark (Berzeleius & Marcet 1813), “The 
volatility of this liquid is very remarkable; it exceeds considerably that of ether”. 
Sulphuret of carbon, which through the evolving chemical nomenclature of the 
period came to be called bisulphide of carbon, might have remained little more 
than an experimental oddity, had it not been for a single, yet critical, industrial 
application of the 1840s. In the first decades of the nineteenth century any number 
of practical applications of new chemical discoveries were investigated. Although 
many of the successful commercial applications occurred in the United Kingdom, 
the science of applied chemistry was particularly vital in France, reflected in a 
series of texts such as those of Chaptal, Payen, and Regnault. Of these, Chaptal’s 
text does not even mention bisulphide of carbon (Chaptal 1807). Payen, in the first 
edition of his text in 1849 (just on the eve of carbon disulfide’s industrial debut), 
alludes to the compound only through a footnote that briefly describes some of its 
properties, including its ability to dissolve sulfur (Payen 1849, pp. 74–75 [foot-
note]). By 1851, however, Regnault devoted over 15 pages to carbon disulfide, 
including detailed advice on methods to synthesize the material in bulk (Regnault 
1851, pp. 382–388). 
Carbon Sulfide in the Rubber Industry 
There was reason for carbon disulfide’s new importance. On the March 25, 1846, 
Alexander Parkes filed a British patent for a new process for treating India-rubber 
in order to render it both malleable and stable for a variety of applications (Han-
cock 1857). The process was simple: the goods were dipped in a solution of 
carbon disulfide into which sulfur had been dissolved. The powerful solvent 
carried the sulfur into the rubber where it acted, without heat or pressure, to vulca-
nize the material.  
Parkes was a chemist and an inventor whose métier was another technologic 
breakthrough of the time, electroplating. It was this work that initially drew him to 
the potent solvent properties of carbon disulfide. In 1843, he patented a process 
for electroplating, particularly delicate objects, by first dipping them in phospho-
rous dissolved in carbon disulfide, followed by immersion in silver nitrate, before 
electrolytic deposition of metal. At one point, a spider’s web silver coated using 
Parkes’ method was presented to Prince Albert (Prosser 1959–1960).  
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Even though electroplating was a major Victorian industry, the financial stakes 
in the rubber industry were immense by contrast. Only a few years before Parkes’ 
innovation, the first chemical breakthrough in vulcanization had been patented 
separately in the United States by Goodyear and in the UK by Hancock for 
Charles Macintosh and Company (Pickles 1954–1958). This chemical reaction, 
the original “hot” vulcanization process, was the first that could convert natural 
rubber from a nearly useless product to a flexible, almost resilient, wonder-
material that would not become brittle and cracked in winter nor disintegrate in 
summer. Within the year, Hancock further consolidated his position by acquiring 
the patent for the new Parkes method as well. Hancock referred to this as a rubber 
“converting” process to distinguish it from “vulcanization”, but the semantic 
distinction did not hold (Hancock 1857, pp. 123–126, 256–270).  
The technology of hot vulcanization, linked to mechanical innovation in the 
heavy equipment needed for mixing and rolling the rubber feedstock, required 
large-scale factory manufacturing, an arena in which Macintosh and Co. could 
easily dominate. In contrast, cold process vulcanization was technologically 
simple and often took place in small-scale workshops producing items such as 
balloons, rubber toys, and other small consumer items. A similar application of 
carbon disulfide also allowed rubber sheets to be spliced together, either for 
simple repairs or for more complicated fabricating, for example, making tire inner 
tubes. Such small-scale manufacturing did occur in the UK, but found a particular 
niche in and around Paris. Because of the volatility of carbon disulfide, the simple 
technology of the process, and the small-scale, poorly maintained workplaces 
where the manufacturing took place, heavy exposure of laborers to carbon dis-
ulfide through inhalation and skin contact was almost guaranteed.  
The first cases of carbon disulfide toxicity began to be reported very soon after 
carbon disulfide was introduced in rubber working, with the index cases noted in 
France, which was consistent with the heavy use in this country. The symptoms of 
the unusual syndrome induced by carbon disulfide included headache, numbness, 
disturbed sleep, a feeling of drunkenness, and, in its most severe manifestations, 
madness in the form of mania.  
Auguste Delpech first officially reported the syndrome in a note read to the 
French Academy of Medicine at its meeting on January 15, 1856 (Acadamie de 
Medecine 1856). Even in this initial report, Delpech recommended prevention by 
forbidding altogether such work in small rooms and, in larger factories, reducing 
direct contact with carbon disulfide. Delpech followed this preliminary note with 
an expanded case report describing a 27 year-old named Victor Delacroix, whose 
specific job was dissolving rubber in carbon disulfide to patch and repair objects 
(Delpech 1856a). Previously in perfect health, within three months of first expo-
sure Delacroix began to experience a variety of complaints, predominantly neuro-
logical. The findings included motor weakness, described by Delpech as resemb-
ling that found in conjunction with lead colic. Delpech also made particular note 
that the patient’s “sexual desire and erections were abolished”.  
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In a nearly simultaneous publication, Delpech described responses in pigeons 
and rabbits experimentally exposed to carbon disulfide (Delpech 1856b). Another 
report published at about the same time and following Delpech’s delineation of 
the toxic effects of carbon disulfide described a 16 year-old named Bois (Beau-
grand 1856). It can be noted that this case description also concludes by high-
lighting the patient’s ongoing sexual impotence.  
After this initial flurry of publications on carbon disulfide, little else appeared 
until Delpech’s voluminous 118-page paper in the Annales d’Hygiene Publique, 
Industrielle et Sociale (Delpech 1863). In this publication, Delpech documents 24 
case histories, emphasizing, in particular, the psychiatric aspects of intoxication. 
In the psychosexual arena, the effects described include both impotence and, 
especially in women, heightened arousal.  
Carbon Disulfide Hysteria 
The clinical-scientific interest in the effects of carbon disulfide on the nervous 
system, epitomized by Delpech’s rigorous, yet fundamentally descriptive app-
roach, coincided with the great French advances in neurology and the emerging 
discipline of psychiatry in the nineteenth century. Within the neurological para-
digm, toxic insults presented a specific cause and effect from which general 
principals could be extrapolated from the empiric evidence. For example, 
Esquirol’s classic early text on insanity (Esquirol 1965 [1845], p. 41) specifically 
addresses the effects of lead, noting, 
The vapor of lead, produces in Scotland a species of insanity, in which the 
maniacs lacerate themselves at every opportunity and which the Scotch 
peasants call, mill-reeck. 
As models of psychiatric disease began to develop further, however, the observed 
effects of neurotoxins were reinterpreted to conform to theoretical constructs, 
rather than serving to challenge fixed assumptions. Carbon disulfide, with its aura 
as a sexual toxin, even an aphrodisiac, held a particular allure for Charcot and his 
circle, as they promoted their novel concepts of psycho-neurological disease sub-
sumed under the new diagnostic classification of “hysteria”. Charcot featured 
carbon disulfide in his Tuesday Lesson of November 6, 1888 (Charcot 1889), 
reviewing the work of Delpech published thirty years earlier, but also presenting 
at length the findings of his junior colleague Pierre Marie (later of the eponymous 
Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease). Marie had previously published a case of a female 
carbon disulfide-exposed worker with paralysis, sensory loss, and visual field 
deficits. In his case report, Marie emphasized the sexual aspects of intoxication 
that were to be echoed by Charcot in his lesson. “Genital problems are, however, 
frequent in carbon disulfide hysteria, and can consist of genital excitation or, con-
versely, impotence” (Marie 1888).    
The fact that carbon disulfide was clearly a toxin with multiple effects on the 
nervous system was interpreted as supporting the view that “hysteria” could also 
be triggered by this cause. Indeed, lead and alcohol were also considered potential 
 91 
toxic triggers of hysteria (Gilles de La Tourette 1891, p. 109). Along with Charcot 
and Marie, Gilles de la Tourette and, later, Guillain were also interested in and 
wrote about carbon disulfide (Gilles de La Tourette 1882; Guillain & Courtelle-
mont 1904). The term Charcot’s carbon disulfide hysteria persisted as late as 
Lehman and Flury’s classic text on solvents, first published in German in 1938 
and later translated into English (Lehman & Flury 1943, pp. 298–302). The sexual 
mystique that surrounded carbon disulfide also remained well into the twentieth 
century. In Belgium, there were rumors that a special train car had been set aside 
to transport women workers exposed to carbon disulfide, so that they would not 
be brought into contact with other commuters on account of the workers’ licen-
tious behavior (personal communication, E. Kusters, University of Brussels, 
Belgium, September 19, 2001).   
Carbon Disulfide in the Nineteenth Century British Medical Literature 
Although the original patent was British and industrial applications of carbon 
disulfide certainly took place in the United Kingdom, fewer original observations 
on the subject of carbon disulfide toxicity were reported in the nineteenth century 
English medical literature. Nonetheless, British medical writers did contribute to 
the field, particularly in documenting carbon disulfide-related polyneuropathy and 
optic nerve deficits (Hadden 1886; Edge 1889; Opthalmological Society 1884). 
Benjamin Ward Richardson was one of the most notable British commentators on 
carbon disulfide. Richardson, a prolific writer on a variety of medical subjects 
including occupational diseases, authored a small popular book on occupational 
disease published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in which he 
wrote (Richardson 1879, p. 81):  
Toy balloon makers […] are subject to much danger from the inhalation of the 
vapours of bisulphide of carbon […] The workers become depressed in spirits, 
they lose appetite, they are emaciated, and some of them are actually rendered 
imbecile and insane.  
Ironically, despite these dangers, Richardson (an early animal rights advocate) 
was a great promoter of the use of carbon disulfide for the painless euthanasia of 
unwanted pets (Richardson 1884). 
One of the most vivid descriptions of working conditions in carbon disulfide 
vulcanization was published in Thomas Oliver’s massive text, Dangerous Trades 
(Oliver 1902). Although a multi-authored work, he himself drafted the chapter on 
the specific subject of carbon disulfide. In writing of these workers Oliver relays 
one of the most telling anecdotes of nineteenth century industrial disease, describ-
ing how bars were placed on a second story opening of a factory to prevent the 
workers from killing themselves through defenestration (Oliver 1904):  
Some of them have become the victims of acute insanity, and in their frenzy 
have precipitated themselves from the top rooms of the factory to the ground. 
In consequence of bisulphide of carbon being extremely explosive, vulcani-
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zation by means of it has generally to be carried on in rooms, one side of 
which is perfectly open. This open front is usually protected by iron bars. 
It was also the British cold vulcanization industry that gave the English language 
the first use of “gassed” as a passive verb to mean poisoned by inhalation, noted 
in an 1889 Liverpool Daily Post item stating (Simpson & Weiner 1989): “Gassed 
was the term used in the india-rubber business, and it meant dazed.”  
Viscose Rayon 
In the 1890s, just as cold vulcanization was falling under somewhat better control 
and carbon disulfide disease outbreaks were becoming infrequent, if not rare, a 
new technology emerged requiring far greater quantities of carbon disulfide than 
ever had been used in vulcanizing. This new industry was artificial silk manufac-
ture.  
Artificial silk would prove to be the first mass market success brought to twen-
tieth century consumers by the chemical industry – a synthetic polymer dry-run 
for plastics. In the first thirty years of the twentieth century, artificial silk manu-
facturing worldwide expanded more than 100-fold, with much of the growth in the 
first decade following World War I (Darby 1929). Such a brave new product 
required a name sleeker than artificial silk. The appellation glos was proposed at 
one point, but did not take hold. In 1924, with the United States by then leading 
the pack in worldwide production, the National Retail Dry Goods Association of 
America recommended a new name for the product, rayon (Simpson & Weiner 
1989).   
Although several different chemical processes allowed conversion of the abun-
dant and cheap starting material cellulose pulp into a finished textile product 
rivaling silk, the most widely used approach, then and now, is called viscose. 
Viscose synthesis is entirely dependent on carbon disulfide as its key manufac-
turing constituent. Within only a few years of the introduction of this new techno-
logy, the first cases of carbon disulfide poisoning due to artificial silk production 
were reported in the scientific literature.  
This time it was American physicians who alerted the medical community to 
these “index” cases, all of whom were presented in the late winter of 1904 and 
were employees of the new Artificial Silk Works in Lansdowne, Pennsylvania, a 
Philadelphia suburb (Jump & Cruice 1904–1905; Francine 1905). One of these 
case reports includes an insightful review of the literature, along with an astute 
critique of carbon disulfide hysteria as a diagnostic entity (Jump & Cruice 1904–
1905): 
In most of the cases, in addition to the symptoms of neuritis, there have been 
seen the peculiar manifestations of hysteria, and in some of the milder ones the 
hysteria has been the prominent feature. This has led Pierre Marie to say that 
hysteria is the chief thing in this disorder. But in reviewing a number of cases 
one is stuck constantly with the appearance of those symptoms which deter-
mine peripheral neuritis of toxic origin.  
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The initial US publications calling attention to carbon disulfide as an emerging 
risk in the new artificial silk industry were followed by a long hiatus in the medi-
cal literature, despite the massive increase in rayon manufacturing that was taking 
place over this period. Alice Hamilton’s 1929 text on industrial toxicology, for 
example, devotes ten pages to carbon disulfide, but only a single page to the 
potential risks of rayon manufacture, referring to her own case experience along 
with the two publications of a quarter century before as her only citations for the 
industry (Hamilton 1929, pp. 360–370). In the contemporaneous volume Labor 
and Silk, Grace Hutchins gives attention to both the economics and the health 
hazards of artificial silk, but does not mention carbon disulfide or its risks 
(Hutchins 1929).  
In 1928, the Lancet carried a small item in its Parliamentary Intelligence section 
quoting the Home Secretary. In response to a query on health conditions in artifi-
cial silk factories, Sir William Joynson-Hicks stated (Anonymous 1928): 
I have received reports by the Medical and other Inspectors of Factories who 
have been visiting these works. It appears from these reports that the condi-
tions generally are satisfactory, but cases of conjunctivitis have occurred at 
one or two works, and there have also been some cases of dermatitis. Suitable 
precautions have been taken in each case and the hon. Member may be assured 
that the conditions will continue to receive the special attention of the Medical 
Staff. 
His reassurances would seem inconsistent with the data already accumulating at 
the time of this statement. In his final work on occupational medicine, published 
after his death, Sir Thomas Legge described the changing epidemiology of carbon 
disulfide intoxication (Legge 1934, pp. 120–122). Until 1926, Legge had been the 
Senior Inspector of Factories. He noted that between 1925 and 1931, 16 cases of 
carbon disulfide poisoning had been reported in Great Britain. Of these, eleven 
had been among workers in churn-room processing of artificial silk, with the 
earliest case reported in 1925, three years prior to the Home Secretary’s reassu-
rances that minor eye and skin problems were the only hazards of the trade. Legge 
also noted two additional cases in another emerging manufacturing process also 
dependent on carbon disulfide – transparent paper. This consumer product, like 
viscose-process artificial silk, is still made today using carbon disulfide, and, like 
rayon, is known by its trade name (first introduced in 1912) – cellophane (Simp-
son & Weiner 1989).  
As the 1930s progressed, multiple case reports began to appear documenting 
hazards of the rayon industry attributable to carbon disulfide. Some of the richest 
occupational medical literature on carbon disulfide emerged from Italy (Negro 
1930). As shown by Carnevale and Baldesseroni in their analysis of carbon disul-
fide-related disease in this period in Italy, the political-economic state apparatus in 
the Fascist period was an important contributor to large-scale over-exposure, 
despite firm medical evidence of the hazards of carbon disulfide (Carnevale & 
Baldesseroni 2001). Similar issues also came to the fore in Nazi Germany, where 
increased hazards due to rayon production were acknowledged at the highest 
94 
levels as a necessary expedient in intensified production of armaments and related 
matériel (Proctor 1999, p. 118). One of the most thorough investigations of carbon 
disulfide toxicity in the rayon industry of the period was carried out by Dr. Alice 
Hamilton (Hamilton 1943, pp. 287–399). One of her chief collaborators in the 
investigation, which was based in Pennsylvania, was Dr. F. H. Lewey, the exiled 
former chief of Institute for Neurological Diseases in Berlin (Lewey 1941). Dr. 
Hamilton took great pride in this study and particularly in the irony of being able 
to present some of the results (prominently acknowledging Dr. Lewey as her co-
author) at the VIII International Congress for Industrial Surgery and Occupational 
Disease (Hamilton 1943, pp. 360–370). This was the last such international occu-
pational health meeting before World War II, and it was held under Nazi aegis in 
Frankfurt-am-Main in 1938. 
Perhaps the darkest chapter in the history of carbon disulfide involved a rayon 
plant, Widzewska Manufaktura, established by the Germans in occupied Lodz, 
Poland and which operated from February 1941 until January 1945. After more 
than a hundred cases of carbon disulfide poisoning (among 600 exposed), in 1943 
the authorities directed that any of these forced laborers becoming ill would be 
sent directly to a psychiatric facility. Most, if not all, were later killed (Paluch 
1948). 
Carbon Disulfide since 1950 
In the last 50 years, increasingly sophisticated epidemiologic studies have identi-
fied a number of additional hazards associated with carbon disulfide, over and 
above the central and peripheral neurotoxicity linked to the chemical since the 
nineteenth century (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 1996). In 
particular, a causal association has emerged between carbon disulfide exposure 
and both altered lipid metabolism and cardiovascular disease. Other toxic effects 
are also suspected, including potential teratogenicity. Even in terms of neurolo-
gical effects, case reports continue to underscore the complicated nature of carbon 
disulfide’s toxicity (Frumkin 1998; Graham 2000).  
Many thousands of workers continue to be exposed to carbon disulfide around 
the world. Many of those exposed work in production facilities located in less 
economically favored regions, although significant consumption in industrialized 
countries also continues. For example, just under 200 million pounds per year are 
used in the United States (Honeywell 2000). 
Moreover, new sources of carbon disulfide exposure continue to be introduced. 
Although carbon disulfide is rarely, if ever, used directly in modern rubber manu-
facturing, it is a major chemical precursor of accelerator chemicals that are critical 
to the industry. Thus, 15 per cent of the carbon disulfide consumed in the US goes 
into the manufacturing of these rubber industry materials, with potential exposure 
to those employed in the chemical manufacturing sector (Honeywell 2000). 
Carbon disulfide, which had been employed in the past as an agricultural fumi-
gant, has generally been phased out of this application. Yet, similar to the trans-
formation in rubber processing, carbon disulfide is now used to as an intermediate 
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in the manufacture of other pesticides. The most important of these is metam 
sodium, a widely used fumigant for field crops such as potatoes, tomatoes, and 
strawberries. Metam sodium came to public attention when a large rail transpor-
tation spill in Dunsmuir, California in 1989 exposed hundreds of people to the 
fumigant and its principal breakdown product, an irritant chemical called methyl 
isothiocyanate (Pruett et al. 2001). It is less generally known that another by-
product of metam sodium’s use is its precursor, carbon disulfide. Indeed, environ-
mental release of carbon disulfide from all sources combined appears to be a 
major source of toxic chemical pollution. In 1993, for example, the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory documented 93 million 
pounds of carbon disulfide pollution, ranking it the largest toxic chemical emis-
sion overall in the US (US Environmental Protection Agency 1995). 
Nor is inhalation the only potential route of exposure for carbon disulfide. In 
the nineteenth century, despite the growing awareness of its toxicity, preparations 
containing carbon disulfide were a part of the standard pharmacopoeia: one accep-
ted prescription for rheumatism called for carbon disulfide combined with alcohol, 
four to six drops, every two hours (Griffith & Thomas 1859, p. 451). Lest this 
appear quaintly ill-advised, however, a far more important source of pharma-
cological carbon disulfide continues to be prescribed in the form of disulfiram, 
which remains the cornerstone of aversive therapy for ethanol dependence (Swift 
1999). The disulfiram effect is mediated by the build-up of acetaldehyde through 
inhibition of alcohol’s metabolism. Disulfiram itself is metabolized to carbon 
disulfide, which may account for some of the drug’s acute and chronic toxicity 
(Ellenhorn 1997, pp. 1356–1362). 
Summary 
Carbon disulfide is a highly toxic chemical with a long history of multiple indus-
trial, agricultural, and consumer applications. From making balloon’s to spinning 
rayon fibers, with each new technological innovation involving carbon disulfide 
new outbreaks of disease have occurred. The medical-scientific literature repeat-
edly “rediscovers” the hazards of carbon disulfide, sometimes reinterpreting the 
unusual constellation of its toxic effects in order to fit theoretical constructs of 
disease. Despite its long and dangerous history, carbon disulfide remains in wide-
spread use and continues to pose a threat to many thousands of unsuspecting 
persons around the world. 
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10: Sven P. M. Forssman: A Swedish Pioneer of Occupational 
Health and a Bridge Builder of ICOH 
Gideon Gerhardsson, Professor Emeritus, Stockholm 
Occupational health should aim at: the promotion and maintenance of the 
highest degree of physical, mental, and social well-being of workers, in all 
occupations; the prevention among workers of departures from health caused 
by their working conditions; the protection of workers in their employment 
from risks resulting from factors adverse to health; the placing and mainten-
ance of the worker in an occupational environment adapted to his physiolo-
gical and psychological equipment and, to summarize: the adaptation of work 
to man and of each man to his job (ILO/WHO 1950). 
In the gallery of ICOH pioneers the Swedish physician and scientist Sven Forss-
man is an outstanding profile, a cornerstone in the history of Swedish occupa-
tional health. He opened the doors for continental impulses into Swedish working 
life and initiated national and international research and development that broad-
ened the framework of mutual understanding and started a dialogue with and 
among more advanced countries. Forssman was one of the architects behind the 
above cited definition of occupational health. His writings cover a very dynamic 
period of change and renewal influencing the working life at large. (Forssman 
1959, 1966, 1985). This paper places Sven Forssman’s work within the context of 
the Swedish and international developments in occupational health.  
Background 
Sweden is a large country with a small population. With just below nine million 
inhabitants, there are less than 20 people per km2. Of these, four million are gain-
fully employed. 
The industrial history of Sweden is relatively short. However, some remarkable 
contributions have been made to the common European development of occupa-
tional health and safety, particularly the activities of the labor market parties 
(Forssman 1985). Although changes in Swedish working life may mirror the 
impact of new technologies and the strong forces behind current trends, so, too, 
does the inherent resistance to change. In 1880 Sweden was a poor farming 
country, which in 1950 manifested itself as an advanced industrialized society, 
and in 1980 was designated as one of the so-called old industrialized countries, as 
compared to the newly industrialized countries, the young tigers.  
Although productivity, work and the working environment are three closely 
inter-related concepts, there is, on occasion, a lack of congruity in their reference 
frameworks (Forssman 1959). The provision of goods and service of the highest 
possible quality at the lowest possible cost is the prime objective of production 
and productivity. Job content and the standard of the work environment are 
closely allied to the aspirations and expectations of people at work. Work is not 
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epitomized by the pay check, but involves the satisfaction of a job well done and 
opportunities for self-improvement and advancement. It is not always easy to 
reconcile the concept of profitability with the adaptation of the job to suit the indi-
vidual. 
The performance of production is the determining factor in the availability of 
opportunities for creating pleasant and stimulating work. The cost of industrial 
safety and the structuring of the job content must ultimately be borne by produc-
tion. Efforts directed towards creating a viable synthesis of the concepts of 
productivity, work and a pleasant work environment are beset with controversial 
elements. In particular, these elements are conditioned by the divergence in the 
initial standpoint and outlook of the employer and employee.  
Agreements 
In all probability, Sweden is unique in the sense that the Swedish Employers 
Confederation – or SAF as it is known by its Swedish acronym – and the Swedish 
Trade Union Confederation – or LO – formulated rules governing cooperation in 
each individual sector of the economy at a very early stage. The two organizations 
set up joint organs of cooperation and employed their own experts for purposes of 
implementing their shared objectives. Initially after the turn of century they were 
generally instrumental in forcing this decision on the parties. 
A series of disputes, strikes and violent conflicts of interest characterized the 
labor market in Sweden throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Proposals for coercive 
legislation to stabilize conditions were put forward in several government study 
papers and parliamentary bills introduced by political parties. In this situation, 
SAF and LO elected to ward off government interference by securing industrial 
peace through the negotiation of voluntary agreements in the private sector. 
The most important document was the 1938 agreement to maintain industrial 
peace, the Saltsjöbaden Agreement, named for the place where it was signed 
(Forssman 1985; ALC 1989). The prime purpose of this agreement was to safe-
guard production and employment. Wage agreements negotiated by the two sides 
at the central level would be binding at the local level throughout the period of 
validity of the agreement. 
In a series of corollary agreements, the negotiating parties formulated their 
community of interest in three other fields in particular: industrial health and 
safety, occupational training and rationalization. A number of permanent joint 
councils were established: 
• The Joint Industrial Safety Council in 1942, 
• The Joint Industrial Training Council in 1944, and 
• The Joint Work Study Council in 1948. 
 
Through a series of agreements, councils and committees, the two sides had not 
merely secured opportunities for promoting constructive, mutual cooperation; 
funds were also allocated for engaging the services of qualified, external exper-
tise. This, in turn, necessitated the employment of in-house experts to formulate 
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the assignments: SAF engaged the services of Dr. Sven Forssman as medical 
advisor in 1939, while LO appointed its first medical advisor, Dr. Erik Bolinder, 
in 1964.  
Sven Forssman was born in 1911 in the old university city of Lund in southern 
Sweden. The family, having close relatives in England and South Africa, actually 
lived in the mainstream of global medical sciences. His father, physician and 
scientist, was known world-wide, among other things, as the originator of the 
Forssman antigene. From childhood Sven Forssman was used to sharing the 
dinner table with innovative talents from all parts of the world. He spent most of 
his summer vacations abroad. His father loved traveling, and the young Sven 
often joined him. 
Breaking New Ground 
Sven Forssman entered the field of occupational medicine through a biochemical 
portal. Following medical university studies and academic research in Sweden and 
Germany he successfully defended his doctoral thesis in Lund, Sweden: Studien 
über Umsatz und Wirkungen der Bernsteinsäure. His scientific talents were re-
markable, and in 1943, at the age of 32, the same age at which his father had 
reached such a position, he was appointed full professor at the National Institute 
of Public Health in Stockholm, Sweden. The institute was founded in 1938 but its 
development had been hampered by the Second World War. Initially the institute 
had three departments: public hygiene, occupational hygiene and food stuffs. Sven 
Forssman headed the occupational-related division. His first obligations included 
raising funds, and he successfully utilized his many contacts, particularly in the 
US (SIF 1938–66, 1968).  
Sven Forssman’s era of academic research and scholarly work was based on the 
philosophy that, when breaking new ground, only the most refined theories and 
research procedures should be practiced and that jointly by the biological, psycho-
logical and technical sciences. Production technologies were much more complex 
than could be judged from Safety and Health Regulations of that time. 
Research, Training and Information 
The duties of his department at the institute included research, training and infor-
mation (SOU 1937). Research laboratory studies and animal experiments were 
combined with field investigations. Wartime left a backlog of health risks from 
substitute materials and forced production. Substitutes for technical solvents, such 
as benzene, carbon-disulphide and various halogenated hydrocarbons, were spot-
lighted. Metals and metalloids, lead, mercury, cadmium and arsenic, appeared in 
new combinations, inorganic and organic. The production of synthetic rubber and 
man-made fibers and the use of biocides raised health issues. Owing to the short-
age of gasoline, producer gas from charcoal came into extensive use. The synd-
rome chronic carbon monoxide intoxication stimulated a debate among doctors 
that went on for two decades. 
 101 
Two alarming issues were industrial and traffic accidents. Available personal 
protective equipment did not meet expectations, and much work was done on 
respirators, eyeglasses, ear protectors and protective clothing. The safety belt for 
cars, later named the Volvo belt, was one of the spectacular research results 
(Andréasson & Bäckström 2000).  
One of Sven Forssman’s slogans was: “Let not new knowledge turn to dust in 
the archives: explain and use it in daily life.” The department’s doctoral theses, 
reports and books were widely distributed in schools, seminars, and training and 
information activities of all kinds (SIF 1938–1966). 
From the very beginning he received other part-time assignments as consultant 
and expert, both in Sweden and abroad. His talent at bringing the right people 
together in mutual endeavors made him influential in four international bodies that 
will be referred to later: the Permanent Commission (now ICOH), the Internatio-
nal Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Social Security Association 
(ISSA), and the World Health Organisation (WHO).  
Cultivating the Fields 
The ILO/WHO concept of occupational health from 1950, which extended the 
scope from “absence of illness” to: “…the promotion and maintenance of the 
highest degree of physical, mental, and social well-being of workers in all occu-
pations…”, was a forward-looking definition but was questioned in influential 
quarters. It was, however, an efficient practical tool in experienced hands. The 
SAF appointment in 1951 gave Sven Forssman a singular opportunity to test and 
to apply the broadened ILO/WHO definition of occupational health. 
He left his chair at the institute in experienced hands and started what was, in 
several respects, a new career as medical adviser to the Swedish Employers Con-
federation, which gave him a unique direct contact with the organized employers 
in the free world and also with several institutes and organizations beyond the iron 
curtain. In the new position his links to the national and international trade unions 
were strengthened. 
Cooperation 
Sven Forssman’s appointment by the employers also gave him opportunities to 
continue important research projects initiated during his tenure at the Institute of 
Public Health. During the decade 1950–1960 Sweden enjoyed full and sometimes 
more than full employment (ALC 1989). The labor market parties also provided 
financial backing. A few examples may serve as illustrations. 
A study of accident prone workers was extended to a comprehensive shop floor 
investigation in the iron and steel industry that resulted in a useful model for other 
industries (Hagbergh 1960). In a total-accident approach, the types, frequencies 
and conditions pertaining both to near-accidents and accidents that had occurred 
were mapped. Causal factors in the before-the-fact chain of events were identified. 
A removal of one of the main factors in the chain prevented or reduced the 
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number of accidents. Near-miss accident (incident) statistics were tested and came 
to be used effectively in preventive programs. The results could be read in a 
reduction of total accidents on the job, off the job and in traffic. 
A big issue was absence from work (Forssman 1961, 1965). Total absence from 
work, both long- and short-term, was studied. Sickness, sickness absence and 
social absence were studied in companies of different size and were related to 
workers’ age, sex, and type of work. The findings increased the interest of the 
labor market parties in occupational health services and impacted on the insurance 
bodies. The methods for collecting and evaluation of data provided food for 
further research. 
Much noted were Sven Forssman’s studies of occupational mobility and old age 
(Forssman 1946, 1957). The labor turnover differed from one type of industry to 
another. The pros and cons of the ageing population were visualized in a manner 
useful for the employer and the employee. 
Ergonomics 
The American concept, human factors in engineering, was launched in Sweden as 
ergonomics by production people but was vitalized by Sven Forssman’s own 
experiences from the US. The foundation was provided by Taylor-Gilbreth’s time 
and motion studies in the US in the early 1900s. From the late 1940s this approach 
was further developed and institutionalised as Methods, Time-Measurement 
(MTM). The Swedish MTM Association was founded in 1955. With strong 
support from Sven Forssman and his colleagues the MTM Association published 
in 1966 The Swedish Handbook of Ergonomics, which included broader British 
views of human performance. This book was named the production ergonomics 
bible (Forssman 1986). 
A leading role in the systematized industrial application was played by several 
big Swedish companies, members of SAF, particularly the Volvo Company. In the 
middle of the 1970s Volvo’s three car factories in Gothenburg, Skövde and 
Kalmar enjoyed much publicity. The whole production line received a new de-
sign. Abundant new handling devices were installed and teams replaced line 
assembly. Physical factors should no longer prevent women from working in most 
jobs. Participation of workers in decision-making was announced. In the develop-
ment of new car models appropriate components were to be scrutinized and app-
roved by ergonomics expertise from OHS. 
Psychological problems, not clearly recognized at the Institute of Public Health 
in the late 1940s, came to the fore over the years. Swedish experiences were fre-
quently presented internationally, such as in the two first WHO-seminars on 
mental health and industry-related psychiatry in 1952 and 1953, and in the ILO 
preparatory work for conventions and recommendations in the field. From the 
1950s stress and stress factors in working life became an increasing issue of its 
own. In 1952 SAF created the Council on Personnel Administration (CPA 1978). 
The council played an important role in research on psychological and socio-
logical problems at work. Their field studies were given wide publicity. In 1955 
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an industry-sponsored Institute for Physiology of Work was established, which 
catalyzed applied ergonomics. From the 1950s, stress and stress factors in 
working life became a prominent issue of its own (SOU 1973; Levi & Levi 2000; 
Levi 2000). In 1973, the laboratory for clinical stress research at the Karolinska 
Institutet was elected as WHO’s first global center for studying psycho-social 
factors.  
A Useful Umbrella  
Ergonomics became an umbrella term used to describe a variety of measures 
designed to adapt the job and work place to the aptitudes and limitations of man 
on the basis of anatomical, physiological and psychological knowledge (Forssman 
1986). The prime task of ergonomics lay in the deployment of suitable technical 
designs to render conditions at work as comfortable as possible for the individual, 
with job requirements pitched at a level compatible with the capability of the 
employee. 
Major tasks of ergonomics involved ensuring that weights, lifting, work posture 
and movement patterns are compatible with human biology. Due consideration 
was given to the person’s perception of his or her surroundings and behavior 
patterns in formulating the job description and structuring the work place, as 
typified by the layout of control consoles and instrument panels. 
As far as was possible, every effort was made to ensure that the right man was 
on the right job. Work could also be made easier through education, training and 
various administrative actions. The use of technical devices could go a long way 
towards offsetting deficiencies in ability and work capacity. Because people are 
creatures of change, efforts had to be made to incorporate an adequate level of 
flexibility in technical systems. Both output capacity and reaction times decline 
with advancing years. 
Thus, in ergonomics it became important to combine knowledge from both the 
human and the technical sciences to optimize the interaction between people, their 
work and the environment. This approach promoted both efficiency at work and 
the well-being of the individual.  
The main issue facing industrialized and developing countries is the problem of 
maintaining or increasing the level of productive work coupled with a reduction in 
a steady stream of attempts to improve work methods, machines, material and lay-
outs. Ergonomics has made a valuable contribution in the form of action to im-
prove health and promote safety and well-being. The study of ergonomics sets out 
the rules for equipment, machines, tools and body movement patterns. 
We must not loose sight of the fact that the statistical mean values quoted in 
manuals refer to a national average person, seldom, if ever, encountered in reality. 
The average figures quoted are too high for one half of the working population 
and too low for the other half. The work of planning and design should be based 
on the people with whom one is actually dealing. Due allowance should also be 
made for the difference in the physical attributes of men and women. 
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A sedentary position is the preferred posture for many types of work. The 
figures quoted in a variety of manuals for chairs and benches must frequently be 
adjusted for compatibility with the people who actually use them. Unfortunately, 
there are all too many poorly designed chairs on the market. 
The use of foot pedals frequently merits reassessment. Knee-action control 
may, on occasion, be more suitable than foot control for sedentary work. The 
coordination of eye and body movement is probably the task most frequently 
handled by ergonomics. A thorough understanding of one’s conscious perception 
of the surroundings is important, especially in the context of work calling for 
speed and precision relying on the coordinating function of the eye. 
Change and variation in work are important factors influencing the individual’s 
perception of his job. Periods of exertion must be followed by periods of rest and 
recovery. This requirement sets an upper limit on variations. In most cases, there 
are many ways of achieving variation, both in the job as such and in the environ-
ment in which it is carried out.  
All work needs a structural pattern that the individual recognizes and to which 
he is accustomed. The absence of such fundamental stability will instill a feeling 
of insecurity in the individual carrying out the work. The degree of such stability, 
however, varies considerably from one individual to another. Some people prefer 
relatively monotonous work, with all eventualities known in advance. Others 
prefer a good measure of the unexpected and look forward to its occurrence with 
stimulating anticipation. 
Thus, any discussion of the possibility of introducing variety to the job must be 
based on the premise that no two people are alike and that the individual’s need 
for change will vary. The fundamental structure of the technical system is of deci-
sive importance in determining the pressure to which an individual is subjected 
and the scope of variety which exists. 
Occupational Health Services 
The voluntary SAF-LO guidelines for company occupational health services 
(OHS) and occupational training became efficient tools for the shop-floor applica-
tions (Forssman et al. 1966). Staff members of company health programs were 
supposed to perform independent work on the basis of a scientific approach and 
proven experience under supervision of a joint committee. 
The technical part of the company health services was to be managed by an 
authorized safety engineer. The following factors were included: industrial safety 
and accident prevention; occupational hygiene; ergonomics (design of work-
places); environmental hygiene; and conservation of natural resources. 
The medical part of the company health services should be managed by a 
competent occupational physician and should contribute to achieving balance 
between job demands and the work capabilities of individuals and group employ-
ees. Covered factors included preventive medical measures, check-ups, first aid 
and minor medical treatment, and rehabilitation. Gradually even personnel from 
the behavioral sciences were tied to the teams. From the 1950s onward psycho-
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logical tests were often used as pre-employment tools within both the private and 
the public sectors. Standard-setting and training played an important role in the 
Joint Council’s many programs and projects. The trade unions accepted MTM 
standards (Methods-Time-Measurements) as measurement tools for rate-setting 
and for defining “a fair day’s work”. 
The Swedish model deviated from those of other European countries, where 
legislative measures received first priority. The models for occupation health 
services (OHS) included in-house OHS (large enterprises), OHS-area centers 
(small and middle-sized undertakings) and trade-OHS archetypes, such as for 
building and construction, farming and forestry (Forssman 1972). 
Eventually, increased efforts by the labor market parties to enroll small 
companies in OHS proved successful. In 1988, 80 per cent of the Swedish 
working population – four million gainfully employed – was covered. Some 
10,000 people, safety engineers, industrial hygienists, physicians, nurses, physio-
therapists and behavioral scientists, for example, were employed in the OHS with 
a total annual budget of three billion SEK. This point in history marked the peak 
accomplishment of an OHS aimed at serving all gainfully employed persons. 
Demanding Goals 
Health surveillance of employees was part and parcel of company health pro-
motion programs containing not only preventive technical, medical and psycho-
social aspects, but also ergonomic requirements aiming at an optimization of the 
employees’ work and work content (ALC 1989; Gerhardsson 1999). 
Classical primary prevention is the prevention of any clinical manifestations of 
disease. Secondary prevention is the early detection and treatment of such disea-
ses, and tertiary prevention is the avoidance of complications, including therapy 
and rehabilitation. Ergonomic targets go still further, covering physical overload 
in work (static and dynamic) as well as psychological load (mental over- and 
understraining).  
For the most part people have been regarded as somewhat inflexible compo-
nents in technical systems that are mainly focused on raising productivity and the 
technical quality of the product. Higher productivity has, in turn, determined what 
resources are available for social development in the community. This has 
resulted in the content of work being watered down in far too many cases: people 
have been forced to realize their human potential outside their work. Higher 
productivity has been partly achieved through greater standardization of manufac-
tured products and further division of work, which has at the same time led to 
higher pay. The contribution of the employee has been defined in the same terms 
as for mechanical components: time, power, speed of movement, reach. Once the 
skilled worker has learned the pattern of the job, the opportunities for further 
development of his skills have often been rather limited. 
Research into job design and the organization of production has largely focused 
on studying the effects of attitudes, job motivation and job satisfaction. In a 
number of studies it has been shown that such subjective variables can be of 
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considerably more significance for production result than the physiological para-
meters previously investigated. 
Technical Surveillance 
In the technical field it is the engineers themselves who best understand the varia-
bles that influence technical change, so they therefore have particular responsi-
bility for what happens. The role of the technologist today must not only be to 
solve technical problems, but also to contribute to the analysis of their human 
effects. 
The relationship of working environment factors to health which should be 
covered may be subdivided into five main categories that may be quantified: level 
of activity (physical and mental), physical impact (noise, vibrations, radiation, 
electromagnetic fields, climate), chemical impact (fumes, gases), biological im-
pact (micro-organisms) and social impact (man as a fellow being). 
Thus, health surveillance is closely connected with the technical planning of 
each job. Consequently, technical health surveillance routines should cover indus-
trial processes, equipment, instructions and work routines, and be based on the 
risk described and the exposure to the risk. 
Occupational hygiene surveys and routine measurements are used to determine 
the workers’ exposure and provide basic material for efforts to increase the quality 
of the work environment. Epidemiological studies need own appropriate strate-
gies. 
Technical supervision should involve all potential hazards and also include 
reliability assessment of protective systems. In the systematic management of 
technical surveillance of the work and working environment managers, safety 
engineers, doctors, trade union members and others are involved. The process-
dependent parameters should be used to structure the preventive efforts. 
Medical Surveillance 
Medical surveillance is based on pre-employment medical examination, sickness 
absence surveillance, interviews after absence and periodical health reviews. The 
interval between the health reviews can vary and the updating depends on health 
status and working conditions. In many cases the nurse performs most of the 
examinations. Indications of, say, obstructive airways disease, are brought to the 
attention of the doctor. Further action is individually linked to the health status 
and working conditions, and preventive measures to be undertaken are indivi-
dualized. Health screening schemes identifies highly susceptible individuals, such 
as those with obstructive airways disease. 
Psycho-social Surveillance 
The quality of life concept also has a “quality of working life” component. In a 
broad sense the quality of working life encompasses numerous factors: wages and 
hours, work environment, benefits and services, human relations, career and 
others. In a narrow sense it may be restricted to such positive individual values 
that can be gained by changes in work organization and increased work content. 
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As a part of health surveillance, work organization and work content are issues 
of increasing importance. Historically such aspects were defined as organizational 
problems to be dealt with by the personnel department and not a responsibility of 
the health and safety team. This philosophy is now changing. The need for consis-
tency and a closer connection to individual life style make assistance from the 
health team important. However, quality of working life issues must be under-
stood in the historical perspective, particularly with regard to the national eco-
nomy and culture. 
Stress reaction is the common name for physical and/or mental deviation from 
the body’s condition of equilibrium. Stress at work is caused by both under- and 
overloading. The experience of stress has positive as well as negative aspects 
(Hagbergh 1960; Levi & Levi 2000). 
All jobs need to have a structure that the individual knows and has become used 
to. If this underlying stability is missing, tasks are experienced as insecure. The 
demand for stability varies considerably from one individual to another. Some 
people prefer relatively monotonous work, where everything that can occur is 
known about in advance. Others want a greater element of unexpected situations. 
While they are young, people often accept less interesting work if it is well paid: 
pay is more important than job satisfaction. At later stages of life pay is often not 
so important; it is then more important to realize one’s aptitudes. The work has 
become routine, and there is nothing more to be gained as far as the content is 
concerned. 
Job enrichment, that is to say, assigning extra tasks, has shown itself to help 
some people, but it can cause stress for others. However, the values of many 
people change over the years. Such changes are linked to the individual and 
consequently of importance in health surveillance. 
Various attempts have been made to adapt work organizations to technical 
changes, but much remains to be done. Important questions are the distribution of 
responsibility and authority. A functional division of production used to be the 
predominant pattern. Various types of group or teamwork have been tried: for 
example, the production flow can be split up among a number of parallel work-
groups. This makes the work less tied and provides longer work cycles. 
Maintained Efforts 
The negotiating parties have maintained this community of interest over many 
years through the conclusion of revised and supplementary agreements. This 
cooperation on the labor market came under heavy attack in the 1960s and 1970s 
from opponents of confrontation politics, groups of environmental activists and 
others. The concept of profitability was singled out as a special target of attack. 
However, by the 1980s the negotiating parties – now three in number with the 
addition of the Negotiation Cartel for Salaried Employees in the Private Business 
Sector (PTK) – formulated a joint program for the 1980s and ratified it through 
several agreements. Three of these agreements are noteworthy in this context: 
• The Development Agreement (1982), 
• The Equal Opportunity Agreement (1982), and 
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• The Work Environment Agreement (1983). 
 
The Development Agreement identified the development and promotion of the 
efficiency of private companies, and the safeguarding of employment as issues of 
common interest to companies and employees alike. With the conclusion of this 
agreement the parties expressed their desire to promote the efficiency, profitability 
and competitive ability of private companies, to create conditions favorable to the 
maintenance of employment levels, job security and satisfying and meaningful job 
content. As in other quality programs, it required the active participation of all 
employees at a company. Work and the work environment were to be structured 
to reflect the statutory and negotiated requirements for a good working environ-
ment. The organization of work and the tasks allotted to the individual should be 
designed to ensure that the work assigned to the employee was as interesting and 
stimulating as possible. The employer was required to give an account of the 
considerations motivating the introduction of new technology, to list the technical 
and financial consequences, and to review its impact on employment and the 
environment. In many cases, this process required the participation of skilled 
experts. 
The Equal Opportunity Agreement set out the objectives and guidelines for the 
promotion of equal employment opportunities. The agreement stated that the pro-
motion of equal opportunities for men and women were an important objective. 
This applied to salaried staff and wage-earners alike. 
The Work Environment Agreement contained the rules governing activities 
related to the work environment, guidelines for company health programs and an 
agreement on occupational training. The agreement stated that a corporate health 
program should consist of a technical and medical section, both with special 
emphasis on the psycho-social element. Staff manning the company health pro-
gram should perform their work on the basis of a scientific approach and proven 
experience under the supervision of a joint industrial safety committee or com-
pany health program committee. Emphasis was placed on preventive action and 
rigorous precautions should be taken to assure the impartiality of company health 
programs. Issues related to the interpretation of the terms “scientific approach” 
and “proven experience” were referred to a national-level scientific committee for 
resolution. 
As an example of the integrative ambitions, the LO reported that it had graded 
all their 2.1 million members on a point scale for purposes of wage statistics. The 
point system took into consideration the nature of the work and a variety of 
environmental factors. The points were added up to provide a total to indicate 
level. The task of grading all members took five years. Each occupation was 
graded using following scales: 
1. Intellectual effort and concentration (1–3 points) 
2. Occupational responsibility and hazards (1–5 points) 
3. Person-to-person relationships (1–3 points) 
4. Job variation (1–4 points) 
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5. Physical effort and mental stress (1–4 points) 
6. Physical environment (1–4 points) 
7. Skill, educational background (1–15 points). 
 
A room maid in a hotel was graded at 14 points on the scale, a boilermaker in the 
construction industry at 23 and a professional driver at 25 points. 
The Emergence of a New World of Work 
Throughout the developments presented above Sven Forssman was the fore-
sighted promoter, and he was able to spread his message through many channels 
(Forssman 1952, 1960, 1974; Rantanen 1992). In 1957 the ICOH endorsed his 
proposal the organize scientific sub-committees. In a short period of time the 
number rose to more than 20 such scientific committees. They managed issues 
from daily safety and health to long time aspects of ageing and work (ICOH 
1986). 
In 1966 Sven Forssman left the Swedish Employers Association for a new 
challenge. In that year the Swedish Parliament decided that the main organizations 
in the Stockholm area should be transferred or coordinated into a new Institute of 
Occupational Medicine, and Sven Forssman was selected as Director General of 
the institute. He was also elected to formulate programs for a new Swedish Fund 
for workers protection paid by enterprise levies (Forssman 1970). 
In the reconstructed institute about 50 per cent of the capacity was devoted to 
research, 30 per cent to teaching and 20 per cent to service. The institute was 
organized into departments covering five main areas: medical, technical, physiolo-
gical, psychological and sociological, and a number of interdisciplinary working 
teams. Early diagnoses, multifactorial causes and epidemiology were new per-
spectives. The institute divided the research projects into four groups: occupa-
tional hazards; special working methods or production processes; work adjust-
ment; and vulnerable occupational groups. 
The state’s contribution to the financial support of a better working environ-
ment at large was manifested in 1972 in the establishment of the Workers Protec-
tion Fund, financed by employer levies (Oscarsson 1997). Of the fund’s annual 
budget, two fifths covered the cost for the National Board of Safety and the 
Institute of Occupational Medicine. During its existence, 1972–1992, the fund 
distributed more than 10 billion SEK. The three main sectors were research and 
development, education and training, and state-run institutions. To the contribu-
tions from the Workers Protection Fund was added the temporary Swedish 
Working Life Fund 1990–1995, also financed by employer levies, which initiated 
25,000 projects for workplace development. The total costs of the latter, indivi-
dual employers additional costs included, were around 33 billion SEK. Here the 
workers particular knowledge was highlighted in concept-driven changes of diffe-
rent types. The models included expert-, technology-, design- and communica-
tion-driven changes.  
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The rising welfare increasingly changed the expectations of jobs and the 
working environment. To the demand for safe and healthy conditions at work 
were added comfort and job satisfaction. Efforts were taken by industry in order 
to improve the working conditions and to change the organization of work to 
make jobs more attractive. Practical tests were undertaken in several factories and 
different new methods combining increase in production with job satisfaction 
were evaluated. In 1975 SAF presented conclusions from 500 experimental pro-
jects in Swedish companies from 1969 to 1974. Workers’ participation, new forms 
of supervision and job re-design were set in motion (SAF 1975). New tools from 
the quality movement came into use. In these workplace studies OHS criteria were 
frequently used but not always in the terms set down by the less flexible standar-
dized texts. 
Sven Forssman was an innovator and pioneer who was well aware of fore-
running paradigm shifts (Smith 1988). He left the Swedish National Institute of 
Occupational Medicine in 1972 for new, summarizing and concluding duties, 
mainly global (Forssman 1959, 1985, 1986). His many appointments as consultant 
to the WHO 1950–1972 at WHO headquarters and at the Regional Offices for 
Europe, Middle East, Far East and Western Pacific, ended with a permanent post 
for Europe, 1973–79, at the WHO office in Copenhagen. He also served as a 
consultant for Latin America and England, 1979–1982, linked to ILO’s regional 
offices. As an honorary member of the ICOH, he maintained close contact with 
ICOH activities. In reports and articles he recounted the progress at all levels, 
targeting research, service and teaching; new institutes, occupational health 
centers and company health services. Long-term and short-term needs were evalu-
ated and coordinated. The comprehensive teaching programs, in university-based 
and other institutes and in companies, included manpower training, under-
graduate, graduate and postgraduate courses, training in team work, continuous 
education and training. Different approaches to the introduction of occupational 
health and safety concepts to workers were tested and evaluated at both high and 
low levels of industrialization. 
Realities of Tomorrow 
The political pressure in force in Sweden from the middle of the 1970s ended the 
Saltsjöbaden era (Thörnquist 2003). The authorities became more policing and 
executed harder sanctions. During the first part of the 1990s and with the 
employers as driving forces, the central agreements between the labor market 
parties were successively dissolved. However, the labor market parties did main-
tain their cooperative spirit, but from 1993 mainly on the local levels.  
To his more static opponents Sven Forssman replied that the visions of today 
were the realities of tomorrow (Frick et al. 2000). He maintained his belief in the 
progressive strength of the ILO/WHO definition of occupational health which was 
further extended in the UN Agenda 21. However, in its fulfillment two trends 
diverged and needed to be harmonized: the production-integrated ergonomics 
exponential progression and the arithmetic, step-by-step, changes of the legal 
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standards. The regulatory standards procedures were too rigid and lagged too far 
behind. Here the ICOH still had an important role to play (Gerhardsson 1999, 
2003; Levi & Levi 2000; Levi 2002). 
“Think globally and act locally” was a slogan introduced in 1992 from the UN 
Agenda 21 document on environment and development. Agenda 21 mirrored 
current demands and future goals. At the local community level, four needs were 
to be integrated: physical, psychological, ethical and existential (Nynäshamn 
1995; Gerhardsson 1999). This brings many different activities to the fore. The 
role of OHS, to promote research, information, education and service, is not easily 
profiled. A current goal in Sweden is to integrate OHS with management develop-
ment and business (AMF 1988; LO, SK & Vinnova 2002; Thörnquist 2003).  
Some important work related aims to be strived for currently in Sweden may 
summarized in four major points: 
A. The Remoteness and Discontinuity of the Technological Society 
High-technology society does not have much in common with agrarian society. 
One common feature, however, is the reactions and behavior of people. To people 
in a technological society the remoteness of their fellow men, the discontinuity of 
events, the lack of an overall view and interrelationships are often frustrating 
experiences. Many people feel alienated in their own society. Technical progress 
is the result of man’s talent for solving problems, his capacity for creative 
thought; it is strange that the resulting technology is so often considered to be 
man’s curse. 
B. The Value of Work 
Work did not carry much status in earlier societies. Work was for slaves, not for 
free people. Work was long considered to be a necessary evil. It has sometimes 
been assigned an altruistic value, as a way of serving one’s fellow men. But not 
until the materially rich society evolved did work in itself become a means where-
by the individual could realise himself. 
Work as a necessary evil can be performed with the same degree of acceptance 
in the pre-technological and the technological society. Work as a means of serving 
one’s fellow men is not necessarily dependent on the form of organization, either. 
But work as a means of realizing oneself requires definite prerequisites, perhaps 
particularly of a material nature. A poor society has little opportunity of satisfying 
the numerous different individual potential requirements of its citizens. 
The division and distribution of work concerns both individuals and groups of 
people. In an organization it is easy to see that vertical and horizontal distribution 
of work may be both socially and technically conditioned. A suitable social 
division of work may increase efficiency in a given production process. Techni-
cally conditioned division of work is often an inevitable result of the technique 
selected. Such prerequisites often determine rather inflexibly the conditions for 
work organization. 
The distribution of work known as Taylorism, after its originator, was based on 
the assumption that scientific laws govern the organization of work. This resulted 
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in the first large-scale production systems, and the railway and telecommunica-
tions networks, which in a short space of time coordinated both times and duties 
across continents. In the old trades, the same person performed all the work 
operations himself. Professional skill, judgment and initiative could immediately 
be given weight, importance and appreciation. In modern routine repetitive work 
the duties are often limited in content, sometimes to the point of meaninglessness. 
C. Forms of Work Organization 
Various attempts have been made, perhaps particularly in Sweden, to counteract 
the schematic division of work through new forms of organization leading to 
better coordination, comprehension and independence. The assembly line can be 
broken up so that cycle times and scope for shifting between different work opera-
tions increase. Relatively autonomous groups permit greater variation of work 
operations in the format of the small group. 
Human-relations research studying the relationship between job satisfaction and 
productivity have found that democratic forms of leadership and group decisions 
improve work efficiency in terms of the group. This is a less authoritarian alterna-
tive to the agrarian society. 
Modern socio-technology endeavors to combine the kinds of technical and 
social systems which do not go as far in work division as the Taylor school did. 
Socio-technology has also sometimes worked successfully with ergonomic cri-
teria. 
The social system conditions the relations between the people forming part of 
the organization. The technical system determines the relationship between 
people, physical planning and work organization. Ergonomics adapts work to man 
by taking into account the capabilities and limitations of man. Ergonomics is an 
aid in humanising efficiency requirements which without it would easily become 
far too one-sidedly production-oriented. 
D. New Technology – New Options 
In theory, new technology gives us more options than earlier technologies 
permitted. We should accordingly be able to make both large and small organi-
zations more human. However, the fact shall not be concealed that the mecha-
nisms of the technological society are not easy to combine with the conventional 
characteristics of man. 
New techniques, which have a short lifespan, are replaced by new versions that 
require further training and sometimes re-education. For this reason great attention 
has been paid to the learning process in educational connections. The learning 
curve illustrates the ability to absorb a new technique. Techniques are easy to 
learn purely theoretically. It is an interesting and all-absorbing experience. Those 
who apply a new technique can often pick up its use faster than the innovator. The 
showpiece products of the industrialized countries are now often made better in 
the developing countries and learning has not caused the major problems it was at 
first believed would arise. Entirely new branches of technology have sprouted up 
in a short space of time. 
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However, the willingness to adopt anything new is limited among ordinary 
people. Better the devil you know, than the devil you don’t. Old, engrained tradi-
tions maintain a strong grip on people. In the industrialized society attempts are 
made to teach people to like variability: there is more security in a company 
which is changed by new ideas than in one which is rigid and static. 
An industrial research scientist, Sir Jeuan Maddock, UK, once said that a 
tradition-preserving attitude is the same as suicide to companies practicing it. He 
considers it more important to study the forgetting curve than the learning curve. 
The reason is that the forgetting curve is too long in large bureaucratic organiza-
tional structures. The small new companies are successful because they have 
nothing to forget. Developing countries now undergoing industrialization have no 
old factories to pay off. 
In the industrialized countries there is now a large surplus of old factories, 
abandoned machines and a great number of employees with the wrong skills and 
knowledge, all less suitable for the future. New companies, wherever they exist, 
can acquire up-to-date equipment and be sure of obtaining optimally-trained per-
sonnel and a suitable organized and practical staff that is ready to accept change 
from the outset. Large companies try to overcome their large inherent inertia by 
creating independent subsidiary companies. The number of large organizations is 
increasing, however, and it is therefore fairly important to devote special attention 
to the requirements of efficiency in the larger organizational systems. 
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11: Health in the Era of Molecular Medicine  
– An Historical Perspective 
Alfons Labisch, Institute for the History of Medicine, Heinrich-Heine-University, 
Düsseldorf 
The Enigma of “Health” – Introduction 
Health is an enigma. Georges Canguilhem labeled it “a life in the silence of the 
organs (Leben im Schweigen der Organe)” (originally a dictum by the French 
surgeon René Leriche, quoted in Georges Canguilhem 1974, p. 58) – a nice but 
intriguing formula that has been adopted by many others (Gadamer 1993). 
“Health” cannot be grasped. Nevertheless, everybody wants to be healthy at 
almost every stage of her or his life. Health always takes one of the top positions 
among all social values and private wishes. There is a myriad of literature about 
health. One characteristic of this genre is that the topic is dealt with in nearly 
hermetic circles that take hardly any notice of each other – be they in social 
science, in the humanities, or in everyday life. This is a first hint at the fact that 
“health” always subsumes other questions to be dealt with, more than seems to be 
the case in “pure” scientific discourse. 
It is just as interesting as it is difficult to cut a path through the jungle of know-
ledge, desires and needs called “health”. However, the interrelationship between 
medicine and health helps to determine an orientation in the possible contents of 
this term. To examine this interrelationship in history presents us with the specific 
task of paying attention to the dimension of time – which is of course the main 
dimension of history, but which is also an important dimension of any possible 
meaning of health (Koselleck 1979, 2000, for the history of medicine, Labisch 
2001b). Looking for the complex interrelation of medicine, health and society in 
history is always fascinating – as our societies98 and our network99 both imply. But 
facing the dramatic changes in science and society it seems to be – as a sort of 
applied history of medicine – especially fruitful to change perspectives and – 
while drawing some “lessons from the past” – to look for the “challenges of the 
future” (as the motto of this conference implies). So what deserves to be expli-
cated here is an historical comparison that goes beyond the current processes. We 
are now facing a new era in which the old foil of a cellular-bacteriological concept 
based on physiology and biochemistry is being replaced by a new foil of the sub-
cellular molecular concept. The main focus will be the question of the dynamics 
and dimensions of these leading ideas. With a glance at the interdependence of 
health and society, some conclusions will be drawn from our small medico-histo-
rical mind-game: What can the current, still more or less hidden, concept of 
                                                
98 European Association for the History of Medicine and Health; Society for the Social History of 
Medicine. 
99 The International Network for the History of Public Health. 
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“molecular health” mean in a globalized world? Our discussion will be summa-
rized under the aspect of the general rationalization of modern life. 
From Bacteriology to Constitutional Hygiene, from Genomics to Proteomics 
– an Historical Comparison 
In the following section, two secular changes in medical concepts100 will be com-
pared: the development from bacteriology to constitutional hygiene (Konstitu-
tionshygiene) is an historically completed process. This process may serve to shed 
light onto the current change in molecular medicine from genomics to proteomics. 
This is equally true for the scientific concept and for its effects on the everyday 
world, because our life today is in every respect hygienically and bacteriologically 
improved (as Anne Marie Moulin would probably say, our world is “pasteur-
ized”). So what happened in the years following 1880, when the seemingly simple 
and clear concept of bacteriology was first developed scientifically in a revolu-
tionary step and then became an integral part of our daily lives? What – and this is 
exactly our little medico-historical mind-game (or should we say: thought experi-
ment) – can be expected when something similar happens to our current, equally 
simple and clear concept of genetics? 
Bacteriology (ca 1880 to 1910) and the “Homo Hygienicus” 
The Bacteriological Concept of ca 1880. In the 1880s, Robert Koch (1843–1910) 
proceeded on the assumption that there is a one-dimensional relationship between 
germs and disease: “Where there’s a germ, there’s a disease”, and vice versa: 
“Where there’s a disease, there must be a germ”.101 This linear concept of early 
bacteriology produced significant innovations (on the significance of Koch’s 
discovery for the theory of science, see Carter 1985; 1991; Schlich 1996). Beyond 
science and clinical research, there is a specific notion of health inherent in every 
medical concept. Bacteriology therefore affected the perception and interpretation 
of individual and public health. Individual bacteriological health meant the 
absence of germs; public bacteriological health meant securing health by elimina-
ting germs which may cause disease, or at least by breaking the chain of infection. 
The complex domain of public health was designed according to laboratory con-
ditions; this led to the ideal type of the homo hygienicus exemplified elsewhere 
(Labisch 1992). With its scarce rules, bacteriology had an enormous impact on 
public and individual life as well and thus enormous public campaigns were also 
launched.  
This one-dimensional interpretation of health – and by analogy also of disease – 
called forth massive criticism in medical science, in clinical practice, and even-
                                                
100 A “medical concept” – in accordance with Karl Eduard Rothschuh’s magnificent masterpiece 
Konzepte der Medizin –  is here defined as a coherent scientific theory and medical practice of 
a physiology, a pathology, and therapy (see Rothschuh 1978). 
101 This linear theory is the fundament of the famous Koch postulates. These postulates may be 
summarized as follows: 1.) The germ can be found in every case of disease. 2.) The germ must 
be isolated and cultured. 3.) The germ causes in case of over-vaccination the same disease and 
has to be newly extracted from the vaccinated animals. 
 119 
tually also in scientific hygiene and in public health. With this a discussion started 
in which the initial concept of bacteriology was continually complemented and 
expanded. Such a development represents a model (Lehrstück) of both medical 
history and theory of science which cannot be described in detail here. Yet it 
should be noted that even those attempts in therapy which were conceptually 
conclusive led to a scandal – the failure of Koch’s tuberculin in 1890 (Gradmann 
1999a, b, 2000, 2001). 
 
The Bacteriological Concept of ca 1910. The bacteriological concept of ca 1910 is 
characterized by the fact that all possible factors in the interplay of germs and 
hosts were regarded as dynamic, both by themselves and in their interplay. The 
virulence of germs varies from harmless to life-threatening. The influence of 
(microbiological) vectors or of the environment, respectively, varies from negli-
gible to constantly pathogenic. Finally, the disposition of a potential host varies 
from immune to highly infectious. Moreover, there is a mutual influence of germ, 
vector and host. The model disease from which these results – including the 
phenomenon of the “healthy germ carriers” – were obtained was tuberculosis, 
which in those days was scandalized as “the proletarians’ disease”. The result of 
rather fortuitous tests was that, although one hundred per cent of the population, 
i.e. everybody, was infected with tuberculosis germs,102 only a very small percen-
tage fell ill with tuberculosis in the course of their lives, and an even smaller 
percentage died of it.103 The phenomenon of the “healthy germ carriers” was con-
firmed in the campaign against endemic typhoid during the first decade of the 
twentieth century (e.g. Anon. 1912; Drigalski 1948).  
As a consequence, the medical basic concepts, the understanding of exposition 
and disposition, and finally the understanding of individual and public health 
developed from static to dynamic forces. In the 1890s a dynamic concept of the 
interrelationship of disposition for a certain disease and its cause developed 
(Hueppe 1893; for a summary, see Hueppe 1923). A generation later, Ferdinand 
Hueppe (1852–1938) was able to recapitulate (Hueppe 1925, p. 10):  
In this sense, no normal and pathological life process, no disease is a fixed 
state of affairs, “status”, but an energetic process, “processus”, and as such a 
function of variable factors, i.e. of variable pre-disposition or disposition as 
cause, of variable triggering impulses or germs or of variable external condi-
tions. 
These dynamics in the interplay of germs, vectors and human beings can be 
studied again today (to the misfortune of the people concerned, especially in 
                                                
102 Cf. Naegeli 1900. All corpses examined were infected with tuberculosis, but only in a few cases 
was tuberculosis known as manifest disease.  
103 On the significance of tuberculosis in the transition from infection to epidemic theory, cf. 
especially the work of Adolf Gottstein: Cf. Koppitz & Labisch 1999. On the socio-historical 
significance of tuberculosis, cf. Condrau 2000.  
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Africa) in a particularly dramatic way in the return – or, as malariologists say, in 
the “rollback” – of malaria.104  
Molecular Medicine (ca 1980 to ?) and Molecular Health 
The Genetic Concept of ca 1980. After a leap in time of roughly 100 years the 
concept of molecular medicine regains attention. Since the 1940s the genetic 
credo has been as follows: A gene encodes a protein, a given protein presupposes 
a gene – or to put it in clinical terms: a gene encodes a disease, or a given disease 
presupposes a gene, respectively. The human organism therefore is the realization 
of its genetic program, and there is a strict hierarchy from gene to organism. 
As has been shown above, every medical concept carries a specific interpre-
tation of health. From the genetic dogma of that time follows a one-dimensional 
understanding of individual and public health. Disease cannot exist when genes 
are in perfect order. If this is not the case, individual and public means have to 
ensure that the genetic handicap of diseases be eliminated or at least be kept from 
spreading.105 This clear and neat concept of early genetics, too, had a major 
impact on science, on medicine and on the public. The consequence, again, was a 
one-dimensional understanding of individual health (health equals genetic norm) 
and public health (implicitly and partly explicitly, eugenics). These poor ideas of 
“a gene for [...] (this or that disease)” led as well to exaggerated hopes of 
clinicians (e.g. gene therapy) as well as to groundless fears of the public 
(“cloning” as the demanded or horrible replication of individuals). 
 
The Genetic Concept of ca 2010 – Emerging since 1995. With another time warp 
we leap into the year 2010. If what happened to the early concept of bacteriology 
were repeated, what would the concept – not of genetic but of molecular – medi-
cine look like in the year 2010? In protein analysis a new understanding of the 
interplay of genes and environment has become apparent since the middle of the 
1990s, but at first only for the expert.106 There are two examples: through splicing 
or RNA editing different information may emerge on the way from the actual 
gene (DNA) to the messenger-RNA, which may lead to different proteins. These 
events are probably controlled by metabolic processes which means control from 
                                                
104 According to the WHO reports there were 1.1 million casualties (fatal cases) in 1998; the 
annual incidence was 273 million. Africa, with an incidence of 238 million has almost reached 
the initial rate of the early 20th century. According to recent research by MIM (Multilaterale 
Initiative on Malaria), even these dreadful figures are underestimates by far (Keusch 2001). 
105 The more or less explicitly voiced and apparently unavoidable health-related utopias of genetics 
and the eugenic conclusions drawn from them are frequently addressed in the literature. 
Among many others, see Dunn 1962; Kevles 1985; Wess 1998; Silver 1998; Kitcher 1998. 
See also, Paul 2001; 2003; Paul and Ganten 2003. 
106 A definition: A genome comprises the entire genetic information of an individual. Each cell 
contains a complete copy of the genome. The term genomics circumscribes the characteri-
zation and the sequencing of the genome as well as the analysis of the relationships between 
genetic activity and cell function. A proteom includes the whole protein profile of a given cell 
or tissue at a given time. The term proteomics circumscribes the systematic analysis of the 
protein profile of healthy and diseased tissue with reference to the respectively active genes. 
On the development and the state of the art in proteomics, see Burley et al. 1999; Maelicke 
1999; Williams 1999; Lander and Weinberg 2000. 
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the outside. In addition, a protein sequence may split after its production into 
different proteins (posttranslational modification). These may in turn influence 
genetic control. This means that there is a spatial and temporal coordination of the 
production of proteins that cannot be explained from the genetic set of a cell, the 
so-called “genome”. Let us take an example: pupa and butterfly have the same 
genome. Our focus thus turns from “genome” to “proteome” and hereby to the 
analysis of the interplay among genes and proteins with a special awareness to the 
epigenetic dynamics of molecular phenotypes (Pandey & Mann 2000).  
The question of genetic factors and actual real-life manifestations of fatal dise-
ases illustrates how problematic the genetic perspective on predominant diseases 
in clinical medicine will become. For instance, what should women who carry a 
breast cancer gene do? Although the chance of actually falling sick during one’s 
lifetime is very high, nobody can tell the exact point in time when this is going to 
happen. (By the way, this is just another aspect of time in conceptualizing health.) 
What is going to happen to women who have to face life with such knowledge? 
What is going to happen within their families? What is going to happen to their 
daughters (and mothers)? And what advice should the doctors give? In other 
words, are those women healthy? Are they sick? Are they ill? Are they handi-
capped? Are they at least “healthily ill” (Hubbard & Wald 1993; Lerner 1999)? 
Even the phenomenon of the healthy carrier of “bad genes” is repeated. Often 
the phenotype does not correspond to the (pathological) genotype. So apparently, 
the genetic makeup of organisms is able to adapt dynamically to defects, risky 
behavior, and environmental pressure (e.g. the myoglobin-knockout-mouse which 
is as lively as any other mouse) (Goedecke et al. 1999a, b). This has important 
consequences for securing individual and public health, only very few diseases 
can be explained monogenetically; major diseases and causes of death, such as 
heart or circulatory diseases and malignant formations, can only be explained 
epigenetically. And, although it is quite obvious, we may state here that epigenetic 
processes are the classical area of public health.  
To take this analogy to the bitter end: We have to record at least one scandalous 
therapeutic attempt that failed. Jesse Gelsinger died unnecessarily in September 
1999 at the Institute of Human Gene Therapy at Pennsylvania State University, 
Philadelphia because of an exaggerated attempt at genetic therapy. A conceptually 
conclusive gene therapy does not yet exist (although we know from several case-
histories, that the model works on natural bases). Just as in bacteriology, the 
development of a conceptually conclusive therapy will probably take much longer 
and will, maybe, as in the case of penicillin, only be discovered “accidentally”.  
What follows from these rapidly changing methods in molecular medicine is 
that the individual distinctiveness of a gene on the one hand and the behavior of 
individuals and the influences of the environment on the other hand must be 
perceived and evaluated in a completely new form. There is no causal program-
matic and hierarchical relationship between genome and organism; there is no 
genetic determinism. Rather, gene control takes place in an interaction between 
genetic and epigenetic factors. Gene, individual and environment thus must be 
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understood as equal factors. As genes have just been mapped by the HGP, gene 
control through behavior and environment will be one of the main areas of 
research – and at least the concept of “gene” (in German Gen für) will be called 
into question (Beurton 2000). 
As an analogy to Hueppe’s résumé of the situation at the turn to the twentieth 
century cited above, we may therefore formulate the situation today at the turn to 
the twenty-first century: 
Every normal and pathological course of events in life is not a permanent state 
that is predisposed in the human genome, but rather a lifelong process; and as 
such it is a function into which the genetic predispositions, the variable beha-
vior and the variable environmental conditions enter as factors. 
Health, Medicine and Society in a Globally Industrialized World 
Change in Society, Change in Medicine 
Health is defined in a categorical way. It has to be filled with new meanings from 
different points of view, depending on the given time and social context. The only 
distinguishing feature of similar categories – such as time or money – is that 
health can in some form be related to a given biological basis, the “biological 
material” of human behavior and action, which in itself is conceived and shaped 
in contingent and historically conceptualized forms. 
So the question is now: How does the new concept of molecular medicine 
interrelate to the new cosmology of life and work in a globalized society? How 
does the new computerized and molecularized Aussen-Welt – usually labeled as 
“nature” – interfere with the globalized Mit-Welt – usually labeled as “commu-
nity” or ”society” – and the genetically individualized Innen-Welt – usually 
labeled as the “I and me”? (For a revised version of this philosophical-anthropo-
logical concept, see also Labisch 1992, 1999.) For people, the new forms of work 
and life mean growing spatial and social mobility. In the work process, an 
externally pre-determined positional discipline has been replaced by a task-
oriented functional discipline. A good example of these processes is the produc-
tion of cars with the development from the production line of the 1930s that lasted 
until the 1960s to today’s group production of automatically pre-built modules. 
Production line work is now mainly carried out by robots (unless it is cheaper to 
have it done by the new laboring class of the “developing countries”. E.g., Nike, 
Esprit and comparable labels exist only as registered names and not as industrial 
facilities). Classical industrial “blue-collar work” will decrease to less than ten per 
cent, while media- and data-processing “T-shirt-work”, as I refer to it here, will 
increase to more than one third of the labor force. (The other third are employed 
in services.) The leading kind of human work means today regulating, controlling 
and processing information. The “blue-collar-worker” of a stratified “fordian” 
society and the “T-shirt worker” of the so-called “post-modern” society are quite 
different people.  
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Social discipline is individualized to an extent and scope hitherto unknown. In 
work and everyday life the demand on individually displayable communicative 
skills and performance is constantly growing. Consequently, the demand on pre-
dictable psychic, mental and social capacity and, therefore, on a newly evaluated 
form of physical capability is also growing. It is this kind of health that becomes a 
value to all people who want to participate in this new world. So for the twenty-
first century a new panorama of diseases is to be reckoned with. The new 
“morbidity”, the wide field of psycho-mental disorders including addiction and 
violence, will grow in importance. This development occurs alongside the growth 
of the illnesses of the elderly and newer maladies (e.g., AIDS, HIV), as well as the 
recurrence of older infectious diseases (e.g., tuberculosis, malaria). In any case, 
classical public social insurance schemes have been implemented to meet strati-
fied risks (“class”, “strata”, “regular employment schemes”). This is especially 
true for public health measures, which are by definition related to groups, strata, 
and, as far as legal or political measures are concerned, to communities and/or 
society. As we have seen, the new risks are mainly individualized on a new 
concept of the biology of the body. How social policy and public health should 
react to this development has neither been discussed nor even noted up until now 
in Germany – and perhaps in other classical industrialized countries as well. 
The Molecular Transition of Medicine 
Modern data-processing is one of the main driving forces of globalization. 
Electronic data-processing also affects medicine. The results may be particularly 
noticed in all areas of imaging procedures – such as CT-Scanning, MRI, 3-D-
Sonography, etc. This development leads to a virtualization of the patient. It also 
makes itself felt within the context of computer-guided apparatus in the form of 
so-called robotics in surgical techniques (e.g., stereotactic brain surgery). More-
over, medicine has shifted its scientific frame of reference to the so-called life-
sciences, in particular to molecular biology. The molecular transition, which has 
been taking place since the 1980s, is yet another secular concept change in 
medicine following anatomy in the sixteenth century, pathology of organs in the 
seventeenth century, pathology of tissue in the eighteenth century, and cellular 
pathology and bacteriology in the nineteenth century.  
In concord with the potential of data-processing, molecular medicine will 
change our understanding of human life. In the last couple of decades medicine 
has more or less followed the model of “exposition”: diseases approach the human 
being from outside (e.g., bacteria, viruses, stress factors). Molecular medicine 
shifts this etiology from exposition, i.e. from the outer world, to disposition and 
thus to the (genetic) inner world of the individual human being. First, this means 
that dispositions to disease are internalized as biological fate. From this follows, 
secondly, that dispositions to diseases, hitherto understood as general risk factors, 
are individualized. And, thirdly, this implies that, on the basis of this individual 
genetic disposition, individual statistical risks become evident. In the cultural 
context of medicine this means that the obvious processes of individualization in 
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society (Mit-Welt) and self (Innen-Welt) are met by biological individualization 
(Aussen-Welt).  
For the most frequent diseases and causes of death, these genetic risk factors, in 
turn, range from a negligible general risk to 100 per cent certainty. Moreover, the 
factor time, even with 100 per cent probability, is not predictable. The example of 
hereditary breast cancer has already been addressed. Still, diseases will soon be 
due to individually determinable handicaps. This individualization must be wel-
comed from the doctors’/practitioners’ as well as from the patients’ point of view. 
Instead of a general statistical risk, there is a personal risk; diagnosis and prog-
nosis may be carried out on the basis of individual genetic probabilities. Finally, 
this has significant consequences for therapy: drugs will soon be produced accor-
ding to specific genetic profiles, and coordinated in special groups, which are de-
fined by so-called SNPs (Single nucleotide polymorphisms).107 Pharmacogeno-
mics will shape pharmacy as well as medical practice in an hitherto unseen 
individualized therapy. Finally, prevention will also change dramatically. 
Molecular Medicine and Public Health 
Thus, public health will also be scrutinized under the headings of molecular medi-
cine. There is a myriad of international examples of how public health and the 
knowledge of inherited diseases interfere in history. Currently, the question is 
dealt with as a new kind of problem. What really is new, is the kind of knowledge 
available. Life sciences and molecular medicine seem to be paving the way 
toward a sort of biological engineering of man. These assumptions are based on 
the model of genetic determinism, which has been shown above to be obsolete.  
Two main paths of public health intervention using molecular medicine are 
widely discussed: genotype-prevention and phenotype-prevention.108 The preven-
tion of risk- or disease-related genotypes involves, more or less, the old and well-
known question of (collective) eugenics. For ethical reasons (eugenics in history, 
esp. NS-medicine) as well as for scientific reasons (genetic determinism), this is 
no real alternative. Phenotype-prevention is based on the knowledge of specific 
genotypes, tackled on the basis of group prevention both in behavior and in the 
environment. Some well-known examples are treatment of Phenyl-Keton-Uria (= 
PKU) and Haemochromatosis. Both diseases belong to the category hereditary 
                                                
107 For further detail, see the SNP-Consortium Ltd, built by the most important pharmaceutical 
companies of the world: http://snp.cshl.org/. 
108 Cf. Norbert Paul (2002b). In accordance with Paul phenotype- and genotype-prevention are 
defined as follows: Phänotypische Prävention bedeutet die Vermeidung von Gesundheits-
schäden und Todesfällen in Personengruppen mit einem spezifischen Genotyp. Die Beziehung 
potentiell schädlicher, mutagener oder genotoxischer Umweltfaktoren mit menschlicher gene-
tischer Varianz wird als Ausgangspunkt für Strategien genommen, in denen es a) um die Ver-
änderung der schädlichen Umweltfaktoren und b) um eine Unterbrechung der schädlichen 
Interaktion von Umwelt und Genotyp etwa durch eine Veränderung des Genotyps geht. Geno-
typische Prävention hat zum Ziel, die Weitergabe risiko- oder krankheitsbezogener geneti-
scher Eigenschaften von einer Generation auf die nächste zu unterbrechen. Beratung in der 
Familienplanung, genetisches Screening von Merkmalsträgern, pränatale Diagnostik, Abtrei-
bung und – in ferner Zukunft – genetische Eingriffe in die menschliche Keimbahn stehen 
hierfür als Instrumente zur Verfügung. 
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metabolic diseases, which are among the best known hereditary diseases. Recent 
summaries of the results in managing these diseases in the long run with special 
diets are quite restrained.109 Nevertheless, these diseases serve as a sort of a para-
digm for future public health genetics and an applied healthy behavior. The main 
features of these public health procedures are a more or less compulsory genetic 
screening and life-long diets. These diets are the basis for the recently much 
acclaimed concept of functional food, nutriceuticals, which opens a new round in 
commercialized health food (Kellogg’s then, Nutri-Food now). 
All these developments are challenging the classical public health scene – a 
movement, that accidentally invented in the 1980s the term “new public health”, 
now seems quite old. One of the very first scholars who discussed public health 
and genetics was Neil A. Holtzman from the School of Public Health in Baltimore 
(Holtzman 1989). After more than ten years of research (mainly on genetical 
screening), relying on the complex model of genotypes and phenotypes, quite 
recently he attacked the rising euphoria concerning gene-screening, predictive 
medicine and genetic prevention (Holtzman & Marteau 2000a, b):  
In our rush to fit medicine with the genetic mantle, we are losing sight of other 
possibilities for improving the public health. Differences in social structure, 
lifestyle, and environment account for much larger proportions of disease than 
genetic differences.  
Julio Frenk is an international protagonist of the “new (?) public health” move-
ment who has worked in WHO on reducing health inequalities and enhancing 
responsiveness to the legitimate expectations of the population and assuring fair-
ness in financial contribution. He has thus dealt with all the classical new public 
health goals and procedures of today. In the early 1990s, he wrote:  
... the biological sciences also contribute to understanding human populations. 
[...] biological sciences are just as essential to public health as are the social 
sciences, [and, summarizing his ideas in the nice phrase] Health is a crossroad. 
It is where biological and social factors, the individual and the community, and 
social economic policy all converge (Frenk 1993, p. 469).  
So knowledge of life sciences and molecular medicine will disperse into the 
public. Within this general process people concerned will ask for the new diag-
nostic and preventive procedures discussed in the media. Molecular knowledge is 
already influencing behavior, mainly in the field of procreation. So, the most 
promising ways to go ahead are those which try to combine the growing know-
ledge on epi-genetic processes (e.g., NO, free radicals) with standard procedures 
in individual and public prevention. The problem is that many people in public 
health still do not accept the idea that health – including all notions of public 
health – always have a biological component. “In the Universe of Public Health 
                                                
109 See the quite pessimistic, Treacy et al. (1995): “Progress in the treatment of hereditary meta-
bolic disease is thus better than it was, but it is still only a partial success. [...] Restoration of 
normal homeostasis, the key to successful treatment, remains an elusive challenge and is a 
logical, major focus for research in human genetics.” 
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knowledge is based on applying biological, social and behavioral sciences”, as 
Julio Frenk has written. Whichever departure point one chooses, nature/biology, 
society/sociology and the self/behavioral sciences, this field opens a special field 
of pragmatic history in public health, or, as may be seen from several examples, 
even of an applied history of public health. (This is especially observable in the 
history of public interventions, e.g., malaria.110) 
“Molecularization” as an Aspect of “Medicalization”, Part of a General 
“Rationalization” of the Body – Conclusion and Summary 
The consequences of the molecular transition in medicine, which has been mainly 
one of pure science up until now, will be the “molecularization” of individual 
lives and societal action (Paul 2002a). Our exploding knowledge in this case first 
appears as a threat. Dispositions to diseases have been transformed from the statis-
tical probabilities of risk factors into an individual probability of actually falling 
ill with a particular disease and maybe even of dying of it. For some monogenetic 
diseases this even turns into individual certainty. Here, too, a basic characteristic 
of modernity is realized once again: Our expanding knowledge leads ever more 
events in life from the realm of “re” or “fate” to the realm of certainty, of know-
ledge, and thus to the inescapable “must” of deliberate and sensible action. In the 
future, the images of normality that are incorporated in our physiology and im-
plicit in a new notion of health will be substantially bound to our knowledge of 
our own definitely individual genetically determined dispositions.  
Basic knowledge of medicine and medical techniques affect society; they 
change both actions and behavior. Medical thinking and doctors’ action have an 
immediate effect on both the social and cultural levels. Hygiene and bacteriology 
are prime examples of these processes: They have “hygienized” or “pasteurized” 
our environment and our behavior. In recent years the pharmacological possibi-
lities of contraception changed sexual behavior in general, including the role of 
women. The transition to molecular medicine will change the individual life-
spheres and the social world in a similarly fundamental way. Already today 
molecular genetics and clinical reproductive medicine influence the generative 
behavior of man. The technological potential to manage basic physiological pro-
cesses influences our understanding of the end of life (e.g. “brain-death”). So the 
beginning and the end of life are in question again. Thus, in the end a genetic 
everyday life will become as real for mankind as the bacteriological life-sphere 
has become. The transitional phase will be characterized by great uncertainty. As 
soon as young people grow up into this genetic Lebenswelt, it will become fact 
and will be furnished in a way that as yet remains invisible to us.  
Still, humans probably have ca 32,000 genes, and ca 400,000 proteins have 
been estimated to date. The gap between those two figures shows that there is a 
                                                
110 For the revival of ecological measures against malaria, see Takken et al. (1991); for the histo-
rical comparison of the concepts of bacteriology and of molecular medicine, see Labisch 
(2001a). 
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special link between the possibilities encoded in the genome and the infinite 
diversity of human phenomena. The linkage of genotype and phenotype does not 
become simpler, but ever more complex. Or, to say it as succinctly as possible: 
“the fewer genes, the more environment and behavior”. It is exactly this comple-
xity that lies behind replacing the term “genetization” (for this special concept, 
see, e.g., Gordijn 1998, p. 11; van Zwieten & ten Have 1998; Lipman 1998), 
which implies a one-dimensional relationship in the sense of a genetic determi-
nism, by the multi-dimensional term “molecularization”. “Molecularization” is 
only one further step in an all-encompassing “medicalization” of all aspects of 
life, including the birth of “volatile bodies”, as Norbert Paul has termed the dyna-
mic relation of gene, information and the body. “Medicalization” itself is in turn 
only one aspect of a “rationalization” of life in modernity. As the seemingly 
simple and shameful small genetic program of man has been revealed with the 
completion of the HGP, it will be the epigenetic processes – from protein patterns 
to the influences of behavior and environment – that will be the real problems in 
the future.  
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12: Vaccines as Global Public Goods 
Anne Marie Moulin, Director of Resarch, CNRS-Centre for Economic, Judicial 
and Social Studies and Research (CEDEJ), Cairo. President of the Administrative 
Council of the French National Agency for AIDS Research (ANRS) 
No man is an island [...] and therefore never send for whom the bell tolls; It 
tolls for thee (John Donne 1622, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions). 
“Globalization” is as loaded with promises as it is frightening (for the concept of 
global public goods, see Kaul et al. 1999; Sen 1987). Globalization is an encom-
passing concept, which refers to many events of the last century, the submission 
of the planet to market laws and the dependence of populations on shareholders’ 
decisions in distant capitals. This globalization is concomitant with persisting 
gross inequalities in economic and health status across the world (Wilkinson 
1996). Globalization is also currently equated with increased risk of deforestation, 
pollution, destruction of ecosystems, and the many misuses of nature. These 
developments are of an extent that it may be argued in favor of a new contract 
with nature (Serres 1990) as a prerequisite for any safe social contract within 
human communities. Globalization is also related to the apparent return of epide-
mics, both old plagues and new scourges. An unprecedented exchange of germs 
has been made easier by modern transportation and streams of migration caused 
by war or poverty. The adoption of new lifestyles and novel modes of consump-
tion and production have facilitated the trespassing of the species barrier. Globali-
zation has been accompanied by intent reflection on the way of securing more 
happiness and well-being for the majority. In the present eclipse of interest in 
utopian thinking, economists and politicians have put the stress on the failure of 
the free market to fulfil some important human needs, appealing to the theory of 
public goods.  
The concept of public goods (Samuelson 1954) encompasses items that display 
the characteristics of publicness (common goods) as compared to private goods. 
They cannot be individually appropriated and can be shared without competition. 
In economic terms, they display the features of non-rivalry and non-exclusion of 
use. Although they are essential to the harmony and well-being of everybody, they 
are not allocated optimally on the market because no one is prepared to pay the 
price. Everyone relies on his neighbors (called free riding or passager clandestin 
in French). The examples of public goods most often cited are security, public 
health, air purity and education. Public goods do not discriminate against popu-
lation groups or generations (present and future), and they may suggest and even 
require collective action.  
Economists have paid great attention to this matter. Since the market is not 
supposed to produce these essential goods, external agencies such as states, for 
example, should be responsible for providing them and securing their access for 
all. But in many countries the state is weak or corrupt (Visvanathan & Sethi 1998) 
and does not fulfil its functions, causing a dramatic shortage of these precious 
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goods. The intervention of NGOs offers alternative solutions but may induce 
negative effects that further debasement, deterioration, loss of credibility and 
prestige, thus undermining local states. 
With the decline of socialism and the triumph of liberal thinking, the notion of 
“global public goods” has been introduced as a necessary provision. It represents 
an extension of the notion of public goods at the international level. Thinking in 
terms of global public goods (global versus national) means looking for mecha-
nisms to ensure a more equitable international status quo and share experiences 
and resources. Some people tend to add to the already long list, liberty with its 
five components as defined by Amartya Sen: liberty of speech, economic opportu-
nities, social capital, transparency and political security. 
Public health and scientific knowledge, among other things, have thus emerged 
as global public goods. They should be shared by all, since this sharing is not 
detrimental to anyone and is furthermore an absolute necessity. AIDS has con-
quered the planet without resistance. The African viruses, such as Marburg or 
Ebola, may strike European cities as well. If countries do not collect and exchange 
reliable and timely statistics on diseases, how can national surveillance be 
possible? In the post-antibiotic era, if multiresistant pathogens expand, there will 
be no sanctuary for anybody. “…and therefore never send for whom the bell tolls; 
it tolls for thee.”111  
Vaccines developed to alleviate the burden of infectious diseases and eradicate, 
or at least contain, the various plagues that besiege mankind may legitimately rank 
among those global public goods. However, no efficient mechanism exists for 
their distribution.  
Vaccines may not exactly correspond to the definition of global public goods, 
because they do not strictly correspond to the criteria of non-rivalry and non-
exclusivity of use. They are sometimes labeled as “impure” by economists. 
Although strictly speaking, there should be no competition for good health, 
vaccines can be detained and monopolized, to the detriment of those people most 
in need. Paying due attention to them means a quest for strategies circumventing 
the market, such as alliance between governments and non-profit private agencies 
and foundations. The debate shifts from the economic to the political level. 
The Vaccinal Status of Populations over the World 
If we choose to assess public health in the world by considering the vaccinal 
status of populations and the production and distribution of vaccines, what is the 
present picture? The burden of infectious diseases, once conceived as a legacy of 
an archaic past, still predominantly weighs on the least developed countries, the 
one third of the 160 non-industrialized countries, which do not belong to OECD 
(Organization for Economic Development). These 160 countries represent 85 per 
                                                
111 Ernest Hemingway has built up his novel on the civil Spanish War on this famous quote from 
the Elizabethan metaphysical poet, John Donne. 
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cent of the whole population. In 1977, 17 million deaths were still caused by in-
fectious diseases.  
Only six basic pediatric vaccines are generally implemented throughout the 
world: BCG, polio, diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough and measles. These are 
historical vaccines developed more than 25 years ago and implemented jointly in 
the UNICEF Extended Immunization Program, familiarly known as EPI.  
In spite of many discussions, the EPI has not been extended. A vaccine against 
hepatitis B has been developed, the first vaccine known against a cancer whose 
viral origin is documented (among infected newborns the virus induces a major 
risk of liver cirrhosis and cancer). However, the vaccine is not yet included in the 
EPI program. Another example of a disease not covered by the EPI program is 
meningitis, which periodically strikes children in the Sahelian belt of Africa. 
Even for EPI, the actual coverage does not reach the level required by inter-
national programs. Reports from countries on their own data have sometimes 
turned out to be inaccurate, the resources allotted by international programs being 
proportional to the good results obtained by Ministries of Health. An investigation 
recently conducted in Burkina-Faso revealed that less than 30 per cent of the 
children were protected by the basic vaccines.112 The vaccines currently available 
are far from dealing with the totality of infectious diseases: diarrheas, AIDS and 
hepatitis, hemorrhagic fevers, to name only a few. 
In spite of historical tradition that in the past singled out vaccines among other 
remedies, especially in France (Pasteur oblige), vaccines aimed primarily at the 
protection of collectives and delivered to them free tend today to lose this privi-
lege and become anonymous goods subject to the same laws as other pharma-
ceuticals. In developed countries, there is a growing advocacy in favor of vacci-
nation tailored to the individual, after looking at his lifestyle, genetic make-up, 
and personal or family allergic antecedents. This individualist current should gain 
momentum as the knowledge derived from the program on the Human Genome 
imparts more information on decisive factors in individual susceptibility to 
pathogens. What are the roots of this historical tradition that makes vaccines 
singular?  
Globalization in the Past: The Triumph of Jennerian Vaccine 
Globalization began long before the theorization on global public goods. Turning 
to history, we can ascertain the consequences of incipient globalization in the past. 
The Colombian adventure, for example, in the sixteenth century, triggered an un-
precedented exchange of goods and evils (Crosby 1972; Moulin 1991a), germs 
and technologies that developed rapidly and traveled along the same route as 
merchandise and slaves. Immunization against smallpox, even before the emer-
gence of immunology as a science (Silverstein 1989; Moulin 1991b), represents 
                                                
112 Philippe Stoeckel, Association for Medical Research, AMP is a non-profit medical association, 
personal communication, June 2001. 
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the first known universal attempt at ridding mankind from a plague, and, in fact, 
comprises the first medical globalization.  
Whereas Jennerian vaccine is usually considered a landmark of Western inno-
vation, Edward Jenner capitalized in fact on former practices of variolation. 
Jenner himself was a variolator. Before submitting young Phipps to cowpox, the 
material he used for his inoculations was derived from spontaneously occurring 
benign smallpox cases in order to protect his clients in the countryside.  
Variolation may have come from the East and probably originated in many 
places in Africa as well as in Asia. Voluntary exposure of children, the population 
most at risk, to a benign form of the disease had probably long been practiced in 
many countries all over the world. After Jenner’s discovery, almost all countries 
retrospectively claimed a local or national recipe leading to successful protection 
based on the casual manipulation of germs, probably due to the spontaneous atten-
uation of microbes in the natural environment. 
The best known epic comes from China. Variolization, effected by inhalation of 
smallpox crusts, expanded from China into most of Southeast Asia. China has 
been celebrated as the cradle of many valuable inventions such as gunpowder, 
writing and even immunization. But it is not the Chinese custom of sniffing small-
pox, transmitted by generations of Chinese scholars, that spread all over the 
world. Another technique, smallpox inoculation, was the one that ultimately pre-
vailed and is today still the underlying model for most vaccines, which are 
commonly injected. In recent years, some historians of Chinese medicine such as 
Charlotte Furth, Angela Ki-Che Leung, Bridie Andrews, and Michele Thompson 
have documented another story (Thompson 1998; Moulin 1999a). At some point 
between the thirteenth and the eighteenth century, the sniffing of smallpox came 
to coexist with another method, inoculation. This method may have originated 
among the underprivileged half of humanity: women. 
Smallpox inoculation perhaps represents the first known invention to be attri-
buted to women. In their medical treatises, Chinese scholars repeatedly com-
plained about ignorant female quacks who took care of patients and pretended to 
heal them with acupuncture without any apprenticeship and knowledge of the 
body “meridians”. Operating in the secrecy of homes, they opened up smallpox 
pustules in order to quicken the evacuation of pus and to stimulate the natural 
course of the disease. 
This leads me to an exciting hypothesis. If women, intending to facilitate the 
discharge of pus, pricked the smallpox vesicles with a needle, they loaded their 
needlepoints with infected matter. If they inoculated other children later with the 
same needle, they certainly observed, variolous matter being extremely conta-
gious, the efflorescence of a few spots. Although the risks were great, the infec-
tion had a chance of conveying protection against the dreadful scourge. 
Whereas the sniffing method remained restricted to parts of Asia (Indochina, 
Japan, Korea) (Rotermund 1991), smallpox inoculation expanded in the world to 
the point of later challenging Jennerian vaccine after it was introduced in 1800. In 
the very last decades of the WHO eradication program, an epidemic of smallpox 
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flared up in China and was attributed (Henderson et al. 1987) by medical autho-
rities to the survival of traditional inoculation.  
Yet, in spite of the competition with smallpox inoculation and the absence of 
rapid means of communication, Jenner’s vaccine spread rapidly, adopted by medi-
cal elites and governments eager to stimulate the natural growth of their popula-
tions and to protect their troops. More than 100,000 vaccinations were thus carried 
out in Europe in the early nineteenth century. 
Just a few dates may serve to illustrate the globalizing march of the vaccine. 
Jenner published his Inquiry in 1798. The vaccine reached Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean in 1800; it arrived at Constantinople by the turn of the century and 
made its way to Baghdad in 1802. One year after, Balmis’ Vaccine Cruise carried 
the prophylactic fluid from Spain to Latin America, after a journey of several 
months with arm-to-arm transfer among orphans who embarked on the boat 
(Bowers 1981).  
In many countries vaccination was officially made compulsory: in 1812 in 
Russia, in 1816 in Sweden, in 1837 in Egypt (Gallagher 1990; Chiffoleau forth-
coming). (By comparison, in France the law making vaccination compulsory was 
passed only in 1902! Murard & Zylberman 1996.) 
No doubt populations were less enthusiastic than their leaders about the new 
technique. They did not understand the link between smallpox and its prevention 
(Moulin 1999b). They felt anxious about the innovation and often perceived it as 
an odd invention of a tyrannical state. Naturally enough, they linked the vaccine to 
other vexations, such as taxes and conscription. 
I had long assumed that this requirement could not be enforced in countries 
before the advent of the omnipotent modern state. This view was based on pre-
vious work on Egyptian hygiene. In Egypt, reports assessing the results of vacci-
nation campaigns indicated that the operation was not carried on reliably among 
newborns. Administrators who were responsible for the execution of orders by the 
Viceroy were more careful about registration than about the actual immunization 
(Moulin 2002). Jean-Pierre Goubert has analyzed the situation in three capitals, 
Algiers, Montreal and Paris during the same period and showed that the move for 
vaccines was irregular according to the social group involved (Goubert 2001).  
In fact, immunization was probably implemented more regularly (and more 
roughly) in the early nineteenth century than I supposed. In czarist Russia, for 
example, vaccination was made compulsory at the very beginning of the nine-
teenth century. While it is unlikely that peasants rallied heartily to the tenets of 
hygienist doctrines, it should be remembered that landlords retained absolute 
rights over their “souls” (serfs). We have an echo of that power, applied to medi-
cal affairs, in the literary work of Countess de Ségur, a writer of popular novels 
for children in the romantic era. She was born Rostopchin and was the daughter of 
the governor who burned Moscow when Napoleon invaded Russia. He was him-
self a zealous advocate of Jenner’s innovation and ordered moujiks on his estates 
to be vaccinated. Peasants resented this animal poison being inoculated into their 
blood and tried to escape the measure by cauterizing the vaccinal wound with 
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what was available to them, hot limestone found in basins close to their homes. 
Countess Rostopchin had the opponents publicly flogged (Dufour 1990, pp. 73–
74). The novels Les petites filles modèles and Les malheurs de Sophie integrated 
parts of these harsh episodes into these edifying stories intended for the children 
of the European bourgeoisie. 
This tradition of brutality left a scar. People have had mixed reactions to public 
health campaigns and sometimes reacted violently to what they considered as a 
provocation. The urban revolts of Rio have been documented by Brazilian histo-
rians (Fernandes 1990; Theophilo 1997). Similar episodes in Canada, Uruguay 
and elsewhere are currently being explored.  
Not only do vaccination campaigns infringe on privacy and liberties; they may 
also expose people to adversities and the hazards of immunization (Wilson 1967). 
The Mulkowal disaster in India, tetanus contamination of an anti-plague vaccine 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, had a long-lasting impact on the accep-
tance of vaccines on the sub-continent. The Lübeck trial in 1930, following one 
hundred infant deaths, possibly due to contamination of BCG vaccine by living 
Koch bacilli vaccine, nearly nullified half a century of vaccinal research and 
caused stigmatization of the vaccine in many countries (Menut 2001; Moulin 
1999c). Some countries, such as the Netherlands, have never encouraged the use 
of BCG. 
In recent years, in countries of West Africa, the news that vaccinated children 
had perished of measles, induced an immediate drop in the vaccine coverage. 
Public opinion is easily turned upside-down, and communication has to be care-
fully engineered and updated to avoid panic and to foster confidence (Balinska 
2001). Recently, in northwestern Cameroon, rumors that a tetanus vaccine admini-
stered to girls over fourteen during a mass campaign was intended to sterilize 
future mothers triggered roars of protest against the doctors and state officials 
coming from the capital who carried out vaccination. Suspicion that the western 
countries want to curb African fecundity, ethnic rivalries and lack of confidence in 
the central administration contributed to development of the rumor (Ndonko & 
Schmidt-Ehry 2000). Although there was not a shred of evidence, schools were 
deserted for a while due to fear of compulsory vaccination! Vaccine acceptance is 
a matter of belief as well as science (Moulin 1996, pp. 11–37). 
In spite of these adversities, smallpox vaccination became a global “première” 
and spread across the world, laying a groundwork that WHO would complete in 
the 1970s. 
The Myth of Eradication 
The eradication of smallpox was a celebrated victory of international cooperation. 
Although it was largely due to decades of empirical work and even hazardous 
practices, this success was hailed as a monument of modern science and universal 
solidarity. To date it has remained unrivalled, in spite of WHO’s vigorous efforts. 
The focus of international organizations on specific diseases in a context of 
limited resources has even induced some adverse effects. During recent years, 
 137 
WHO has successively conceived programs aimed at eradication of the main 
scourges. These programs have met unexpected obstacles and have been ridden 
with intrinsic controversies over strategic choices. 
Poliomyelitis is an instructive example. Polio has disappeared from Europe and 
the United States, but a few thousand cases are still currently reported in Africa. 
Harlem Gro Brundtland, the director of WHO, has made the eradication of polio 
one of her targets. It will not only accomplish forcibly one of WHO’s goals of 
eradication in the face of posterity. It has also been promoted by American 
countries because the hazards of a single case linked to emigration, force main-
tenance of immunization programs at a high cost in terms of staff and money, and 
they are impatient to have this burden removed from their shoulders. 
On the other hand, the specific investment in polio in developing countries is 
enormous, and mobilizes many people each year. When the polio season arrives, 
sometimes the bulk of the health teams is unavailable for other tasks, especially in 
countries with scattered populations. During this period there is nobody left to 
take care of more immediate and vital concerns, even in emergency cases such as 
fulminating meningitis that induces irreversible cardio-vascular collapse. 
For many other diseases such as malaria, WHO has cautiously retreated to the 
adoption of keywords, such as disease control, that do not have the emotional 
appeal linked to the dream of eradicating diseases. This century-old dream was 
born with microbiology and is a progeny of the Baconian enterprise for tailoring 
nature to man’s needs and desires. Is this relative failure the reason why the 
present picture of vaccinal status in populations is still so heterogeneous and un-
satisfactory? 
Modern Times. The State of the Vaccinal Art 
Large companies now produce vaccines on an unprecedented scale. These 
changes have necessitated the establishment of strict regulations, even before the 
precautionary principle was proclaimed in full. 
In 1955, the Cutter episode in the polio saga (Paul 1971) illustrated how mass 
production of viral vaccines differed from laboratory research: insufficient inacti-
vation of the virus in one of the batches resulted in the occurrence of acute polio 
in two hundred children, eleven of whom died. Today the safety of vaccine pro-
duction has been greatly improved and elaborate regulations are implemented. We 
have come far from the bold amateurism of Pasteurian times!  
Because of the level of expertise required and the monopolizing tendency of the 
market, the number of vaccine-producing firms has been reduced to a handful. 
Few newcomers venture into the field, and the old firms themselves tend to 
merge. The cost of new technologies is skyrocketing, and the companies want pri-
marily to ensure their research and development departments substantial benefits. 
For many years, the old Fermi rabies vaccine (cultivated in sheep brains) has 
been maintained in Africa, where it sporadically occasions allergic disorders and 
neurological syndromes. In comparison with the grim reality of rabies cases, there 
is no question that it should continue to be employed. Yet a harmless vaccine, 
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genetically engineered, has long been available, but its price is too high for the 
continents where rabies exacts its toll of victims. 
A similar story could be told for meningococcal vaccine. Since the available 
meningococcus polysaccharide vaccine did not work for newborns (polysaccha-
ride antigens do not induce immunity at this early age), a conjugate vaccine 
against A/C meningococcus was planned that could offer better protection in 
infants (Campagne et al. 2000). Probably for commercial reasons, the company 
decided ultimately not to proceed, disappointing expectations for improvement of 
infant mortality in the “meningitis belt” linking the countries of the Sahel 
(Kaninda 2000).  
An effective vaccine against the strains A, C and W does exist, in fact, in de-
veloped countries. Administered every two or three years in sub-Saharan popula-
tions, it would interrupt the transmission among children. International organiza-
tions suggested that trials take place in countries struck by epidemics such as 
Burkina Faso. But pharmaceutical firms did not take the challenge. 
Cost considerations bias public health decisions. The old polysaccharide 
vaccine against meningitis is still in use but, these last years, it has not been syste-
matically administered. Health services wait for the onset of epidemics. It is only 
after notification of numerous cases that a campaign is launched a posteriori. This 
new strategy, meant to avoid the problems of storage and the waste of vaccine lots 
left unused, is responsible for casualties that could have been avoided (Chippaux 
1999, 2001). Such a public health policy, adopted on economic grounds, means a 
departure from the systematic immunization strategy that prevailed in colonial and 
early post-colonial times. 
Vaccines are biological products. Once produced, they still need to be stored 
and delivered, each stage being exposed to specific risks. The refrigeration chain 
is vital for the storage of vaccine stocks. The replacement of gases dangerous for 
the environment (ozone) in refrigerators (following the Montreal agreement) was 
very expensive. It cost more than one million dollars in the Ivory Coast (Da Silva 
1999). Injected vaccines demand material safety, and disposable needles and 
syringes. The ban put on merthiolate, a mercury derivative used as an antiseptic in 
multidose presentations, has led to a drop in this type of presentation, useful for 
mass campaigns, due to fear of contamination.  
Recently news spread of the use of counterfeited meningitis vaccines against 
meningitis, offered by Nigeria to its neighbor, the Republic of Niger, during an 
epidemic. The vaccines, bearing the brand name of a pharmaceutical company 
administered by NGO in the field, allegedly contained nothing but water 
(Broussard 1996). 
Any modification in vaccine production is now considered as a departure from 
authorized practice, and relevant boards must check the chain of operations, as if 
it were a completely new approach. This regimentation, which introduces addi-
tional delays and costs, makes improvement of vaccines little attractive for busi-
ness unless the market is very promising, as it is for some diseases that raise great 
concern in the industrialized countries. 
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For economic reasons, developing countries will not benefit soon from the 
expensive “high tech” vaccines to come, directed against Helicobacter pylori, 
related to stomach ulcer, or Chlamydia, involved in arteriosclerosis. (The sphere 
of vaccination extends far beyond infectious diseases!) 
In 1976, when Merck marketed hepatitis vaccine at the high price of $30, it was 
out of reach for most countries suffering from a high rate of the disease. It was the 
first vaccine genetically engineered, and it was also the first vaccine against a 
virus-induced cancer. The WHO Hepatitis Taskforce then advocated the local pro-
duction of vaccine using cheaper methods: producing vaccine out of the infective 
virus particles found in patients’ sera (Muraskin 1995). This method did not in-
volve sophisticated technology transfer and in addition created local opportunities. 
National firms in Korea, China and Thailand accepted the challenge, but the 
results were uneven. The question was raised: since the inactivation of infectious 
particles may be faulty, is it ethical to allow lower security standards for economic 
reasons in less developed countries? 
This double standard question is raised for vaccines that are badly needed in the 
developing world. To be developed, they need to be considered as useful on the 
western market so that they are attractive to companies that could produce them. 
For example, in 1999, an urgently needed vaccine against rotavirus was spon-
sored by the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in 
Bethesda, Maryland, USA. When tried in the US and Venezuela, although highly 
lauded for its efficacy against the greatest killer of children, it was found to induce 
a small percentage of intussusception (inducing bowel obstruction) and was 
consequently abandoned. The vaccine, that had been welcomed as “a fabulous 
treasure for the children in developing countries” (Melton 2000; Glass et al. 1997; 
Bresce et al. 1999) was taken off the market, after the CDC (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention) in Atlanta recommended that clinicians stop administe-
ring it. It is now being argued that rotavirus infection might itself be responsible 
for intussusception, provoked by a mesenteric rotation around enlarged ganglia 
stimulated by the infection.  
Three vaccines were about to be launched, and planned trials were stopped in 
Bangladesh and in India. The question was passionately debated: was it ethical to 
drop a vaccine offering good protection because of a few casualties in poor 
countries with high infant mortality? The risk/benefit calculation may vary from 
one country to another. The counterargument was: is it ethical to license a vaccine 
or a drug with known adverse effects? A general debate has arisen whether 
vaccines in less developed countries may include those judged unacceptable in 
more affluent countries. In the time of globalization, there is an ongoing debate on 
the universal application of safety standards across national borders.  
The ethical debate notwithstanding, the heart of the matter lies elsewhere. If 
developed countries do not market a vaccine, there is not the slightest chance that 
this vaccine will be produced and distributed to the poorest countries with a preva-
lence of waterborne intestinal infections. Supporters of the vaccine still argue to 
date that this decision has deprived children of the Third World of a much-needed 
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preventive measure and that thousands of deaths could have been avoided (Cohen 
2001). 
The ethical question of the “double standard of care” is raised for vaccines as it 
has been for other kinds of drugs, such as antiretroviral therapy. The debate, 
which has flared up around the fate of AIDS patients and access to antiretrovirals, 
has pointed to the unequal status of patients across the world. 
The Site of Clinical Trials 
What happens when trials take place in the less advanced countries? This is now 
increasingly the case. Although developing countries are far from benefiting from 
research spin-off, they are on the frontline of clinical trials (European Science 
Foundation Policy Briefing 2001, p. 13), including many types of vaccines. Most 
trials for vaccines, still in their infancy (e.g., for schistosomiasis, malaria, AIDS), 
are taking place in the Third World. Why? 
The reasons are many. Multicenter vaccine trials are most efficient where the 
rates of infection are high: hence the importance of the so-called vaccine trial 
“sites” for tuberculosis or AIDS in Africa, Asia and America. In order to accom-
modate the requirements of statistical computations, it is also easier to recruit 
numerous cohorts for epidemiological studies in the Third World. These popula-
tions are less often solicited for other types of studies and less likely to be taking 
drugs liable to interfere with the new drug administered. Some other motivations 
exist as well. In developing countries, populations are often more flexible and less 
demanding. They expect personal benefits from their participation in clinical 
studies, such as access to medical care or financial compensation.  
In some places, the research projects may not be in tune with the epidemio-
logical context and the population’s interests in the country that hosts the trial. A 
lack of concordance has been shown in South Africa between the vaccine strains 
elected for the trial and the prevalent local clades (Salim & Karim 2000). 
Once implicit and informal, understandings of the conduct of human experi-
mentation have become codified into national and international regulations that 
require careful examination of the intended research, both from a scientific and 
ethical viewpoint. The IRBs (Institutional Review Boards) are supposed to super-
vise the trials and check the informed consent procedures of the proposed 
research. Although there is a kind of universal agreement on the ethical frame-
work of clinical trials in the medical and scientific community, one of the foun-
dations of modern biomedicine, national legislation may be limited or lacking. 
Local IRBs are often not well developed and may be subject to influence. Compe-
tent experts are already burdened with many administrative tasks and may neglect 
careful supervision of the submitted projects. 
The matter of informed consent has been little dealt with from an anthropo-
logical viewpoint. There are on-going debates on the validity of consent, if given 
by a person different from the subject of experimentation: for example, village 
chiefs, local deputies, or heads of the families. Words such as randomization or 
placebos are abstractions that are not easy to present in crystal clear language. In 
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Western countries experience shows that detailed consent forms are elaborated 
more to protect the investigator and the sponsor against legal ramifications than to 
convey clear information adapted to the subjects. An investigation recently con-
ducted in France on clinical practices showed that, because of the increased 
sophistication of forms, most of them prepared by the sponsors of the trial and 
their lawyers, the responsibility of imparting clear explanations to the subjects 
falls upon the clinicians’ shoulders. The quality of the patient/doctor relationship 
emerges as the decisive element in the context (Fagot-Largeault & Amiel 2000). 
In underdeveloped countries, doctors and health officers are already overworked 
and do not have adequate quarters and time to inform the patients at length 
(Mselatti et al. 2001). Ultimately, more than illiteracy, extreme poverty deprives 
the subjects of their autonomy. 
If the trials lead to positive results, there should be provision to ensure access to 
the new drugs. It has been far from the rule in the past. In the past, populations of 
the countries who served as guinea pigs for clinical studies on hepatitis B vaccines 
(in Senegal, for example) did not benefit from the vaccines at a fair price after 
licensing. As yet, there has been no universal agreement on the terms of a contract 
that would link the participation in a trial with the availability of the tested 
vaccine. Such agreements would put an end to this kind of scandal (Rothman 
2001). Negotiations about adequate post-trial access to a successful vaccine, such 
as against malaria or AIDS at an affordable price, remain pending.  
The choice of technological platforms in some parts of Africa and Asia, where 
populations are already registered and monitored, professionalizes patients, who 
find secondary benefits in their participation. The choice of these sites and their 
captive cohorts is not only influenced by considerations of safety for investigators 
(absence of civil or foreign war, permission from local ministries), but reflects 
various interests, in particular the agendas of the firms and the foreign countries 
involved. How can the benefits of studies be extended to areas remote from the 
big cities and the national hospitals? What is the impact of these trials on the 
development of local know-how and research team training? All these considera-
tions go further than the simple question of the consent form and appropriate 
information delivery and bear on the future of the local scientific communities.  
The Universality of Vaccinal Strategy in Question 
While vaccinal trials are sources of political and ethical queries and doubts, the 
basic dogmas of vaccinal science are themselves questionable. Are vaccines 
among the most effective instruments of global health, as products of the universal 
validation of “science”? What is the place of immunization in tomorrow’s 
society? 
Numerous questions remain unanswered: the interaction between natural and 
artificial immunization on which the vaccination and revaccination agenda 
depends; the impact of maternal antibodies on infant behavior toward environ-
mental pathogens; the reactions of bodies exposed to various strains of pathogens, 
that have a varying microbial burden in their guts and natural cavities that poten-
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tially interfere with the mucosal delivery of vaccines. Nutrition deficiencies, para-
sitic infections, elective genetic variations may substantially affect the immune 
response. Auto-immunity has to be discussed, as well as the onset of tumors of the 
immune system such as lymphomas. 
The predominant model of injectable vaccines may also be challenged. More 
than 1,000 cases of hepatitis caused by injections are reported in Africa. Edible 
vaccines would be interesting, but raise questions linked to the use and spread of 
GMO (genetically modified organisms) in human organs.  
The development of genetics, illustrated by the worldwide successes of the 
Human Genome projects, points to another issue. The detection of individual 
genes governing susceptibility to diseases might encourage industrialized coun-
tries to develop individual vaccines tailor-made to the personal genetic make-up. 
Some biologists suggest that the time of collective immunization, irrespective of 
individual differences, is behind us and that we may have reached the historical 
limits of artificial immunization. The new germs are hidden in our cells and 
successfully escape our immunization mechanisms. If we trespass this limit, we 
might be at risk of provoking an unprecedented wave of autoimmunity. Politicians 
are thus confronted with the scientists’ queries. But these same politicians also 
have to remember that vaccinations strengthen the communitarian ethos but are 
subjected to the criticisms of sacrificing the individual (Pywell 2000) or may rein-
force the application of “double standards” to “northern” and “southern” popula-
tions.  
South African Thabo Mbeki’s stance on AIDS treatment may apply to vaccines. 
While his statement that HIV viruses are not the cause of AIDS raised, legitima-
tely, a roar of protest in the international scientific community, his remark that 
drugs (are vaccines among them?) marketed by the wealthy countries are not the 
solution to the African tragedy, has some truth in it. Hygienists have long pleaded 
that wonder drugs too easily replace the much needed measures of social justice 
that modify the life circumstances and remove the conditions that promulgate 
disease. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, although a century-old culture of public health has promoted what 
some authors call a “vaccine reflex” among the health professionals (“reflex” 
sounds a strange term, the opposite of sound and critical evaluation), although the 
practice of vaccination raises obvious questions. The universalization of vaccines 
still has a long way to go. Various initiatives have recently come from private 
foundations to balance the tendency to leave the fate of the vaccines to the market.  
The rules of appropriation of the global public goods such as health and know-
ledge, allegedly available to all, still need to be redefined at the international level 
and strictly applied. The case of vaccines illustrates the intricacies of the issues 
involved by political and social choices in this domain. The official declaration of 
vaccines as global public goods would be a step in the right direction, if it initiates 
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concrete action and sound reflection on why and how, and which vaccines should 
be used. 
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13: Mills, Migration, and Medicine:  
Ethnicity and the Textile Industry, 1950–2000 
Ian Convery and John Welshman, The Institute for Health Research, Lancaster 
University 
Introduction113 
The history of the textile industry has mirrored the industrial fortunes of Britain 
over the past hundred and fifty years. This paper is concerned with the health of 
South Asian migrants in the textile industries of Lancashire and Yorkshire since 
1950. It is based on the preliminary findings of a series of oral interviews con-
ducted with former mill workers, at four sites – Blackburn, Bolton, Bradford, and 
Preston. These study sites were chosen to permit comparisons between different 
types of industry, predominantly cotton and wool, and among different ethnic 
groups. Whereas much of the available literature tends to look at individual dis-
eases, such as byssinosis, our concern was to look more holistically at the health 
of migrant workers, both in the workplace and at home. This material has been 
supplemented with other archival and documentary sources, such as census data; 
trade union records; public health records including Medical Officer of Health 
(MOH) reports; and company records. The paper contrasts the “traditional” con-
cerns of the histories of occupational health and public health with the issues that 
emerge as significant in the oral interviews.  
Although the economic history of the textile industry has been relatively well 
served, less has been written on the history of occupational health, and even less 
on the history of the health of migrant workers. But a number of academic studies 
in different disciplines have touched on these themes. One has been a well-estab-
lished literature that has been concerned with the economic history of the textile 
industry, including the role of migrant Irish workers (Rose 1996; Timmins 1996; 
Winstanley 1996, pp. 147–148). This includes histories that make use of oral 
interviews, though this work has in general been confined to the United States 
(Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 1987; Dowd Hall et al. 1987). A second has 
been academic writing on migration which in part has argued that the “myth of 
return” has been influential (Anwar 1979). Third, there have been studies that 
have been concerned with the radicalization of labor, including workers in the 
textile industry, and based in part on ethnographic fieldwork (Khan 1979; Jackson 
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1992). One strand of this work has served to demonstrate the potential role played 
by ethnic brokers (Brooks & Singh 1979). Fourth, there are increasing numbers of 
local studies, including one of the experiences of South Asian migrants in the 
textile industry in Oldham (Kalra 2000). Finally, and more recently, there is an 
emerging literature on the history of occupational health (McIvor 2000, pp. 111–
147).  
However, our concern is particularly with health. In general the history of the 
health of migrant workers has been neglected, as has the history of ethnicity and 
health in general (Welshman 2000). This study has attempted to illuminate the 
twin themes of public health and occupational health by making use of oral inter-
views. It has responded to Dorothy Porter’s call to look at the histories of public 
health and occupational health “from below”. In that respect, its approach is 
similar to that of McIvor and Johnson and their work on asbestosis in Glasgow 
(Johnson & McIvor 2001). It attempts to make sense of the oral material in light 
of the secondary literature outlined above and is organized in three sections. First, 
it examines the health issues usually seen as significant in relation to the textile 
industry, such as dust, scrotal cancer, byssinosis, lighting and ventilation, and 
noise. In this case the main actors were central government departments, the trade 
unions, and individual academic researchers. Second, it explores “health” from the 
perspective of the workers themselves and analyzes these issues “from below”. 
Here the main areas that emerge from the interviews transcribed so far include 
experiences of migration, perceptions on arrival, experiences on the night shift, 
health and safety, and racism. Third and finally, the paper assesses what implica-
tions this approach has for how we view the histories of occupational health and 
public health.  
The History of Occupational Health and the Textile Industry 
The framework presented by Avtar Brah, in a seminal study of South Asian 
Muslim women and the labor market, offers an analytical framework for this 
study. It provides an opportunity to reconcile the often polemical arguments of 
structure and culture, and contextualize the narratives of the mill workers inter-
viewed within the various temporal and spatial dynamics of social differentiation, 
gender, labor position, health, and migration. It is therefore instructive to see how 
the health and labor of South Asian mill workers is socially constructed, is repre-
sented in discourse, is constituted by and is constitutive of labor markets, and is 
framed within personal narratives and collective histories. To these, we might add 
migration histories, British industrial archaeology, South Asian cultural identities, 
and political and social change, and how labor markets are determined by entitle-
ments. Such a framework weaves together structural and cultural formations and 
addresses the salient issue of how structures (economic, political, and ideological) 
may change on an inter-generational and temporal basis, and both interact with 
and shape cultural identities and meanings (Brah 1993, p. 443).  
Recent writing on the history of work provides a helpful framework for viewing 
the history of occupational health in the textile industry. Arthur McIvor, for exam-
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ple, has argued that in general the history of occupational health has been neglec-
ted. He suggests that what has been written tends to fall into one of three main 
strands of interpretation. First, there is a “Whig” interpretation that tends to stress 
the emancipating effects of science, technology and political reform. Together 
these resulted in an amelioration of the work environment. Second is found a 
Marxist interpretation that typically is concerned with the allegedly alienating and 
physically harmful effects of work under industrial capitalism. Profit was placed 
above health and safety. Third, a revisionist perspective is common in much 
recent writing on this subject, that challenges stereotypes and shows that improve-
ments were uneven and subject to reversal, and that inequalities persisted (McIvor 
2001, pp. 111–113). Some of the health issues in the textile industry, such as 
heating, lighting and ventilation, were generic issues that were common to indus-
trial work in general. Others, such as scrotal cancer and byssinosis, had a more 
specific connection with the actual materials and processes involved. But it is also 
important to understand that the implications for health of the cotton and wool 
industries could be quite different.  
Health issues of course have played a key role in the earlier history of the textile 
industry. It was recognized in the nineteenth century that workers in the Lan-
cashire cotton industry were characterized by high incidences of tuberculosis, 
bronchitis and asthma (Winstanley 1996, p. 124). The respiratory disease of byssi-
nosis, caused by inhaling cotton fibers and associated with dust in cardrooms, was 
described as early as the 1860s (Schilling et al. 1955, p. 217). But it was only in 
the twentieth century that health issues came in for more systematic attention. In 
his Milroy lectures to the Royal College of Physicians, given in March 1927, 
William Francis Dearden, MOH for Manchester and a Certifying Surgeon, con-
sidered some of the health “hazards” of the textile industry. Among these dangers 
were temperature and humidity, dust, fatigue, twisters’ cramp, lighting, infections 
that included weavers’ cough, and sanitation (Dearden 1927). McIvor suggests 
that occupational health and safety standards in the textile industry worsened 
during the inter-war period, when workers had to cope with older machines and 
cheaper fibers and when production was accelerated (McIvor 2001, p. 140). 
Ventilation was a particular concern in the early 1900s, when the etiology of 
some diseases remained poorly understood. Again, trade unions were prominent 
in pushing for improved conditions. But equally, wartime was a time of move-
ment, when the improved ventilation and air conditioning experienced in the 
munitions factories made textile workers unwilling to return to dusty cardrooms 
and hot spinning rooms. The issue of ventilation was often bound up with the 
related theme of heating. Here government-sponsored departments and individuals 
carried out some important research. In 1927, for example, a sophisticated study 
was devised to test the hypothesis that artificial humidity in weaving sheds was 
responsible for the excessive rates of sickness among the workers. Sponsored by 
the Industrial Fatigue Research Board, it was conducted by Austin Bradford Hill, 
later to be famous, with Sir Richard Doll, for his work on smoking and lung 
cancer (Bradford Hill 1927). But again debates about the heating of factories 
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persisted into the postwar period. Evidence from attempts to get agreements 
between unions and manufacturers in the 1940s suggested that mills were more 
often too cold than too hot.  
Arguably, the most rigorous investigation into the health of textile workers was 
the Joint Advisory Committee on Conditions of Work in the Cotton Trade. It was 
established in November 1944 with the terms of reference to: 
enquire into and report on the most effectual methods of implementing certain 
requirements of the Factories Act, 1937 in cotton spinning, doubling and 
weaving factories and other cognate problems.  
These included ventilation, lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, medical and 
welfare services, dust, the arrangement and spacing of machinery, and noise in 
weaving sheds. Its membership included representatives of management, trade 
unions and HM Factory Inspectors. Reconstituted with new terms of reference in 
1958, it issued a series of reports, with a final report in 1961. Even then, attention 
was sporadic, and remedial measures were often slow to be implemented.  
In the early part of the twentieth century, much of the concern about health in 
the textile industry centered on the particular disease of scrotal cancer, long 
known to be common among mule spinners. Spinners typically worked barefoot 
in undershirt and trousers, and leaned over the mule to join the broken ends of 
yarn. The scrotum thus was constantly in contact with oil on the trousers. In 1922, 
experiments on mice demonstrated that cancer was caused by crude mineral oils, 
and the connection between lubricating oils and scrotal cancer was proven. 
Remedies suggested by the 1926 Home Office report included the provision of 
safer oils, the prevention of contamination by oil, the provision of protective 
clothing, education on the importance of cleanliness, and medical examinations 
(Home Office 1926). However, these recommendations were not compulsory, and 
although “epitheliomatous ulceration” became a registered disease from 1919, 
medical examinations for workers were rejected. Moreover, while splashguards 
were fitted on existing mules from 1938, so that oil would not soil the clothing of 
workers, protection against scrotal cancer was not incorporated in the 1937 
Factory Act. While trade unions and the Joint Advisory Committee of the Cotton 
Industry campaigned for safer lubricating oils, commercial companies proved 
obstructive, and such oils were slow to be introduced (Ministry of Labour and 
National Service 1952). Only in 1954 were compulsory medical examinations for 
workers belatedly started. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Amalgamated 
Association of Cotton Spinners and Twiners continued to do valiant work with 
former workers suffering from scrotal cancer, but compensation remained a battle. 
The work of Terry Wyke on the history of scrotal cancer provides a good example 
of McIvor’s revisionist strand of writing. Wyke argues that, while more research 
might have been conducted and opportunities were missed, in the end the em-
ployers showed little interest in the health of their workers (Wyke 1987, pp. 195–
196).  
A more general area of concern in the early 1900s was around issues concer-
ning dust in early processing, particularly in the carding process. Here trade 
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unions were active in trying to prove that dust inhaled in cardrooms had an effect 
on the health of the workers. A Dust in Cardrooms Committee was appointed in 
order to see if dust in cardrooms was the cause of ill health and disease, and it 
held its first meeting in September 1927. Its Secretary was Dr S. A. Henry, HM 
Medical Inspector of Factories, and it took evidence from a large number of 
individuals and organizations. The Home Office and the trade unions together 
sponsored conferences, and commercial companies were active in promoting 
equipment that allegedly reduced the amount of dust produced. Examples inclu-
ded the Weco Vacuum Card Stripper, produced by British-Weco Ltd.; the New 
Patent Dustless Card Stripping and Flat Strip Conveying Plant; and Platts’ Patent 
Metallic Clothing for Carding Engines. Nevertheless, these problems persisted 
through the early postwar period. The final report of the renamed Joint Advisory 
Committee of the Cotton Industry, published in 1961, concerned dust in card-
rooms (Ministry of Labour 1961). As late as 1977, studies were still suggesting 
that levels of dust in the textile industry remained unacceptably high (HM Factory 
Inspectorate 1979a).  
Dust was an area of concern because of its association with the industrial 
disease of byssinosis. As we saw earlier, this had been the subject of debate as 
early as the 1860s. The case of byssinosis was different from that of scrotal 
cancer. In the 1950s, the Nuffield Department of Occupational Health at the 
University of Manchester and the Medical Research Council’s Pneumoconiosis 
Research Unit at Cardiff were active in epidemiological research. One study 
compared 190 card- and blowroom workers aged 40–59 from 28 mills, with 88 
men of the same age from two engineering factories. Of the cotton workers, 115 
(60 %) had symptoms of byssinosis, while only four of the controls had any 
serious degree of respiratory disability (Schilling et al. 1955, p. 225). R. S. F. 
Schilling, Reader in the Nuffield Department of Occupational Health at Man-
chester, offered a comprehensive history of the disease in his Milroy lectures to 
the Royal College of Physicians, given in February 1956. Schilling argued that  
with a new awareness of the disease and more effective methods of dust 
control, the cotton workers should soon be rid of it after suffering for more 
than a century (Schilling 1956, p. 29).  
The compensation scheme remained limited to workers employed in the opening, 
blowing and carding rooms. But later studies established that byssinosis was also 
found among winding room workers (Mekky et al. 1967). 
Compensation for male workers who had died or become incapacitated from 
byssinosis was payable under the 1940 Act and later under the 1946 National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act. The Amalgamated Association of Cotton 
Spinners and Twiners supplied data to the Nuffield Department of Occupational 
Health at Manchester and awarded sickness benefits. The trade unions tried, for 
example, to reduce the qualifying period for disablement benefit from twenty to 
ten years. Other organizations, such as the Socialist Medical Association, were 
also active in campaigning. Some encouragement was given by the experience in 
the United States, where legislation was introduced in August 1970 to provide 
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federal disability payments to textile workers who suffered from “brown lung” or 
byssinosis. Back in Britain, new regulations introduced in 1974 meant that 
workers employed in any processes up to and including the winding and beaming 
processes in any department where the spinning or manipulation of raw cotton 
was carried out could claim disability benefit (DHSS 1973a, pp. 59, 69). The 
qualifying period was reduced from ten years to five. In May 1976 the first com-
pensation award to a cotton worker suffering from byssinosis opened the way for 
hundreds of other claims on cotton firms. 
Nevertheless, in terms of action taken, there were arguably more similarities 
than differences between the cases of byssinosis and scrotal cancer. The payment 
of disability and death benefits, in particular, remained carefully circumscribed. 
For much of the early postwar period, it remained limited to workers employed in 
the opening, blowing, and cardrooms in factories where the spinning of raw cotton 
was carried on; workers had to be employed for at least 20 years; and they had to 
be totally or permanently incapacitated for work as a result of byssinosis (Ministry 
of Pensions and National Insurance 1963, p. 5). Much of the contact between 
specialists and the trade unions consisted of diagnoses on individual union mem-
bers. However, byssinosis remained difficult to diagnose and distinguish from 
bronchitis and emphysema, particularly among cotton spinners. Perhaps most 
interesting is the potential role of the trade unions. Wyke argued that, in the case 
of scrotal cancer, the trade unions had played a relatively unimpressive role 
(Wyke 1987). But in relation to byssinosis, Sue Bowden and Geoffrey Tweedale 
have recently argued that the trade union response has been much misunderstood, 
and that the unions deserve more credit than they have traditionally been afforded 
(Bowden & Tweedale forthcoming). 
Arthur McIvor has made the point that occupational health has traditionally 
made progress in wartime, and this is perhaps clearest in the case of lighting, 
though this was not peculiar to the textile industry. Lighting was the subject of 
attention for a number of reasons. Perhaps most prominent was its effects on 
industrial production and on the way that the association between poor lighting 
and eyestrain, headaches, and psychological effects might contribute to the in-
efficiency of the worker. It was claimed, for instance, that studies of silk weaving 
carried out in the winter months showed how lighting affected the quality and 
quantity of the work that was produced. Second, it was recognized that poor 
lighting was often a contributory factor in accidents. Third, it was argued that 
good lighting also helped to maintain a high standard of sanitation and prevent 
accumulation of waste and dirt. Thus the Home Office argued in 1921 that “good 
lighting is essential for the maintenance of order and decorum” (Home Office 
1921, pp. 1–2). Studies of lighting tended to assess it in terms of its adequacy and 
suitability, including within the second category such issues as constancy and 
uniformity, the prevention of glare, and the avoidance of shadow. An important 
distinction was that between natural and artificial lighting. 
The links between lighting, productivity and the efficiency of the workforce 
were further illustrated by some of the studies carried out in the 1930s by the 
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Industrial Health Research Board and the Illumination Research Committee under 
the auspices of the Medical Research Council. One of these concluded from a 
series of experiments that, although it was always more difficult to see small 
objects than large ones, improved illumination did improve the ability of the 
subjects to see small objects (Weston 1935, p. 11). Lighting was covered in 
successive reports issued by the Departmental Committee on Lighting in Factories 
and by the 1937 Factories Act. Nevertheless, it was during the Second World War 
that most attention was given to lighting. On the one hand, it was necessary to 
instigate a blackout, but, on the other, wartime conditions led to increased em-
ployment of workers at night. Contemporary observers thought that work was 
done under greater pressure, leading to greater strain on the worker. Equally, the 
increased prevalence of night work meant that the time spent under artificial light 
was greater. The result was new minimum standards for artificial lighting. As was 
argued by the Ministry of Labour and National Service, the new wartime condi-
tions justified a higher standard of lighting than that previously recommended “in 
the interests both of the workers and of increased production” (Ministry of Labour 
and National Service 1940, p. 6). Whether these higher standards survived into 
peacetime is difficult to judge.  
A final issue that was more specific to the textile industry was noise. Again, it 
had long been recognized that particular types of workers, notably those involved 
in weaving, were particularly prone to deafness. An investigation by the Industrial 
Health Research Board in 1935 showed that noise in weaving sheds (with noise 
levels above the 90–100 decibel range) seriously impaired hearing and affected 
production. Therefore, weavers learned to lip read (McIvor 2001, p. 141). How-
ever, proof of causation was not enough to satisfy the courts, it being necessary to 
demonstrate negligence on the part of the employer. In 1970 the Wool Industries 
Research Association (WIRA) concluded that much machinery in the wool textile 
industry generated noise that was in excess of that considered safe, and more 
could be done to relieve the effects of high noise levels by paying more attention 
to machine maintenance and siting and by using ear defenders and absorption 
barriers (WIRA 1970, p. 16). In the 1970s, the Amalgamated Textile Workers 
Union tried to persuade central government departments to extend compensation 
coverage for occupational deafness to include its members. It was argued that 
conventional looms should be replaced by more modern weaving machines, 
weavers provided with hearing protectors, and weaving sheds constructed with 
sound absorbing ceilings. Occupational deafness was subsequently prescribed 
under the 1965 National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act (DHSS 1973b, p. 90). 
Nevertheless, there was also evidence that little attempt was made to reduce noise 
levels by management, and that individual workers remained reluctant to wear ear 
protection. 
The textile industry was thus associated with a range of health issues, some of 
which were generic to industrial work in general, while others were particularly 
linked to specific materials and processes in the textile trade. Scrotal cancer and 
byssinosis were associated more with the Lancashire cotton trade, and noise (and 
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in the early 1900s, anthrax) more with the Bradford wool industry. There were 
also differences over time, so that in the early part of the twentieth century the 
main concerns were over dust levels in cardrooms. But by the 1970s, it was byssi-
nosis and noise that had become the subject of attention. Together, the changing 
nature of the labor force, medical research, wartime conditions, growing union 
power, changing attitudes on the part of employers, and state intervention meant 
that by the postwar period conditions had improved (McIvor 2001, p. 145). The 
main actors in this area were central government departments, trade unions, legal 
firms and individual researchers, of whom Schilling in Manchester was a good 
example. How far these issues impinged on individual workers is more difficult to 
judge. Trade union records sometimes contain correspondence between individual 
workers and their trade union representatives, usually in connection with compen-
sation claims. These are often eloquent and moving testimonies from workers in 
the final stages of scrotal cancer. In a more general sense, the voice of the worker 
is absent. How far were issues of health perceived as important, and what signifi-
cance did health have in the general context of working life? In the next section 
we examine these issues through the particular example of the experiences of 
South Asian migrants in the Lancashire and Yorkshire textile industries.  
Migration 
It is arguable that by the immediate postwar period some of the major occupa-
tional health issues in the textile industry had been cleared up. What is more 
certain is that the industry itself was in decline. The decline of Britain’s manufac-
turing base in the late 1970s and early 1980s had a particularly serious impact on 
the textile industry. To take one local example, in 1971 there were 18,234 people 
in Oldham employed in textiles, but by 1995 this number had fallen to only 1,827 
(Kalra 2000, p. 133). The decline had actually begun much earlier. Reports pub-
lished in the 1940s convey vividly the economic and manpower problems faced 
by the wool trade. In 1947, for example, the Board of Trade lamented the retire-
ment of older workers along with manpower shortages in terms of women, 
younger workers, different sections of the industry and particular districts. It out-
lined a range of measures designed to improve the attractiveness of the industry 
(Board of Trade 1947, pp. 43–65).  
These problems were reflected in measures taken by individual mills: offering 
accommodation for migrant Italian workers and providing transportation for 
workers from outlying areas. Nevertheless, a report by the National Economic 
Development Office (NEDO) on the wool trade, published at the end of the 1960s, 
also presented a pessimistic picture. This argued that increased output was neces-
sary, along with increased investment and modernization, more shift work and 
higher productivity, the standardization of product ranges, more specialization in 
products and services, further reductions in manpower, and the liquidation of 
unprofitable businesses (NEDO 1969, p. xi). What was also apparent from the 
NEDO report was the increase in the number of migrant workers. It was estimated 
in 1969 that, of the overall workforce of around 144,000, European migrants 
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comprised 3,645 or 2.6 per cent; Indian and Pakistani migrants 9,813 or 6.8 per 
cent; and other Commonwealth or foreign workers 1,542 or 1.0 per cent (NEDO 
1969, p. 22). In particular cities and on particular shifts, the proportion of migrant 
workers was much higher. 
While the rise and fall of the economic fortunes of the textile industry is rela-
tively well-known, the history of the health of migrant workers has been generally 
neglected, as has the history of ethnicity and health in general. But first it is ne-
cessary to provide some background information on the reasons for migration, and 
the growth of ethnic minority communities at our four study sites. There are prob-
lems in using census data, particularly for the latter part of our period. The 1991 
Census included an ethnic question for the first time, as opposed to simply recor-
ding place of birth. The census data indicates that the number of South Asian 
migrants in the four study sites increased substantially over the period 1951 to 
1991 (Tables 13.1 and 13.2). 
 
Table 13.1. South Asian population of the four study sites, 1961–1991. 
Year Bradford Bolton Blackburn Preston 
1961 4,969 424 639 693 
1971 17,060 4,910 4,555 3,125 
1981 25,352 7,157 7,346 7,731 
1991 60,646 17,812 18,830 10,103 
Source: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1961–1991). 
 
Table 13.2. South Asian population as percentage of population of the four study sites 
1961–1991. 
Year Bradford Bolton Blackburn Preston 
1961 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 
1971 5.8 3.2 3.2 3.2 
1981 5.6 2.8 5.2 6.2 
1991 13.3 6.9 13.8 8.0 
Source: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1961–1991). 
 
In terms of the profile of early migrants, the original pioneers were former seamen 
and soldiers, who provided an important source of support for the later arrivals. 
Others were small landowners who invariably joined a relative or close friend in 
Britain. An important group was that of displaced people, including those from 
the Manga Dam project. Many used the compensation they received to send 
family members abroad as an investment, with the expectation of a return through 
remittances (Anwar 1979; Kalra 2000). Above all, the early migrants were male: 
for example, over 90 per cent of South Asians in Bradford at the time of the 1961 
census were male. Obtaining a visa, collecting the money for a ticket, and finally 
landing in Britain involved an immense amount of labor and effort. In the 1950s, 
travel agents in Pakistan charged £250–£300 for a passport and airfare to Britain, 
rising to around £600 in the 1960s. With average per capita incomes in Pakistan of 
around £30, migration was restricted to relatively affluent families. Those who 
participated in migration did so with the expectation of a substantial return 
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through remittances, with the aim of returning to Pakistan within four to five 
years. This was the so-called “myth of return” (Anwar 1979).  
An important theoretical framework around migration is provided by the debate 
between those who favor alternative structural and cultural explanations. Among 
the former are writers such as Rex, Miles, and Duffield, while the latter include 
Wallman, Anwar, and Khan. Together they have engaged in a polemical debate 
about the history of the labor market position of South Asians in Britain. The 
structuralist position derives in part from a Marxist interpretation of society. An 
“informal apartheid” was central in determining occupation and labor market 
position, and jobs were those that the white population did not want. In this analy-
sis, power relations limit choices, so that Asian people do not choose to live in 
inadequate housing any more than they choose low-status jobs. An “underclass” 
or class fraction analysis is often apparent in this interpretation (Rex 1979; Miles 
1982; Rex & Tomlinson 1997). On the other side is the culturalist interpretation, 
coming in part from ethnographic studies. Here the role of culture is central in 
determining occupation and labor market position. It is thus argued that the early 
migrants wanted work that required little long-term commitment and paid fairly 
well, and that South Asians have different goals from the rest of society, with 
solidarities based on ties of religion and kin (Anwar 1979; Khan 1979). 
A case study of migration from Mirpur in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan (Figure 13.1) 
to Bradford in West Yorkshire indicates some of the key “push and pull” factors 
associated with the migration process. Two “push” factors were particularly 
important in relation to the migration of Pakistanis to Britain: the partition of 
British India in 1947 when Pakistan (East and West) was created, and the con-
struction of the Mangla Dam in Pakistan in the early 1960s which flooded 250 
villages in the Mirpur district of Azad Kashmir (Anwar 1996). In both these cases, 
large numbers of people were displaced, and Mirpuris were given priority for 
immigration at that time. Whole communities from that area migrated to Britain, 
particularly to the West Midlands and Yorkshire (Kalra 2000). The Mangla Dam 
project was thus important, combined with the post-partition political climate in 
Azad Kashmir and increased pressure on rural land in Pakistan. The correspon-
ding “pull” factors in Britain were gaps in the labor market caused by the econo-
mic boom of the immediate postwar period that created a need for workers, parti-
cularly in manual jobs and shift work. Specific “pull” factors in Bradford included 
the development of community and kin networks around mosques, shops and 
community organizations. As Anwar has written, “colonial links, political free-
dom of movement and economic push and pull factors developed into a chain 
migration” (Anwar 1979, p. 21). Thus these were significant factors in relation to 
migration and settlement patterns (Taylor 1990).  
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Figure 13.1. The Indian subcontinent. Source: Taylor (1990). 
The migration of South Asian workers to West Yorkshire was evident in the 
changing demography of Bradford. The numbers of Indians, Pakistanis and Bang-
ladeshis increased from 542 to 60,646 between 1951 and 1991. In 2000 it was 
estimated that by 2006 Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi ethnic groups would 
represent three, eighteen and one per cent, respectively, of the total estimated 
population of Bradford (Bradford Metropolitan District Council 2000, p. 3). Both 
structuralist and culturalist arguments have relevance to the migration of “South 
Asians” to Britain. Most of the jobs available were unskilled and involved un-
sociable hours of work, poor working conditions and low wages (Ahmat et al. 
1993). But recruitment was often through family ties and kin networks. The moti-
vations for migration were conveyed in some of the interviews. One South Asian 
worker in Bradford said that  
when I was in Pakistan, everyone asking when you going to England you 
know, that time very easy come here. Very easy, you have ticket money, then 
you can just pay and make a passport and come to here (interview TP034).  
Another from Bradford simply replied that “I came in search of better future” 
(interview TP002). The arrival of Irish migrants in Britain in the late 1800s offers 
some points of comparison, except that the Irish arrived during a period of indus-
trial expansion and the “South Asians” in an era of decline. 
Perceptions on Arrival 
The debate between the structuralists and the culturalists provides a helpful frame-
work for the background to migration. In addition, the oral interviews provided 
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vivid testimony on the experience of arrival. One worker who arrived in Bradford 
in the 1950s commented that “it was a cold, dark misty evening. A lot of mills 
around, a lot of darkness, very short days, long nights, very, very cold. That was 
the picture” (interview TP036). Another recalled that “it was like another world, 
because of the fog and the smoke” (interview TP032). 
In the early phases of postwar migration, Pakistani men had arrived without 
their female kin. The class position of these men was typically that of low wage 
workers residing in poor quality housing in declining inner-city areas of British 
cities. Groups of young Asian males lived together in often overcrowded condi-
tions. They faced difficulties in adapting to life in Britain, including cooking, 
obtaining halal foods, and coming to terms with the climate. A South Asian 
worker from Preston, for example, recalled that  
we have a main problem on those days is the food. One Asian grocer used to 
come from Birmingham, Mr. Desai, and we giving our requirements, a list, so 
every fortnight he bring them (interview TP027).  
Another worker from Bradford remembered that: 
Our house was 53, and end of the street there were toilets for each households. 
It was cold and damp. There used to be coal available to burn, but in those 
days it was not easy. You were only to burn coal on Saturday and Sunday. 
You had to put on a lot of coats (interview TP032). 
Another worker from Preston recalled how it was difficult to find suitable food. 
He said that  
we used to slaughter the chickens in the kitchen ourselves to make them halal, 
but there were difficulties in finding grinding equipment. We used to use a 
milk bottle to grind ginger (interview TP028).  
Many of the respondents told stories of up to 17 young Asian men living together 
in three or four bedroom houses. Those working on the night shift would share a 
bed with the day shift workers, and they recalled that “the bed was never cold”. 
It is relatively clear how and why South Asian workers came to be employed in 
the textile industry in Britain in the immediate postwar period. They were a cheap 
source of labor for an industry that was in decline, and they came to occupy an 
ethnic niche (Ahmat et al. 1993). What is much less well-known is the history of 
the health of migrant workers. Some recent writers have argued that migrants and 
ethnic minorities have reduced entitlements in host societies. They tend to be 
exposed to poor working and living conditions, which are per se determinants of 
poor health, but they also have reduced access to healthcare for a number of poli-
tical and cultural reasons. These include language, lack of education, different 
concepts of health and disease, discrimination and racism (Bollini & Siem 1995, 
p. 821). Others share this view, stating that members of immigrant ethnic minority 
groups tend to have poorly paid, insecure jobs, and their success in the job market 
depends upon the availability of work, their skills and qualifications, and their 
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ethnic stereotype as “good” or “bad,” “skilled” or “unskilled” employees (Lloyd 
Evans & Bowlby 2000). 
The psychological and physical health of migrants in Bradford was linked to the 
new climate and living conditions. A lifestyle that was overwhelmingly indoors 
was in great contrast to the outdoor sociability of village life in Pakistan. The loss 
of social networks led to isolation, particularly for mothers, while the lack of 
English lent a complexity to formal interactions. In addition there were cultural 
differences, with the individualism and independence that characterized urban 
Britain providing a contrast to the dependency and loyalty evident in rural Mirpur.  
Working on the Night Shift 
One of the issues that we were concerned to explore in the oral interviews was the 
experience of working on the night shift. The night shift would run until six AM, 
with a thirty minute break for food at about one AM. It has been suggested that 
the concentration of South Asian men on the night shift showed how their oppor-
tunities for other jobs were blocked and reflected a deliberate attempt to minimize 
contact between South Asian men and white female workers. But from the point 
of view of the workers themselves, there were clear incentives to work on the 
night shift. It offered a sense of security in working with people who spoke the 
same language and with migrants who were kin relations. Equally important, the 
night shift paid more than the day shift. So the night shift was advantageous both 
to the management and to the migrants (Kalra 2000, pp. 113–116). 
By the mid-1960s, around 65 per cent of Bradford’s South Asian population 
was employed in the textile industry. Different people justified the concentration 
of Pakistani men on the night shift, from which women were prohibited from 
working by law, in different ways. Some justifications were linguistic, since it was 
claimed that segregated shifts allowed Urdu or Punjabi speaking worker teams to 
communicate more easily among themselves. Others were evidence of sexual 
panic: a view that South Asian men were somehow threatening to white women. 
Paradoxically, notions of the feminine oriental were used to justify their employ-
ment. Perceptions of manual dexterity reflected general and radicalized stereo-
types, with claims of “nimble” fingers illustrating a feminization of the male 
Asian worker (Jackson 1992, p. 202). And blatant racism was evident in claims 
that, for example, Asian workers could cope with the boredom of a 12 hour shift.  
A former worker from Bolton commented that  
white people did not want to work night shift because of the inconvenience, 
and the Asian people, wanted to work night shift, its only because it was paid 
better (interview TP036).  
A former worker from Bradford said that “at night all Asian, there were only 
Pakistani at that time, up to 1971 […] overlookers were white, and in charge of all 
Pakistanis” (interview TP032). A former worker from Bolton commented that 
“the night shift always operated with Asian people, 99 per cent of the staff were 
Asian” (interview TP036). A Bradford worker recalled that “there were shifts 
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when all night and weekend, 12 hour shifts, day and night. No time for your 
family, no time for leisure” (interview TP028). A former fellow-worker from 
Bradford said that “they [English workers] considered day shift was for them, 
night shift for Pakistani and weekends were Pakistanis” (interview TP032).  
One question in the query concerned the health implications of working on the 
night shift. One of the workers interviewed by Kalra responded in the following 
way: 
I did not want to leave the job. But after working on the night-shift for so 
many years I could not sleep at night. The doctor gave me sleeping pills, 
which worked at first and I thought I could go back to work, but they stopped 
working after a while. Then I went to Mirpur and even though I could sleep 
there, the rest of my health suffered. While I was there, I went to a desi hakim 
[doctor] who gave me some apna [local] medicine with which I was getting 
better. But it is not the same level of health care. Now, I can only sleep by 
taking pills and they make me feel sleepy all the time (Kalra 2000, p. 125). 
Kalra goes on to argue that prolonged working on the night shifts in the Oldham 
mills led to industrial accidents, bone complaints, and breathing problems. 
Further, ill health led to the high level of unemployment found among these 
migrants. He argues that “years of working on the night-shift took their toll and 
resulted in weakened bodies not able to even undertake light laboring work” 
(Kalra 2000, pp. 125–126). However, those arguments have not been borne out in 
the interviews conducted for this study. 
Health and Safety 
As we noted earlier, some of the occupational health problems that had previously 
dogged the textile industry may have been mitigated by the postwar period. In 
reviews conducted in the 1970s, the Health and Safety Executive commented that 
accidents were still occurring because of a management failure to implement 
health and safety recommendations, and because workers were too reticent to 
adopt safe working methods (HM Factory Inspectorate (1979a, b). It was found, 
for example, that on routine visits, many safety guards in plant blowing rooms 
were defective. Anecdotal evidence supports the argument that health and safety 
measures were ignored or not implemented. One study published in 1976 sugges-
ted that workers often took their face masks off; that dust was like a “snowstorm” 
and caused “Monday fever”; and that noise levels remained deafening, especially 
in weaving sheds (Cox & Golden 1976, pp. 5, 8, 11, 25). 
Again, the oral interviews provided insights in how health and safety issues 
were perceived by the workers themselves and integrated into lay conceptions of 
health and illness. One former worker from Bradford recalled that  
dust levels were always very high. On your clothing, your body and your hair, 
there was always a lot of dust, extractor fans […] were not regularly used 
because the mill becomes too cold (interview TP036).  
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A worker from Bolton said that  
the noise was the first thing you take home with you the very first day, cause 
you can actually hear it when you go to sleep after. But it was very, very 
noisy, and very dusty, because of the cotton fibers (interview TP032).  
Another worker from Bolton remembered that  
although as a supervisor it was my responsibility to make sure everyone wears 
it, I felt uncomfortable wearing it myself, so I never put a restriction that they 
must wear it (interview TP036). 
One of the interesting aspects of health and safety is the relationship with langu-
age and literacy. A former worker from Bradford remembered that  
there were some [health and safety] notices around, I never read it. One, you 
couldn’t read, and if you do read you don’t understand (interview TP028).  
Another worker from Bolton said that: 
they would always give some sort of warning to say when they [factory in-
spectorate] are coming in, so all the guards are put on, and you know you are 
going to get inspection, and it’s probably once or twice a year […] when the 
guards start coming off again you know they’ve been and gone, and they are 
not going to come during the night shift anyway (interview TP036). 
Johnson and McIvor have argued persuasively that in relation to asbestosis on 
Clydeside, attempts to enforce health and safety regulations in the workplace were 
compromised by the machismo culture evident among shipyard workers. Whereas 
in younger workers this took the form of a reckless bravado, in older workers it 
was expressed more through a sense of stoic fatalism (Johnson & McIvor 2001, p. 
57). With regard to our interviewees, the latter theme provides a better fit with the 
oral evidence, with the migrants displaying evidence of a relative disregard for 
personal health. Of course, comparison between the two studies is difficult. The 
workers interviewed by Johnson and McIvor were asbestosis victims, who pro-
vided vivid testimony to the effect that occupational disability had had on their 
lives. In contrast, our project made a deliberate decision not to use lists that were 
available of workers who were seeking to make compensation claims against 
employers for allegedly work-related health problems. It was thought that these 
would bias the findings of the study.  
Racism in the Textile Industry 
Early sociological studies of the north of England found evidence of racism in the 
mill culture. Polish, Latvian, and West Indian migrants were viewed with hosti-
lity, and were seen in terms of stereotyped characteristics, although these findings 
also revealed important differences in how the different ethnic groups were 
viewed (Jackson 1965, pp. 85–88). The main legislative attempt to tackle racism 
came with the 1968 Race Relations Act, covering discrimination in employment, 
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trade unions and trade organizations, advertising and notices, housing accommo-
dation and other business premises. In the textile industry, the 1968 Act affected 
agreements relating to the employment of foreign workers and requirements to 
join a trade union. But it was only in 1970 that the Department of Employment 
and Productivity issued memos on migrant workers in relation to the separate 
issues of religious observances, language and communication. 
It is clear that in addition to racial abuse from colleagues, there was institutional 
racism in the industry. This could take the form of a lack of promotion or training, 
radicalized labor, pay differentials, arguments over the control and management 
of time (trips home and Eid), and a perceived lack of union support, with the 
migrants being seen as “alien, foreign, and temporary”. This was again evident in 
some of the oral interviews. One interviewee simply stated that “the union doesn’t 
support ethnic minorities” (interview TP005). One worker from Bolton recalled 
that: 
All management structure was all white, and the view of the people at that 
time was it will stay white as along as we are here. It was very fresh from the 
British Raj in India, that “we are the masters” and “we shall remain the 
masters”, and I think that people accepted that (interview TP036).  
Another worker from Blackburn recalled that: 
when I was promoted as a mechanic first time, the manager promoted me and I 
got the letter, and er… all the white mechanics they walked out and they said 
to the management if he comes in we’re going out. So the personnel rang me 
up and said we have a problem, we want you, but this is our problem, they will 
all walk out (interview TP005). 
Evidence of racism came through strongly in the other interviews that were con-
ducted. Another worker from Bolton said that “the rate of pay was different. If 
you work on the same job on the nights it is different, less, than during the day” 
(interview TP036). One worker from Bradford said that “I think there was a racist 
attitude in every structure, whether it’s coming from the workforce, union, mana-
gement” (interview TP033). A worker from Bradford summed his feelings up 
simply by saying that “well, it was depressing for us, no promotion, after thirty 
years no promotion” (interview TP032). Another worker from Bradford said that 
“it was a feeling of just a second class citizen […] it degrades yourself you see” 
(interview TP028). One worker from Preston replied similarly that “there was 
never an opportunity for promotion, you were always on the dead-end job. It is 
your luck that you will stay on the shop floor” (interview TP027). Recent socio-
logical work has argued that racism has important implications for health, inclu-
ding psychological well-being. The history of racism, including its implications 
for the health of migrant workers over time, is an area deserving further study. 
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Conclusion  
This paper has attempted to compare the conventional history of occupational 
health in the textile industry with the material that emerges from interviews 
conducted with former South Asian workers. The interviews provide striking 
evidence of the economic problems that the industry faced, and how migration 
fitted into this. Those interviews that have been transcribed so far show how, as 
mill owners were faced with a shortage of workers in the 1950s, they turned to 
South Asian migrants. A workforce that had been predominantly young and 
female, was thus replaced in a short space of time with one that was male and 
ethnic. New technology allied to increasing competition from abroad required 
longer working hours, and South Asians took jobs that were not wanted by the 
local population, such as on the night shift. Migration was organized by family 
and kinship ties, with “ethnic brokers” playing an important role. Employers 
claimed that manual dexterity made these migrants particularly suitable for textile 
work, but stereotypes that were often feminine were also contradictory. What is 
clear is that migrants were not often members of trade unions. Equally important, 
there were varieties in their experience, depending on the mill in which they 
worked, their education, and the level at which they were employed. This analysis 
highlights the potential of comparative studies. It would be extremely interesting, 
for example, to compare the ways that perceptions of difference impinged on the 
way that both Irish and South Asian migrants were viewed within the textile 
industry. 
Evidence on health is more fragmentary, but it is clear that migrants lived in 
overcrowded conditions, at least initially, and safety notices were often not read, 
because they were in English. Working on the night shift also had important 
implications for health, though these are difficult to measure systematically. What 
is perhaps most striking is the dissonance between the conventional history of 
occupational health in the textile industry and the material collected in the oral 
interviews. In the former the main themes include scrotal cancer, byssinosis, dust 
in cardrooms, lighting and ventilation, and noise, where the main actors were 
central government departments, trade unions, and individual researchers. But the 
issues that have emerged as significant in the oral interviews are usually con-
cerned with the experiences of migration and arrival, living in overcrowded 
conditions, working on the night shift, health and safety, and racism.  
It is important to remember that, at the time of the conference for which this 
paper was prepared, only a small number of the interviews conducted had been 
transcribed. In this respect, the findings are very much preliminary and the fuller 
analysis will follow. The respondents were predominantly male, and the sample 
was relatively small. It is also arguable that in a sense they represent a “survivor’s 
story”, in that workers who may have died from byssinosis were unavailable for 
interview. However, what is arguably most interesting about the interviews is how 
they have revealed less explicit information about health than was anticipated at 
the outset. The interviewees tended to give relatively low priority to health when 
compared to more general issues concerning the experiences of migration and 
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arrival, housing, and racism. When the interviewees considered issues of occupa-
tional health, they were usually integrated into lay conceptions of health and ill-
ness. In this respect, a different type of analysis, incorporating traditional concepts 
of health and illness around metaphors of heat, cold, wet, and dry, is arguably 
necessary. Health is there in the interviews, but in coded forms.  
In turn, the use of oral interviewing has implications for how we view the histo-
ries of occupational health and public health. Looking at occupational health in 
this way brings us closer to the point of work, but also challenges the emphasis 
traditionally given to the main actors and organizational forces. To give one 
obvious example, South Asian migrants in the textile industry were not usually 
members of trade unions. Another task is to link oral and documentary sources 
more effectively. This presents both challenges and opportunities, but it should be 
possible to use the oral interviews to interrogate other documentary materials. In 
relation to the theme of housing in the 1950s, it should be possible to juxtapose 
the radicalized accounts of “multi-occupation” that occur in MOH reports of the 
1950s with the lived experience of the migrants as recounted in oral interviews. 
Finally, it is also arguable that this study has more wide ranging implications for 
the twin histories of public health and occupational health. The experience of the 
worker has traditionally been refracted through other organizations, such as trade 
unions, and public health and occupational health look rather different when seen 
“from below”. Interviews with workers make it possible to look at health both in 
and out of the workplace, and to focus on individual outcomes rather than organi-
zational forces. Indeed, from the point of view of the worker, the division between 
public health and occupational health, with which the conference has been con-
cerned, is perhaps in the end irrelevant. 
References 
Ahmat Y., Hussain A., Gata Aura T. & Clarke A. (1993) “The textile industry and Asian workers 
in Bradford” Race Today, 14:215–218. 
Anwar M. (1979) The Myth of Return: Pakistanis in Britain. London: Heinemann. 
Anwar M. (1996) British Pakistanis – Demographic, Social and Economic Position. Warwick: 
University of Warwick. 
Board of Trade (1947) Working Party Reports: Wool. London: HMSO. 
Bollini P. & Siem H. (1995) “No real progress towards equity: Health of migrants and ethnic 
minorities on the eve of the year 2000” Social Science Medicine, 41(6):819– 828. 
Bowden S. & Tweedale G. (2003) “‘Mondays without dread’: The Trade Union Response to 
Byssinosis in Lancashire Cotton Industry in the Twentieth Century” Social History of 
Medicine, 16(1):79–95. 
Bradford Heritage Recording Unit (1987) Destination Bradford: A Century of Immigration. Brad-
ford: Bradford Heritage Recording Unit. 
Bradford Hill A. (1927) Artificial Humidification in the Cotton Weaving Industry: Its Effect Upon 
the Sickness Rates of Weaving Operatives. MRC Industrial Fatigue Research Board Report 
no. 48. London: HMSO. 
Bradford Metropolitan District Council (2000) Bradford Population Forecasts Information 
Bulletin. Bradford: Bradford Metropolitan District Council. 
 163 
Brah A. (1993) “‘Race’ and ‘culture’ in the gendering of labour markets: South Asian young 
muslim women and the labour market” New Community, 19(3):441–458. 
Brooks D. & Singh K. (1979) “Pivots and presents: Asian brokers in British foundries” In: Wall-
man S. (ed.) Ethnicity at Work. Pp. 93–112. London: Macmillan. 
Cox S. & Golden R. (1976) Textile Worker. Harmondsworth: Kestrel Books. 
Dearden W.F. (1927) “Health hazards in the cotton industry” Journal of Industrial Hygiene, IX 
(9): 371–401, 453–472, 488–502. 
DHSS (1973a) Pneumoconiosis and byssinosis: Report by the Industrial Injuries Advisory Coun-
cil. Cmnd. 5443. London: HMSO. 
DHSS (1973b) Occupational Deafness. Cmnd. 5461. London: HMSO. 
Dowd Hall J. et al. (1987) Like a Family: The Making of a Southern Cotton Mill World. Chapel 
Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press. 
HM Factory Inspectorate (1979a) Cotton and allied fibers: Health and safety 1971–1977. Health 
and Safety Executive, London: HMSO. 
HM Factory Inspectorate (1979b) Wool-textile: Health and safety 1971–1977. Health and Safety 
Executive, London: HMSO. 
Home Office (1921) Lighting in Factories & Workshops. London: HMSO. 
Home Office (1926) Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Consider Evidence as to 
the Occurrence of Epitheliomatous Ulceration among Mule Spinners. London: HMSO. 
Jackson B. (1965) Working Class Community: Some General Notions Raised by a Series of Studies 
in Northern England. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Jackson P. (1992) “The radicalisation of labour in postwar Bradford” Journal of Historical Geo-
graphy, 18(2):190–209. 
Johnson R. & McIvor A. (2001) “‘Dust to dust’: Oral testimonies of asbestos-related disease on 
Clydeside, c1930 to the present” Oral History, 29(2):48–61.  
Kalra V.S. (2000) From Textile Mills to Taxi Ranks: Experiences of Migration, Labour and Social 
Change. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Khan V.S. (1979) “South Asian women in South London” In: Wallman S. (ed.) Ethnicity at Work. 
Pp. 114–133. London: Macmillan. 
Lloyd Evans S.L. & Bowlby S. (2000) “Crossing boundaries: Racialised gendering and the labour 
market experiences of Pakistani migrant women in Britain” Women’s Studies International 
Forum, 23(4):461–474. 
McIvor A. (2001) A History of Work in Britain, 1880–1950. London: Palgrave. 
Mekky S,. Roach S.A. & Schilling R.S.F. (1967) “Byssinosis among winders in the cotton 
industry” British Journal of Industrial Medicine, 24(2):123–131. 
Miles R. (1982) Racism and Migrant Labour. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Ministry of Labour (1961) Dust in Cardrooms: Final Report of the Joint Advisory Committee of 
the Cotton Industry. London: HMSO. 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (1940) Fifth Report of the Departmental Committee on 
Lighting in Factories. London. 
Ministry of Labour and National Service (1952) Mule Spinners’ Cancer: Second Interim Report of 
the Joint Advisory Committee of the Cotton Industry. London: HMSO. 
Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance (1963) Pneumoconiosis and Byssinosis. London: 
HMSO. 
NEDO (1969) The Strategic Future of the Wool Textile Industry. London: HMSO. 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1963) Census 1961 (Great Britain), London: HMSO. 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1973) Census 1971 (Great Britain), London: HMSO. 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1983) Census 1981 (Great Britain), London: HMSO. 
Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (1993) Census 1991 (Great Britain), London: HMSO. 
164 
Rex J. (1997) “The nature of ethnicity” In: Guibernau M. & Rex J. (eds.) The Ethnicity Reader. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Rex J. & Tomlinson S. (1979) Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis. London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
Rose M. (ed.) (1996) The Lancashire Cotton Industry: A History Since 1700. Preston: Lancashire 
County Books. 
Schilling R.S.F. (1956) “Byssinosis in cotton and other textile workers” Lancet, ii:261–265, 319–
325. 
Schilling R.S.F., Hughes J.P.W., Dingwall-Fordyce I. & Gilson J.C. (1955) “An epidemiological 
study of byssinosis among Lancashire cotton workers” British Journal of Industrial Medi-
cine, 12:217–227.  
Taylor C. (1990) “Asians in Britain – origins and lifestyles” In: McAvoy B.R. & Donaldson L.J. 
(eds.) Health Care for Asians. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Timmins G. (1996) Four Centuries of Lancashire Cotton. Preston: Lancashire County Books. 
Welshman J. (2000) “Tuberculosis and ethnicity in Britain 1950–70” Sociology of Health & Ill-
ness, 22(6):858–882. 
Weston H.C. (1935) The Relation Between Illumination and Industrial Efficiency. 1 – The Effect of 
Size of Work. London: HMSO. 
Winstanley M. (1996) “The factory workforce” In: Rose M. (ed.) The Lancashire Cotton Industry: 
A History Since 1700. Pp. 121–153. Preston: Lancashire County Books. 
WIRA (1970) WIRA report 101: Noise in the textile industry. Leeds: WIRA. 
Wyke T. (1987) “Mule spinners’ cancer” In: Fowler A. & Wyke T. (eds.) Barefoot Aristocrats: A 
History of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton Spinners. Pp. 184–196. Little-
borough: George Kelsall. 
 165 
14: Politics, Industry and International Health in Latin America 
during the 1940s 
Marcos Cueto, School of Public Health, Universidad Peruana Cauetano Heredia, 
Lima, Peru 
 
International health during the mid-twentieth century is a theme that has received 
little attention from historians of medicine. The remarkable studies on medicine as 
a tool of empire that appeared a few years ago studied developments of the turn of 
the century and concentrated on the activities designed in the metropolitan cen-
ters. I believe that an enlarged temporal perspective could be an instrument in 
understanding change and continuity in international health and will provide 
better insight into the interface between global and local interests. This perspec-
tive is pertinent even today when international health is again redefined (Kikbusch 
2001). A similar thought appeared in the Rockefeller Foundation 1946 Annual 
Report:  
International health has in recent years expanded so rapidly and crystallized 
into such definite form that it appears to be of more recent origin than it 
actually is (Rockefeller Foundation 1948, p. 2).  
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze the major changes in the 
motivations, organization and practice of international health in the Americas 
during the 1940s. As this study will try to demonstrate, these changes were 
marked by an increase in the range, diversity and intensity of international health 
activities and left a strong legacy for the post-war period. In addition, its ties with 
political imperatives – marked by the conflict of World War Two and the be-
ginning of the Cold War period – were stronger than before.  
In order to understand the period analyzed in this paper, I will describe briefly 
international health in Latin America at the beginning of the twentieth century. I 
will not address here the Latin American responses to this new panorama of inter-
national health, because of the lack of research. In any case, I recognize that the 
view of this article from the top-down may be incomplete, but it should be helpful 
for future studies on the reception and resilience of Latin American health systems 
and ideas. 
Background 
Between 1913 and 1939 the International Health Division (IHD) of the Rocke-
feller Foundation (RF) was the most important international health agency opera-
ting in Latin America. Support of research in the basic biomedical sciences, the 
reform of medical education and campaigns against hookworm, yellow fever and 
malaria, were the main activities of the Rockefeller Foundation in the region 
(Cueto 1994). Besides the foundation, there was a loose web of institutions inte-
rested in health in the Americas. The main institutions related to this web were US 
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businesses, universities and the military. Some of the web’s members concen-
trated their interest in Latin America, while others were interested in Latin Ame-
rica as part of a broader concern with health affairs in general. 
The web included the medical departments of US industries operating in Latin 
America, such as the United Fruit Company. The United Fruit Company culti-
vated and exported bananas from Central America, the Caribbean and Colombia 
and established a network of hospitals, laboratories and sanitation activities be-
ginning in 1912 (Wilson 1942). Another important component of this web was 
one of the first truly multilateral institutions: the Pan American Sanitary Office. It 
was created in 1902 as a unit of the Pan American Union, and, until the 1940s, it 
concentrated on the establishment of quarantine regulations, health codes, small-
pox vaccination and campaigns against bubonic plague in Latin American ports 
and cities (Howard-Jones 1980; Pan American Health Organization 1992).114  
Other components of this international web were the academic institutions 
devoted to tropical medicine. These were created in the first decades of the 
century and experienced a revival with the entry of the US into World War Two. 
The most prominent institutions were the School of Tropical Medicine of Tulane, 
the one in Puerto Rico (created in association with Columbia University (Ramirez 
de Arellano 1989) and Harvard School of Medicine’s Department of Comparative 
Pathology and Tropical Medicine (Cueto 1996). It also included professional 
societies, such as the American Society of Tropical Medicine (that grew from 520 
active members in 1940 to 952 in 1943), and academic journals, for example, The 
American Journal of Tropical Medicine that has existed since 1921; Mosquito 
News, that began to appear in 1941; and The Journal of the National Malaria 
Society, published between 1942 and 1951. Some of their activities were funded 
by the Rockefeller Foundation and new philanthropies such as the American 
Foundation for Tropical Medicine, that operated in New York in 1940 (Faust 
1944). Finally, other components of this web (that have been less well studied) 
were the various medical departments of the US military and humanitarian and 
religious organizations, such as the National Red Cross Societies coordinated by 
the League of Red Cross Societies created in Geneva in 1919 and the Adventist 
Church (Reid & Gilbo 1997).  
Despite the diversity of institutions and the organization of important sanitation 
campaigns, the scope and relevance of international health before World War Two 
were not clearly defined in the Americas. The links between international agen-
cies and US politics and industries were unstable, and activities were scarce, 
fragmented, suffered discontinuity and – with some exceptions – used few re-
sources and little personnel. In contrast, during and just after World War Two, the 
number of agencies, programs, fellowships and grants directed toward Latin 
America increased dramatically. In addition, from the early 1950s international 
health became part of more global development schemes and an important ingre-
dient of the Cold War. 
                                                
114 The Pan American Sanitary Bureau is today better known as the Pan American Health Organi-
zation, PAHO.  
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New and Old Motivations 
International health in the Americas experienced a revival at the beginning of the 
1940s for a combination of reasons. Some were similar to the motivations that 
launched international health in the precedent period. One strong motivation was 
the fear of reinfection. US governments and institutions were concerned that in-
creased contact with less-developed regions of the world produced by commerce, 
war and air transportation augmented the risk of imported infections in the US. 
International health became a valid means of protection for American soldiers, 
businessmen and travelers, and a form of prevention for the US population at 
large.  
The concern for protection and prevention was especially strong among the 
military. During the years of World War Two, eight million American soldiers 
were exposed to disease hazards that were under control in the US, such as 
malaria. This disease had the highest incidence among tropical illnesses in the 
army during the war with a total of 460,872 cases, of which only 4,000 trans-
missions occurred on the American continent. However, thanks to new drugs and 
medical treatment, mortality rates for malaria among the US military were very 
low.115 In the wake of the conflict, Fred L. Soper, a former officer of the Rocke-
feller Foundation, added an important argument to support a close relationship 
between international health and the US military: “Should the war come again, the 
United States will need healthy nations as allies.”116 
The military concern for hemispheric safety also resulted from the need to 
secure a safe supply of rubber and quinine from South America. The Japanese 
invasion of the Dutch East Indies in 1942 cut off the primary world source of 
quinine, which was crucial for the treatment of malaria (Steere 16 February 1946). 
Almost immediately the US government signed agreements with all Andean 
countries to revive the almost extinct Chinchona-bark industry, organize scientific 
expeditions to the areas where quinine was first discovered, establish laboratories 
in the main Latin American cities and buy all bark that exceeded certain minimum 
alkaloid content. Likewise, the US lost the rubber supply after the Japanese take-
over of Malaysia as well as in other rubber production areas in Asia. Another 
military reason for following developments in Latin America closely during the 
war was the strategic location of the Panama Canal and the fear that, if Nazis 
controlled Dakar, a possibility that existed until 1943, they would be able to 
invade the new world. 
A loyal hemisphere was necessary in the war effort and not only for military 
reasons. Another important motivation was the economic importance of Latin 
America for the US International health was constructed as a tool for increasing 
                                                
115 Dengue was second to malaria, the former causing 84,090 hospital admissions among soldiers. 
The two diseases had the highest incidence among tropical diseases in the army during the 
war. See Simmons 1947.  
116 Fred L. Soper. “International Health Work in the Americas, May 3, 1948.” Nelson A. Rocke-
feller Papers (hereafter NAR) Series 114. Box 111. Folder 932. Rockefeller Archive Center, 
New York (hereafter RAC). 
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the economic productivity of regions of the world under American influence. The 
protection of plantations, mines and camps from epidemics became essential. The 
growth of American business in the region was corollary to the development of 
industrial medical departments operating abroad. For example, by the late 1940s 
the United Fruit Company employed 89,986 people in the tropics and maintained 
1,830 beds in its hospitals and dispensaries. The medical director of the company 
explained to the participants of the Fourth International Congress on Tropical 
Medicine and Malaria the importance of medicine for successful business in the 
tropics: “Philanthropy is not only a virtue; it is a basic law of survival” (Salisburry 
1948). In the same meeting the idea was even expressed in technical terms: health 
was an important investment for “the stabilization” of the labor force and the 
continuity of economic production.117  
Moreover, during and after the war, American political and academic leaders 
realized that Latin America represented a very important market for American 
goods. In order to render Latin Americans capable of buying these products, it 
was necessary to instigate some degree of economic and social development to 
raise the local standards of living. In 1945 a medical military officer in charge of 
US-Latin American relations explained the idea to other Americans attending the 
annual dinner of the American Foundation for Tropical Medicine:  
All the taxpayers’ money spent […] in the other Americas will come back to 
the taxpayers of the United States in improved trade relations (Dunham 1945).  
Paradoxically, the growth of interest in Latin America came out of the tragedy of 
Europe. This was true in the case of the Rockefeller Foundation. After the Nazi 
invasion the Rockefeller Foundation’s work in continental Europe practically 
ended. In addition, China, a long-term interest for the foundation, was in the 
middle of a civil war. As a result, the foundation closed its offices in continental 
Europe and transferred some resources and personnel to Latin America.118 In 1945 
Rockefeller appropriations to Latin America were greater than those earmarked 
for all other regions of the world combined. The relocation of resources continued 
even after the end of the war. In 1948 Latin America received 44.3 per cent of the 
International Health Division money, the US and Canada only 32.8 per cent and 
the rest of world 22.9 per cent. In contrast, during the period between 1913 and 
1933, Rockefeller Foundation expenditures by geographical areas were: 35 per 
cent for Europe; 49 per cent for the Far East (where the RF supported a medical 
school at Beijing) and only 10 per cent for South America, Central America and 
                                                
117 Comments of Jerome Rodhain to the presentation of E. I. Salisburry, “Health and Medical Ser-
vices in the Tropics.” p. 1450. In: Proceedings of the Fourth International Congress. 
118 In a 1943 meeting of the RF it was noticed: “Geographically the field of operations has shifted 
under the influence of the War. While the work in Continental Europe and much of the Far 
East is temporarily at the standstill, the activities under regular program in South America 
have increased markedly.” “Analysis of program in relation to changing condition. Prelimi-
nary Divisional Statement, 5 October 1942.” Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter 
RFA). R.G. 3. Series 908. Box 13. Folder 135. RAC. “Memorandum about the extension of 
our IHD Program in South America.” Attached to the letter A.J: Warren to R.B.F. 8 August 
1940. RFA E.G. 3 Series 908 Box 12 Folder 126 RAC. 
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the Caribbean.119 It is also important to underline the reversal of this trend in the 
1950s when the foundation resumed contact with European institutions and indi-
viduals. In 1948 an important Rockefeller officer expressed the consensus of the 
IHD: “we cannot expect in the future to maintain our program in Latin America at 
the level reached during the War.”120 An illustration of these trends appears in the 
evolution of IHD fellowships by region during the period 1917 to 1951 (Table 
14.1). 
 
Table 14.1. International Health Division fellowships by country, 1917–1951. 
 1917–26 1927–36 1937–46 1947–51 Total 
Canada and US 89 354 229 157 829 
Latin America and the Caribbean 73 126 219 55 473 
Europe (including UK) 182 232 90 78 582 
Near and Far East 45 151 57 95 348 
South Pacific and Others 18 9 46 32 105 
Source: Rockefeller Foundation Archives. Record Group 3. Series 908. Box 15. Folder 173. 
Rockefeller Archive Center. 
Note: Europe includes West and Central Europe, Scandinavia and the Balkan areas. The Far East 
includes India, China and Japan. South Pacific includes Australia. The category “others” 
includes a few grants to countries of the Middle East and Africa. 
 
The fellowships from the IHD and other agencies intensified the Americanization 
of Latin American medical and health personnel and institutions. At the beginning 
of the twentieth century the medical Mecca for many Latin American students 
was Paris, and it was common to find a large amount of French textbooks in local 
medical libraries. By the mid-twentieth century US universities became the favo-
rite choice for Latin American medical students pursuing a postgraduate educa-
tion, and a reading command of English nearly became a requirement for medical 
training. For example, in 1943, of the 123 Latin American RF fellows, 119 studied 
at educational institutions in the US and Canada. There were also greater facilities 
to overcome language barriers. Beginning in 1942 Latin American RF fellows 
attended a preliminary eight-week course at Johns Hopkins University, basically 
to improve their English, before the start of the regular course of study (Rocke-
feller Foundation 1943, p. 139). In addition, the foundation granted an important 
number of travel grants to enable experienced health officials and medical re-
searchers to visit the US and exchange views with their American colleagues. 
Americanization was not a trend resisted by local individuals and institutions. 
Moreover, it appears that there was competition among locals to take advantage of 
the access to technology, financial resources and fellowships. 
                                                
119 “Report of IHD Staff Conference, 19 May1948, New York City,” RFA. R.G.3 Series 908 Box 
13 Folder 134; “Rockefeller Foundation Expenditures during the period 22 May 1913 to 31 
December 1933 by Geographical areas.” RFA. R.G. 3 Series 900 Box 3 Folder 23. RAC.  
120 Lewis Hackett “Interrelationship of IHD and other agencies operating in Latin America: the 
problems that arise and their solution. To what extent is coordination possible?” In: “Report of 
IHD Conference, 19 May 1948.” RFA. R.G. 3 Series 908 Box 13 Folder 134. RAC. 
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New Institutions 
The greater interest in international health in the Americas was also expressed in 
the emergence of new agencies and a series of reorganizations at the RF. At the 
beginning of the 1940s the Latin American work of the IHD was reorganized in 
four main field offices located in Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Havana (in charge 
of the Caribbean, Central America, Colombia, Venezuela and British Guyana) and 
Buenos Aires. It is important to emphasize that in 1940 only one other IHD field 
office existed abroad (in India) (Rockefeller Foundation 1941, p. 117). The 
Buenos Aires’ office, created in 1939 as the Rio de la Plata and Andean Region 
Office, operated in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay and Para-
guay. It was extremely active until 1949 when it closed its doors, partly because 
of political tensions between the US and the populist Argentinean dictator Juan 
Perón.121 
Lewis W. Hackett, an experienced officer of the RF with experience in Central 
America (1914–1924) and Italy (1924–1940), moved from Rome to Buenos Aires 
to head the new IHD office in Buenos Aires. It is interesting to note that the deci-
sion of the foundation was considered the beginning of the end of its work on 
yellow fever and a diversification of the foundation’s interests in the region. 
During the 1930s, the significant work of the RF on yellow fever in Brazil was 
handed over to the Brazilian government. This work completed, the moment was 
considered ripe for an expansion of “the general public health program throughout 
South America”. The latter was understood as the decentralization of health ser-
vices, the promotion of full-time positions in the public health ministries, the 
training of nurses and support for medical education reform. 
The activities of the foundation in Latin America were not isolated events but 
part of a broad process of renewal of international health’s institutions (see Table 
14.2). 
In addition to these organizations, other institutions existed in the US for which 
data are not readily available, such as the W.K. Kellogg Foundation that concen-
trated on the education of dentists, physicians and other health professionals in 
Latin America; the Division of International Health of the US Public Health 
Service created in 1945 as the Office of International Health; the powerful Medi-
cal and Research Program of the National Research Council and a Committee on 
Medical Research of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(Williams 1951). 
                                                
121 “South American region-authorization, November 6, 1939.” RFA. R:G: 3 Series 908. Box 12. 
Folder 126. RAC. 
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Table 14.2. Organizations working in international health in the Americas, 1949.  
Note: N.A. = Not Available. 
 
Name 
 
Year of Creation 
 
Scope 
No. of 
Officers 
 
Headquarters 
Annual Budget 
USD 
IHD of the RF 1913 The globe 49 New York 2.1 million 
Pan American Sanitary 
Bureau 
1902 (1946) major 
reorganization 
21 American 
republics 309 
Washington 
D.C. 1.9 million 
Office of Inter-
American Affairs 1940 
Western 
hemisphere 100 (US) 
Washington 
D.C. 9.5 million 
World Health 
Organization 
1946 
(Constitution) 74 states 549 Geneva 5 million 
United Nations Inter-
national Children’s 
Emergency Fund 
UNICEF (UN agency) 
1946 50 countries N.A. New York N.A. 
Source: “Meeting of the Rockefeller Foundation Commission on review of the international health 
Division, May 19, 1950.” Rockefeller Foundation Archives. R.G. 3. Series 908. Box 13. 
Folder 140; “Structure, Policy, Staff, Methods of Operation, Program and Expenditures of the 
International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation.” Rockefeller Foundation Archi-
ves. R.G. 3. Series 908. Box 13. Folder 136; “The Rockefeller Foundation Commission on 
Review of the International Health Division. “Other Organizations which have International 
Health Programs or Related activities.” Rockefeller Foundation Archives. R.G. 3 Series 908. 
Box 14. Folder 147. RAC 
 
During World War Two, medical departments of the US Army acquired an enor-
mous global role. When the war was imminent in 1939, the medical departments, 
that between the two world wars had been granted insufficient appropriations and 
had only a small nucleus of officers, received substantial support from the govern-
ment.122 These funds prompted the Army Epidemiological Board of the Secretary 
of War (originally established as the “Board for the Investigation and Control of 
Influenza and Other Epidemic Diseases in the Army”) to play a very active role 
between 1941 and 1946. An example of the US Army medical activity was its use 
of 17 million dollars during World War Two in a mosquito control program that 
included the use of DDT and distribution of antimalarial drugs. 
More importantly, the intervention of military medicine in the war was per-
ceived as a remarkable success. A military doctor stressed the fact that, in the 
Spanish American War at the turn of the twentieth century, 13 US soldiers died of 
disease to every one killed on the battle fields. In World War One the ratio was 
one to one. In contrast, during World War Two only one American soldier died of 
disease for every 85 that were killed in battle (Simmons 1950). The image of a 
medical victory also stems from a number of remarkable medical discoveries and 
applications made by the Army, such as new drugs like atabrine and chloroquine 
                                                
122 “Statement by Brig. General James S. Simmons, Chief, Preventive Medicine Service, Office of 
the Surgeon General, U.S: Army (For presentation on 14 December 1944 before the Senate 
Sub-Committee on Wartime Health and Education).” RFA. R.G. 200 Series 61. Folder 732. 
RAC. 
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for malaria, the use of DDT against epidemic typhus and malaria, and the exten-
sive use of sulfas. 
One of the most important American agencies created with World War Two 
was the Office of Inter-American Affairs.123 The office was created in 1940 after a 
proposal by the third child of John D. Rockefeller Jr., Nelson Rockefeller, who 
had had strong economic, political and cultural interests in Latin America since 
the 1930s. For example, until 1940 he was director of the Creole Petroleum 
Company, the Venezuelan subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, and made 
extensive visits to the region. After a 1939 visit to Latin America, alarmed by 
Nazi influence in the region, Nelson Rockefeller prepared a memorandum for 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. He strongly recommended an active program of 
US cooperation, propaganda and development. Roosevelt responded by appoin-
ting Rockefeller head of the new Office of the Coordination of Inter-American 
Affairs.  
The office organized a series of economic, health, and educational projects in 
the region that lasted about ten years. Under the supervision of the office hospi-
tals, health centers, mosquito control measures, instruction of physicians, nurses 
and sanitary engineers, as well as water supply and sewerage systems were 
developed in Latin America. Anti-malaria campaigns included the control of 
larvae by ditching, draining and the use of oil. Later some of the first DDT 
spraying programs were carried out. These programs were directed by Major-
General George C. Dunham of the US Army, an expert in tropical medicine with 
experience in Panama and the Philippines, who in 1945 published an illustrative 
article entitled “The Role of Tropical Medicine in International Relations” 
(Dunham 1945).  
The health activities of the office were run by especially designed and well-
funded institutions called Cooperative Services of Public Health (Servicios 
Cooperativos de Salud Pública) (Campos 1997). These were usually headed by an 
American expert who was responsible to the ministries of health. Most of the staff 
was locally hired and received full-time salaries. These salaries were usually 
higher than what equivalent public servants received. The decision was justified 
as a means of demonstrating the importance of sustaining a local career in public 
health. The Servicios were able to maintain their program and personnel through 
the frequent political changes that characterized the region. According to its 
director, a demonstration of their accomplishments was that in one Latin Ameri-
can country the program survived six different ministers of health (Dunham 1944, 
1945). 
By 1948 there were about 130 US health and sanitation experts in Latin Ame-
rica and an estimated 8,000 local physicians, nurses, technicians and unskilled 
                                                
123 The office, created in 1940 as the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Rela-
tions between the American Republics, changed its name to Office of the Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs in 1945 and in 1946 was called the Office of Inter-American Affairs. In this 
paper I am using the latest denomination. 
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workers employed in the Servicios.124 In addition 600 Latin Americans received 
fellowships for training, usually abroad, in some of the medical and health fields. 
Initially, it was expected that the cost of these programs was going to be shared 
and that the national governments would take over the work when US cooperation 
came to an end. Namely, at the beginning the goal was to set an example, as the 
Rockefeller Foundation tried to do in the pre-war years. However, the Servicios 
faced some of the problems previously encountered by the RF, such as increasing 
local demands to enlarge their responsibilities. In addition, they were under 
pressure to obtain rapid results, because initially they were to exist for only five 
years (although the term was later extended to 1950). According to some contem-
porary observers, the uncertainty about the future complicated the recruitment of 
American officers with experience in the field.  
There was also some tension, duplication and overlapping among American 
agencies. For example, a Rockefeller officer complained about the attitude of the 
Americans working at the Servicio in Uruguay:  
It rapidly occupied the fields in which we might have operated. […] They 
employed all our fellows, but did not conceal from us or the Minister their 
opposition to having us around.125  
A corollary criticism came from other US institutions. Some believed that the IHD 
excluded them from their work and openly discouraged the integration of Rocke-
feller programs with local official institutions. 
By 1951 the Office of Inter-American Affairs had spent 30,403,103 USD on 
health projects during its ten years of existence. This was far more than all the 
grants given by the RF in Latin America during the pre-war years. Of the 661 
original projects of the office, 547 were still being carried out after 1951.126 It is 
also important to stress that, after 1951, many of these programs continued under 
the auspices of the Foreign Operation Administration, and, later, from 1961, were 
part of the US Agency for International Development. Consequently, the office 
provided the framework for American health projects in Latin America that would 
continue during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Certainly, the Servicios had a lasting influence in the region by replacing exis-
ting government agencies or becoming the most powerful programs in the health 
ministries. Their administration of significant resources and personnel with a high 
degree of autonomy gave them strong political influence. In Mexico, for example, 
water supplies were built by the Servicios without consultation with the State 
Health Department, because the whole bureaucratic process was considered too 
cumbersome and slow. In Colombia the government just abolished its original 
Division of Sanitary Engineering and turned these activities over to the Servicio.  
                                                
124 “NX Cables SA by Harry W. Frantz, United Press Staff Correspondent, 23 January 1948.” 
NAR, Series 114. Box 111 Folder 932. RAC. See also Bliss 1985.  
125 Hackett, “Interrelationship of IHD.” RAC. p. 7.  
126 United States Public Health Services. Bureau of State Service. (1953) Ten Years of Cooperative 
Health Programs in Latin America, an evaluation. Washington D.C. Library of the New York 
Academy of Medicine. 
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With a much smaller budget, but a clear leading role in the region, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) appeared in 1946. It replaced a number of European 
organizations and made an alliance with the Pan American Sanitary Bureau that 
changed its name to the Pan American Sanitary Organization and became WHO’s 
regional office for the Americas. The latter increased its prestige, resources and 
political influence under the leadership of Fred L. Soper, who was appointed 
director of the bureau in 1947, a position he retained until 1959 (Soper 1970). In 
consonance with the new international trends, Soper was convinced that the 
organization should move from “border and port quarantine […] [to] a general 
direct attack on communicable diseases in their endemic haunts”.127 Soper orga-
nized important campaigns to fight malaria, offered fellowships to train Latin 
Americans in US medical and public health schools, and obtained a magnificent 
building for PAHO in Washington, D.C. However, it was really in the mid-1950s 
when he appeared as a true regional and global leader with the gigantic operation 
to eradicate malaria. 
Contradictions 
An important event that had an impact in the shaping of international health was 
the decision of the Rockefeller Foundation to close its International Health Divi-
sion in 1951. In terms of visibility, staff, autonomy and resources, the IHD was 
the most important of the five divisions of the foundation (IHD, Medical Sciences, 
Natural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities). In 1951 the IHD was offici-
ally merged with the Medical Sciences Division, and a new Division of Medicine 
and Public Health appeared, inheriting part of the IHD’s final obligations. What 
really happened is that, since the 1940s, the foundation has placed less emphasis 
on public health and paid greater attention to agricultural development. After a 
survey, Mexico was the first country to receive a substantial program to improve 
its food plants through plant breeding, better soil fertility and the control of insect 
pests. The decision suggests that for the trustees of the foundation food and 
nutrition had replaced infectious diseases as the main problems of backward 
societies. 
The reasons for the closure of the division were complex and political and go 
beyond the range of this article. However, it is pertinent to describe some aspects 
of the process. In April of 1950 the foundation appointed a commission to review 
the IHD and make recommendations for the future.128 The meetings took a year of 
work for three sub-committees on policy, program and finance that delivered a 
final report in June 1951. The commission was formed by present or former 
trustees, including Henry Allen Moe, Secretary-general of the John Simon 
Guggenheim Memorial Foundation; Thomas Parran, former US Surgeon General 
                                                
127 Fred L. Soper. “International Health Work in the Americas, 3 May 1948.” NAR Series 114. 
Box 111. Folder 932. RAC. 
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and then Dean of the School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh; John 
D. Rockefeller III; and three officers of the Foundation, including Alan Gregg 
(then vice-president of the foundation) and Warren Weaver, director of what 
would become in 1951 the powerful RF Division of Natural Sciences and Agri-
culture and latter appointed vice-president of the foundation (1955–1959).  
The RF commission also included twelve outstanding academics who had 
worked with the foundation before, among whom were Paul C. Mangelsdorf of 
the Botanical Museum of Harvard University, the epidemiologist Kenneth Maxcy 
of the Johns Hopkins University and Hugo Muench from the Harvard School of 
Public Health. A number of leading agricultural experts were also part of the 
commission, such as William I. Myers, dean of the College of Agriculture of 
Cornell University, Richard Bradfield of the Department of Agronomy of Cornell 
University and E. C. Stakman, chief of the Department of Agriculture of the 
University of Minnesota. 
There were numerous reasons given for closing the IHD. First, the foundation 
considered that its work on yellow fever, one of its major interests, was done 
(Strode 1951). In addition it was a success story. This meant that the scientific 
origin of the disease was identified, an effective vaccine was available and a 
practical method for its manufacture on a commercial scale was worked out by 
officers and researchers of the RF and the Rockefeller Institute of Medical 
Research (Corner 1964). However, the elimination of the disease, envisioned by 
the foundation in the 1910s was then considered impossible, since there was a 
natural reservoir in the jungle, primates intervened in the transmission, and more 
than one mosquito could infect people. Yellow fever was by that time not con-
sidered a major menace, since it no longer interrupted commerce or affected ports 
and urban areas. In addition, in May 1951 one of the main characters of the 
Rockefeller yellow fever story, George K. Strode, discoverer of the virus that 
produces the disease and former scientific director (1944–1949) and director 
(1944–1951) of the IHD, retired after 34 years of work with the foundation.  
Secondly, the RF considered that new health agencies were doing the same 
work as the IHD, with larger budgets and greater willingness to work with or 
interact with American foreign policy. The Rockefeller concern for competition, 
overlapping and duplication is clear in the discussions of the commission. In 
addition, there was a strong tradition in the foundation of working only on under-
takings where their pioneer role could make a lasting impression. This idea was 
also instrumental in creating the perception of the IHD as the matrix of new 
developments in international health. According to the scientific directors of the 
IHD, agencies such as the WHO could not have come into existence “had it not 
been for the International Health Division which had the original concept and 
blazed the trail”.129 
There was also a political component in the decision of the RF. It appears that it 
was difficult for the leaders of the RF to accept all the political changes of the 
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post-World War Two period. Before the war the foundation operated under the 
assumption that western philanthropy, science and medicine were supreme univer-
sal aspirations for all cultures. Its relationship with American foreign interest was 
subtle, even at times reluctant. Before World War Two nothing appeared to 
contradict the conviction that all societies were moving along the same lines of 
modernization. However, the termination of capitalism in China with the 1949 
revolution, the tension between Argentina and the US, and the emergence of the 
“Iron Curtain”, dramatically changed the world within which the foundation led 
philanthropic endeavors. The Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the 
US made it extremely difficult for any agency to maintain a low profile and 
formal independence from political goals during the 1950s. 
Another political reason for RF to terminate the IHD was related to a new per-
ception of what was needed in developing countries. There was a growing realiza-
tion among some officers of the foundation that an integrated social development 
was absolutely necessary in backward countries in order to make health programs 
effective. In the discussions of the commission this idea was expressed by some as 
a vague concept called “human ecology”.130 For other RF officers the solution for 
underdevelopment was a concentrated effort in improving agricultural techniques. 
Finally, the desire to integrate all activities of the foundation in fewer divisions 
served to diminish internal tensions. One source of internal tension was the fact 
that for years the IHD received annually a lump sum to be disbursed by its own 
Board of Scientific Directors. It also worked as an operating division, whereas the 
other divisions were dispensing agencies not directly engaged in the running of 
field programs. There were also officers who truly believed that this was a unique 
opportunity for new medical developments. According to Morrison the decision to 
create a new division was:  
a good reply to those outsiders who feel that the Foundation has tended to be-
come more and more conservative […] the new arrangement gives us all a 
chance to do something really original in the way of integrating the preventive 
and curative aspects of medicine.131 
Another consideration that played a role in the decision of the RF was the concern 
that international sanitation improvements were causing a problem of overpopula-
tion in less-developed countries. In the opening remarks made by the President of 
the RF to a meeting of the commission reviewing the IHD, there was mention of 
the need for population control due to “the increasing amount of criticism of 
public health work because there is no corresponding limitation on birth rate”.132 
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A more blunt statement was made in another of the meetings of the committee. 
Andrew J. Warren, declared:  
In some quarters, the finger is being pointed at the IHD something like this. 
You are going into […] backward countries where […] you are reducing the 
death rate while the birth rate is remaining high, and you are adding to the 
social and economic burden.133  
A corollary idea emerged from the medical departments of American industries 
operating abroad. Among some contemporary experts there was a preoccupation 
with the overuse and expenses of the medical facilities provided by US companies 
and philanthropies abroad. For example, the General Medical Director of Standard 
Oil Company, who was in charge of 24 hospitals and 92 clinics for 34,000 em-
ployees and 166,000 of their relatives, complained that the medical expenses for 
the Latin American affiliates of the company had risen from a little less than three 
million dollars in 1940 to over nine million in 1950. He also confessed that in 
many of their oil camps: 
Hospitals are bulging with invalids – not with employees, but with their 
dependents – wives, children, aunts, uncles and grandparents. […] In the 
Netherlands West Indies not long ago, I heard the remark: “I don’t know why 
she came to the hospital for this one. She had the other 13 at home.” […] This 
case illustrates the trend, medical service, whether good or bad attracts. When 
it is excellent, it is impossible to curtail it […] Is this good business? (Collier 
1950).  
A similar concern was expressed by the chief of the Medical Department of the 
United Fruit Company that administered 2,000 beds in 14 hospitals, sick camps 
and dispensaries in Latin America. These served the health needs of their 90,000 
employees and 250,000 of their family members. The number had grown from 
1948 when the total number of employees and relatives attended by the Medical 
Service amounted to 195,910 (Salisburry 1948). 
Legacies 
As a result of these developments, a new framework for international health in the 
Americas emerged during the 1950s. This framework was not necessarily cohe-
rent or complementary, nor did it have clear leadership. It was certainly diverse 
and somewhat fragmented, but had some common goals. Among these goals was 
an increased Americanization of Latin American public health, medicine and 
society. It was only during World War Two that European medical influence 
declined in Latin America. In addition, after this war the links between politics 
and international health were more clearly expressed than in the past. Between the 
two world wars the Rockefeller Foundation avoided clear political connotations in 
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its work or expressed a general interest in the development of Western civiliza-
tion. After the war it was clear that for some politicians and public health leaders 
that international health had a role to play in the Cold War.  
The idea of international health as a tool of the Cold War was probably not 
shared by everyone in the US, but it was clearly expressed by James Stevens, the 
former Chief of Preventive Medicine of the US Army and later dean of the School 
of Public Health at Harvard University. From 1950 he organized a series of fasci-
nating meetings on “Industry and Tropical Health”. In the welcoming address of 
the first meeting, attended by delegates of 23 industries and ten agencies, Stevens 
explained: 
Powerful Communist forces are at work […] taking advantage of sick and 
impoverished people, exploiting their discontent […] to undermine their politi-
cal beliefs. Health is one of the safeguards against this propaganda. Health is 
not charity, it is not missionary work, it is not merely good business – it is 
sheer self preservation for us and for the way of life, which we regard as 
decent. Through health we can expand industrial production, strengthen our 
military forces and maintain the high morale of all our people. Through it we 
can prove, to ourselves and to the world, the wholesomeness and rightness of 
Democracy. Through health we can defeat the evil threat of communism 
(Simmons 1950).134 
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15: Tangerian Ghosts and Riffian Realities: The Limits  
of Colonial Public Health in Spanish Morocco (1906–1921)135 
Francisco Javier Martínez Antonio, Postdoctoral Fellow, Laboratoire REHSEIS, 
Paris 
Introduction 
In May 1930, the internationally-renowned Italian parasitologist, Gustavo Pitta-
luga, (who had settled in Spain) and one of his disciples, Francisco Ruiz Morote, 
visited the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco after attending the International 
Conference on Malaria held in Algiers. They were accompanied by Captain Dr. 
Joaquín Sanz Astolfi, Director of the Laboratory of Clinical Analysis of the 
Tettouan Military Hospital, who had also travelled with them to Algiers as repre-
sentative of the Protectorate’s Health Services (Sanz Astolfi 1931–1932). During 
their short trip, Pittaluga and Morote got a glimpse of the Protectorate’s health 
organisation and institutions, its sanitary conditions as well as the plans and 
outcomes of the first anti-malarial campaign launched the previous year. After the 
visit, they published a paper in Pittaluga’s journal, Medicina de los Países 
Cálidos, which also appeared in África, the journal of the Spanish Army in 
Morocco. 
In that paper, Pittaluga claimed that Spanish health initiatives in Morocco had 
been  
guided in an excessively military sense, abandoning some of the main scien-
tific and public health orientations which must be the base, never to be for-
gotten, of every doctor’s actions […] (Pittaluga & Ruiz Morote 1930).  
But he added “that all prevention has vanished on contact with a cosy, full-of-
promises reality” (Pittaluga & Ruiz Morote 1930). Morote confirmed this impres-
sion when he wrote that  
remembering the visit is enough to eagerly wish that the work developed there 
would become better known in the metropolis and to know to what extent pub-
lic health work has contributed and is contributing to improving the population 
health status and to easing Protectorate’s duties.  
Out of all initiatives, for Morote  
the most impressive ones are those concerning rural dispensaries [strictly 
called “dispensaries for natives”]. They are advanced posts of civilization, now 
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enjoying the peace they contributed to sow in such an efficient way (Pittaluga 
& Ruiz Morote 1930). 
In fact, by the time of Pittaluga and Morote’s travel, there existed a network of 58 
“dispensaries for natives” in Spanish Morocco, ten of them in the towns and 48 in 
the countryside, spread throughout the Protectorate’s territory. They were run by 
Spanish doctors and Spanish and Moroccan auxiliary personnel. They generally 
had exploratory, analytical and surgical equipment and small infirmaries, and they 
were provided periodically with drugs, vaccines and, when necessary, with 
disinfection devices. These dispensaries had begun to offer outpatient, clinical and 
surgical care and were used as the basis for the launching of the first health 
campaigns against malaria, typhoid fever or syphilis (Delgado 1930). The network 
of dispensaries may be taken as a symbol of the deployment of a health system in 
Spanish Morocco. Its presence was represented throughout the 20,000 km2 of 
territory, and its coverage of a population that overall was estimated at between 
600,000 and one million inhabitants. 
But things had been quite different in the years prior to the Rif War (1921–
1927) and, obviously, in the course of it. Despite a tradition of medical activities 
in Morocco since the last quarter of the 19th century, Spain was unable to establish 
more than four urban and sixteen countryside dispensaries in its Protectorate zone 
before 1921. In this first period of existence, activities of dispensaries for natives 
were hindered by personnel and equipment problems, by the lack of proper facili-
ties and funding, and by the lack of administrative co-ordination between the 
ministries of State and War and between Tettouan and Melilla. Spain also acted 
under pressure of measures taken by France in its much larger Moroccan Protec-
torate, exhibited in either its inability to match developments there, or in the 
constant menace of French interference in the Spanish zone (Martínez Antonio et 
al. 2003; Molero Mesa et al. 2002; Molero Mesa 2003). 
However, as this paper attempts to show, another major obstacle for the crea-
tion of dispensaries for natives during this period was the relative persistence of 
Morocco’s public health structures and agency. Since the 19th century, Moroccan 
public health action had been expressed in different forms, ranging from govern-
ment participation in modern state-wide organs, such as the Sanitary Council of 
Tangiers, to popular rejection of foreign intervention. Most historiography on the 
French and Spanish Protectorates in Morocco has tended to ignore or underesti-
mate the development of the Moroccan state prior to and after 1912, though as it 
will be seen, Moroccan agency proved resilient and influenced public health 
developments in the Spanish and French Protectorates for many years after they 
were formally established. 
When this agency is systematically taken into account, the question of the 
colonial character of the Spanish (and French) Morocco’s health system arises. 
Many historians have argued that the Protectorate regime was only a façade for 
direct colonial action (Hoisington 1995; Rivet 1996; Gershovich 2000; Pennell 
2000; Villanova 2004). However, the impact of events taking place in Morocco 
was too strongly felt in metropolitan Spain (and France) to consider them as 
182 
“merely” colonial. Conversely, Spain (and France) had to display too much direct 
intervention to control Moroccan authorities and territory to describe their activi-
ties as “mere” colonization. In the case of Spain, it seems especially clear that 
differences were not of such a degree as to explain its relationship with Morocco 
in colonialist terms. Their interaction resembled more a conflict between countries 
of similar (weak) power: similarity led to war, not to colonization, and to expro-
priation or seizure of local authority, not to its intervention. An attempt will be 
made to clarify this crucial issue, although present conclusions cannot be but 
tentative, as they are based almost exclusively on Spanish and French sources. 
The main hypotheses may nevertheless be taken into consideration while the 
process of gathering data from Moroccan archives is carried out. Specific public 
health developments concerning the Jewish community are not addressed in this 
paper, an absence which should also be corrected in future works. 
Caring for the Ports and the Army 
Public Health and the State in 19th Century Morocco 
Did Moroccan Public Health Exist? 
In order to understand the weight of the Moroccan “factor” in the creation of 
dispensaries for natives in Spanish Morocco, it is first necessary to examine the 
trajectory of Morocco’s public health during the 19th century. In broad terms, the 
period 1822–1894 was an epoch of relative stability for the country, especially the 
last twenty years (Laroui 1993). Such stability, however, far from being static, 
was a fruit of a constant, tension-filled compromise between the numerous forces 
which operated on the Moroccan stage. Internally, the Sultan and the Makhzan 
(Moroccan government) interacted with local actors (caïds = governors, zawias = 
religious brotherhoods), social groups (ulamas = religious experts, commercial 
bourgeoisie, urban artisans) and certain territories (Rif, High Atlas, Saharan oasis) 
in order to reach some degree of cohesion for Moroccan society. Externally, the 
autonomy and sovereignty of Morocco evolved through relationships with several 
European and Western states as well as other Arab-Islamic countries (mainly the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt) and with nearby colonies (French Algeria and 
Senegal), foreign enclaves (Spanish strongholds in the north and factories on the 
Saharan coast) and British Gibraltar. The international status quo on the so-called 
Moroccan question (parallel to other questions d’Orient such as the “Ottoman 
question” and the “Chinese question”) was maintained to some extent throughout 
the century. 
Out of this dynamic and troublesome balance, a number of administrative, eco-
nomic, military, institutional, legislative, cultural or political transformations 
materialised. However, they are usually interpreted as the outcomes of “informal” 
or direct imperialism exerted on the country, whose only chance was to resist and 
delay them as much as possible. But in accordance with authors such as Abdallah 
Laroui or Wielfried Rollman, it could be said that the role played by Moroccan 
authorities in those transformations seems more active than mere resistance. In the 
field of public health the following questions must be asked: what was Moroccan 
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in Morocco’s public health, if anything? And what were the effects of such 
“Moroccanness” in the health system, if any? Based upon this author’s PhD 
research (Martínez Antonio 2005a) it will be first argued that “Moroccanness” or 
Moroccan agency consisted of two coupled mechanisms of multiple diversifi-
cation and personal/oligarchic authoritarianism. On the one hand, attempts were 
made to keep unstoppable European intervention in matters of medicine and 
public health at bay by fostering participation of as many foreign countries as 
possible so that competition between them arose, along with a complication of 
administrative procedures. On the other hand, increasing internal fragmentation of 
Morocco’s health system was somewhat slowed down by an authoritarian concen-
tration of competencies in the hands of the Sultan and the Makhzan. In this way, 
sanitary measures could be taken and imposed without negotiation with social, 
local or territorial actors, while administrative procedures were eased. In sum, 
Moroccan weakness did not lead to dependence and anarchy in public health but 
rather to a kind of fragile autonomy. 
This particular Moroccan agency led, in the second place, to a predominance of 
the maritime and military components of the health system. In my opinion, health 
systems in the 19th century were generally composed of four branches (navy, 
army, maritime and land-based public health) or, in other words, they were con-
figured along a double civil-military and internal-external axis (Martinez Antonio 
2005). Maritime and army public health were prominent in Morocco because in 
both spheres a balance could be kept between international and Moroccan sanitary 
interests and also between the extension of the health system to a wider population 
and territory and the tendency of some localities to different degrees of self-
management. Such balances were not possible in navy and land public health, 
which suffered from a high degree of foreign dependence and internal heteroge-
neity. In some way, the first two branches tried to compensate the lacks of the 
latter, often assuming part of their competencies and tasks, though this did not 
mean that they succeeded in achieving their own goals. However, it seems certain 
that the most complex and comprehensive structures of Moroccan public health 
were those caring for the ports and the Army. 
This analysis can provide perspective on colonialist (and post-colonialist) 
accounts which have pictured the Moroccan authorities and people as having no 
interest in public health issues or merely resisting and conditioning imposed Euro-
pean initiatives in different ways. Colonialist accounts have promoted an unfair 
view of Morocco as a “medieval” country regarding health and medicine, reduced 
to a fossilised mosaic of classical Arabic medical institutions and practitioners, 
Muslim charity, folk healers and “superstitious” practices. All of these existed, of 
course, but so too did other more comprehensive and newly-created public health 
structures, whose existence was, at least in part, sought and enabled by the efforts 
of Moroccan authorities. On the other hand, it is also necessary to keep a distance 
from nationalist (and Islamist) historiographies which construct Moroccan medi-
cine as free from European influence and homogeneously based on the Arab 
tradition or which regard foreign influence just as an imposition. In general, it is 
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more useful to consider the differences between the history of public health in 
Morocco and in European countries as differences of degree and not of kind. On 
these conceptual grounds, a basic picture of the higher structures and most rele-
vant institutions of 19th century Moroccan public health are presented in the next 
two paragraphs. 
The Reigns of Moulay Abderrahman (1822–1859) and Sidi Mohammed IV (1859–
1873) 
An improved system of maritime public health began to be set up in Morocco 
during the reign of Sultan Moulay Abderrahman. The so-called International or 
Maritime Sanitary Council of Morocco, based in the port city of Tangier (also 
called the Council of Tangier), obtained a formal delegation of power from the 
Sultan (firman) in 1840 to “be responsible for the maintenance of public health on 
the Empire’s littoral, to elaborate all regulations and take all measures to carry out 
this purpose” (Raynaud 1900; El-Bezzaz 1982–1983). Though its precedents went 
back as far as 1792, the Sanitary Council of Tangier was essentially contemporary 
to others created in the main ports of the Arab-Islamic Mediterranean countries, 
such as Tunis (1835), Istanbul (1838–1839), Alexandria (1843) and Tripoli 
(Gallagher 1983; Panzac 1986; Schepin & Yermakov 1991; Moulin 1995; Mizrahi 
2003). In the following years, the Council improved its internal organisation 
through a permanent commission and a secretary. In addition, delegations were 
established in the other “imperial ports” (Tettouan, Larache, Rabat, Casablanca, 
Mazagan, Safi and Mogador) from 1846 on. Medical personnel was gradually 
attached to the Council, and revenues were raised by charging fees to ships for 
sanitary inspection. Finally, a provisional quarantine station was established on 
the isle of Mogador in 1865, so that pilgrims returning from Mecca could be 
isolated if cholera was suspected. 
It has usually been argued that the Council of Tangier was in fact a foreign 
institution, given that its members were the foreign diplomatic representatives in 
the city and its main budget was provided by foreign governments. Thus, its 
measures would have been dependent on the plans for foreign “penetration” in 
Morocco, the “civilisation” of the country, the promotion of European commercial 
exchanges and the protection of European communities in the port cities (Raynaud 
1900; El-Bezzaz 1982–1983). But this picture, though partly accurate, is 
nonetheless too reductionistic. To begin with, the Sultan had only “delegated” 
power in maritime health affairs to the Council, a precaution which would long be 
regretted by European representatives. For example, when it came to sensitive 
matters such as the control of maritime pilgrimage to Mecca, the Sultan often 
imposed his decisions upon the Council’s recommendations, because he still held 
executive power. Morocco also received foreign representation comprised of up to 
fourteen countries (Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Portu-
gal, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, the United States, 
Italy and Germany) that were obligated to making equal economic contributions 
and to rotate among the posts periodically. Agreement was naturally difficult and 
the threat of one country’s imperialist interests being predominant was neutralised 
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to a certain extent. Furthermore, in regard to pilgrimages to Mecca, the Sultan had 
appointed consuls (wakils) in Gibraltar, Tunis, Alexandria and Cairo, which 
probably allowed the Tangier Council to keep regular contact with its counterparts 
of those cities, as did the Council of Tunis (El-Bezzaz 1985; Gallagher 1983). 
Undoubtedly, cooperation with other Arab-Islamic countries was the most effec-
tive way of avoiding European inherence. 
On the other hand, a degree of direct control over the Council was exerted by 
Moroccan authorities through the naib, the Sultan’s official representative in 
Tangier since 1848, who acted as a de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs (Rollman 
1983; Pennell 2000). All the Council’s resolutions had to be submitted to his 
office, the Dar al-Niaba, and then sent to the Sultan for approval. This resulted in 
increased centralisation and co-ordination of maritime sanitary affairs throughout 
the country. Besides, slow and long official procedures could reduce the actual 
efficiency of European proposals when necessary. Finally, the naib could influ-
ence measures proposed by the Council so that they were not only of benefit to 
foreign residents and European commerce, but also to the fast-growing native 
population of port cities and to the new Moroccan commercial bourgeoisie. In the 
port cities, the caids and pachás were charged with controlling the Council’s dele-
gates and their approval was necessary for any measure taken in case of epide-
mics. 
The relative development of maritime public health in Morocco was used as a 
basis for proposing changes in land public health. In Tangier, the Council tried to 
extend its measures from the port to the city itself and also to support initiatives 
taken by civil doctors of the growing European community. It became common in 
this period for European settlers to propose sanitary reforms in case of epidemics 
of cholera or other diseases and to seek the support of the European consuls in the 
Council. A similar process occurred in the port cities (Raynaud 1902). However, 
the firman of 1840 had not allowed the extension of activities of the Council to-
wards urban public health. The risk was higher for Moroccan authorities in this 
field because the number of foreign countries would have been reduced and 
control over local authorities would have been more difficult to achieve. The same 
happened for European countries because they would have been obliged to in-
crease their expenses, competence between them would have increased and popu-
lar rejection of their influence would have been more serious. Therefore, no 
confluence of interests took place. On the one hand, Europeans attempted modest 
initiatives; on the other, traditional Moroccan institutions persisted. In Tangier and 
in the other ports, there existed urban assemblies composed of local authorities 
(caïd, pachá), merchants, ulama, doctors (tobba) and the market inspector 
(muhtasib) which had traditionally been in charge of proposing anti-epidemic 
measures. For example, in Tettouan during the plague epidemic of 1799–1800, 
“eminent city notables, including the ulama, decided that it was necessary to close 
the city gates so that it would be preserved from any contagion” (El-Bezzaz 
1985). The assemblies still kept some of their power during this period and were 
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also responsible for the good conditions of streets, buildings, slaughterhouses, the 
water supply and food sold in markets. In Tangier, for example, the muhtasib  
for cleaning the streets and squares, raised a little tax on the slaughtered cattle 
and directed a brigade of ten workers who swept the streets and gathered the 
litter, which they put on a limited number of donkeys to be taken to the 
orchards surrounding the city (Laredo 1994). 
Parallel to the Council of Tangier, the sultans Moulay Abdehrraman and Sidi 
Mohammed IV also started the transformation of military public health as part of 
their general reform of the Army (nizam al-askr) which followed Moroccan 
defeats against France (1844) and Spain (1860) (Rollman 1983). In this matter 
they followed the path established by the Ottoman Empire and Egypt (also by 
Tunis and by the army of the Algerian resistant, Abd al-Qadir). In the Ottoman 
Empire Sultan Mahmud II had created schools of military medicine and surgery in 
1827 and 1828 respectively, which were unified in the Imperial School of Medi-
cine (Mekteb-i Sahâne-i Tibbiye) in 1839, directed by the Austrian Dr. Bernard 
(Lewis 1984; Ishanoglu 1992; Panzac 1995). In Egypt Pasha Mehmet Ali had 
founded the School of Military Medicine at the Hospital Abu Zabal in Cairo in 
1826–1827, directed by the French doctor Antoine Barthèlemy Clot, also known 
as Clot Bey (Panzac 1989). 
Moroccan developments seem to have been much more modest than those in 
the Ottoman Empire and Egypt in this period, although further research is still 
needed on the subject. However, it is quite certain that Morocco contacted both 
countries in order to limit European influence in its military public health, as was 
the case for the maritime branch. Driss Mossaoui has shown that some Moroccan 
students were sent to study in the schools of Cairo and Istanbul during this period 
(Mossaoui 1995). They should have been attached to the new military regiments 
(‘askar), which increased from their original number of 900 to more than 3,000 
men in 1870. Moulay Abderrahman requested of Mehmet Ali that scientific and 
military works be translated into Arabic from European languages (mainly 
French), and a number of them could have been medical books, perhaps the same 
that Clot Bey had sent to Tunisian authorities in 1854 (Gallagher 1983). European 
influence in the Moroccan army medicine already existed in this period, though it 
was split between different countries. Since the end of the 18th century, it had been 
usual for Spanish military doctors, as well as naval surgeons from Gibraltar, to 
travel to Morocco at the request of the Sultan (Justel 1991). In 1861, a big supply 
of drugs that was probably addressed to the Army was acquired from France 
(Amster 2003). An important question which has not been systematically posed is 
the role of “renegades” (converts to Islam), especially of Spanish origin, as practi-
tioners in the Moroccan army. 
For most of this period, there was no formal Ministry of War. The katib al-jish 
(chief of the jish or guich regiments) remained the highest military officer, 
although in 1845 Moulay Abderrahman relied on his son, the future Sultan 
Mohammed VI, for directly supervising and fostering the modernisation of the 
army. It was in the first years of his reign that Sidi Mohammed created the post of 
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wazir al-harb or Minister of War (Rollman 1983). Greater military centralisation 
was then achieved, and it went along with a more permanent organisation of the 
army throughout the country, because askaris were distributed in the Sultan’s 
guard and in garrisons in the main cities. These developments should have 
affected sanitary and medical structures as well, in the sense of a greater control 
by central authorities, although there is a lack of specific data about this issue. In 
addition, it seems plausible that Moroccan military doctors did not enjoy much 
executive power compared with their military chiefs, as this was also true in most 
European armies. This consultative character limited the extent of European inter-
ventions in military public health, as was the case with the Sanitary Council of 
Tangier. Finally, the army tried to be used as basis for extending reforms to land 
public health. A clear example is that the army was usually charged with imple-
menting “sanitary cordons” around cities or areas in case of epidemics (Raynaud 
1902). However, results were quite modest. 
The Reigns of Moulay Hassan I (1873–1894) and Moulay Abd el-Aziz (1894–
1906) 
During the reigns of Moulay Hassan I and Moulay Abd el-Aziz, maritime and 
military public health continued to be predominant in Morocco and their develop-
ment was achieved by similar mechanisms as in previous decades. However, 
Morocco’s “sanitary autonomy” in the international context and “sanitary cohe-
sion” inside the country became more and more precarious from the 1880s on-
ward. By then, Western health systems were swiftly moving to a new basis. The 
former system of quarantines, sanitary cordons, sanitation and disinfection had 
been mainly consultative in character. It had concentrated its activity on tempo-
rary epidemic outbreaks and had relied on contagionist or miasmatic interpreta-
tions of disease. This system started to give way to one of inspection, which was 
based on a permanent health administration, where the increasing executive power 
of doctors was displayed through new institutions such as laboratories and suppor-
ted by the new scientific doctrines of bacteriology and experimental hygiene 
(Rosen 1958; Porter 1994, 1999). Moroccan authorities were interested in these 
new developments, but were also aware that they enabled a greater degree of 
European intervention in the country’s public health which risked eroding the 
cohesion of traditional public health structures and the support of practitioners and 
people alike. 
In maritime public health, for example, European doctors played an increasing 
role in the Sanitary Council of Tangier. “Medical advisors” had begun to be 
appointed regularly from the 1860s onward, mainly in Tangier, and the consuls 
relied more and more on their technical expertise. For example, they assumed the 
sanitary inspection of the port of Tangier and elaborated the Council’s quarantine 
regulation, approved in 1878. In the beginning these doctors were private practi-
tioners working for the European communities but, for example, from 1885 on-
ward, Spain officially attached doctors to its Moroccan consulates (Felipe Ovilo, 
Enrique Rebolledo, Severo Cenarro and Antonio Jordán among others). European 
doctors were also appointed to the Mogador lazaret so that they directly 
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supervised the quarantine of Mecca pilgrims. The Spanish doctors Cenarro and 
Rebolledo assumed this task in the 1890s, although still under strict control of the 
Moroccan authorities. In 1900, under the increasing menace of a plague outbreak 
similar to the one that had affected Porto in 1899, the French doctor based in 
Algiers, Louis Raynaud, was recruited by the Sultan for that mission. Once he had 
reorganised the lazaret in 1901, he appointed another Algiers health officer, Dr. 
Gagé, and a Council medical advisor to supervise the quarantine under his instruc-
tions (Raynaud 1902). 
It was following doctors’ suggestions that the European consuls systematically 
pressed the Moroccan government to have the Mogador lazaret organised on a 
more permanent and scientific basis. They also counted on the force of agree-
ments reached at the International Sanitary Conferences of Dresden (1894) and 
Venice (1897). For example, the second article of the Venice Sanitary Convention 
stated: 
It will be recommended to the competent authorities in Morocco to implement, 
in the country’s ports, measures in harmony with those stated in the general 
[international] sanitary regulations, in order to prevent the invasion and diffu-
sion of plague. 
The distant placement in Mogador and the inadequacy of its building and equip-
ment never fully satisfied Europeans. Dr. Enrique Rebolledo was the first to make 
a report suggesting the need for creating a new lazaret. Soon after his arrival, Dr. 
Louis Raynaud sent a new report to the Council and to Moroccan authorities 
proposing the establishment of a lazaret definitif in Tangier, the ten-mile distant 
Punta Malabata being regarded as an ideal setting (Raynaud 1902). It was not 
until 1909 that an international commission was appointed to study the exact loca-
tion and characteristics of the future lazaret, although it was probably never built 
(Laredo 1994). 
The creation of a modern lazaret was a main concern of the Tangier Sanitary 
Council, but new public health developments spoke less for this kind of institution 
than for a permanent health administration in the port cities. By means of such 
administration the hygienic conditions of streets and buildings, slaughterhouses, 
sewage systems, water systems or garbage removal could be controlled in order to 
improve the general urban health status, thereby strengthening the city’s defences 
in case of epidemics. In this sense, the Council succeeded in supporting the 
creation of the Hygiene and Sanitary Commission in Tangier in 1892 (with a brief 
predecessor in 1884) based upon a formal delegation from the Sultan to the 
Council of the responsibility “for assuming the cleansing of the city of Tangier, 
the street paving and the repairing and building of sewage collectors” (Marco 
1913). Although this measure could not be extended to other port cities, the new 
commission and the lazaret project served as arguments for European consuls to 
propose a reorganisation of the Council in 1899 so that it truly acted as a perma-
nent maritime health “service”, that is, was given real executive powers. 
In general all these new transformations in maritime public health ran strongly 
against Moroccan interests because they tended to shift executive power in health 
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affairs into the hands of foreign technical experts which the country could not 
provide itself (or, at least, not in sufficient numbers). However, Moroccan autho-
rities strived to keep their agency in sanitary affairs. For example, the centralising 
role of the naib was assumed by the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs because 
“daily contact with the consuls had allowed him [the naib] to take on more and 
more power” and to pursue his own particular interests (Pennell 2000). On the 
other hand, Moulay Hassan re-confirmed the 1840 “delegation” to the Council by 
means of a new dahir (official decree) in 1879, thus keeping his personal autho-
rity in sanitary affairs. Dr. Raynaud complained that the dahir kept on restricting 
the Council’s jurisdiction, allowing it only “to admit or reject the ships arriving 
from the ports of the Empire, to put them in quarantine and fix its duration accor-
ding to the regulations of sanitary affairs”. Thus, the Council’s action remained 
“exclusively limited to the sea and not to land” (Raynaud 1902). 
Impotence caused despair and, sometimes, rage in European representatives. An 
1899 memorandum of the Sanitary Council complained about the “almost insur-
mountable obstacles, which render its aims and its deliberations useless”. The 
memorandum continued:  
The Makhzan will not modernise itself, the Moroccan statesman in power is 
not sensitive to the best intentioned and most disinterested advice. The axiom 
which has been confirmed up to now, that ‘the Sanitary Council is but an 
organ of the Sultan’, who has the power to sanction or reject any agreed reso-
lution, not only avoids consequently any fertile activity, but casts a doubt over 
its own right of existence. 
Moroccan authorities also managed to slow down the creation of the Hygiene 
Commission of Tangier and later to exert significant control over it. Until 1903, 
the Commission remained mainly a private initiative of local European doctors. 
Only then, an organic regulation was approved and European consuls participated 
for the first time in its sessions (Marco 1913). The 1879 dahir made it difficult for 
the Commission to count on the Council’s support, while the persistence of local 
functionaries, such as the muhtasib, did much to discourage its work. In the words 
of their members themselves, the first attempt to create it in 1884 failed because  
[...] the muhtasib and his personnel first, the administrator of Sultan’s proper-
ties and the different market members, the nadir or administrator of the 
Mosque’s properties, the select Israelite board, the governor and his Khalifa, 
all in one word conspired against the existence of the Commission [...] (Marco 
1913). 
Finally, institutions most representative of the new “hygienist” model of European 
public health, such as disinfection stations or bacteriological/analytical laborato-
ries, had to wait longer to be created. Only after the Protectorate regime was 
established in 1912 could the French Pasteur Institute and a Spanish Laboratory 
start their activities in Tangier. 
Nevertheless, in spite of Moroccan efforts, the number of foreign countries with 
actual weight in maritime public health affairs shrank to France, Great Britain, 
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Spain and perhaps Germany. The connection of Dr. Raynaud and Dr. Gagé with 
French Algeria revealed that French expansionism in the Maghreb was severely 
threatening Morocco. For Spain, doctors Felipe Ovilo and Enrique Rebolledo 
achieved significant influence due to their role as medical advisors of the Council, 
and the same could be said of Severo Cenarro, strongly committed to the Hygiene 
Commission until his death in 1898. Great Britain reinforced its involvement, 
always relying on its commercial and naval power and on the links with Gibraltar, 
while Germany’s influence was mainly felt at the turn of the century. This fact, 
combined with the loss of contacts with other Arab-Islamic countries, revealed a 
stronger and more incisive European influence on Moroccan maritime public 
health. 
On the other hand, Hassan I continued the process of transformation of the 
Moroccan army begun by his father and his grandfather. Military public health 
was not an exception. A medical student, Abd al-Salam al-‘Alami, was sent to the 
School of Military Medicine Qasr al-Aini in Cairo to become a military doctor, as 
others had been before him (Mossaoui & Roux Dessarps 1992; Amster 2003). 
However, initiatives under the influence of European countries became predomi-
nant in this period over collaboration with other Arab-Islamic countries. In 1886, 
an School of Military Medicine was created at Tangier under the direction of the 
Spanish Army doctor Felipe Ovilo Canales, that functioned until 1899 (Martínez 
Antonio 2005c). At least twelve Moroccan students are recorded as having started 
a two-year course focused on anatomy and therapeutics and complemented by 
practical clinical and surgical assistance under surveillance of Drs. Ovilo and 
Cenarro in the attached dispensary that was founded the same year. Some of them 
did not complete their studies for several reasons, but others such as Mustapha 
Essandi, Hamed Romani and Mohammed Dukaly, whom Ovilo soon began to 
treat as “disciples”, prolonged their training. They even travelled to Spain in 1888 
to pass university exams and to become acquainted with Madrid’s main research 
and clinical centres. 
Ovilo’s pupils soon participated in harkas (minor armed expeditions) sent by 
the Sultan to punish northern qabilas, as Si Ahmed Temsamami did in Boccoia in 
1896. According to Ellen Amster, he  
was designated by the Makhzan military doctor attached to the expedition of 
Moulay Abdesselam el Mrani, of Ben el Bagdadi and of Mahboub, where he 
fulfilled his role using European methods (Amster 2003).  
Felipe Ovilo himself was appointed chief of the health services of the harka sent 
against the qabila of Anghera in 1892. A project to establish a military hospital in 
Tangier was also foreseen in connection with the school, the Spanish Dispensary 
being the first step in its realisation. But “the first Muslim Hospital to be created 
in Morocco for centuries” was not finally created. However, the Spanish Dispen-
sary, as well as the English Mission Hospital and the French Hospital in Tangier, 
assisted Moroccan troops on several occasions and served then as part-time mili-
tary hospitals. 
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France also became strongly involved in Moroccan military public health and 
managed to achieve a privileged position among other European countries. Dr. 
Fernand Linarès, a member of the French Military Mission in Morocco (sent in 
1877 under the direction of Jules Erckman), entered the personal service of the 
Sultan in Fez from 1882 onward and accompanied him on different occasions, for 
example, in the mhalla to Tafilalet in 1893. Linarès became a key agent for 
French policy in Morocco during his long stay in the country (1877–1902). His 
influence upon the Sultan and the Makhzan was strongly felt, and it was most 
probably at his suggestion that the new Sultan Moulay Abd el-Aziz, de facto his 
Grand Vizir and regent Ba Ahmed (1894–1901), decided to take Arab graduates 
from the School of Medicine of Algiers for the army service (Amster 2003). 
Through Linarès, France became the main foreign influence in Moroccan military 
public health. His role was much more decisive than that of other European 
doctors formally attached to the court, such as Dr. Adolfo Ladrón de Guevara 
(1889–1892 and 1894–1897), who could never achieve significant influence 
(Rollman 1983). Finally, a number of the military officers periodically sent to 
Gibraltar by Hassan I were trained as “medics” for service in the askar regiments 
(Rollman 1983). Purchase of medical equipment or products as well as the 
sending of students to military schools of medicine in Europe or America have not 
yet been confirmed, but should not be discarded as possibilities, given that other 
countries were still involved in different ways in Moroccan military reforms 
during this period (Pennell 2000). 
Moroccan authorities managed to keep a degree of control over these initiatives 
which tended to take military public health out of their hands. For example, 
centralisation of military affairs was reinforced by Hassan I through the strengthe-
ning of the Ministry of War (wazir al-harb). The Sultan also succeeded in keeping 
European military doctors far from him and the central Makhzan for some periods. 
Adolfo Ladrón de Guevara was usually confined to the area of Tettouan and 
Tangier, as were the other members of the tiny Spanish Military Mission in 
Morocco. Felipe Ovilo, due to his work at the School of Medicine, remained most 
of the time in Tangier, even if he met Hassan I there in 1889 and participated in 
Spanish embassies to Rabat in 1887 and to Marrakech in 1894. Dr. Linarès was 
already in Morocco in 1877, but it was only from 1882 onward that he could settle 
in Fez as the Sultan’s personal physician. Besides, he could not accompany the 
Sultan in all his mhallas, as he did, for example, in 1893. European military 
doctors were also assigned to different branches of the Moroccan Army, so that 
their influence was diversified. Finally, the School of Tangier was only officially 
recognised when the Sultan visited Tangier in 1889. It was the Moroccan govern-
ment which paid the students a grant and gave them an “annual suit”, thus keeping 
them under its control, although more important in this regard was that these 
school-educated military doctors were themselves Moroccan. Control of this 
institution was so significant that, in 1899 the Spanish Minister in Tangier com-
plained that 
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the Makhzan and the Moors in general think that its creation and tolerance [of 
the school] are signs of excessive benevolence towards Spain, which they tend 
to correct from time to time with a systematic opposition and intransigence 
[...]. Thus, instead of diffusing Spanish influence in the Empire, this Legation 
is obliged to spend what it has in periodic begging and supplications to the 
Makhzan so that the students are given the modest grant and the annual suit 
that were fixed by the deceased Sultan. 
The last quarter of the 19th century thus saw the situation of Moroccan public 
health worsen. In comparison with the middle decades of the century, there were 
no dramatic events as the wars with France and Spain but new developments in 
international public health pushed Morocco’s health system to its limits. 
Exchanges with other Arab-Islamic countries virtually ceased; the number of 
European countries with decisive influence shrank; central authority moved to the 
very person of the Sultan; and local resistance grew stronger. Instead of allowing 
controllable changes, the Moroccan tactic gradually shifted to avoiding any 
change at all, as almost all helped undermine its interests. This policy of “obstruc-
tion” was stigmatised by foreign representatives although it continued to be a 
form of Moroccan agency to their profound despair. 
Between Makzhan and Siba. Provincial and Local Public Health in Northern 
Morocco at the End of the 19th Century 
Thus far a brief sketch has been drawn of the central (or state) level of the public 
health framework as it was configured in Morocco during the 19th century. An 
attempt has been made to show how Moroccan agency acted at this level by 
fostering diversification of the inevitable Western influence and authoritarian 
concentration of power in the hands of the Sultan and his central Makhzan. It has 
also been shown how this agency resulted in the preferential transformation of the 
maritime and military branches of Morocco’s health system, in contrast to much 
weaker public health changes in naval and land public health. However, if the 
creation of dispensaries in Spanish Morocco is to be understood, lower levels of 
Moroccan public health must be also analysed. The north of the country has been 
chosen for this examination because it will increase the focus on the future 
Spanish “zone of influence”, actually the main interest of this study. However, 
this analysis could be applied to Morocco as a whole. Instead of the whole 19th 
century, just the final decades will be studied. 
To speak of public health levels means that in the usually alleged breach be-
tween bilad al-Makzhzan (government controlled areas) and bilad al-Siba 
(autonomous areas only recognising the Sultan as spiritual leader) or between the 
cities and the countryside in Morocco, there existed in fact an articulated chain of 
administrative, institutional or political organisms and authorities – no matter how 
thin it might have been. Even if this chain did not reach a significant part of 
Morocco’s population and territory, it showed the existence of a Moroccan public 
health system broader than most descriptions account for. This study shows that 
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there were four levels – the Sultan-central Makhzan, provincial, local, and the siba 
– the latter being in fact the limit of reach and showing particular characteristics. 
This general framework proved to be resilient, having an undeniable impact on the 
French and Spanish Protectorates when they began to be established in 1912. At 
all four levels, diversification and authoritarianism, as well as predominance of 
military and maritime public health prolonged themselves, though this kind of 
“fractality” was expressed in particular developments at every level. 
The “Provincial” Level: Tangier 
In northern Morocco, a number of loosely defined provinces, whose centres were 
cities such as Tangier, Fez, Oujda or Ouazzane, were defined in the second half of 
the 19th century. In Tangier, provincial power crystallised around the naib. This 
post was transformed from a de facto minister of Foreign Affairs into a functio-
nary subordinated to the actual minister established by Hassan I in 1879 because 
he pursued his own interests more than those of the Sultan (Pennell 2000). How-
ever, this change was not so clear, as nothing was in the city of the Strait, and the 
naib actually stood at an intermediate position between the wazirs (ministers) of 
the central Makhzan and local officers such as the caid (military governor) and the 
pachá (civil governor). The post had been “provincialized” because it could no 
longer have a state-wide influence but it became (and was tolerated as) the “hand” 
of the Sultan for everything occurring between Tangier and Melilla (Zaim 1988). 
It is not strange that the post became a virtual monopoly of two important families 
of Andalusian descent of Northern Morocco, first through Mohammed Bargach of 
Salé (1860–1886) and later through Mohammed Torres of Tettouan (1886–1908). 
In the same period, and not by chance, the position of foreign consuls in 
Tangier in relation to their metropolitan governments’ activities in Morocco 
changed as well. For many decades the main foreign actors in Morocco, the 
Tangier consuls began to lose their primacy by the last quarter of the 19th century. 
European governments managed to directly reach the Sultan, either by more and 
more frequent embassies, or by permanent missions settled in port cities or in any 
of the imperial capitals – Fez, Marrakesh, Meknes and Rabat. Those new 
representatives assumed the main role in the policy of “peaceful penetration” and 
“civilisation” displayed in the Moroccan administration. The cases of Harry 
MacLean or Fernand Linarès are most representative of this shift (Des Cilleuls 
1959; Pennell 2000). Tangier’s consuls became increasingly “provincialized” and 
their activities were more and more confined to the north of the country. 
This provincialization of the naib and the foreign representatives was also 
reflected in public health. In the case of maritime public health, the Sanitary 
Council of Tangier remained a state-wide organism but new developments were 
increasingly achieved through direct contacts of European representatives with the 
Sultan and central Makhzan. For example, the 1892 “delegation” of Hassan I that 
allowed the creation of the Hygiene Commission was a result of the embassy of 
the French Consul, Count of Auvigni, to the court (Marco 1913). The Council 
could but acknowledge the “sterility of its efforts to veil for Europe’s public 
health” because it worked “as an organ of the Sultan and needs the sovereign 
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sanction to make agreements effective.” The appointment of Dr. Raynaud in 1900 
was probably made directly by the Sultan after a suggestion from Dr. Linarès. 
The project of the quarantine station in Tangier reflected very clearly the 
ambiguity of the Council as a vehicle of state and provincial interests at the same 
time, an ambiguity that may have influenced its final failure. On the one hand, the 
new location was favourable for Tangerian notables (the naib – first and foremost) 
and the merchants of Tettouan and Larache who worried about the sanitary 
dangers associated with their growing commerce with Spain or France. Spanish 
commerce with Morocco focused also in practice on the northern area of the 
country as reflected in the establishment of regular sea connections by the Com-
pañía Transatlántica in 1887, whereby Tangier occupied the central position 
(geographic and economic) in the traffic between Cádiz, Málaga and Barcelona in 
Spain and Rabat, Mazagan and Mogador in Morocco (Rodrigo 2002). The 
Spanish population in Tangier rose to 6,000, by far the largest European commu-
nity in the city, and Spaniards were also predominant in Tettouan. The Spanish 
Legation in Tangier had accordingly a growing interest in protecting the southern 
shores of the Iberian peninsular and Spanish citizens in those cities rather than 
Morocco’s littoral as a whole. On the other hand, Tangier was also a more ade-
quate location than Mogador for controlling maritime health in rapidly developing 
ports such as Casablanca and Rabat, where Makhzan and French interests were 
predominant. Finally, the Sultan and Great Britain were interested in maintaining 
the Council as a guarantee against any dismemberment of Moroccan public health 
and as a guarantee of persisting influence due to the proximity of Gibraltar. 
In military public health, the School of Military Medicine is most representative 
of the increasing provincial detour of Tangerian actors. During his visit to Tangier 
in 1889, Hassan I issued a dahir by which he compromised by recruiting students 
for the school from throughout Morocco, but, in practice, future doctors continued 
to be mostly, if not exclusively, Tangerians. Dr. Felipe Ovilo confirmed this in 
1891: 
On occasion of the great Muslim feast of Aid Seguer, the pupils of this School 
of Medicine, supported by His Shariffian Majesty, marched for the first time 
grouped and uniformed, taking their place in the military ranks that accom-
panied the Governor of Tangier. This fact has had the strongest effect on the 
authorities and the Moorish people, even more as they are sons of this city, 
who by order of His Shariffian Majesty have been chosen as the future doctors 
of the Moroccan Army (Lourido Díaz 1996). 
It was also very significant that on the occasion of Hassan I’s audience with Dr. 
Felipe Ovilo in 1889 in Tangier, the Sultan was accompanied by his Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Si Fedul Garnitt, and not by the naib, Mohammed Torres, who 
had been directly involved in the creation of the medical school through his 
contacts with Spanish representatives. In a way, the Sultan was trying to reaffirm 
his control over the initiative and that of his minister. Nevertheless, he failed and 
Torres’s interests prevailed. Pupils were recruited from good families of the city 
(Temsamami, Dukkali) and were nominated or at least approved by him, as he 
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was in the position of “dispensing favours” to local notables, therefore reinforcing 
both his position and theirs. 
Another relevant sign of provincialization was that the school’s doctors were 
sent mostly, if not exclusively, to serve in military expeditions taking place on the 
northern fringe of the country. These became very frequent and included, for 
example, those against the Anghera in 1892, the Ibuqquyen in 1889, 1896 and 
1898, and the Guelaia in 1880 and 1893–1894 (Pennell 2000). Most of these were 
not mhallas commanded by the Sultan, but smaller harkas led by Sultan’s 
relatives, such as Prince Moulay Arafa or Prince Moulay Bu Beker and accom-
panied by secondary Makhzan authorities, local caïds and military chiefs. In the 
case of Anghera, the harka was completely organized from Tangier. In the other 
cases, there was usually co-operation between Tangier, which sent troops by sea 
to disembark in Melilla and move to the hinterland, and Tadla, Oujda or even Fez, 
which sent troops by land. To sum it up, Tangerian military doctors acted regio-
nally in a defined area of the country, while, in contrast, Algerian doctors re-
cruited by Ba Ahmed at the suggestion of Fernand Linarès probably acted in a 
wider territory. 
Similarly, the Spanish Legation and, in general, all Spanish representatives in 
Tangier pressed for the school to be created in this city and not in Ceuta, where 
the Spanish government had been thinking of establishing several institutions in 
the 1880s. The failure of the Spanish Military Mission in Morocco, which had its 
base in Ceuta and Tettouan, may also be explained by the lack of support from 
Spanish representatives in Tangier. In this way, these Tangier residents retained 
their power even if they could no longer act on a general Moroccan level and 
limited themselves to contacts with the naib and local notables. Provincialization 
resulted in Spain finding it increasingly hard to reach the Sultan and have a signi-
ficant impact on Morocco’s general public health. 
In summary, the provincial level of Moroccan public health essentially repro-
duced the characteristics of the state level, though through different actors. The 
naib and the consuls became subordinated to the Makhzan and foreign embassies 
or missions, though they retained a degree of autonomy. Some periodical efforts 
were made to control this situation but, in general, autonomy posed no serious 
threat because regional actors did not intend to question higher authorities, and 
these, in turn, let them act with relative freedom for their interests. The project of 
the quarantine station in Tangier and especially the creation of the School of 
Medicine in this city reflected the increasing provincial detour of Tangerian initia-
tives. 
The Local Level: Anghera and Guelaia 
If most analyses tend to subsume the provincial level into the central Moroccan 
government, the local level is usually reduced to the siba. It is true that in the 
second half of the 19th century, it became increasingly difficult for the Sultan and 
for Tangier authorities to keep qabilas such as Anghera and Guelaia under 
control. For the first time, local leaders managed to concentrate power in whole 
qabilas (or in most of their fractions) and managed to act on their own, often 
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creating problems to the Sultan and Makhzan. The difference with the provincial 
level was that local autonomy posed a much more serious danger. Whether they 
set up irregular forces to defend their territory from European expansionism, orga-
nised seasonal migration to nearby European enclaves and colonies, or engaged in 
smuggling, local leaders threatened the Sultan’s authority and legitimacy. None-
theless, what they actually intended was to assume functions of defence and 
organisation that they considered the Sultan was unable to render in their areas. 
This fact connected them, though weakly, with the rest of Moroccan structures. 
In addition, Moroccan central and regional authorities managed to neutralize 
local autonomy to a certain extent by using authoritarian measures supported by 
strong use of force, either military or diplomatic. For example, it has already been 
mentioned that harkas were periodically sent from the 1880s on to control the 
above mentioned qabilas. As a result, more or less strong garrisons under the 
command of caids were established in the vicinity of Ceuta (Anghera) and in 
Silwan (close to Melilla) (Pennell 2000). Their missions included preventing 
armed incidents with Spanish enclaves, preventing qabilians from settling and 
cultivating neutral land around Ceuta and Melilla, regulating commercial ex-
changes through customs, and controlling migration to European enclaves and 
colonies. In the course of time, garrisons tended to become disorganised and new 
local leaders turned again to concentrate power. However, when armed incidents 
re-appeared or denunciations of smuggling were made by European countries, 
new expeditions were sent which either re-established the garrisons and dissuaded 
the qabilians or repressed them. On the other hand, the Sultan managed to keep on 
acting as the exclusive representative of Moroccan interests, preventing local 
leaders from participating in international negotiations such as the Spanish-
Moroccan Treaty of 1894 which followed the armed clashes between the Guelaia 
and the Spanish military units in Melilla. 
Changes in the northern qabilas were paralleled by those in nearby European 
enclaves and colonies, which also became increasingly autonomous from the 
metropolitan governments and their higher representatives in Morocco. In the case 
of the Spanish enclaves, for example, the military authorities in Ceuta and Melilla 
became officially or de facto separated from the Commandant Generalships of 
Andalusia and Granada in the last quarter of the 19th century. There was little 
coordination with the Spanish representatives in Tangier, a lack of communication 
that resulted in local military authorities developing an increasing mentality of 
expansion which did not fit well with the Spanish status quo policy towards 
Morocco. In addition, smuggling of products (guns included) accounted for a 
significant percentage of the enclaves’ otherwise restricted economy and the 
creation of military units composed of qabilians (Compañía de Moros Tiradores 
del Rif in Melilla in 1859, which was transformed into the Milicia Voluntaria de 
Ceuta in 1895) was fostered (Arqués & Gibert 1992). The armed conflict near 
Melilla in 1893–1894 was triggered by the construction of a new post in the 
campo that had been ordered by the Military Governor, General Margallo, who 
was killed by Riffians in the course of combat. Similar developments were taking 
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place in the French Algerian region of South Oranais, where, for example, mili-
tary officers often decided on their own new operations or advances into the 
Moroccan-Algerian border zone.  
In other words, European enclaves and colonies tried to pursue expansionist 
objectives that they thought their governments were not implementing as they 
should. Increasing autonomy posed a more serious threat for metropolitan govern-
ments than the autonomy of the Tangier consuls. In the case of Spain, the 
enclaves’ aggressive initiatives could potentially cause the failure of the politics of 
status quo and “peaceful penetration” by forcing Morocco first to limit Spanish 
activities and second to grant new privileges to other European representatives 
after the inevitable protests. Thus, Spain tried to reinforce coordination of the 
enclaves with its general policy in Morocco by developing their military admini-
stration and institutions, by establishing duty-free ports or by creating customs. 
These measures could not prevent periodic armed incidents or smuggling but at 
least reduced them. As it is seen, both Morocco and Spain tried to keep local 
actors under control, even if Moroccan measures were more drastic than those in 
the Spanish enclaves. 
All these events were also reflected in public health. At the local level, foreign 
intervention was clearer. For example, Eastern Riffian seasonal migration to agri-
cultural complexes in French Algeria intensified in the second half of the 19th 
century. There were two main itineraries: by sea, through the port of Melilla to-
wards the ports of Oran and Nemours or by land, through the frontier adjoining 
Oran province. Migration involved thousands of Riffians every summer, with the 
consequent danger of spreading epidemics. That is why, for example, French 
Algerian health authorities began to take measures concerning migrants, such as 
compulsory smallpox vaccination and disinfection of ships and personal effects, 
which enhanced the development of their maritime public health services. On the 
other hand, increasing regulation of commerce between the Spanish enclaves and 
Oran province, on one side, and the nearby qabilas, on the other, led to the estab-
lishment of customs by the Europeans, as in Melilla from 1867 on (Zaim 1988). 
Commerce regulation improved sanitary control because, for example, the market-
place was located outside the town, in the campo, preventing qabilians from 
reaching the city and Spaniards from travelling to the countryside. Other measures 
for qabilians, such as smallpox vaccination, may also have been used. 
Military public health followed a similar path. This period saw an increase of 
Spanish garrisons and also of the units of Riffians under Spanish command 
(Milicia Voluntaria de Ceuta). Accordingly, from the middle of the 1880s, the 
Spanish government had decided to improve the military hospitals in the area so 
that they had better facilities and equipment, more personnel and larger capacity. 
The hospitals of Ceuta and Melilla increased in size to 200 beds, while in the 
Peñón de Alhucemas, Peñón de Vélez and Chafarinas Islands, there were 50 
places (Larra 1900). But these institutions also had the purpose of “attraction” for 
nearby qabilas. According to the military doctor Ángel de Larra Cerezo, more 
than one thousand Riffians had been assisted in those hospitals between 1885 and 
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1900, a number that included not only civilians but also, for example, “100 
Riffians” who had fought against Melilla troops in 1893–1894 (Larra 1900). In 
fact, assistance to Riffian combatants, either involved in clashes against Spaniards 
or inside their qabilas, seemed to be very frequent, because Larra confirmed that 
in the military hospitals “the Moors cured of serious wounds and operated on are 
very numerous” (Larra 1900). Smallpox vaccination may also have been done on 
Riffians. Besides, Spanish Army doctors travelled from time to time to the 
“Moorish camp” to carry out surgical operations or provide clinical care to local 
notables, though “the risk for their lives” limited this measure to isolated cases. 
Similar developments, though surely on a larger scale, may have taken place in 
the region bordering on French Algeria. 
For Morocco, these facts implied a severe threat to its control over local public 
health. Though some degree of control could be achieved, the local agency of the 
qabilas could not be completely channelled. In maritime public health, the fact 
that migrants followed different routes reveals the attempt to avoid Makhzan 
control, as well as dependency exclusively on one European enclave or colony 
and therefore a form of diversification. The same could be said for commerce. 
Local leaders of qabilas sought to acquire some control over the flux of migrants 
and products, so that they could benefit most from them and reinforce their autho-
rity. Clandestine migration and smuggling also provided a means of thwarting the 
effectiveness of Spanish and French sanitary measures, as well as Makhzan 
control. In this context, official harkas sent to Anghera and Guelaia systematically 
tried to ensure legal commerce of these qabilas with nearby enclaves. Fighting 
against smuggling was an indirect means of achieving more “sanitary security”, 
and it is not strange that the Sanitary Council of Tangier considered it a priority 
for avoiding the risk of epidemics. Morocco also interacted with competence be-
tween the Spanish enclaves and French Algeria in the area. 
In military public health, qabilas’ agency was again not absent and was re-
flected first in travels to both Spanish and French military hospitals in order to 
avoid dependency on one or the other. Smuggling of drugs and medical material 
with foreign enclaves should not be discarded. Local leaders could also severely 
hinder sanitary measures by launching hostilities which prevented people or 
combatants from travelling to the enclaves. Moroccan central and regional 
authorities tried to ensure control through the military doctors sent to these areas 
as part of the harkas. These were mainly the doctors trained in the School of 
Tangier, although, as mentioned earlier, Felipe Ovilo himself participated in the 
expedition to Anghera in 1892. It is possible that these doctors offered their 
services to the Riffians and Jbalians immediately after the fighting, but we do not 
know if any of them remained in the garrisons for a more prolonged time. 
Algerian doctors recruited through French influence could also have a role in the 
region, thus allowing Morocco not to depend exclusively on one country. 
The bilad al-siba: Ibuqquyen 
Beyond the local level, the analysis of Moroccan public health becomes even 
more complex. In the Tangier province, qabilas such as Ibuqquyen, Ait Warya-
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ghar, Beni Arus, Ait Said or Ajmás, in fact, up to two thirds of the future Spanish 
Protectorate, were only linked to the system described here too loosely to properly 
become a part of it. Structurally, this happened mainly because these qabilas did 
not manage to act collectively externally and establish a single authority inter-
nally. This fact prevented them from having a collective link within the chain of 
Moroccan power and to interact collectively with European countries, represen-
tatives, colonies or enclaves. It is a matter here of a “microscopic” dimension of 
society – fractions, sub-fractions, clans – which have usually been analysed with 
the help of anthropological concepts by a long list of anthropologists of Moroccan 
society, such as Robert Montagne, Ernst Gellner, David M. Hart, David Seddon or 
Henry Munson Jr. 
However, this shift from historical to anthropological analysis should not be 
overemphasized. If applying the term “public health” at this level may seem 
excessive, there existed nonetheless health structures to meet the care needs of 
groups of people – even if their complexity was very small. Apparently, events 
seemed to be confined within qabilas, conveying a sense of isolation and frag-
mentation. But it could be said that transformations taking place at this level were 
a simplified version of those occurring in Anghera and Guelaia and, therefore, 
parallel to the general changes in the rest of Moroccan public health. This meant 
nonetheless a higher degree of autonomy in the face of Moroccan and European 
central, provincial and local authorities, that was very close to virtual inde-
pendence. This was reflected in the very slow pace of maritime and military 
developments in comparison with traditional importance of “naval” and civil inte-
rests. 
In the last decade of the 19th century, the qabila of Ibuqquyen, located in the 
central Rif, provided a most representative example of developments found in the 
area. Ibuqquyen armed activities still seemed to focus mainly on the coastline and 
the sea. The particular balance of European naval power in the Eastern Medi-
terranean and the almost non-existence of the Moroccoan Navy allowed local 
fishermen to engage in gun smuggling with the Spanish enclaves of Peñón de 
Vélez and Peñón de Alhucemas and, more important, directly with foreign ships 
sailing near the coast. Smuggling was so widespread that by 1889 more than 
50,000 guns a year were being sold on the whole Rif coast (Pennell 2000). It was 
this combination of guns and sea skills which led to “piratical” actions, that is, 
modest naval activities (in the sense of a military navy). In Ibuqquyen, small boats 
(carabos) manned with a bunch of armed qabilians or simply armed men hidden 
on the coast were able to create a sustained series of incidents with foreign ships 
from the 1880s on, with their cargo being confiscated, their crews, ransomed or 
the ships sunk. It is probable that some of these incidents were triggered by Euro-
peans not respecting smuggling deals (exchange of foodstuff, skins or wax for 
guns and products) and showed that qabilians were able to ensure their position to 
a certain extent in front of abuses. Smuggling and other naval activities allowed 
the rais (chief or boss) Mesaud ibn Amar, aka “Sibara” (a corrupted form of 
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Civera, the name of a famous Spanish Admiral) and his associate Abdelkrim ben 
el-Hayy Ali Luh to become very powerful men in Ibuqquyen (Pennell 2001). 
On the other hand, the concentration of power in Ibuqquyen took place mainly 
around religious or civil leaders, such as cheikhs, not around military caudillos. 
The roots of this fact rested in the persistence of traditional social structures of 
Riffians in a context of weak articulation of civil administration in Morocco and 
lack of civil influence by European countries. If the internal authority of the 
Sultan and the Makzhan relied on and was mainly exerted through the army, the 
importance of religious and civil leaders in the central Rif could only reflect its 
limits or, to put it in positive terms, Riffian ability of affirming its identity and 
traditions. The fact that local qadis (Islamic judges), such as the father of 
Abdelkrim in Ait Waryaghar, were confirmed in their posts by the Sultans and 
were asked to support them through the bay’a (an oath of allegiance paid by all 
Moroccan authorities and groups to every new Sultan), does not contradict the fact 
that their authority was derived mainly from the dynamics of local society and not 
from the central power. 
Accordingly, health care in Ibuqquyen had mainly a naval and civil orientation. 
On the one hand, the relative weight of “piratical” activities and smuggling, plus 
alternative routes of seasonal migration, kept them quite out of reach of the 
French Algerian and Tangier maritime health services. It could happen that drugs 
or basic medical material were obtained in deals with the Spanish enclaves and 
foreign ships or by pillage, although it has not been possible to confirm this fact. 
On the other hand, traditional practitioners of various sorts and scattered djemas 
(mosques), dar dmanas (houses of religious brotherhoods or tariqas) and shurfa 
(saints) shrines continued to provide for the needs of most local inhabitants. As 
long as significant irregular forces were difficult to organize, military health care 
remained secondary in importance. 
The autonomy of action of Ibuqquyen towards Moroccan authorities was 
matched by similar developments in the Spanish enclaves of the area towards 
peninsular authorities. The Legation of Tangier supported the harkas sent to 
punish qabilians by allowing Moroccan troops to disembark in Melilla or its 
surroundings and then move to the central Rif. However, it was also the peñones 
of Alhucemas and Vélez that needed control, because they acted almost indepen-
dently given their insignificance. Though formally in a state of hostility towards 
coastal qabilas, both peñones were in practice supplied with foodstuffs by them 
and, in turn, allowed the smuggling of Riffians with foreign and Spanish ships 
(and engaged in it) (Villalobos 2004). In this way, they fostered Ibuqquyen auto-
nomy as much as their own, thus hindering Makhzan and Spanish general interests 
at the same time. 
In public health, military hospitals located in Vélez and Alhucemas had a pre-
dominantly civil function. The military garrisons in both enclaves were so reduced 
(one Infantry company in theory) that state functionaries (teacher, telegrapher, 
lighthouse keeper, customs officer), their families and the families of the Army 
officers, plus a tiny Jewish community, accounted for most of the work of the 
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army doctors. The Spanish military hospitals of Alhucemas Vélez also carried out 
a task of “attraction” similar to that in Ceuta and Melilla but with the difference 
that benefits were mainly for civilians and not for Riffian irregular combatants. 
Up until 1909, Lieutenant Dr. Manuel Bastos Ansart observed that the coastal 
qabilas “used to bring us for assistance all ill people who were not cured by the 
potions and magic of their saints” (Bastos 1969). 
Both the Makhzan and the Spanish authorities tried to put an end to this 
situation. In the first case, the maximum degree of control was achieved after the 
1898 harka. The brutality of this expedition reflected the degree of force 
Moroccan authorities had to display in order to exert some control on the area. It 
was also characteristic of the strongly authoritarian character of the Ba Ahmed 
regency in his efforts to keep the country united. The first objectives of the harka 
were to supress naval activities and disorganise civil society because those were 
the key mechanisms for Ibuqquyen autonomy. The two Moroccan gunboats 
supporting the expedition, the Hassani and the Turki, confiscated two carabos 
used by local people. On the other hand, Makhzan troops executed four local 
cheikhs, burnt fields, destroyed houses, imposed heavy fines and took almost 400 
prisoners to Fez (Pennell 2000). In the second place, the brutal use of force was 
intended to integrate incipient military and maritime structures under Makhzan 
authority. For example, Ibuqquyen had managed to organise a force of 500 armed 
men to oppose the harka (Hart 1976) while its “commerce” free from taxes such 
as those imposed in the imperial ports had disliked the Makhzan since the 1840s 
(Pennell 2000). Besides, the Ait Waryaghar had been engaged in a “seven years 
war” during the 1890s, in which fractions of nearby qabilas (Temsamam, Ait 
Ammart, Ait Tuzin and also Ibuqquyen) had also been involved.  
Military and maritime structures had made slow developments in previous years 
as an extension of naval and civil power, but now the goal was to promote them 
under Makhzan control because that would allow connection with the rest of 
Morocco and subordination to central and provincial authorities. The harka 
imposed Makhzan military authority in the area by repressing Ibuqquyen forces 
and integrating combatants from Ait Waryaghar and other qabilas. On the basis of 
military force, a reform of civil structures was made through the appointment of 
new amils or imgharen (local governors of fractions). After the punishment, the 
harka remained camped in the fraction of Izimmuren and its presence discouraged 
naval activities, compelling qabilians to commerce through the customs stations 
of Melilla or Ceuta and to increase seasonal migration to French Algeria and 
Tangier. Through both exceptional methods, the Ibuqquyen (and the central Rif in 
general) seemed to join the general frame of the Moroccan state, but this did not 
last long. The harka retreated one year later to Tafersit in the Eastern Rif and in 
1904 to Taza and Fez. This quick fading of Makhzan authority enabled local auto-
nomy once again, this time led by the Ait Waryaghar, who had traditionally had 
“their backs turned on the sea” (Hart 1976). Military and maritime structures had 
advanced but were now beyond control of the Sultan and the naib. 
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In public health, the army doctors who travelled with the harka, Mahboub and 
Si Ahmed Temsamami, embodied the extension of the activities of the School of 
Tangier to the central Rif. In Ellen Amster’s words, Temsamami used “European 
methods” in a task which comprised assistance to official troops and local contin-
gents. As the harka itself, the presence of military doctors probably did not last 
long. On the other hand, repression in Ibuqquyen provoked part of the local popu-
lation to migrate temporarily or definitively to Tangier, French Algeria and even 
to continental Europe, thus being subjected to health measures of the respective 
maritime authorities. After the retreat of the harka, a number of local inhabitants 
resumed their naval activities and escaped again the control of maritime health. 
In the case of Spain, the strategy consisted of linking the peñones with Melilla 
under a single military command, especially during and after the incidents of 
1893–1894, and of reinforcing the Spanish military institutions and garrisons in 
Vélez and Alhucemas. On this basis, smuggling diminished and the business of 
civilians and Jews with the army increased. In public health, the army doctors had 
to focus more on officers and soldiers. However, the almost incredibly tiny size of 
both enclaves and the impossibility of extending activities to coastal qabilas 
prevented major changes. Assistance to Spanish and Riffian civilians continued to 
be a relevant part of the doctors’ work. 
If there is one thing that should be remembered from this brief presentation of 
the different levels of Moroccan public health is that there existed an articulated 
transition between central institutions and the areas beyond their reach. The 
provincial and local levels of the Moroccan state and public health actually 
existed and should not be relegated into the extremes of makhzan and siba as is 
usually done. Despite autonomous tendencies, these intermediate levels were con-
nected to the general frame of Moroccan public health through more or less autho-
ritarian procedures. Similarly, despite strong European influence, Moroccan 
authorities managed to keep a degree of initiative in public health affairs at all 
levels. As a result, diversification and authoritarian concentration, and the predo-
minance of military and maritime public health were reproduced as general 
characteristics of the Moroccan health system. Only at the level of siba were these 
characteristics reversed, and only there, did a breach with the rest of the country 
occur. A more complex picture arises from this perspective, which helps better 
explain the future difficulties of Spain and France in reorganising public health in 
their Protectorates. 
Tangerian Ghosts and Riffian Realities 
The Limits of Colonial Public Health in Spanish Morocco 
After the signing of the Act of Algeciras (1906), the doors were finally open for 
Spain and France to intervene more directly in Moroccan public health in their 
respective zones of influence. The Protectorate treaties between France and 
Morocco (March 12, 1912) and France and Spain (November 27, 1912) were a 
new step in this direction. As a theoretical result of these agreements, the unified 
Moroccan public health regime should have given way to separate health systems 
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in each zone. The challenge for French and Spanish authorities was not to create 
structures out of nothing, but rather to reform pre-existing levels in each zone. 
Europeans would now lead the process and have the executive power, thus finally 
ending Moroccan initiatives. Territories and population that had been out of reach 
would become integrated. A more balanced development of public health would 
also be encouraged, so that all four branches – maritime, military, naval, land – 
had similar weight. Direction of public health affairs would be more technical, 
based upon the expertise of doctors and upon scientific institutions such as labora-
tories. In theory, the Protectorate regime would allow more Moroccan participa-
tion in the health system than a colonial regime, but ultimately Moroccan institu-
tions and personnel would be subordinated to French and Spanish authorities. 
In practice, neither Algeciras nor the Protectorate treaties ended Moroccan 
agency. Abdallah Laroui has affirmed, against colonialist narratives, that the 
initiatives of the Moroccan state lasted until 1912: only from then on did “initia-
tives” give way to “reactions” (Laroui 1993). This study argues, however, that 
though most fragile and more tenuous than ever, Moroccan initiatives continued 
to exert a persistent influence in the newly established French and Spanish Protec-
torates until the late 1920s. (In fact, one could wonder if initiatives ever dis-
appeared, as the nationalist movement gained momentum already in the early 
1930s.) In Spanish Morocco’s public health, perhaps the clearest proof of this was 
that the maritime and military branches kept on being pre-eminent in the newly 
established health system. This had to do with the fact that the new system con-
tinued to be influenced by the Sanitary Council of Tangier (which was still 
functioning), while a significant part of the territory and population managed to 
stay out of reach. The so-called “Tangier question” and “Rif question” – which I 
have termed the Tangerian ghosts and Riffian realities – were the paradigmatic 
examples of the difficulties created for Spain by the continuity of Moroccan 
agency and institutions during this period. Only by an increasing use of force, 
diplomatic and military, and by an increasing authoritarian concentration of power 
could Spain slowly begin to solve both “questions” and to establish a health 
system in its zone. But in this way, it moved away from the very Protectorate 
regime it sought and was obliged to deploy. 
“Tangerian Ghosts” 
The Persistence of the Sanitary Council of Tangier 
From Consular Doctors to Urban Dispensaries (1906–1912). The Algeciras Con-
ference marked the beginning of a new phase in the “Morocco question” and 
paved the way for the future establishment of Protectorate regimes. In their tacitly 
acknowledged “zones of influence,” France and Spain compromised to support 
the authority of the Sultan and the Makhzan in order that the necessary moderni-
sation of the army, finances, industry, commerce and health system could be 
achieved. In practice, this meant an unprecedented degree of intervention of those 
two countries in Moroccan institutions. However, as Abdallah Laroui has shown, 
the Act of Algeciras was the “last victory” of the Sultan against foreign powers, 
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which would serve as a basis for future moves towards independence in the 1940s 
and 1950s (Laroui 1993). 
One of the main reasons for this was that Tangier remained outside both zones 
of influence. The city stood at the same time as the last site of Moroccan authority 
and as the last site where multiple foreign influences could be overtly exerted. 
Some of the old international and Makhzan institutions remained, while other new 
“international” organisms were planned or created. It was countries such as Great 
Britain and Germany who were especially interested in supporting the autonomy 
of the city and in still recognising some authority to the Sultan. That was a means 
for them to maintain some intervention in Moroccan affairs and to prevent France 
and Spain from exerting exclusive control in their zones of influence. The so-
called “Tangier question” would prove influential in all spheres, including public 
health. 
Health issues were not among those regulated by the Act of Algeciras, which 
limited itself to the following agreements: 1) Creation of a police force in Tangier 
and other ports; 2) Fight against smuggling; 3) Creation of a Moroccan State 
Bank; 4) New taxes and improvement of the financial system; 5) Reform of the 
customs; and 6) Public works and public services. However, this very absence 
implied that an institution so important and with such a long trajectory as the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier remained untouched. In fact, the Council was once 
mentioned in the text, in the fourth chapter, article 61, regarding the question of a 
new tax on urban properties which should be used for public works in the main 
cities: 
A Tanger, cette quotité sera versée au Conseil Sanitaire Internationale, qui en 
réglera l’emploi jusqu’á la création d’une organisation municipale. 
Nothing was said about the Council’s authority in public health, which dated back 
to the times of Sultan Moulay Abdehrraman. Nor was anything said about its 
possible replacement by other equivalent institutions in the French and Spanish 
zones. So the Council was subtly acknowledged, and its functions were neither 
denied nor reshaped. Far from disappearing or being dismantled, it started to 
become a kind of “ghost”, as did the zone of Tangier as a whole, its structures and 
its old regulations of 1840 and 1879 inevitably interfering with the maritime 
health institutions France and Spain planned to create in their respective zones of 
influence. 
In fact, the impact of the “Tangier question” for Spain (and France) was 
multiple. On the one hand, the persistence of the Council meant that Spain could 
not concentrate its efforts exclusively in its zone of influence. Spanish representa-
tives had to be kept in Tangier and in ports of the French zone as part of the old 
system which had not disappeared. In addition, other European countries could 
keep influencing maritime public health in both zones. On the other hand, the 
Tangier Legation kept an important role as co-ordinator of Spanish delegates in 
the ports of the Spanish zone. Its power would interfere with a future maritime 
health authority based in Spanish Morocco. Third, the traditional weight of the 
Larache delegation could transform it in the centre of maritime health in the 
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Spanish zone, but this would probably allow too much Moroccan participation 
because Spanish presence and influence in this city were weak in comparison, for 
example, with Tettouan. Finally, urban public health, of which dispensaries for 
natives were to become a most representative component, was also disrupted 
because the Council had not received authorisation from the Sultan to create 
health institutions in the cities – except for Tangier itself. In this context, it is not 
strange that the control of maritime public health became of extreme importance 
for the development of a health system in Spanish Morocco – at least in the 
Western zone. 
These “shortcomings” of Algeciras’ resolutions implied that maritime public 
health in the Spanish zone did not change much in the years 1906–1912 from 
former decades. Curiously, the most immediate and almost exclusive effect of 
Algeciras was the creation of dispensaries for natives in the Atlantic coast cities. 
They were set up on the basis of the “consular doctors” who had been working in 
Moroccan ports since the 1880s. One of them, Captain Dr. Francisco García 
Belenguer, who worked in Larache, was the first to suggest in June 1906 that a 
dispensary should be built in that city. It was necessary to extend medical services 
to a wider population of “poor Moors and Israelites” so that Spanish influence was 
consolidated and the work of the French doctor recently sent to the city, neutra-
lised. (France would keep a dispensary in Larache and a doctor in Tettouan for 
many years). Following this proposal, the doctor of the Spanish Legation in 
Tangier, Major Dr. Francisco Triviño Valdivia presented to the Ministry of State a 
project for creating dispensaries in the Spanish zone four months later (Proyecto 
de instrucciones para la organización y funcionamiento de los dispensarios 
médicos de España en Marruecos). Two years later, the new doctor in Larache, 
Captain Dr. Carlos Vilaplana González, wrote a new tract entitled Bases para los 
dispensarios de Marruecos. Dispensario de Larache, another attempt at defining 
the characteristics of the dispensaries. 
The centrality of Larache was not only expressed by its leading role in propo-
sing the creation of dispensaries. In 1911, Spain launched a military operation to 
secure that city and Ksar el-Kebir in the face of French moves near the unofficial 
borders of the Spanish zone of influence. After this operation and many delays 
and bureaucratic proceedings, three urban dispensaries were created in the 
Atlantic region. The first was started in Larache in 1908, under the direction of 
Carlos Vilaplana González (1908–1911) and afterwards Ángel Jack Ocampo 
(1911–1919); the second, in Asilah in 1911 with Francisco Moreno Sáenz (1911–
1921); and the third in Ksar el-Kebir in 1912, with Ramiro Torreira Martínez 
(1912–1913) and Manuel Ocaña López (1914–1921). They had nonetheless a 
provisional character, lacking proper equipment, auxiliary personnel and even 
buildings of their own in some cases during the first years. The directors of dis-
pensaries were dependent on the Spanish consuls in those cities and subsequently 
on the Spanish Legation in Tangier. All administrative paperwork, medical re-
gisters and sanitary initiatives had to be submitted to Tangier for knowledge of 
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and eventual approval by the Legation and by the Ministry of State in Madrid. The 
role of the Tangier Legation would persist in the following years. 
In fact, the creation of dispensaries was not so paradoxical because obtaining 
control of the Council delegations was much more difficult than making a slight 
extension of the work of consular doctors. However, the very provisionality of 
dispensaries showed that such control was necessary for obtaining financial re-
sources and improving their facilities and equipment. This was not the only 
problem. As it was said before, Spanish initiatives were not restricted to its zone 
of influence. That is why, for example, Dr. Francisco García Belenguer was sent 
to Fez in 1908, where he stayed at Moulay Abd el-Hafid’s (1908–1912) personal 
service until the Protectorate treaties were signed. His main task was to try and 
influence the Sultan and the Makhzan and to send reports to the Tangier Legation, 
informing about their activities. But it was too late for him to exert an influence 
similar to that of Fernand Linarès at the end of the 19th century. Spain also kept 
consular doctors in Casablanca and Mogador. At least in the first of those cities a 
dispensary was established which was connected to the Tangier Legation. The 
military doctors who served in Casablanca were Antonio Moncada y Álvarez 
(until 1910), Carlos Amor y Rico (1911–1917) and Vicente Vidal Frenero (1921–
1931), while those in Mogador were José Blanco Larruscaín (until 1911), 
Práxedes Llisterri y Ferrer (1912–1913) and Gabino Gil y Sáinz (1914–1915). 
Resources and personnel were used to keep Spanish influence in the whole of 
Morocco until the 1920s with the subsequent dispersion of meagre resources. 
 
The Strategy of the Juntas Locales (1913–1915). The French and Spanish Protec-
torates were finally established in March and November of 1912, respectively, but 
Tangier and its surroundings confirmed their autonomy from both. The city was 
assigned a vaguely international character, which would take almost fifteen years 
to be legally defined. This fact deepened the impact of the “Tangier question” on 
the Spanish Protectorate’s maritime public health. On the one hand, it confirmed 
the persistence of the Sanitary Council, whose existence and jurisdiction were 
once again taken for granted. Spain should then keep its activities in Tangier and 
other ports of Morocco. On the other hand, Spain could not use the Legation of 
Tangier to lead public health in its zone of influence. Tangerian ascendancy in the 
Northern region would have provided a powerful legitimacy, an administrative 
basis and a unity of action for Spanish health activities in its new Protectorate. 
Instead, a new centre had to be “invented” that would not enjoy Tangier’s pedi-
gree and would suffer from interferences of the Legation. Tettouan was officially 
chosen as new centre but Larache possessed similar, if not more favourable, 
conditions for the task. The Council’s delegation in Larache had been traditionally 
more important and, as has been shown, the first dispensaries for natives had been 
established in Larache and nearby cities. Finally, the problems of creating urban 
health institutions and extending their reach into the countryside would remain. 
In these unfavourable circumstances, Spain began to define its Protectorate 
health system. The French-Spanish Treaty of November 1912 lacked any refe-
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rence to public health matters, and it was necessary to wait for a provisional Pro-
tectorate regulation approved by Royal Orders issued in February and April 1913. 
According to these regulations “public health and hygiene” affairs were assigned 
to the Delegation of Native Services (later, Native Affairs), one of the three 
offices of the Spanish Alta Comisaría (High Commission) in Tettouan. In addi-
tion, Juntas locales de Higiene (Local Hygiene Boards), were to be established in 
the main cities. Apart from the regulations, a new urban dispensary was created in 
Tettouan just after the occupation of the city in February 1913 under direction of 
the military doctor Leopoldo Martínez Olmedo (1913–1919). Finally, Dr. García 
Belenguer was appointed as “intimate consultant” of the new Khalifa (higher 
Moroccan representative for the Spanish zone), Moulay el-Mehdi. He was 
supposed to carry out the same tasks as under the Sultan Moulay Abd el-Hafid in 
previous years. 
These initial measures could not hide the persistent debility when faced with the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier, which was explicitly reflected in the specific orders 
given to the Delegation of Native Services in the 1913 provisional regulations. 
According to them, the main task of this organ in health affairs was to strive for 
the “confluence of the Spanish public health action (dispensaries of Larache, Ksar 
el-Kebir, Asilah, Tettouan, Nador and Zoco el Had [the latter being two country-
side dispensaries run by the Army in the Melilla region] with the delegations of 
the Sanitary Council of Tangier, and its expansion in due terms”. Debility was 
quickly given a more proper name. On the occasion of a plague outbreak in the 
Atlantic region in September 1913, a sanitary commission was sent from Spain by 
the Ministry of State, headed by the Spanish Maritime Health Inspector himself, 
Manuel Martín Salazar. Some months before, the ministry had already proposed 
that Martín Salazar should present a design for organising the health services of 
the Protectorate (following a plague outbreak in the Canary Islands). The Proy-
ecto de Organización de los servicios sanitarios de la zona de influence española 
en Marruecos was finished in May and published in November and became the 
first detailed legal text on public health for Spanish Morocco. 
Among other things, the plan proposed the creation of the Hygiene Institute in 
Larache, whose director would become the Protectorate’s Health Inspector. Sub-
ordinated to him, medical officers in Larache, Tettouan, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah 
would be in charge of the maritime health stations in the ports as well as the urban 
dispensaries. They would also serve as members of the local boards of those cities 
in order to take general hygienic measures. Larache’s Institute would also serve as 
basis for the creation of a Spanish School of Tropical Pathology in Africa. How-
ever, the plan failed because Martín Salazar ignored the implications of the 
Sanitary Council of Tangier. During his stay in Morocco, he finally realised that 
neither Spain nor France could adequately organise their Protectorates’ public 
health  
because they lack the indispensable sanitary autonomy, due to the existence of 
an International Treaty that assigns such a delicate matter in the Moroccan 
Empire to different national representatives, badly suited for this kind of 
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services, prone to disagreements based on interests beyond public hygiene and 
besides often sterilised by the technical incompetence of officials charged with 
a task which is essentially unknown to them. 
Thus, sanitary autonomy was still the real challenge for Spain, even though the 
Protectorate had been already established, and maritime public health was the key 
to this autonomy because the more control exercised in this field, the more the 
development of urban and countryside health services would be possible. As a 
result of the commission, two provisional “sanitary parks” were established in the 
ports of Larache and Asilah, but its work ran parallel to that of the Council 
delegations and they depended directly on the Spanish Maritime Health Inspec-
tion. This measure was clearly insufficient and Martín Salazar asked the Ministry 
of State to reach an agreement with France in order to obtain sanitary autonomy 
and also to press for a reform of the Sanitary Council bureau so that Spain could 
increase its influence in it. More realistically, Martín Salazar also proposed a local 
strategy to start bringing sanitary power into Spanish hands. He stated that 
as long as the Sanitary Council of Tangier does not acknowledge our sanitary 
autonomy in the ports of our domain, it could be demanded from the Consular 
Corps of the different cities that the right to intervene in the sanitary exami-
nation of ships would be delegated to this Spanish doctor [the dispensary 
doctor]. 
In fact, that right was not “demanded” but taken by force. Spanish authorities 
decided to use the newly created Juntas de Servicios Locales (Local Boards) as 
bases for the use of diplomatic force against the Protectorate legal frame. The first 
Juntas had been established in Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah by a 
dahir of June 10, 1913 (Cordero Torres 1943). Despite their initial financial and 
legal problems, they provided the institutional space for Spanish consuls to act 
apart from other European representatives and from Moroccan authorities. In the 
absence of specific Local Health Boards, they assumed public health compe-
tencies, placing urban dispensaries under their control. More important, they tried 
and pre-empt maritime health competencies from the Council delegations. It was a 
way either to avoid interference from the Council of Tangier, or to increase the 
role of the Delegation of Native Services of Tettouan in front of the Tangier 
Legation and Larache.  
This process took a particular form in each of the three main ports of the 
Spanish zone. The first move was made in the least important, Asilah, during the 
second half of 1913. The Spanish Consul, who acted then as Council delegate, 
appointed the dispensary doctor, Francisco Moreno Sáenz, as his successor. This 
was a challenge to the Council, as it was this organ that still had the power to 
appoint its delegates. This action provoked official protests of the government of 
Austria-Hungary to the Spanish Ambassador in Vienna in May 1914. The argu-
ment was that, although the Council had not been created as a result of an inter-
national convention, it was “an institution acknowledged by many international 
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treaties”, among them in the “article 176 of the International Sanitary Convention 
of Paris, signed by Spain, and the article 61 of the International Act of Algeciras”. 
Spain tried to act more carefully on the next occasion to avoid such diplomatic 
incidents. This time, the objective was Larache, the main port of Spanish 
Morocco. On January 1, 1914, the Spanish Consul José Buigas Dalmau was to 
start his term as Council delegate for the next six months. A doctor from Martín 
Salazar’s commission, Benigno García Castrillo, was still in the city in charge of 
the provisional “sanitary park” that had been installed in the port, and the Council 
health official was a Spaniard named Ildefonso Hernández. Buigas first tried to 
“obtain” the post of delegate from the Belgian consul in December following 
secret instructions from the Ministry of State, but the consul refused to act without 
previous authorisation by the Council. Then, on January 1, Buigas received his 
post and immediately ordered Dr. Castrillo to assume the sanitary inspection of 
ships, while Hernández would become his “substitute”. Buigas planned to keep 
this situation beyond June 30, as he expected no protests during the following 
term of the French consul, because “France seeks for its zone the same indepen-
dence we seek for ours”. These legal subterfuges proved effective: France did not 
protest, Dr. Castrillo inspected the ships, equipment and facilities were improved 
and the money raised through ship inspection was not sent to Tangier. 
Despite all precautions, the economic importance of the port of Larache made 
protests from other countries all the more expected. This time it was Great Britain 
that complained to the Spanish government. On January 1, 1915, the British 
consul in Larache began his term as delegate, and the same day the British consul 
in Tangier became president of the Sanitary Council. Besides, Great Britain had 
not yet officially acknowledged the Spanish Protectorate. To respond to British 
protests, the Ministry of State asked for a copy of the 1840 Council regulations to 
the Tangier Legation, and some time later sent a note to the British Ambassador in 
Madrid with a wide array of arguments defending the Spanish position. For 
example, the Council was not the result of an international agreement; Spain had 
been charged with implementing a public health administration in the name of the 
Makhzan; and a sanitary station had been set up in Larache that provided a 
preventive service that had not existed before. In addition, the 1861 Treaty of 
Commerce with Morocco, still in force, also allowed Spanish consuls to issue 
sanitary certificates for boats on the Rif coast. Finally, the international conven-
tions stated that consuls were not prepared to render adequate health service, 
which should be assigned to trained personnel as Spain had done in Larache. 
The First World War, which had already started, also provided a powerful 
argument. It was necessary to maintain the de facto situation in Larache and 
Asilah in order to ensure the “neutrality” of the ports of Spanish Morocco, 
because a British or French consul “could raise problems with ships of belligerent 
countries”. Sanitary inspection by Spain would be more “objective” because “a 
foreign consul may be a self-interested party in the present European conflict”. 
So, the Ministry of State could affirm that “the war was the cause of Mr. Buigas 
keeping the delegation post”. Finally, in October 1915, the consul in Larache sent 
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a copy to the Ministry of State of the sanitary certificate made by the French 
consul of Kenitra for an English ship. If sanitary inspection in Kenitra was done 
by the French consul and not by the Council delegate, the Spanish initiative in 
Larache seemed not so unjustified. Strictly, both problems were not equivalent 
because the port of Kenitra had had no Council delegate prior to the Protectorate. 
However, the fact that France made moves to control maritime public health in its 
zone supported Spanish demands for its own. 
The problem did not disappear and was brought to the fore every time a new 
foreign diplomat began his term as president of the Sanitary Council. In Novem-
ber 1915, it was the Russian diplomatic agent in Tangier who, as Council 
president, again demanded a solution for the delegation of Larache. He proposed 
that the Spanish consul could “incidentally and given the present circumstances 
keep the post of delegate as long as he sent the money raised by ship inspection 
since mid-1914 to Tangier”. The Ministry of State and the Tangier Legation were 
eager to accept this proposal but only if it was taken as “definitive and not 
provisional”, that is, the Spanish consul in Larache “would always be the Sanitary 
Council delegate” and the doctor of the Junta would be responsible for ship 
inspection. No agreement was reached and the situation remained as before. 
In the view of the Ministry of State, it was only a matter of time before a similar 
problem arose in the third main port of the Spanish zone, Tettouan. Despite being 
the Protectorate’s official capital, in Tettouan’s port, Martil, maritime public 
health still remained in the hands of the Council delegate. On January 1, 1916 the 
French delegate was to surrender the post to the German consul for the next six 
months. But as these two countries were at war, the French consul suggested to 
the Alto Comisario (High Commissioner), General Francisco Gómez Jordana, that 
the Spanish consul became the delegate. Gómez Jordana sent the proposal to the 
Ministry of State, which accepted the idea. However, at the last moment, France 
decided to propose the consul of the Netherlands as the new Council delegate, 
with the subsequent deception and protests of Spanish Protectorate authorities. 
This fact just confirmed Tettouan’s secondary role in relation to Larache be-
tween 1913 and 1915. The lack of centralised control on maritime public health 
was reflected in new plague outbreaks. In addition, Tettouan could not stop the 
activities of the Spanish Legation in Tangier, which carried much of the weight of 
the strategy of the Juntas. Besides, Spanish activities continued in other parts of 
Morocco. Just after the Protectorate was established, a Spanish Laboratory of 
Bacteriology had begun its work in Tangier almost simultaneously and in direct 
competition with the French Pasteur Institute headed by Dr. Paul Remlinger 
(Moulin 1997). The military doctors Celestino Moreno Ochoa (1913–1917) and 
Francisco Mora Caldés (1917–1921) were its first directors. Consular doctors 
continued to be appointed to the Spanish Legation and often served in the Spanish 
Hospital that had been in operation since 1888. In this period, the military doctors 
Federico Baeza and Francisco Triviño were replaced by Enrique Pedraza de 
Vivanco (1914–1918) and Emilio Crespo y García de Tejada (1915–1917). On the 
other hand, Spanish doctors in Casablanca and Mogador continued their task in 
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both cities during these years, though with uncertain purpose, while the southern 
zone of the Spanish Protectorate (Cape Juby/Tarfaya) still awaited effective occu-
pation. 
Despite all problems, the pre-emption of maritime health competencies by the 
Juntas provided the “umbrella” for the start of the later so-called Sanidad Majzén 
(Makhzan public health), that is, the health services created and controlled by 
Spanish authorities but addressed to the Moroccan civil population in the name of 
the Khalifa, in other words, the Protectorate health system as such, directed from 
Tettouan and addressed to Moroccans. The Juntas were able to acquire financial 
resources from ship inspection and from the Ministry of State (since 1915). The 
posts of Officers of Local Health Services or Local Boards Health Officers, that 
is, a kind of municipal health inspectors, were created the same year. The “sani-
tary parks” of Larache and Asilah were officially integrated in the Juntas and the 
first statistics of ship inspection were collected and sent to the High Commission. 
Urban dispensaries were officially recognised as “Makhzan dispensaries” by a 
dahir of January 1, 1915. The number of people (“Moors”, “Israelites” and Spani-
ards or Europeans) treated in these centres grew significantly. But more important, 
public health measures could be planned on a regular basis and a wider scale. For 
example, in October 1915, the High Commission ordered the Officer of Local 
Health Services in Larache to design a form to collect statistical data “for a better 
knowledge of the salubrity of this city”, which was subsequently extended to the 
other main towns. Morbidity and mortality data were then ranked according to a 
standard nosology, and included information on nationality and religion. As a 
result, monthly statistics started to be submitted to the High Commission and 
published in the Boletín Oficial de la Zona de Protectorado de España en Marru-
ecos (BOZPEM), providing a first picture of the Protectorate’s epidemiology. 
Preventive measures such as smallpox vaccination increased. For example, just 
a few weeks after Tettouan was occupied and its dispensary created, the Spanish 
consul in the city asked the Ministry of State to send 800 doses of smallpox 
vaccine “so that the doctor attached to the Consulate may vaccinate for free those 
natives who ask for it”. It was clearly a propagandistic measure, although it was 
justified due to the “appearance” of some cases of smallpox and the “necessity of 
diffusing among the native population the use of vaccination”. In Larache the 
consul Buigas asked in June 1914 that a “depot of sera and vaccines” be installed 
in the city, and that smallpox vaccine be sent. The petition was written, not by 
chance, just a few days before the consul started the procedure to try seize the 
Council delegation post and was justified using the same arguments as in 
Tettouan. Apart from these opportunistic occasions, vaccination was done regu-
larly as public health structures stabilised. For example, a “vaccination service” 
was organised in the dispensary of Larache from June 1915. Its announcement 
stated:  
In the dispensary of Larache, vaccination will be offered for free to all indi-
gents of every nationality, from 10 to 12 in the morning and 2 to 4 in the after-
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noon. Apart from smallpox vaccine, anti-typhoid vaccine and anti-diphtheria 
serum will be provided to the poor, also for free. 
Dispensaries also offered the poor population drugs for free, which were supplied 
by the Military Hygiene Institute in Madrid. Finally, projects for new water 
conducts and sewage collection began to be planned and discussed by the Juntas 
of the main cities. 
 
The Creation of the Health Inspection and the “Denunciation” of the Council of 
Tangier (1916–1918). The 1915 budget of the Ministry of State for Morocco 
included for the first time a sum for a “doctor, General Health Inspector”. Admi-
nistrative documents confirm that both Spanish peninsular and Protectorate 
authorities planned the appointment of a Protectorate Health Inspector during the 
second half of that year. In contrast with former projects for Larache, the new post 
was presumably be given to the director of the Tettouan’s civil infirmary, which 
had been created for the assistance of the Spanish population of the city already in 
1914. In November 1915, a public call was issued by Manuel Martín Salazar and 
some time later Dr. Eduardo Lomo Godoy, director of the civil infirmary of 
Tettouan, was appointed to the post. The selection committee included Jorge 
Francisco Tello, head of the Epidemiology Section of the “Alfonso XIII” Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid who had accompanied Martín Salazar in the 1913 commission; 
the Spanish Representative in the Office International d’Hygiene Publique of 
Paris, Dr. Ángel Pulido, former Spanish General Health Inspector, 1901–1902; 
Dr. Víctor Llorente, a specialist in sera and vaccines who owned an important 
laboratory in Madrid; and the Professor of Parasitology and Tropical Pathology of 
Madrid, Gustavo Pittaluga (Rico Avello 1969). Such an imposing group of hygie-
nists was surely intended to give the candidate the full support of the Spanish 
public health establishment. 
This fact reflected the increased legitimacy and power that Tettouan had gained 
as the public health centre of Spanish Morocco. In fact, the promotion of Tettouan 
was a main objective of the High Commissioner Francisco Gómez Jordana during 
his term from July 1915 until December 1918. Soon after his appointment, the 
first official regulation for the Spanish Protectorate was approved on January 24, 
1916. In public health, this regulation confirmed the creation of a General Health 
Inspection inside the Delegation of Native Affairs, whose main function was to 
act as consultative board for the High Commission in “public health and hygiene 
affairs”. Periodical visits were also to be made to the health services by the in-
spector in order to suggest possible reforms, while a general report had to be sub-
mitted to the High Commission at least every two years. Dependent on the Health 
Inspection, the directors of civil hospitals and infirmaries would become “dele-
gates for the services of health intervention”. 
However, the 1916 regulations had quite a limited effect in creating a technical 
public health authority with actual executive power. The inspection and its dele-
gations remained a consultative body, so final decisions were in the hands of the 
Delegate of Native Affairs and the local consuls-interveners. Dependence on 
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metropolitan public health was still high. To that date, the civil hospitals and 
infirmaries built or planned were still intended exclusively for Spanish citizens, 
leaving dispensaries as the sole Makzhan services. This last fact is very important 
because the Ministry of State would give more and more support to institutions 
exclusively directed to Spaniards, instead of promoting Protectorate centres. The 
risk began of grow of negating Spain’s international compromises towards 
Morocco which would develop in the years to come. 
In these circumstances, new acts of force for acquiring maritime health compe-
tencies were necessary to further strengthen the Health Inspection and Tettouan’s 
central role. The international context would prove decisive for this process. 
Shortly after the 1916 regulations were approved, French authorities in Morocco 
decided to “denounce” the 1840 firman by which the Sanitary Council of Tangier 
had been established. The state of war was crucial in this action against legal 
agreements, which was probably intended to stop German interference in 
Morocco, so strongly felt prior to and during the war period. The decision was 
conveyed to the foreign representatives in Tangier through the delegate of the 
Sultan in that city. The Residence Generale (French High Commission in 
Morocco) had decided to take full control of its zone’s maritime public health, 
which was to be governed through a new legal regulation to be approved after the 
“denunciation” had gone into effect. 
Immediately, the Spanish Legation in Tangier contacted the Ministry of State 
and expressed its dissatisfaction that France had not informed Spanish authorities 
“so that both governments would have simultaneously acted in both zones”. 
However, it was not too late to co-ordinate Spanish initiatives with those of 
French authorities. The “denunciation” of the 1840 firman was a very convenient 
move for Spanish Morocco’s interest in achieving its “sanitary independence”. 
Thus, the Legation began planning a parallel “denunciation” to be published on 
the same date as the French statement which would put an end to the Council’s 
interference in the Spanish zone. Soon afterwards, a regulation “reorganising 
maritime health police” would be approved which would serve as the basis for 
“the future sanitary regulations”. The Legation felt confident of this manoeuvre, 
as no diplomatic protest, especially from Great Britain, had followed the French 
decision. 
The plan was put into action through a Khalifian dahir published in the 
BOZPEM on March 13, 1916 – the same day as the French Sultanian dahir – 
which was to go into effect on March 19. The law established that the pachás of 
the port cities would assume the responsibilities of the Council’s delegates in 
maritime public health, “though they could, nonetheless, delegate this function in 
benefit of the service”. A royal decree from the High Commission March 29, 1916 
put into effect this new delegation of authority from the pachás to the Spanish 
Consul-Interveners. In sum, jurisdiction in sanitary matters had been removed 
from the Council and returned to the Makhzan (reversing the events of 1840), 
which, in turn, had re-delegated the power in this field to the French and Spanish 
Protectorate authorities. 
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However, the effect of these measures was not as decisive as it was planned. 
This was largely due to Great Britain’s will to continue its support of the Council. 
Just a month after the French and Spanish dahirs were published, the British 
ambassador in Madrid, Sir Arthur Hardinge, addressed the Minister of State, the 
Count of Romanones, to convey the opinion of the British government that the 
suppression of the Council would cause serious inconvenience due to the absence 
of a central organ that could co-ordinate quarantine policy and the application of 
sanitary regulations in the Spanish and French zones and Tangier. To avoid this, 
Hardinge proposed the creation of a new “Sanitary Council of Morocco” on the 
basis of articles 27 and 102 of the planned Tangier Statute, which was then being 
negotiated between France, Great Britain and Spain. 
Hardinge reiterated his proposal to the new Minister of State, Amalio Gimeno, 
in August. Some days later, the French ambassador in Spain transmitted the 
complete agreement of its government with the British plan. Caught by surprise, 
the Minister of State requested a report from the chief of the Tangier Legation, F. 
Serrat, who was also surprised because, in his opinion, there was nothing in article 
27 to support the French-British proposal, and he had no knowledge of the 
existence of an article 102. He nonetheless found a clear explanation for the 
“paradoxical fact” of “re-creating a Sanitary Council or restoring the existing with 
its former powers”: it would mean again accepting foreign intervention “after 
having paid with sacrifices for the independence of our action in Morocco”. For 
Great Britain, it was a way to retain its intervention in Moroccan public health, 
while the benefit for France would be that the new Council would favour its 
never-abandoned ambition of controlling the whole of Morocco at the expense of 
the Spanish zone. Serrat thought that Spain should reject this proposal and defend 
its decisions against the two countries. If a co-ordinated action on quarantine or 
any other issue was considered necessary, “it would suffice to follow the corre-
sponding international regulations adopted in the different Sanitary Conventions”. 
Besides, it would be more important for Spain to co-ordinate maritime public 
health in the ports of Spanish Morocco “with regulations in force in the península 
and Spanish African enclaves” than with the rest of Moroccan ports. 
As a result of these diplomatic manoeuvres, maritime public health was still 
unable to achieve sufficient autonomy in Spanish Morocco. The provisional “sani-
tary parks” installed in Larache and Asilah after the end of 1913 had not become 
“sanitary stations”, although such projects were planned since 1915. Conse-
quently, the Sanidad Majzén directed from Tettouan kept its modest development. 
Interference from the Tangier Legation continued. For example, the Spanish 
bacteriological laboratory in that city increased its activities in Spanish Morocco. 
In 1915 its services included diagnosis and assistance in rabies cases from 
Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah. In 1917, the laboratory asked the 
Institute of Military Hygiene to send antityphoid, anti-paratyphoid, anti-dysenteric 
and haemolytic sera, as well as smallpox vaccine, all for diagnostic purposes. 
Competition with the laboratory of Tangier still came mainly from Larache, not 
from Tettouan. As was mentioned above, in 1914 the Spanish consul Buigas had 
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asked for a “deposit of sera and vaccines” from the Alfonso XIII Hygiene Institute 
to be established in the city and “periodically renewed”. This initiative did not 
succeed, but in 1916 the Commander General of Larache asked the Tangier 
Laboratory to send “anti-rabies marrows” for local treatment of the rising number 
of patients in the area. The director, Dr. Francisco Mora Caldés, refused partly on 
technical grounds and partly because he thought its laboratory was prepared to 
“treat all individuals coming from our zone of influence, either military or 
civilians, who need as the sole requisite their presence in this city during the time 
of the treatment”. It seems clear that the laboratory wanted to keep its prerogatives 
at the expense of Larache. 
 
The Authoritarianism of the High Commissioner (1918–1921). Two years had to 
pass for Tettouan to finally become the centre of Spanish Morocco public health. 
The defeat of Germany in World War I increased freedom of movement for 
France and Spain in Morocco, putting an end to more than a decade of German 
intervention after Algeciras. On September 24, 1918, a dahir was published with 
the heading Dahir organizando el servicio sanitario de la Zona. This dahir stated 
“that the power attached to the Makhzan in sanitary affairs would be permanently 
delegated to the Delegate of Native Affairs of the High Commission of Spain in 
Morocco”. The “denunciation” of 1916 had failed because it had returned the 
jurisdiction of the Council to the hands of the Makhzan, but it had not made a 
distinction between the Sultanian (French) and the Khalifian (Spanish) Makhzan. 
This open flank had been used by the British and French authorities to exert 
claims for intervention in maritime health affairs in Spanish Morocco, as has been 
seen. The new dahir closed this door by making the Delegate of Native Affairs 
and not the Khalifa or its Makhzan the direct recipient of responsibility for mari-
time health issues in the Spanish zone. Thus, further interference was prevented, 
but it was at the cost of a new act of force on the Protectorate legal frame. Now it 
was plainly clear that Spain did not “protect” Moroccan authorities but directly 
assumed their competencies. It was all the more natural that, as a result of this 
decision, Dr. García Belenguer ended his mission as “intimate consultant” near 
the Khalifa. 
The dahir created a Central Board of Health (Junta Central de Sanidad) 
composed of ten members and located in Tettouan. Its president was the Delegate 
of Native Affairs. The other members included a functionary of the General 
Secretary of the High Commission, who was to represent the interests of civil 
authorities; a member of the Military Cabinet of the High Commission, who 
would represent the Army; the “doctor who acts as consultant of the Delegation of 
Native Affairs”, that is, the Health Inspector; the Chief of Military Public Health 
in Tettouan; a doctor, a pharmacist and a veterinary appointed by the High 
Commission; an architect from the Delegation of Public Works (Fomento); and a 
secretary without a vote from the staff of the Delegation of Native Affairs. Sub-
ordinate to this central board, specific Local Health Boards (Juntas locales de 
Sanidad) were created inside the Juntas Locales of Tettouan, Larache, Ksar el-
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Kebir and Asilah. Each of these boards contained 12 members: the pachá, who 
was the president; the local consul-intervener, who was the vice-president; a 
representative of the Army; the director of the civil hospital in Tettouan and 
Larache and of the civil infirmary in Ksar el-Kebir and Asilah; a military doctor; 
the chief of the municipal health services; a pharmacist and a veterinary appointed 
by the Delegation of Native Affairs with approval of the High Commissioner; 
three proprietors (one Spanish, one Muslim, one Jew) appointed in the same way; 
and a secretary from the local intervention office. 
On the other hand, the dahir made reference to new institutions, the so-called 
“mixed infirmaries”. In fact, the civil budget for Spanish Morocco published on 
the January 1, 1918 had included sums for the personnel and expenses of two 
“infirmaries for natives” (exclusively for Moroccans) in Tettouan and Larache and 
two “mixed infirmaries” (for Spaniards and Moroccans) in Asilah and Ksar el-
Kebir. Such infirmaries had already started operation between 1917 and 1918, and 
their personnel included, in the first case, two Spanish doctors, two Spanish auxi-
liaries, two Moroccan nurses (one male, one female), a Moroccan cook and a 
Moroccan porter; and in the second case, a Spanish doctor, two Spanish auxilia-
ries, two Spanish nurses (one male, one female), a Spanish cook and a Moroccan 
porter. The infirmaries were considered a necessary complement to the dispen-
saries for natives, because they offered surgical services and a place for convale-
scence. This service could not be provided by dispensaries and, provisionally, had 
been assigned to military hospitals, as will be shown later. 
Despite all, the situation had not changed so much. If the Health Inspector was 
modestly referred to as the “doctor who acts as consultant of the Delegation of 
Native Affairs”, it was because he lacked executive power as well as the admini-
strative, institutional, financial and technical means to plan and implement a 
public health policy. The Health Boards were to act “only as consultative bodies, 
from which the Delegate and its local representatives [the local consuls-inter-
veners] would seek advice when an epidemic of bubonic plague or any of similar 
danger appears”. In 1921 Spanish Morocco still lacked proper sanitary stations in 
its ports, an Institute of Hygiene and a central depot for medical material. No 
health campaigns against syphilis, malaria, typhus or tuberculosis had been 
launched. The budget for civil public health (for Spaniards and Moroccans) had 
risen to a modest six per cent of the total for the Protectorate (781,000 out of 
13,699,322 pesetas) when the infirmaries were planned in 1915, but in 1918 it was 
reduced to a meagre 2.5 per cent of the global expenses (229,000 out of 
11,956,822 pesetas), almost one third of which was for the personnel’s wages. 
Some of these expenses were for Spanish-only or part-Spanish institutions (two 
civil hospitals, two civil infirmaries, two mixed infirmaries). Two “sanitary 
parks”, four modest urban dispensaries and four small infirmaries, two of them 
“mixed”, were clearly insufficient for Makhzan public health to ensure adequate 
assistance for Spanish Morocco’s urban population, even though this group 
comprised only a 10–15 per cent of the zone’s total. 
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 The space allotted to the Sanidad Majzén was, then, small and clearly insuffi-
cient, a side-effect of persistent “Tangerian ghosts” that refused to disappear. 
Impotence led to further authoritarianism in front of the Khalifian Makhzan, 
which was regarded as the only way of acquiring control over health matters. 
Thus, in the 1918 dahir, the High Commissioner himself was given strong control 
over health affairs, even over the Delegate of Native Affairs. His formal approval 
was required before agreements of the Central Health Board were executed and 
also for the appointment of three out of nine voting members in the central board 
and five out of eleven in the local boards. This authoritarian manoeuvre was 
representative of the period when General Dámaso Berenguer served as High 
Commissioner (1919–1922). Berenguer managed to concentrate civil and military 
power in Spanish Morocco in the face of interference from the peninsula, from the 
Tangier Legation and from Moroccan representatives (Cordero Torres 1943). He 
did so in quite a “personal” way, as all initiatives were taken by him, and he 
appointed men in his confidence to key posts (Nerín 2005). In this way, the 
position of Tettouan was clearly strengthened in relation to Larache and Tangier, 
and it would be more so after the strong military campaign that took place from 
1919 to 1921, which resulted in the complete or partial submission of the qabilas 
of Anghera, Wad Ras, Beni Hosmar, Beni Hassan, Beni Messauar, Jbel Hebib, 
Beni Said, Beni Gorfet, Beni Ider, Beni Arus and the holy city of Chefchauen in 
Ajmás. Most of the new territories under Spain’s control were to be administered 
from Tettouan, while Chefchauen was not organised as a regional centre. 
However, authoritarianism hindered even more the technical authority of the 
Health Inspector. It was usually the High Commissioner himself or his General 
Secretary who addressed the Ministry of State or the Ministry of War to deal with 
public health affairs. Thus, it is not strange that the Health Inspection was tempo-
rarily suppressed in the new Protectorate regulations issued on July 12, 1924. 
Concentration of power in the hands of the High Commissioner had other “colla-
teral” consequences. The growing autonomy of Tettouan towards Spanish penin-
sular institutions meant that the Protectorate’s health system would have to 
finance itself with the specific Protectorate budget, with less and less money being 
received as direct contributions from the Ministries of State and War. If the 
Spanish General Health Inspection and the Public Health Section of the Ministry 
of War could no longer intervene as much in Protectorate affairs, then their 
expenditures to the protectorate would be cut. Instead, both ministries focused 
more and more on purely Spanish interests. 
For example, since 1918 the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid refused to 
continue providing free drugs and vaccines to the dispensaries and to the Tangier 
Laboratory, thus limiting its services to military hospitals and infirmaries. In 1921 
the Ministry of War decided to carry out a general reorganisation of its services 
and personnel in Spanish Morocco. Reorganisation meant reducing costs and 
relocating staff and institutions to better fit strictly military needs that were deter-
mined by the difficult campaigns underway in the Tettouan and Melilla regions. 
Military doctors serving in Tangier and in some Moroccan cities of the French 
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zone, as well as in the south zone of the Protectorate were an easy target. There 
were three consular doctors in Tangier, Francisco García Belenguer (1918–1921), 
Luis Sampedro Díez (1919–1921) and Carlos Amor y Rico (1918–1921) – the 
latter replaced that very year by Ignacio Fernández de Castro – plus the director of 
the Spanish Laboratory and a military veterinarian, Tomás García Cuenca. In 
addition there was the Casablanca dispensary and a consular doctor in Rabat, 
Carlos Amor y Rico (1921–1931), who had been appointed that year. Finally, the 
military doctor Salvador Sanz Perea worked for the Delegation of the High 
Commission in Cape Juby since the occupation of this area in 1916. The budgets 
for all these doctors were terminated. Besides, the countryside dispensary of 
Laucién, near Tettouan, was moved to Chefchauen in 1921, so that medical 
assistance was provided to the forces which had recently occupied the city. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of State focused more and more on health 
services directed to Spanish citizens only. Thus, the Ministry kept on financing 
the civil hospitals and infirmaries established in Tettouan and Larache but made 
no attempt to increase its contribution to mixed infirmaries and infirmaries for 
natives, nor to urban dispensaries. The number of these centres did not grow from 
1918 on and plans for transforming infirmaries for natives into hospitals, as well 
as for creating a new mixed infirmary in Chefchauen were not brought to fruition. 
The Ministry also refused any further effort to establish definitive maritime health 
stations in the ports. Yet, it assumed responsibility for the wages of the doctors 
and veterinarians serving in Tangier, Casablanca, Mogador and Cape Juby, so that 
Spanish presence in the whole of Morocco was not abandoned. In short, the 
growing autonomy of Spanish Morocco’s health system and the financial short-
ages in the peninsula resulted in both ministries concentrating as much as possible 
on their particular (Spanish) interests in Morocco, limiting support given to insti-
tutions directed to Moroccans. It could not have been a worse moment, because 
Spain was occupying more and more territory, which called for a wider health 
organisation. 
As a brief resume, maritime public health continued to be as important in 
Spanish Morocco as it had been before for Moroccan authorities. This fact 
revealed the persistence of external influences, namely the Sanitary Council of 
Tangier, which made it difficult to develop the Sanidad Majzén, which was 
reduced to two “sanitary parks” and a small number of urban dispensaries and 
infirmaries. Efforts of Spanish authorities to reverse this situation led to a growing 
authoritarianism towards the Mazkhzan and the Health Inspection alike and to 
diplomatic acts of force contrary to international agreements. Finally, the High 
Commission had to maximise its resources due to the decreasing or stagnating 
financial contribution from the Ministries of State and War, with the result of no 
more centres being created between 1918 and 1921 and preferential attention for 
Spanish citizens. In short, Spanish Morocco “sanitary autonomy” was only 
achieved by progressively moving away from the Protectorate’s legal frame. This 
was not so paradoxical as it may seem: it just revealed that the degree of effort 
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needed to establish a health system in Morocco, was much more than a “typical” 
colony or even a Protectorate would have called for.  
“Riffian Realities” 
The Opposition to Spanish Presence in the Rif 
The network of dispensaries for natives set up in Spanish Morocco comprised not 
only those in the cities, but also the ones created in the countryside. These dispen-
saries had to face equally strong problems as their urban counterparts during the 
period 1906–1921, although the challenges were of a different kind. They were 
the result of persistent armed opposition of some qabilas to Spanish military 
activities in the name of the Sultan and ultimately of a rejection of the Sultan’s 
authority. The result was that military public health was soon regarded as crucial 
for using the new health system to control maritime jurisdictions. If interference 
from the Sanitary Council of Tangier was especially felt in the Atlantic region of 
Spanish Morocco, local armed opposition would become especially prominent in 
the Melilla region – though not exclusively. 
 
Military Reform and the Fight against Smuggling. The “Rif Question”. The Act of 
Algeciras had agreed to the creation of a “police force” in the eight main ports (or 
“imperial ports”) of Morocco (Tangier, Tettouan, Larache, Rabat, Casablanca, 
Mogador, Safi and Agadir). This “Shariffian Police” would remain under the 
formal authority of the Sultan, and would be composed of Moroccan soldiers and 
European officers and sub-officers and it would be coordinated from Tangier by a 
Swiss chief. In Tettouan and Larache, the officers would be Spanish, in Tangier 
and Casablanca, they would be Spanish and French, and in the rest of the ports, 
they would be French. The new force would comprise between 2,000 and 2,500 
men, many of whom would come from former askar units serving in those cities, 
which had been trained by foreign instructors in previous decades. It was a new 
step in the reform of the Moroccan army, though at the cost of a higher degree of 
intervention by European countries. 
However, Moroccan initiative had been preserved to a certain extent. A military 
“Tangier question” had been created, which would cause serious trouble for 
Spanish military activities in Western Morocco, including public health. On the 
one hand, the formal persistence of Morocco’s military structures implied a dis-
persion of efforts for Spain, as it was obliged to contribute to “Police forces” in 
Tangier and other ports which would probably be outside its zone of influence. 
Army officers were sent to their assigned ports and, in 1907, some Spanish army 
units accompanied French troops when they occupied Casablanca. On the other 
hand, the Legation of Tangier kept its role of co-ordination of army officers and 
personnel appointed to the Spanish consulates, even if the foreseen autonomy of 
Tangier would separate it from the Spanish zone of influence. This fact would 
hinder the autonomy of Ceuta military authorities or of the new military command 
Spain planned to set up in its zone. Third, the traditional weight of Larache (and 
of the Atlantic zone, in general) remained. Such a development could determine a 
central role of this city in the future military command of Spanish Morocco, 
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although this implied less control by Spanish authorities than the equivalent 
influence of Ceuta would ensure in Tettouan. Finally, the measures agreed in 
Algeciras concerned only military structures and this prevented Spain (and 
France) from deploying civil initiatives towards the population of the cities or the 
countryside. In short, developments in the Western region of the Spanish zone of 
influence continued to be strongly conditioned by the formal persistence of the 
Sultan’s military sovereignty. 
In principle, the reform of the Moroccan army agreed to in Algeciras did not 
reach the Eastern part of the Spanish zone, in general Eastern Morocco. It seems, 
however, that a unit of “Shariffian Police” was also created in Melilla, an excep-
tional case given that the rest of units were located in Moroccan towns. Besides, 
the military Governor of Melilla acted as a de facto consul in relationships with 
the Makhzan, as had been done for decades. A special “delegate of the Sultan” 
was projected in the failed Spanish-Moroccan Treaty of 1910 and, in fact, a 
Moroccan official named el-Bachir acted as such during the military campaign of 
1911 to try and dissuade Riffians of attacking Spanish troops (Mesa et al. 2001). 
However, these measures were essentially taken as a result of more or less official 
agreements between Spain and Morocco and, therefore, were outside the new 
international legal frame. Instead, Algeciras had formulated a specific objective 
for the Rif and Eastern Morocco: the fight against gun smuggling. One of the six 
sections of the legal text was exclusively devoted to that issue, which comprised a 
wide array of dispositions, measures and punishments. Special attention was given 
to maritime smuggling, probably due to its importance since the end of the 19th 
century. According to the Act, “l’application du Règlement sur la contrebande des 
armes dans le Riff et, en général, dans les régions frontières des possessions 
Espagnoles, restera l’affaire exclusive de l’Espagne et du Maroc”. The same was 
said for the regions close to French Algeria, where French and Moroccan autho-
rities would have the exclusive responsibility of preventing the gun traffic. 
It could be said that this distinction between military measures in the West and 
the East of Morocco showed the increasing debility of the country in the face of 
foreign intervention. In a way, Morocco was not only being divided in two main 
zones of influence, Spanish in the extreme North and French in the centre, but in 
each of them a longitudinal separation was being drawn. However, this measure 
also threatened to make difficult the creation of a unified military authority in 
Spanish Morocco and French Morocco, given the consequent separation and 
diversity of methods between Spanish and French authorities in Tangier, on the 
one hand, and in Melilla and the South Oranais, on the other. In spite of it all, the 
use of the term “gun smuggling” was an attempt to keep to some extent a link 
between the situation and institutions in both longitudinal extremes of the country. 
For Morocco, it was the way of preserving its military sovereignty, as the fight 
against the gun traffic could be considered a measure complementing army 
reforms, and the authority of the Sultan was not questioned. For Spain and France, 
it was the way of avoiding a lack of coordination of efforts in Morocco and also of 
ensuring that their action reached the whole territory of their zones of influence. 
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In the end, all actors involved in Algeciras and all measures agreed to the act 
attempted to deny the fact that some groups and territories in Morocco were in a 
process of self-determination towards the Sultan and had the ability to oppose 
serious armed resistance to him or to any of his “protectors”. In Eastern Morocco, 
the acquiescence of the Sultan to foreign interference was regarded as demonstra-
ting the demise of his functions. Besides, the exclusion of Tangier from the two 
zones of influence helped finally undermine the legitimacy and reach that 
Moroccan regional authorities had managed to display with great difficulties in 
previous decades. The autonomy of Tangier, that “last victory” of the Sultan in 
Algeciras, would be inseparable from his “first defeat”, the move to independence 
of some areas of the country. The “Tangier question” would be inseparable of the 
“Rif question”. However, Algeciras also attempted denying the particularities of 
Spanish (and French) presence in Eastern Morocco. As it is been shown, Melilla 
had the ability to launch its own initiatives, different from those favored by 
Spanish authorities in Ceuta and Tangier. Besides, as this city would probably be 
outside the Spanish zone of influence, it felt even less obliged to subordinate its 
actions to the new military centres that had been projected in Western Morocco. 
The “Rif question” had a Spanish side, much the same as the “Tangier question”. 
In these circumstances, and despite the “smuggling” rhetoric, the situation in 
the Eastern part of the Spanish zone of influence tended to define itself increa-
singly in its own terms. The link with the Atlantic region was weak. On the 
Moroccan side, the Sultan’s military authority had virtually vanished in the area. 
Since 1904, the false pretender to the throne and supposed Mahdi (a millennial 
figure frequent in movements of resistance in North Africa) el-Roghi Bu Hamara 
had ousted the Makhzan garrison in Silwan and installed himself as actual 
authority in Guelaia (Pennell 2000). It was said before that the harka sent against 
the Ibuqquyen in 1898 had quickly abandoned the central Rif, leaving that area 
beyond the reach of Makhzan forces. However, given that Moroccan military 
integrity had been confirmed in Algeciras, el-Roghi lacked any official recog-
nition despite his actual power in the Eastern Rif. If he could not promote himself 
as a valid representative of the Sultan in front of Spanish authorities, as long as 
the Sultan did not grant him a specific status inside Morocco, the only solution 
was to move away from his authority. In the case of the central Rif, social frag-
mentation avoided any collective leadership, but anyway, existing leaders neither 
had the authorisation to act in the name of the Sultan, nor wanted to obtain it. 
On the Spanish side, Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands and the peñones of Vélez 
and Alhucemas had “smuggling” as one of their relevant occupations, another 
sign of their traditional marginalisation from Spanish action in Morocco. Guns 
coming from Gibraltar and from French Algerian and Andalusian ports were 
transmitted by the enclaves to qabilians, or at least they allowed the traffic. But 
beyond that, “smuggling” was just another aspect of the close relationship of 
Melilla and the enclaves with their surroundings. In some repects, it was difficult 
to say that they were strictly “Spanish”. As it was shown before, the enclave was 
regularly used by Makzhan harkas in their way from Tangier to the central Rif 
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during the last quarter of the 19th century. A unit of “Shariffian Police” had been 
created there. The campo was a zone of transition where Riffians entered to sell 
their products in the market and buy other merchandise. The port of Melilla was 
increasingly used for seasonal migration of Riffians to French Algeria. It was in 
this city that the first military unit composed of Riffian soldiers (the Compañía de 
Moros Tiradores del Rif) had been created in 1859 (Arqués & Gibert 1992). 
Qabilians travelled to the peñones to supply them with foodstuffs and buy 
products. Besides, Spanish official institutions were almost absent. Melilla, and 
even more Chafarinas, Vélez and Alhucemas, were not proper “cities”, as they 
lacked town councilsor other municipal services. While in Ceuta a Commandant 
Generalship existed since the last quarter of the 19th century, a Governorship was 
the only military command in Melilla, which also comprised Chafarinas and the 
peñones. As a consequence of this situation, a tendency persisted in Melilla to act 
apart from Spanish authorities in Tangier and Ceuta, which would prove difficult 
to suppress. 
The interference of Algeciras smuggling regulations would not only be the 
cause of a division between Tettouan and Melilla, but also of a very complicated 
articulation of Spanish military action in the Rif. In some way, the problems were 
parallel to those created by the autonomy of Tangier in the Atlantic region. On the 
one hand, Spain had to spend some of its modest resources in reinforcing the 
Spanish character of Melilla and the other enclaves. A part of the human and 
material means invested by the army in those places was therefore directed to 
themselves and not to activities in Morocco. It could be said that the enclaves 
were being somewhat “re-occupied” even if they were formally Spanish posses-
sions. On the other hand, if a new military administration was finally established 
by Spain in Moroccan territory, it would suffer interference from Melilla and the 
other enclaves. Their traditional military structures, which had dealt with the 
Makhzan and the Riffians until then, would persist, though they would now be 
separated from the zone of influence. Third, the traditional weight of Silwan in the 
region made that town a candidate for becoming the centre of the new military 
administration, but the cost would be a higher degree of local participation than 
Melilla was willing to accept. Finally, military activities could not be a pretext for 
initiatives towards civilians, as there had been no agreement on the issue in 
Algeciras. 
 
From Military Hospitals to Countryside Dispensaries (1906–1912). All these 
events were reflected in military public health. If maritime health was the key for 
Spanish action in Morocco in the Atlantic region, its military counterpart would 
have the leading role in the Rif. However, the Algeciras regulations prevented 
major changes in the period 1906–1912. Substantial efforts were devoted, in the 
first place, to existing military hospitals in Melilla, the Chafarinas Islands and the 
peñones of Vélez and Alhucemas. For example, following the first military 
operations, the Ministry of War decided to raise the category of the hospital of 
Melilla (known as Hospital Central), which became “first class” in March 1908. It 
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was consequently given more personnel and equipment to be able to cope with the 
rising needs of new troops and foreseen operations. During the 1909 and 1911 
campaigns, Melilla counted on two groups of military hospitals and several 
infirmaries, though most centres were provisional (army barracks, schools, 
theatres, churches). The Central Office of Military Public Health of the military 
Governorship of Melilla was transformed by an inspection inside the new Captain 
Generalship created the 1st of June, 1910. Evacuation of wounded and ill was done 
to the military hospitals of Chafarinas and Málaga. A deposit of medical material, 
a laboratory and a radiological cabinet were provisionally installed (Lapresa 
1910). Despite all this, infrastructures and personnel were clearly insufficient for 
assisting a garrison where the numbers had risen to more than 20,000 men (Mesa 
et al. 2001). 
The concentration of efforts on the military institutions of the Spanish enclaves 
left few resources for actions aimed at Riffians. Besides, they continued to be 
managed from the enclaves themselves to a great extent, even if the enclaves 
would probably be outside the future Spanish Morocco. Military hospitals in 
Melilla, Chafarinas and the peñones carried on with their task of “attraction” as 
they had been doing since the last quarter of the 19th century and even increased it. 
For example, Vélez and Alhucemas demanded more facilities and means in order 
to extend Spanish influence in the coastal qabilas. In 1910 or 1911, the military 
doctor appointed to Alhucemas, Manuel Bastos Ansart, argued in a report 
addressed to the Section of Military Public Health of the Ministry of War that the 
assistance of natives was in fact the main task of the hospital, as the garrison was 
very small. Thus, he asked for new clinical and surgical equipment, which was 
immediately sent from Spain (Bastos 1969). It seems that the new material was 
installed in a part of the military hospital, because a separate and permanent 
dispensary for natives was demanded in 1914. However, assistance could be pro-
vided for a growing number of Riffians. 
A new health institution for Riffians was created in Melilla. Just after the 
Algeciras Act was signed, the Spanish Ministry of Public Works launched a plan 
to build a series of civilian infrastructures in Ceuta, Melilla and the Chafarinas 
Islands which would foster Spanish influence in its Moroccan zone. In Melilla, the 
trust of the Marquis of Comillas, one of the biggest Spanish capitalists, won the 
contract to build the port, as well as “a market with fondak [hostel] and cattle 
lodges, an store for grain and merchandise and an infirmary for natives” (Rodrigo 
2002). Such an infirmary or hospital, the later-called Hospital indígena, began to 
be built in 1907 and was finished in 1909. Although it enjoyed civil status, its 
personnel consisted of military doctors and auxiliaries. It did not take long for it to 
be fully integrated in military public health. Its task was to assist Riffian soldiers, 
even though, during the campaigns, it served also as military infirmary for 
Spanish troops. 
But the most important development in the enclaves was the creation of a 
Native Affairs administration of the army in Melilla. This was a consequence of 
the first direct operations of the Spanish army in Moroccan territory, launched in 
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January 1908. The justification of the military Governor General José Marina for 
these operations was the defeat of a mhalla sent by Sultan Moulay Abd el-Aziz 
against el-Roghi, which implied Morocco’s inability of ensuring its compromise 
of direct control in the area. Spain would then assume the responsibility of 
preventing “gun smuggling” carried out by el-Roghi in Restinga (a site some 20 
km from Melilla) and, in general, of ensuring the Sultan’s authority in the Eastern 
Rif. A small fraction of Moroccan territory was occupied, where two military 
posts were established at Restinga and Cabo de Agua (in front of the Chafarinas 
Islands). The garrisons included a military doctor who, apart from assisting 
Spanish troops, started to offer his services to qabilians. As they lacked specific 
facilities and remained directly attached to Melilla’s military health organisation, 
their task was a slightly more permanent version of previous (and scarce) travels 
of military hospitals doctors to assist local notables (Larra 1900). 
The direct presence of Spanish troops outside Melilla altered the fragile balance 
of the area. El-Roghi tried to strengthen his position by expanding into the central 
Rif, but he was defeated. In December 1908, he was ousted from his headquarters 
in Silwan by the Guelaians and replaced by two new local leaders, Mohammed 
Amezzian and Chadly, his former lieutenant (Villalobos 2004). Following some 
incidents with Spanish workers in the mines of Ait Bu-Ifrur in the summer of 
1909, the Spanish Army engaged in fighting against Amezzian and Chadly’s 
harkas which resulted in the “Desastre del Barranco del Lobo” (July 27, 1909), 
where more than 150 Spanish officers and soldiers were killed and 900 wounded. 
More troops had to be sent from Spain (a fact that had already caused serious 
revolts in Barcelona and other cities in July), and, with their support, the 1909 
campaign finally ended with the complete or partial occupation of the qabilas of 
Beni Sicar, Mazuza, Ait Bu Ifrur, Kebdana, Ulad-Settut and Ait Bu-Yahi. Later 
on, in 1911, new operations were initiated which resulted in the death of 
Amezzian. The Kert campaign ended in 1912 with the new boundaries for the 
occupied territory reaching the right bank of the River Kert and the inclusion of 
two more qabilas, Ait Sidel and Ait Bu-Gafar, under Spanish rule. 
Just before the 1909 campaign, an Office for Native Affairs was created inside 
the military command of Melilla, with a subordinated information office in Cabo 
de Agua. The task of this office was to gather all kinds of information about the 
occupied territory and the nearby qabilas to ensure both control and future 
advances. It was the direct precedent of the so-called Oficinas de intervención or 
Intervenciones militares (the equivalent of the Services de renseignement de 
l’Armée in French Morocco). In close physical and administrative connection with 
these offices, the first units of the so-called Policía indígena (Native Police) were 
established just after the campaign in the qabilas of Guelaia and Kebdana. The 
Native Police consisted of Spanish officers and Riffian soldiers and combined the 
control of public order with the support to Spanish army units. Finally, Melilla 
authorities were “allowed to attach to the offices anyone who, as garrison doctors, 
may be necessary for the assistance of the Moors”. This statement was the origin 
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of dispensaries for natives in the Eastern Rif area, which acted as the third element 
of the military Native Affairs administration set up in the Melilla region. 
At the end of 1909, the first countryside dispensary was established in Zoco el-
Had of the qabila of Beni Sicar under the direction of Lieutenant Dr. Sebastián 
Lazo García (1909–1914), later followed by Ángel Sánchez Sánchez (1914–
1916), Alberto Conradí Rodríguez (1916–1918), Francisco Camacho Cánovas 
(1919–1920), Manuel Peris Torres (1921–1922) and Tomás de Fez Sánchez 
(1923–1924). It was still provisional by nature, a small wooden barrack with 
modest equipment, some drugs and ointments and no vaccines or sera. In July 
1910, a part of the military infirmary built in the village of Nador (Mazuza) also 
started to serve as a provisional dispensary under the direction of Lieutenant Dr. 
José Valdés Lambea (1910–1915) and later of Nemesio Díaz Mena (1916–1918) 
and Octavio Gómez Salas (1919–1921). After these first steps, a project was 
drafted the same year for establishing four permanent dispensaries in Zoco el-
Had, Nador, Atlaten (Ait Sidel) and Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman (Kebdana). A 
Royal Order of March 6, 1911 finally approved their creation and specific status, 
which was different in principle from military infirmaries and garrison service. 
Approval was also given some time later for another centre in Zoco el Tlatza of 
Ain Ben Rahal, close to Silwan (Ait Bu Ifrur). However, only those of Zoco el-
Had and Nador were actually built before the Protectorate Treaty. In Atlaten and 
Zoco el-Arbaa, as in Restinga, Cabo de Agua and other posts, military doctors 
continued their work as before. 
By then, dispensaries had become part of a more complex organisation of inter-
vención militar, headed by the newly created Sub-inspection of Native Troops and 
Affairs of the Captain Generalship of Melilla (5th January, 1912), which already 
counted on several information offices, units of Native Police and groups of 
Fuerzas Regulares Indígenas (new colonial units created on the 30th June, 1911), 
as well as on the aforementioned dispensaries and doctors. It should be borne in 
mind that, despite the term “countryside”, dispensaries were mainly directed to the 
assistance of Riffian soldiers of the two newly created corps (especially of the 
Native Police, because the groups of Regulares had their own attached doctors). 
Maybe for this reason they were assigned a different name in Spanish (consul-
torios) than the urban dispensaries of the Atlantic cities (dispensarios), a name 
already in use in Spanish military public health. In principle, Spain could not 
extend the service towards the local population because its action in the Rif had a 
purely military justification. However, dispensaries assisted civilians from the first 
moment, as the mission of “attraction” or “civilisation” was regarded as crucial. 
But it is also true that in the first years, many of them were the families and rela-
tives of Riffian soldiers. This was not new for the Spanish army, given that in the 
peninsula the families and relatives of officers were assisted for free in military 
hospitals and had access to free drugs in military pharmacies (Martínez Antonio 
2005a). If it is also considered that countryside dispensaries assisted Spanish 
soldiers, it is clear that the task of these centres, despite its importance, was too 
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huge to be achieved satisfactorily (Riffian soldiers + Riffian civilians + Spanish 
soldiers). 
Apparently, the Native Affairs administration of the army had a colonial flavour 
similar to the famous “oil stain” strategy deployed by General Lyautey from the 
South Oranais (Hoisington 1995). However, it was not strictly colonial because it 
depended on the direct military expansion of the Spanish regular army. It is true 
that, due to Algeciras compromises, military actions in the Eastern Rif had to be 
justified in terms of “police operations” and “restoration” of the Sultan’s autho-
rity. That is why the army presence had to be organised on the basis of military 
posts and systematic disarmament of the population could not be achieved. In 
principle, attacks were only launched in “response” to aggression and advances 
after a qabila had asked for “protection”. Despite everything, the 1909 and Kert 
campaigns mobilised thousands of men and caused hundreds of casualties on both 
sides. Those campaigns were mainly carried out by the mobilisation of peninsular 
contingents, despite the creation of the first units of Native Police and Regulares. 
The Spanish army had crossed the limits of Melilla and established a permanent 
presence in some qabilas. In short, only through the direct use of military force, 
through the “seizure” or “expropriation” of Morocco’s military sovereignty, could 
the first intervenciones militares be created. Collaboration of minor local leaders 
was then achieved through them, and Riffians began to be enrolled in the Native 
Police and Regulares or to participate in irregular harkas in support of Spanish 
units. In public health, the first dispensaries started their work, but they depended 
more on the Inspection of Military Public Health of the Captain Generalship than 
on the Sub-inspection of Native Troops and Affairs, which lacked a specific 
health section. Dispensary doctors lacked any specific status within the Army 
Medical Corps and they were often appointed to army units when necessary. 
Many of their patients were Spanish soldiers and, of course, the officers of inter-
vención. The whole “colonial” system depended, then, on the Spanish regular 
army. 
This was not exceptional. Spain was just following the example of France, 
whose advances from French Algeria progressed so quickly that they risked pro-
voking the loss of the Eastern part of the Spanish zone of influence in Morocco. 
Since 1903, General Lyautey had relentlessly moved into Moroccan territory from 
the South Oranais. In 1907, the city of Oujda was occupied by French Algerian 
troops and, soon afterwards, the qabila of Beni Snassen was brought under 
control. The French had contacted el-Roghi for mining concessions and even sent 
a force against him which crossed the river Muluya but was defeated. In public 
health, Lyautey had begun to use military doctors to provide assistance to the 
colonial forces and local population, a crucial feature of his “oil stain” strategy. In 
1910, the Service de Santé des confines Algero-Marocaines was created, which 
threatened to extend its influence to the left bank of the river Muluya (Cilleuls 
1959). In practice, the South Oranais and Melilla were involved in similar prob-
lems and similar strategies and competed in the same area. 
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On the other hand, as it was said before, the Native Affairs administration of the 
army was directed from Melilla and was integrated in its military structures, 
though the enclave itself would probably remain outside the Spanish zone of 
influence. A new military centre in Moroccan territory would then suffer interfer-
ence from Melilla and would also have to compete with Silwan, the traditional 
Makhzan military post in the area. Silwan enjoyed traditional legitimacy in 
Eastern Morocco and it is not strange that el-Roghi established his headquarters 
there. However, if Silwan became the Spanish military centre in the Rif, that 
would mean allowing more Riffian participation than Melilla was eager to accept. 
A first example of this was provided soon after Algeciras. In 1906, the Sindicato 
Español de Minas del Rif (SEMR) – a company where the Marquis of Comillas 
and another powerful businessman and politician, the Count of Romanones, 
participated – was given permission by el-Roghi to exploit iron ore in Uixan in the 
qabila of Ait Bu-Ifrur. A Spanish civil doctor, Víctor Ruiz Albéniz, was hired by 
the company to care for Moroccan and Spanish workers, but he was also un-
officially charged by Melilla military authorities to act as an agent near the 
pretender. Ruiz Albéniz managed to become el-Roghi’s “personal doctor” and, as 
such, he lived “under his protection” for ten months in Moroccan territory (Ruiz 
Albéniz 1922). It is not unlikely that he was also charged with the assistance of el-
Roghi’s harka, the most powerful in the area. As this irregular unit protected 
Spanish interests, it acted as a de facto colonial force in which Ruiz Albéniz could 
have worked as a kind of medical chief. However, the wish for more control of 
Melilla and the fear of international and Moroccan protests (el-Roghi lacked any 
official status) meant that Spain did not support el-Roghi’s expedition to the 
qabila Ait Waryaghar in September 1908, which ended in an astounding defeat. 
Ruiz Albéniz complained that he had not been allowed to “go through Restinga 
and cure the [soldiers of el-Roghi] wounded gathered in the alcazaba [el Roghi’s 
headquarters in Silwan]” (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). The retreat of el-Roghi from 
Guelaia put an end to this moves. 
Spanish troops occupied Silwan in September 1909. A strong military garrison 
was established and a military infirmary was created. But there was no collabo-
ration with Riffian leaders and, therefore, the new Spanish Silwan had no legiti-
macy among the local population. El-Roghi had been supported by Guelaians 
because he had assumed their interests. When Spain could not count on them, they 
were strong enough to oppose the Spanish army through the new leaders 
Amezzian and Chadly and through popular resistance. For complex reasons, 
namely the debility of Spain in regard to international agreements and its lack of 
control on Melilla, collaboration with Riffians was discarded, but “Riffian 
realities” refused to be denied and would cause serious problems in the following 
years. In this context, the town of Nador could only have little authority as 
embryonic centre of the newly occupied territories. The triangular relationship 
Tangier-Tettouan-Larache in the Atlantic zone had a close parallel in the Eastern 
Rif: Melilla-Nador-Silwan. Nador had previously had little or no importance in 
the Eastern Rif and in fact the town was almost made out of nothing, a kind of 
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colonial village if the presence of the army had not been so explicit. Trapped 
between the Native Affairs administration of Melilla and the regular army in 
Silwan and advanced posts, its theoretical role as regional centre during this 
period – and for many years – would be more virtual than real. In addition, Nador 
was theoretically dependant on Spanish authorities in the West, another fact which 
would deprive it of legitimacy when faced with Riffians and also with the Spanish 
army in the Melilla region. 
To end this section, it should be added that this pseudo-colonial system also 
made possible the beginning of civil institutions. The first so-called Juntas de 
Arbitrios were created in the villages of Nador and Cabo de Agua in 1912. The 
Juntas de Arbitrios followed the model of the ones already existing in Melilla, 
Chafarinas and the peñones. They were a kind of municipal council of a lesser 
category than those of the peninsular municipalities and Ceuta, though they also 
depended on the Ministry of Interior (Cordero Torres 1943). As stated before, 
Melilla was not a proper “city” and therefore lacked a town council and a public 
health board, nothing strange in an enclave that had acted for centuries as a mere 
garrison-prison and lacked a significant number of civilians until after the 
Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859–1860. In fact, the Junta of Melilla was controlled 
by the army and presided over by a general, so it tended to confuse itself with the 
military administration. Its public health activities were extremely modest. A so-
called sub-delegate of medicine worked at its service, but civilians were assisted 
either in the military Hospital Central or by private practitioners. If the Junta 
proposed any sanitary measures, it was the army which was usually most affected 
by them and which would put them to work. 
The modest civil public health suffered problems parallel to those of the army. 
First, most of the scarce civil resources invested in the area aimed mostly at 
creating institutions in Melilla and the enclaves which had not existed previously. 
The main interest was to improve the situation of the Spaniards themselves, more 
than to act on behalf of the Riffians. Second, the Junta of Melilla kept on con-
trolling measures towards civilians in the Rif, although the enclave would remain 
outside the Spanish zone of influence. For example, the Hospital Central conti-
nued to assist Riffians as it had done before. As early as 1910 two separate ten-
bed wards for “moros y moras” (male and female Moors) were created. The hos-
pital personnel included two Moroccan male nurses, who acted at the same time 
as interpreters, and a Moroccan cook, who prepared food according to medical 
instructions but adapted it “to the taste of natives”. On the other hand, the creation 
of the new Juntas of Nador and Cabo de Agua made it difficult to establish inter-
venciones civiles (the equivalent of the controleurs civiles in French Morocco) in 
those villages. Their connection with Melilla hindered the central role of Nador in 
the area. As a result, their activities were mainly directed towards Spanish settlers. 
For example, in 1910, the director of the military infirmary of Nador asked 
Melilla if civilians could be assisted in that centre. He received a positive answer 
regarding Spaniards but nothing was said about Riffians. In 1911 the chief of the 
army health service of the “territory of Nador” informed Melilla authorities again 
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about the need for “regulating health assistance for [Spanish] civilians and moors” 
in the area. In his opinion, the village of Nador had to be provided with health 
services “in similar conditions as the plazas menores [Vélez and Alhucemas] and 
the rest of villages in Spain”, because its population was rapidly expanding. The 
answer was that Spanish civilians could receive “first aid” in the military 
infirmary and be sent to the Hospital Central of Melilla in case of severe illness. 
Besides, a military doctor would visit patients at home, receiving for that work a 
supplement from the fondo de arbitrios (a precedent of the Junta de arbitrios). 
There were no regulations, however, concerning the Riffians. 
The third problem was that public health action on civil Riffians should have 
relied on local leaders and institutions and allowed them a degree of participation. 
Again, el-Roghi could have been a crucial actor but collaboration was not possible 
in the end. As a result, private initiatives were launched in the area which, at the 
same time, aroused widespread rejection by Riffians, and menaced the develop-
ment of a civil colonial public health centred in Nador. Those initiatives were 
represented by the CEMR. After the campaigns of 1909 and 1911, the company 
consolidated its mining activities in Uixán. Ruiz Albéniz had to care for the 
growing number of workers, many of them Riffians or Moroccans in general. The 
company had its own health care facilities, which were mainly intended for mild 
problems. In case of serious trauma or illness, patients were sent to Melilla. In 
addition, other complementary initiatives were taken. Dr. Ruiz Albéniz reported 
that in 1908 he promoted the creation of a “bread oven” which produced more 
than 500 kilograms of wheat bread a day, not only for workers but for “everyone 
who passed through Beni Bu Ifrur”. He claimed that “in the whole qabila, the 
daily flapjack made of barley, nutritional basis of the native family, was aban-
doned” (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). 
The conclusion of this section is that only under the “umbrella” of direct action 
of the Spanish regular army could a “colonial” military public health be sketched 
in the Eastern Rif during this period, of which countryside dispensaries were the 
most representative institutions. Local armed opposition made military public 
health the key of Spanish action in the area, much as maritime public health was 
in the Atlantic region. Then, the situation had not changed so much from former 
decades when Moroccan authority still prevailed. The direct use of military force 
in the name of the Sultan was the subterfuge to act on Moroccan territory but, at 
the same time, moved Spain away from a true “colonial” action which should 
have relied on local leaders and institutions to a greater extent. Besides, the 
connection with Spanish authorities in Western Morocco was problematic and, in 
fact, two different processes had started in each extreme of the Spanish zone of 
influence. The “Rif question” stood behind all this. 
 
The Modest Growth of the Network of Dispensaries (1913–1915). The establish-
ment of the Protectorate brought about some punctual changes that did not 
substantially alter the framework of Spanish action in the Rif. As stated before, in 
the provisional regulations of February and April 1913 the Delegate for Native 
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Services in Tettouan had been given responsibility for “hygiene and public health” 
affairs. The consuls in the cities would be his local representatives, except for the 
Melilla region, where the absence of diplomatic personnel made the Commandant 
General a de facto consul. On the other hand, a post of “Inspector of the Informa-
tion and Native Affairs Offices” was also created inside the High Commission, 
which was supposed to centralise the work of the Sub-inspection of Native Troops 
and Affairs of Melilla and of the newly created Negotiates of Natives Affairs of 
Ceuta and Larache (transformed into Sections in 1913 and Sub-inspections in 
1914). In principle, these measures would mean that the Delegate and the Inspec-
tor would co-ordinate existing countryside dispensaries in the Melilla region and 
those which were to be newly created throughout the zone in the following years. 
In practice, their power and resources were quite virtual and the connection with 
Tettouan remained very weak. In the Eastern Rif, existing dispensaries continued 
to be essentially directed from what was now called the Commandant Generalship 
of Melilla. 
However weak it was, the connection helped Nador acquire some importance as 
the regional centre of public health in the Rif. The dispensaries of Nador and Zoco 
el-Had (but especially the former) increased their activity, which consisted mainly 
of small surgical interventions, smallpox vaccination, drug dispensing, the use of 
Elmerich ointment for scabies and 606 salvarsan injections for syphilis. There 
were also some beds for isolating patients with infectious diseases or for conva-
lescence. The buildings were improved, auxiliaries were attached and houses for 
the doctors were built. During 1913, Zoco el-Had was already providing around 
300 treatments per month, and Nador, almost 1,000. In addition, doctors often 
travelled to the nearby duars (small settlements scattered throughout the country) 
to assist patients and vaccinate people in an effort to extend “attraction”. In 
November 1913 Dr. Valdés Lambea asked for and received laboratory equipment 
“to begin with the study of Riffian pathology” in Nador. This included a micro-
scope, a centrifugator and a complete set of laboratory reactives, glassware and 
instruments. With the new equipment, he expected that 
the study of regional pathology could be based on solid grounds and the diag-
nosis will be more precise and scientific, the treatments and the task we have 
been assigned will be closer to the work a doctor can conduct from modern 
dispensaries (Valdés 1914). 
In a way, Valdés was trying to act as head of Spanish military doctors in the area, 
though he was not officially acknowledged as such and lacked any administrative 
basis. Apart from obtaining the laboratory, he published a short Arabic-Riffian-
Spanish vocabulary for doctors’ use and, in 1914, the first annual report of his 
activities in the Nador dispensary. He also assumed the assistance of the Native 
Police unit called Tabor de Alhucemas, the former unit of “Shariffian Police” of 
Melilla which had been established in Nador. The other permanent dispensary, 
Zoco el-Had, was the second in importance, and its director, Dr. Lazo García, 
published his first annual report in 1913 in the Spanish medical journal Los 
progresos de la clínica with the title “La medicina militar española en el Rif”, as 
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well as a leaflet published by the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid (Lazo 
1913). In the following years, Lazo and Valdés published a number of articles in 
other Spanish medical journals, such as the Revista de Sanidad Militar, España 
médica and Revista Clínica de Madrid. Their articles mainly consisted either of 
descriptions of rare clinical forms of diseases or of general information gathered 
about frequent diseases, without much scientific discussion or laboratory data. 
In their annual reports, Valdés and Lazo gave preferential attention to the work 
oriented towards civil Riffians. However, the bulk of patients continued to be the 
soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares, their families and relatives. As Dr. 
Lazo acknowledged, his first group smallpox vaccination was made on the 120 
soldiers of Zoco el Had’s Native Police unit, “beginning, to be exemplary, with 
the Spanish officers” (Lazo 1913). In any case, the assistance of Riffian soldiers 
could be considered as the “military side” of the “civilising” role assigned to 
dispensaries in the newly established Protectorate, even if the Native Police and 
Regulares were not formally under the authority of the Khalifa. But it was more 
difficult to justify the use of dispensaries by the Spanish regular army. When 
reading the Army personal records of Valdés, Lazo and other dispensaries’s 
doctors, it becomes clear how often they had to assist Spanish troops in the area 
and participate in military operations, with the subsequent neglect of their 
functions towards Riffians. Despite its persistence, this parallel work was seldom 
mentioned in their annual reports and caused problems. For example, the Ministry 
of State paid a supplement to doctors, constructed the buildings and provided a 
fixed amount for maintenance expenses (medical supplies). This compromise was 
confirmed after countryside dispensaries were labelled as “Makzhan dispensaries” 
in 1915, as were those in the cities. However, the ministry became reluctant to 
continue its support to countryside dispensaries as they served mainly military 
purposes. Besides, the ministry could not participate in the management of those 
centres or direct their activities because there were no consuls-interveners in the 
Rif, as there were in the Atlantic port cities. Finally, the ministry would have pre-
ferred giving preference to civil Riffians instead of Riffians soldiers. 
Despite these problems, new dispensaries were established in the Eastern Rif in 
the period 1913–1916. In May 1914, the Commandant Generalship of Melilla 
proposed to the High Commissioner that the two permanent dispensaries which 
had been planned for Atlaten and Zoco el Arbaa of Arkeman in 1911 should be 
built instead in Monte Arruit (Ait Bu-Yahi) and Tauriat Hamed (Ait Sidel). The 
reason was that in those years the occupied territory had widened, and it was now 
more convenient for the dispensaries to be located on the borders with unoccupied 
qabilas. In the budget of the Ministry of State for 1914 and 1915, credits were 
assigned for the building of those two dispensaries, as well as for three other 
permanent centres in Zaio (Ulad Settut), Yazanen (Ait Bu-Gafar) and again in 
Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman (Kebdana). All those five dispensaries maintained, 
however, a provisional character as part of the military infirmaries installed in 
those posts or in nearby places. For example, the facilities in Yazanen consisted of 
a wooden barrack attached to the military infirmary located inside the perimeter of 
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the garrison camp. In Monte Arruit and Tauriat Hamed, assistance of Riffians was 
the responsibility of either the garrison doctors, or of doctors from the military 
infirmaries at Atlaten and Silwan. Silwan military doctors were also in charge of 
assistance in Zaio. In Yazanen, service was provided by the doctor of its own 
infirmary, first Octavio Palazón Yebra (1914–1915), later followed by Asterio de 
Pablo Gutiérrez (1916) and Luis Muruzábal Sagües (1917). The same happened in 
Zoco el-Arbaa, with Roberto Solans Labedán (1914), Mariano Graíño Noriega 
(1915–1916) and Domingo García Doctor (1917). A permanent installation of 
these five dispensaries had to wait until 1917–1918, and then some of them 
changed their location. 
In the end, the extension of the network of countryside dispensaries continued 
to depend on the direct presence of the Army, a result of new operations, now not 
only launched in the Rif, but also in the regions of Tettouan and Larache. The 
difference from former years was their greater extent and scope. The rhetoric of 
“police operations” in the name of the Sultan and of “preventing smuggling” was 
set aside to a certain degree when the Protectorate was established, and Spain was 
able to act more freely in its zone. Thus, the years 1913–1916 saw an almost un-
interrupted series of small moves aimed at the enlargement of the territory under 
Spanish control. However, the fact that military operations by 1916 had only re-
sulted in the control of 600 km2 in Melilla and in the presence of the Spanish 
Army in less than one fifth of the small Protectorate’s territory shows the extent of 
Riffian and Jbalian armed opposition. In Melilla, General Gómez Jordana was in 
command during this period before leaving for the High Commission in Tettouan. 
Jordana fostered the development of dispensaries for natives in collaboration 
with Tettouan but kept on relying on the army as the main basis of the system. 
Military public health in the enclaves continued to be improved. For example, a 
permanent laboratory was finally established in Melilla. Its origins went back to a 
provisional centre installed by the Military Hygiene Institute of Madrid during the 
“1909 campaign”. When the combats was over, Melilla’s authorities proposed that 
the material be kept in the enclave so that a proper laboratory could be estab-
lished. Time passed until a provisional centre was attached to the first group of 
military hospitals in Melilla in 1911, during the “Kert campaign”. Although analy-
tical-bacteriological laboratories had been created in the eight peninsular 
Commandant Generalships after 1909, the Melilla laboratory had to wait until 
December 1913 to be organised on a permanent basis. Its first director was Major 
Dr. Antonio Redondo Flores (1911–1919?), later followed by Ángel Morales 
Fernández (1919–192?). Other personnel included a “chief of services”, Captain 
Dr. Paulino F. Martos, five auxiliaries – instructed soldiers from the Military 
Health Corps Brigade of Melilla – and four assistants (Calatraveño 1916). 
On the other hand, the enclaves continued to interfere on assistance of Riffians 
carried out from countryside dispensaries and on the central role of Nador in the 
area. In Melilla, the Hospital Central continued its task as well as the infirmary 
for natives, which, in Lazo’s opinion, had been actually transformed into a real 
Hospital militar indígena for it provided assistance exclusively to Moroccan 
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soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares (Lazo 1913). However, the problem of 
who should pay for civilians’ expenses began to appear, and military authorities 
and the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla often complained to the High Commissioner 
and the Ministry of State about the slow construction of civil centres. Through the 
Sub-inspection of Native Troops and Affairs and the new Sub-inspection of Mili-
tary Public Health, Melilla kept its central role over Nador. In Vélez and Alhu-
cemas, it seems probable that a specific locale for assisting Riffians was obtained 
from the government when the Protectorate was established. In Vélez, for ex-
ample, a provisional barrack was set up in March 1914 on the lowest part of the 
rock “so that female Moors and children come in greater numbers without having 
to overcome their shame of going up to the garrison”. In its first year of existence 
(March 1914 – February 1915) more than 800 patients were assisted, 23 of them 
requiring surgical intervention. Severe cases were sent to the military hospitals of 
Tettouan or Melilla. In general, the bulk of patients travelled to Vélez and 
Alhucemas from September to November, that is, the months when malaria was 
more intense. For example, 351 patients were treated in Vélez in September and 
October 1915 alone, 243 of whom were diagnosed with that disease. Serious 
malaria outbreaks were recorded in the area in 1914 and 1916. Among the mili-
tary doctors working in Alhucemas in this period were Manuel Bastos Ansart 
(1911) and Antonio Muñoz (1915). 
Finally, the army increased the number of military infirmaries and doctors in 
military posts, thus taking resources away from dispensaries and infirmaries for 
natives and overlapping with their role towards Riffians. In the Melilla region, 
there existed eight military infirmaries (Nador, Silwan, Cabo de Agua, Atlaten, 
Yazanen, Restinga, Zoco el Arbaa of Arkemam and Avanzamiento) and a good 
number of scattered military posts, in some cases with their own doctor. The 
direct presence of the army implied the complete lack of participation of Riffians 
and resulted in persisting opposition against Spanish doctors, even those of 
dispensaries. For example, the latter had to be systematically escorted by the 
Native Police when travelling to the duars due to the risk of being attacked by 
qabilians. Most patients continued to visit one or more traditional practitioners 
before going to the dispensary. Women seldom appeared, except for unmarried 
girls and older women. Doctors tried to combat this reluctance by publicizing 
success stories from clinical or surgical cases with spectacular symptoms, but 
good survival rates, in order to convince and “attract” people. For example, 
Valdés began to receive more frequent visits in Nador after he performed an 
amputation on a Riffian whose hand had been blown up by dynamite and after he 
removed a tumour from the back of another man (Valdés 1913). 
The growth of military public health in the Melilla region, either direct or in the 
form of dispensaries for natives, allowed the increase of actions towards civil 
Riffians. The task of military hospitals in the enclaves has been already com-
mented, as well as the “attraction” strategy of countryside dispensaries. Regarding 
the latter, the provisional regulations of 1913 had stated that the Delegate had to 
seek for the “confluence” of all dispensaries with the structures of the Sanitary 
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Council of Tangier. This allowed a certain participation of the Ministry of State in 
the area and a certain connection with Tettouan for the development of civil 
public health for Riffians. But results were modest. For example, the post of civil 
nurse was created in the Nador dispensary in 1914, due to the number of civilians 
assisted there. Antonio Burgos Berlanga was appointed to the post. The laboratory 
installed in Nador was partly financed by the Ministry of State given that its 
object was in principle the study of “Riffian pathology” in general, and, therefore, 
civilians could also benefit from their services. 
In contrast, public health for civil Spaniards continued its development, fostered 
by the growing number of Spanish settlers in Melilla and towns such as Nador, 
Cabo de Agua, Monte Arruit and others. The Junta de arbitrios of Melilla sub-
stantially increased its budget and a new one was created in 1916 in the village of 
Zaio, which raised to three the total number existing in the Eastern Rif. But the 
connection with the Western urban Juntas under the central direction of the 
Delegation of Native Affairs was very weak and, in practice, they remained 
dependent on the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla. Their focus on Spaniards resulted 
in few or no initiatives towards Riffians and their Spanish character prevented 
their use by the Ministry of State or the High Commission as basis for civilian 
public health. To worsen things, the Juntas began using dispensaries for assistance 
of Spaniards, thus interfering with their task towards Riffians. For example, 308 
of the 794 patients (39 per cent) assisted in Nador in a trimester of 1916 were 
Spanish settlers, while in Monte Arruit they comprised 60 of 137 (43 per cent). 
Finally, in advanced areas private companies continued to be important health 
care providers. In the iron mines of Ait Bu Ifrur, Dr. Ruiz Albéniz continued with 
his task until 1923, when he turned over the post to Dr. Lope García de Obeso. 
The number of miners working for the now called Compañía Española de Minas 
del Rif (CEMR) rose to some two thousand during this period. Many of the 
workers were Spaniards, but the rest came from all over the Rif and beyond. Local 
rejection to this initiative was probably even more intense than in the case of the 
dispensaries. 
 
The Paradoxical Definition of Nador as Regional Centre (1916–1918). The Pro-
tectorate regulations of January 1916 confirmed the creation of the Health In-
spection inside the Delegation of Native Affairs. In principle, this was a new step 
towards integration of countryside and urban dispensaries under a single technical 
organisation centralised in Tettouan. As it was said before, this measure was the 
result of a greater freedom of movement of Spain in Morocco due to World War I. 
Precisely, Spain had been able to increase diplomatic force against Morocco 
through the “denunciation” of the Sanitary Council of Tangier. Freedom of move-
ment also allowed Spanish authorities to challenge Moroccan military sovereignty 
and have direct interaction with local leaders who lacked official or international 
status. But contacts could only be pacific and collaborative in this period because 
France pressured Spain not to undertake direct military operations while their own 
were prevented by the war. 
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The result was a modest reinforcement of Tettouan as military centre of Spanish 
Morocco, including public health. Although the Inspection of Troops and Native 
Affairs Offices of the High Commission ceased to exist in the new regulations, the 
newly created Sub-inspection of Native Affairs and Troops of Tettouan occupied 
its place in some way. Collaboration of General Gómez Jordana with the Jbalian 
leader Ahmed el-Raisuni led to the creation of dispensaries in Laucién (Beni Ider) 
and Ain Yir in September 1917, which served mainly to assist Spanish troops and 
Raisuni’s harka in their joint operations against Anghera. The Sub-inspection of 
Tettouan was responsible for those dispensaries and was also in charge of assis-
ting the first official Makhzan troops, the so-called Mejalas Xerifianas or Mehalas 
Jalifianas (created in 1913), though they were still reduced to little more than a 
personal guard of the Khalifa in Tettouan. Given that the chief of the Sub-
inspection was the High Commissioner himself, it began to assume a central role 
in native affairs in some way. 
Though essentially important, these changes were in the end more formal than 
effective for the Melilla region. In the first case, the reach of the Health Inspection 
was limited by the impossibility of appointing delegates in the Rif, due to the 
absence of civil hospitals, infirmaries or dispensaries in the area. In the second 
case, the Sub-inspection of Native Affairs and Troops of Melilla kept its position 
ahead of Tettouan. This weak connection with Tettouan implied that the role of 
Nador as a regional centre continued to be secondary. Collaboration with local 
leaders fostered by the new Commandant General of Melilla, General Aizpuru 
was far less relevant than in the Western zone and did not help Nador either. In 
fact, military operations were brought to a halt between 1916 and 1918, and no 
new countryside dispensaries could be created. The only change was that some of 
them were moved to more convenient places before the operations ended or just 
after. For example, it was proposed that the two dispensaries in Monte Arruit and 
Tauriat Hamed be re-located near the new borders with the non-occupied territory. 
In the end it was only the latter that was transferred, first to the post of Ras Tiker-
min (Mtalza) in May 1916 and afterwards to the post of Yarf el-Baax (Mtalza) at 
the end of that year or the beginning of 1917. 
The annual report published in 1918 by Lieutenant Dr. Policarpo Carrasco 
about his work in the dispensary of Yarf el-Baax that appeared as a journal article 
in the Revista de Sanidad Militar provides an example of the work done in the 
countryside during this period (Carrasco 1918). In the last seven months of 1917, 
Dr. Carrasco assisted 1,152 patients, mainly from the qabilas of Guelaia, Mtalza 
and Ait Said. He prescribed sulphate and quinine chloride for malaria, Ehmerich 
ointment for scabies, opium derivates for pain, atropine for heart disorders or 
analgesics for headaches. He applied antiseptics to leg ulcers and recommended 
specific diets for different gastrointestinal disorders. He also conducted surgery on 
a native policeman to remove a bullet that was lodged in his abdomen. There was 
regular contact with the Hospital indígena and the Laboratory of Melilla. On the 
one hand, severe cases of illness, trauma and gun wounds were treated in Melilla 
after first being sent to the military infirmary in Kandussi. On the other hand, 
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Major Dr. Redondo Flores visited the area on several occasions to inspect the 
location and sanitary conditions of the military camps and proposed hygienic 
measures and works on the river beds to decrease the high incidence of malaria 
among the troops. Following his suggestions, Dr. Carrasco himself proceeded to 
treat wastewater dumps with petrol and ordered the periodic ventilation of tents. 
Yet, traditional problems persisted. For example, the high price of quinine 
limited its systematic use, a treatment that mainly was used only “for the natives 
of the 10th unit of Native Police and for some civilian Moors”. The most severe 
cases of trauma and wounds were in practice due to armed incidents (including 
bomb explosions) between qabilians and the native policemen. It is not strange 
that Carrasco made some remarks about the “great limitations” of his work and 
the influence of the “very peculiar characteristics of our relationships with the 
natives of non-submissive territory [namely, the qabila of Ait Said] on the number 
of patients assisted in the dispensary and on nearby military posts”. The dis-
pensary provided assistance, not only to Riffian soldiers of the Native Police and 
Regulares but also to a “considerable” number of Spanish troops, though statistics 
were not published because “this task is not a part of its official mission” (Car-
rasco 1918). In short, assistance to Riffian civilians must have been still quite 
reduced. 
Traditional interventions also persisted in Nador. For example, the military 
laboratory of Melilla became more sophisticated. In 1916, it comprised six depart-
ments: 1) clinical analysis; 2) hygienic analysis; 3) bacteriology and parasitology; 
4) normal and pathological histology; 5) sera and vaccines; and 6) general ser-
vices. It acted as the depot for vaccines and sera sent by the Military Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid for Spanish troops and countryside dispensaries. Thus, it could 
proceed to deploy periodical vaccination campaigns against smallpox and typhoid 
fever, mainly on Spanish recruits. Other functions included the periodical inspec-
tion of military centres and camps and research on malarial foci, plague outbreaks 
and other diseases. Dr. Redondo expected that the laboratory would become an 
“Institute of Colonial Hygiene” in charge of the technical direction of the Protec-
torate’s sanitary policy, from which the existing laboratories in Ceuta, Larache 
and Tangier would depend (Calatraveño 1916). However, the “great expectations” 
of Dr. Redondo were far from reality. The human and material resources of the 
laboratory were insufficient, and diseases such as malaria and syphilis remained 
extensive (Molero Mesa 2003). Competition between Melilla, Tangier and Lara-
che resulted in a general lack of co-ordination. On the other hand, military hospi-
tals of the enclaves continued their task of “attraction”. In September 1916, the 
dispensaries of Vélez and Alhucemas received authorisation from Melilla to pro-
vide free medicines to “manifestly poor natives”, as did countryside dispensaries. 
The number of patients assisted increased due to a new malaria outbreak in 1918. 
Finally, the network of military infirmaries and posts was not very much altered 
due to inactivity, except for the creation of a new infirmary in Kandussi. 
However, a crucial process started which would become more important in the 
following years. If the higher definition of Tettouan as centre of Makhzan military 
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public health and of Nador as regional office was not relevant in absolute terms 
during this period, it began to be so in relative terms. The reason was paradoxical: 
the Ministries of War, State and Interior started to freeze their direct contribution 
to Spanish activities in Morocco. If Protectorate organisms were to enjoy more 
autonomy with the new regulation, then they would have to count only on their 
own financial, material and human resources without calling for direct support 
from those ministries. This meant, on the one hand, the impossibility of expanding 
the modest network of dispensaries and infirmaries for natives. By contrast, it 
meant also that they were assuming assistance to Riffians with less interference 
from Spanish institutions in Tangier and the Spanish enclaves. 
In the case of the Ministy of War, the Military Public Health Section began to 
think if it should keep on providing free drugs for countryside dispensaries or if, 
on the contrary, they should be financed by the Ministry of State. Besides, the 
Military Hygiene Institute, which sent vaccines and sera to the laboratories in 
Melilla, Larache and Ceuta, complained about the burden it posed for the ade-
quate operation of military laboratories in Spain. These questions were important 
because the army contribution for the assistance of Riffian soldiers and civilians 
must have been high in absolute and sometimes in relative terms. In 1915, for 
example, the health budget accounted for 4.3 per cent of the total budget of the 
Ministry of War destined for “Action in Morocco” (4.7 million out of a total of 
108 million pesetas). In 1917 this percentage essentially remained at 4.2 per cent 
(4.2 million out of a total of 100 million pesetas). It has been impossible to know 
how much money was assigned exclusively for Riffians and how much for the 
Melilla region, because the budget for “Action in Morocco” was not detailed. But 
given that the army paid for wages of the dispensaries’ doctors, for vaccines, 
drugs and equipment of those centres, for hospital care of Riffian soldiers and 
their families and relatives in Melilla, and for “attraction” from the enclaves, it 
seems clear that cuts in the budget should have been crucial. The army started to 
concentrate on Spanish troops and to abandon its traditional role of “attraction” 
from Spanish enclaves. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of State kept its contribution to the Sanidad 
Majzén at a standstill. In fact, its financial support for the Melilla region decreased 
from 43,880 pesetas for seven dispensaries in 1915 to 31,950 pesetas for nine 
dispensaries in 1918–1921. The civil nurse in the dispensary of Nador had to 
leave his post in the summer of 1916 because the ministry stopped paying his 
wages. Finally, the Junta de arbitrios of Melilla asked for assistance to Riffians in 
the Hospital Central to be charged to the Protectorate’s budget. The Junta de 
arbitrios reported that the expenses for hospitalisation in Melilla were equal to the 
whole budget of the Sanidad Majzén (about 68,000 pesetas) and were compro-
mising measures directed towards the Spanish population. Both ministries focused 
more and more on Spaniards, either in the civil hospitals and infirmaries of the 
Western region, or in the activities of the Juntas de arbitrios in the Eastern Rif. 
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Military Expansionism and the Authoritarianism of General Silvestre (1918–
1921). The Protectorate health regulations issued in 1918 deepened previous 
developments. Those regulations organised the consultative branch of the Health 
Inspection through the creation of the Central Health Board and the Local Health 
Boards. This measure extended the theoretical reach of Tettouan towards country-
side dispensaries in the Melilla region. Despite the lack of consuls-interveners in 
the area and of civil hospitals or infirmaries, it was the head officers of the units of 
Native Police who were supposed to act as general representatives of the Delegate 
of Native Affairs for public health affairs. However, the relative connection 
achieved between urban and rural, civilian and military dispensaries, the relative 
extension of the Sanidad Majzén to the Eastern Rif in this period, owed more to 
the growing authoritarianism of the High Commissioner. As has been said pre-
viously, the regulations of 1918 allowed the High Commissioner to personally 
control the appointment of many members of the consultative boards, depriving 
the Health Inspector and even the Delegate of Native Affairs of much of their 
power. 
In addition, a number of military regulations issued between 1918 and 1921 
gave the High Commissioner greater control of the Native Affairs administration 
of the army. For example, on December 11, 1918, the Commandant Generalship 
of Larache became subordinated to that of Ceuta-Tettouan. This affected all 
departments, including the Sub-inspection of Troops and Native Affairs. A second 
decree, issued January 25, 1919, appointed General Berenguer as chief inspector 
of the Army, not only in the Protectorate but also in Ceuta and Melilla, with the 
honours of “Crown Minister”. Among his new personal powers, he became head 
of a new Direction of Offices and Centres of Information and Police. Everything 
concerning the “recruitment, organisation and posts” of the Native Affairs admini-
stration of the army was decided by him directly, although he could delegate his 
authority to the General Commandants (Cordero Torres 1943; Villanova 2004). In 
July 1920, a royal order of the Ministry of War confirmed that countryside dispen-
saries were dependant on the Sub-inspections of Native Troops and Affairs and 
not on the Military Public Health sections of the Commandant Generalships, thus 
supporting the control of the High Commissioner. 
As a result of his personal concentration of civil and military power, General 
Berenguer began to manage public health affairs by himself or through his 
secretary. He was in direct touch with the Ministries of State and War for these 
issues, leaving no technical autonomy to the Health Inspector. In the Eastern Rif, 
he managed to appoint a Consul-Intervener for Nador in 1919, who established 
the first Junta local de intervención in the area. This fact resulted in some impor-
tant civil public health projects being planned for Nador, which attempted to 
finally make this town the regional centre of Sanidad Majzén in the area associ-
ated with Tettouan. First, a “service for analysis of food and drink” was demanded 
in July 1919, because the existing laboratory in Melilla was limiting its service to 
the city. The Consul-Intervener argued that some peninsular food factories selling 
their products in the area had been affected by trichinosis or lacked proper 
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sanitary conditions, with subsequent danger for human health. In his opinion, it 
was a fact that “beverages elaborated with industrial alcohols and oils (so much 
employed by the qabilas) made not only from olives, and drinks sweetened with 
saccharine” were being widely sold in the area. Thus, it was necessary to establish 
this service to control the hygienic quality of products. In fact, the consul pro-
posed that a service to control the cantinas in the “European villages” be created 
under direction of the new Junta comarcal of Nador (former Junta de arbitrios) 
and another one for “native consumers and cantinas established outside the peri-
meter of military camps, which sell articles to the non-military public”, under the 
direction of the Consulate-Intervention. 
Second, the High Commissioner proposed to the Ministry of State the creation 
of a mixed infirmary in Nador in the spring of 1921, so that clinical and surgical 
care could be provided for all Eastern Rif patients. General Fernández Silvestre 
offered installation of a barrack of 45 x 10 m. in the town, but the proposal was 
rejected due to poor hygienic conditions. The Delegation of Public Works of the 
High Commission was charged with planning a project that would meet all the 
technical requirements and that would be financed by the civil construction 
section of the Protectorate budget. Its status would be the same as that of the 
mixed infirmaries built in Asilah and Ksar el-Kebir, and to the one being planned 
simultaneously for Chefchauen. Third, after February 1921, the Military Hygiene 
Institute of Madrid refused to send more sera and vaccines to the laboratory of 
Melilla for use in the countryside dispensaries. This fact moved the Commandant 
General Fernández Silvestre to request that the High Commissioner created a 
“depot of sera and vaccines” in the Eastern Rif, so that these products could be 
supplied to all countryside dispensaries in the area and vaccination campaigns 
could be launched. The High Commissioner agreed with the proposal and con-
tacted the Ministry of State to decide where it should be located, though, in his 
opinion, “it seems natural that it was the dispensary of Nador, whose town is 
regarded as capital or head of that region”. 
In the end, none of these projects materialised before the Rif War. If they had 
succeeded, Nador would have been able to effectively lead and co-ordinate the 
network of countryside dispensaries in the area. But this network expanded, none-
theless, with the creation of two more centres in 1918–1921. One of them was 
located in Kaddur (Ait Sidel), whose director was Francisco Irañeta y Urriza 
(1919–1920) and later Severiano Bustamante y Fernández de Luco (1921). The 
other was located in Reyén/Hassi Berkan (Ait Bu Yahi), directed by Roberto 
Solans Labedán (1918–1919), Manuel Peris Torres (1920) and Elías Nager 
Martínez (1921). Besides, the five provisional dispensaries previously existing in 
the area were made permanent. In Monte Arruit, the directors were Benito Roldán 
Sevilla (1918–1919) and José Espina Rull (1920–1921); in Zaio, Francisco 
Rodríguez González (1918), Elías Nager Martínez (1919–1920) and Eugenio 
Martín Alonso (1921); in Zoco el-Arbaa of Arkeman, Domingo García Doctor 
(1918–1920) and Ramón Jiménez Muñoz (1921); in Sammar (previously, 
Yazanen), Luis Muruzábal Sagüés (1918), José Malva López (1919–1920) and 
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Damián Navarro García (1921–1922); and in Ras Tikermin/Yarf el-Baax, Poli-
carpo Carrasco (1918), Juan García y Gutiérrez (1919–1920) and José Ventosa y 
Pasoda (1921). The last statistics collected of countryside dispensaries were those 
of 1919. In the first trimester of that year, Kaddur had made 334 treatments, 
Sammar, 294, Hassi Berkan, 360, Zoco el-Arbaa, 453 and Monte Arruit, 488. 
Apart from the authoritarianism of the High Commissioner, the higher defi-
nition of the Sanidad Majzén in the Eastern Rif with Nador as its centre was 
favoured by less interference from Melilla and the other enclaves, whose task of 
“attraction” was substantially reduced. For example, the Junta de arbitrios of 
Melilla and military authorities refused to pay for assistance of Riffians on the 
Hospital Central and focused its resources on the growing Spanish population and 
the permanent garrisons. In the case of Vélez and Alhucemas, “attraction” had 
never achieved great success. For example, in Vélez, less than 1,000 patients were 
assisted in 1915, an insignificant number given that the central Rif and Ghomara, 
despite the lack of urban centres, were densely populated areas within which 
almost half of the population of Spanish Morocco was concentrated. It was not 
surprise, because Native Police and Regulares were always the main original 
impulse for dispensaries, but physical separation from the coast prevented their 
creation in the peñones. In fact, neither doctors, nor officers were ever allowed to 
travel or visit the qabilas. In contrast, dispensaries increased their work towards 
Spanish settlers, even if their number was inevitably small. In both enclaves, there 
existed Juntas de arbitrios which benefited from dispensaries intended in prin-
ciple for Riffians. Finally, from 1918 on, periodical in-communication reduced 
even more their work of “attraction”. A severe outbreak of malaria in the central 
Rif in September 1918 was not followed by an increase of the work of dispen-
saries as in the outbreaks of 1914 and 1916. Instead, it was decided to forbid the 
travel of patients to the dispensaries on the grounds of the “sanitary menace” they 
posed for the Spaniards. “In-communication” became a way of pressuring the 
Riffians, especially when hunger struck the area in 1919–1921, but it also re-
vealed the tendency of both enclaves to concentrate on their own interests. 
Direct interference from the ministries of State and War was also reduced, even 
if this had as many positive aspects as negative ones. The first ministry distrusted 
the experiences of past years, when its contribution to dispensaries had been dis-
torted by the preferential assistance provided to Riffian and Spanish soldiers. 
When General Berenguer asked State to request laboratory products from the 
Alfonso XIII Hygiene Institute of Madrid for the future depot of Nador, the mini-
stry declined the proposal on the grounds that expenses in Melilla and its region 
should be assumed by the Ministry of War or by the Ministry of Interior. The 
creation of the mixed infirmary and the laboratory of analysis were not supported 
on similar grounds, though another factor was also the general reduction of the 
Ministry’s expenses in Morocco and its subsequent concentration on its particular 
“Spanish” interests. 
On the other hand, the Ministry of War focused more and more in the interests 
of the regular army. The defeat of Germany in World War I resulted in Spain 
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being able to re-start more intense operations in its zone without the risk of being 
disturbed so much by complaints of Moroccan authorities or other foreign coun-
tries. The period 1918–1921 saw the extension of controlled territory as it more 
than doubled, reaching a peak of about 50 per cent of the total of Spanish 
Morocco. In Melilla, the campaign gained momentum under command of General 
Fernández Silvestre, who in less than one year (May 1920–March 1921) doubled 
the territory under Spanish control. The area rose to some 4,000 km2 and included 
new qabilas such as Mtalza, Ait Said, Ait Ulishek, Tafersit and fractions of Ait 
Tuzin and Temsamam. The rapid advance of the Army required more resources, 
but the Spanish government sought to put a stop to the astronomical military 
budget (more than 40 per cent of total state expenses) and to the use of Spanish 
troops abroad (in consonance with European developments after WWI). Thus, the 
Ministry of War reduced its contributions to Protectorate public health, suppressed 
its activities in Tangier, French Morocco and Cape Juby and proceeded to a 
general re-organisation of the Army health service in Spanish Morocco which 
took place in 1920–1921. In the first case, the supply of drugs, vaccines and sera 
or medical equipment to countryside dispensaries was reduced, especially to 
Nador, which was increasing its civil activities by the decision of Tettouan. 
In short, a unified, centralised public health system was about to extend itself to 
both extremes of Spanish Morocco after fifteen years of efforts. The authorita-
rianism of the High Commission and the decreasing direct role of the Ministries of 
War and State resulted in more administrative, institutional or political autonomy 
for the Sanidad Majzén and in a relative degree of connection between the Atlan-
tic region and the Eastern Rif. This was achieved at the cost of less technical auto-
nomy for the Health Inspector when facing the High Commissioner and doctors 
when facing consuls-interveners and military chiefs. However, the Protectorate 
health system seemed to be reaching its limits, even if half of Spanish Morocco 
was still outside its control. The Sanidad Majzén suffered from severe deficiencies 
in the Eastern Rif which provoked discontent in qabilians, either civilians or 
soldiers. 
For example, in the “pacified” zone dispensaries which were at last in a position 
of increasing their action towards civil Riffians, had to act in unfavourable condi-
tions. On the one hand, they could count on less money from the Ministry of State 
and less material from the Ministry of War. The possibility of suppressing some 
centres and the replacement of military doctors by civilians were even considered, 
given that the army needed more personnel on the vanguard. On the other hand, 
more effort was required to “attract” civilians to the dispensary than had been 
necessary for native troops. For example, dispensary doctors were given horses to 
be able to visit the duars and assist qabilians at home, probably because “spontan-
eous” visits were not so frequent. Finally, Spanish settlers began to use the dispen-
saries. The Juntas of towns outside Melilla had developed, especially the one in 
Nador, which became a Junta comarcal (county board). Doctors were hired to 
assist the Spanish poor and civil cemeteries were built in some of them. However, 
they lacked health facilities and therefore, in towns such as Nador and Monte 
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Arruit, a growing number of Spaniards was assisted in the dispensaries for 
natives, with the subsequent harm for the Riffians’ interests. Finally, the delay of 
the projects of laboratory, infirmary and vaccine depot in Nador contributed to the 
discrediting of the Tettouan initiatives, which had never been viewed with enthu-
siasm in the Rif. 
Assistance to Riffian soldiers also worsened. The growing number of Native 
Police units (those which had been newly created and those which had been 
moved to the front) and the two groups of Regulares were widely used for the new 
operations because the government had reduced the Spanish regular forces by one 
third. Native troops not only suffered from higher casualties in operations, but 
they were also badly assisted because of the lack of specific health facilities in the 
newly occupied territories. A project for creating dispensaries for natives in Dar 
Drius, Sidi Hossain, Zoco el-Telata and the qabila of Temsamam was considered 
in 1920 which could have helped solve this problem while starting the “attraction” 
policy in those qabilas. However, the project was finally postponed due to the 
lack of resources and personnel. The doctors in the dispensaries had been given 
horses for following Native Police units in their operations, but their multiple 
tasks made this measure clearly insufficient. Given the situation, Riffian soldiers 
could not be very content with Tettouan’s decisions. In sum, the absolute number 
of Riffian civilians and soldiers receiving health care in the Eastern Rif had 
increased in the period 1918–1921 but, in relation to the total territory and popu-
lation now under Spanish control, the percentage had decreased and, besides, the 
services provided became more precarious. This fact surely contributed to the in-
creasing discontent in the occupied qabilas with a Protectorate system whose 
deployment was becoming so problematic. 
In this situation, the impulse for consolidation of the Sanidad Majzén depended 
on new military advances which finally reached the central Rif, the ultimate 
objective of the Spanish army in Melilla for almost fifteen years. The modest 
success of Nador and of the network of countryside dispensaries in the Eastern Rif 
had been a result of military operations of the regular army. Only the new and 
rapid advances of 1918–1921 and the displacement of the bulk of the army and 
native forces deeper into Riffian territory had allowed the creation of a “pacified” 
zone around Melilla, leaving enough space for the Sanidad Majzén to appear. 
However, the cut of expenses prevented a real growth of the army health service 
and caused, instead, a redistribution of centres and personnel towards the front 
line. The military infirmaries of Restinga, Zoco el-Arbaa, Atlaten, Yazanen and 
Monte Arruit were suppressed while new ones were created in Kaddur and Dar 
Drius, plus two hospitals in Dar Drius and one in Annual. The infirmaries of 
Kandussi, Silwan and Cabo de Agua were kept. Dar Drius had become the new 
advanced centre of the army health service in the Rif instead of Silwan. 
Concentration of forces and resources on the front was an attempt to achieve the 
decisive goal but showed the difficulties of Spain and the extent of local oppo-
sition. It was more difficult than ever to speak of a “police operation” as prepara-
tives ressembled those for war. It seemed clear that the central Rif would have to 
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be conquered and defeated, even if that would imply a complete move away from 
Protectorate obligations, even from the usual procedures of the Melilla region. 
Important harkas of significant size begun to be organised by initiative of the Ait 
Waryaghar and some attacks were launched against Vélez and Alhucemas. For 
example, during the malaria outbreak in 1918, Spanish authorities in Vélez 
informed Melilla that  
On the occasion of the closure of this enclave due to the epidemic, a great 
effervescence dominates the nearby campo, to the point of menace of fire if 
they [qabilians] are not allowed to travel to the enclave. I have been told by 
some chiefs with whom I have got in touch that the most intransigent are the 
Beni Urriaguel, which are trying to gather qabilas to attack the enclave. [...] if 
the way is not left open for them, they will make war. I have received a 
proposal from the qabilas of Bocoya, Beni Iteft and Beni-Bu-Frah that if they 
are allowed to pass, they would stand guard to prevent the Beni Ammart from 
coming, as they are the only ones affected by the epidemic [...]. 
While waiting for combat, the Spanish profited from hunger in the Rif to obtain 
submission from local chiefs, even if this meant clearly abandoning its mission of 
“protection” (Madariaga 1999). In fact, the rapid advances of General Silvestre 
were based on this strategy, which suited well with the lack of means of the 
Spanish army. On the other hand, the supposed mineral riches of the central Rif 
moved some Spanish capitalists to try and obtain direct concessions for exploit-
ation from the Riffians instead of through the French Sultan and the Spanish 
Khalifa. In this way, benefits would be higher and the subsequent monopoly 
would not be endangered by foreign intervention or Protectorate regulation. While 
Spanish military officers or even the dispensary doctors were not allowed to enter 
into the central Rif, a representative of a Spanish mining company, Antonio Got, 
travelled periodically to Ait Waryaghar in 1921 and contacted Riffian represen-
tatives to negotiate permission for exploitation (Ruiz Albéniz 1922). Mining 
activities would probably be accompanied by private health initiatives such as 
those displayed by the CEMR. 
In short, brutalisation and abuses of different sorts were progressively seen as 
the only effective means of extending Spanish control into the heart of the Rif. If 
the increasing use of force had been essential for the development of public health 
in the Eastern qabilas, the only way of overcoming resistance in the central Rif 
was a greater degree of force. No room would be available for participation of 
central Riffians, less that there was once for el-Roghi and Guelaians. That was the 
authoritarian move made by General Silvestre, a personal detour that moved 
Spanish action in Eastern Morocco further away from the theoretical protectorate 
it had agreed to. It should be said, however, that this move was not exclusive of 
Melilla aurhorities because General Berenguer had been engaged in open war with 
el-Raisuni in Jbala since 1918. The difference was that the lack of means in 
Melilla and the embryonic situation of Protectorate structures in the area made 
brutal and abusive measures more clear.  
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Yet, these procedures were characteristic of Spanish Morocco as a whole, even 
if it was the decisions of General Silvestre that finally failed and the opposition of 
the central Rif under the leadership of Abd el-Krim that finally succeeded. Here, 
the expulsion of the Spaniards and the rejection of the Sultan were progressively 
seen as the only solution for ensuring respect for identity and autonomy of action. 
The only way for central Riffians to create a health system was to establish it 
themselves. This required a concentrarion of power over traditional social struc-
tures in the area in order to oblige people to fight as well as a complete rejection 
of “colonial” or “protectorate” collaboration with Spaniards and even of 
Moroccan sovereignty. That was the authoritarian move made by Abd el-Krim, 
and his success in 1921 was the final proof that “Riffian realities” could not be 
denied. 
Conclusion 
The Limits of Colonial Public Health in Spanish Morocco 
After the events of Annual in July 1921 and the fall of the whole structure of 
Spanish action in the Melilla region, the Riffians and Ghomarians under the 
command of Abd el-Krim prolonged their triumphal march until they controlled 
about 80 per cent of Spanish Morocco by mid-1925 and a part of the French Pro-
tectorate in the vicinity of Taza and Fez. The “Republic of the Rif” was pro-
claimed and a Riffian government was established which carried out a series of 
administrative, religious, military and economic reforms to ensure its indepen-
dence and the success of operations against the Spanish and French armies. Public 
health was included among these reforms. Medical material was obtained from the 
defeated Spanish Army, including a fully-equipped military hospital in Chef-
chauen, hastily abandoned as the army withdrew from the city in 1925. A number 
of Moroccan doctors as well as some foreigners, such as Dr. Walter Hutyens, 
worked for the Riffians, especially providing health care for the troops. As part of 
a campaign for international recognition, Abd el-Krim asked the International 
Committee of the Red Cross for medical aid and sought help from Muslim chari-
ties and civil associations in Great Britain and other parts of the world. He also 
attempted to be admitted to the League of Nations. His final defeat in March 1926 
by the combined effort of France and Spain and the end of the Rif War in the 
following year put an end to the brief trajectory of an independent and modest 
“Riffian public health”. 
The end of the Rif War was paralleled by the signing of an agreement among 
the European powers about Tangier. A regulation was approved which gave the 
city and its surroundings the status of an “International Zone”, to be governed by a 
complicated set of institutions in which French, British and Spanish represen-
tatives played different roles. The separation of Tangier from the French and 
Spanish Protectorates was finally confirmed. In public health matters, the most 
important consequence was the end of the Sanitary Council of Tangier, which was 
replaced by a Commission of Hygiene and Public Works whose actions were re-
stricted to the international zone. Interference in sanitary questions from Tangier 
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was then reduced to a minimum, though probably not completely stopped. France 
and Spain could finally organise health services on their own in their respective 
Protectorates, although they kept their presence in the city on the Strait through 
different clinical and research institutions. The agreement concerning Tangier also 
brought about a better separation of both Protectorates which led to a reduction of, 
if not an end to, French public health activities in Spanish Morocco and vice-
versa. 
Perhaps the victory over Riffians and the agreement concerning Tangier did not 
put an end to Moroccan and Riffian initiatives against foreign domination, but that 
is another story. However, both events marked the end of a phase in Morocco’s 
history, including the history of its public health. The present article has tried to 
clarify some important issues regarding this historical phase, first in Morocco as a 
whole during the 19th century, later in the Spanish zone of influence between 1906 
and 1921. Perhaps the most important and general conclusion is that, contrary to 
what has been usually stated, Moroccan authorities worried about public health 
and had the ability to actively influence its development to a significant extent. 
The general mechanisms of authoritarianism and diversification and the primacy 
of the maritime and military branches of the health system reflected Moroccan 
agency and placed the country’s public health in an intermediate position between 
that of a “typical” European country and that of a “typical” colony. As a result of 
those efforts, public health structures continued to influence the Spanish and 
French zones of influence after Algeciras and the protectorate treaties. 
In this sense, the current analysis has allowed a definition of the Moroccan case 
on its own “intermediate” or “transitional” terms without relying, on the one hand, 
on colonialist schemes or on nationalist premises. The colonialist view has tended 
to deprive Morocco of much of its historical agency by magnifying European 
domination either to confirm or to deny its effects. Post-colonialist accounts often 
fail to grasp Moroccan initiatives because these were stronger, more autonomous 
and more organised than a mere resistance to or a distortion of European deci-
sions. The lack of post-colonial studies for Morocco and for the Maghreb at large 
is probably not only a result of their academic “marginality”, as Edmund Burke III 
puts it (Burke III 2000), but of the inadequacy of those schemes for the Moroccan 
case (although the author has criticised colonialism and nationalism as “essentiali-
sing narratives” that should be abandoned). Regarding nationalism, it has ex-
aggerated the degree of autonomy and cohesion of Morocco over the influence of 
European countries reagarding traditional Arabic institutions or the specificities of 
certain regions and communities (Riffians, Berbers of the Atlas, Saharaouis, black 
population, Jewish communities). On this basis, the present analysis could also be 
useful for a better understanding of the history of public health in the Medi-
terranean countries in general, which were generally affected by processes of 
foreign influence and internal fragmentation. The Mediterranean of the 19th and 
first half of the 20th centuries would be better conceived as a zone where diffe-
rences in public health between the North and the South, the East and the West, 
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the European and the Arab-Islamic countries, were more matter of degree than of 
kind. 
Of course, differences existed and Moroccan agency was insufficient to finally 
ensure its “sanitary independence”. However, it was the relative development 
achieved by Morocco’s health system after the 19th century which explains why 
France and especially Spain had serious difficulties in establishing a new health 
system in their zones of influence. For Spain, these difficulties were paradigmati-
cally expressed in the “questions” of Tangier and the Rif, which led to a never-
ending series of incidents essentially reflecting its impotence to proceed within the 
framework of the legal regulations of Algeciras and the Treaty of the Protectorate. 
“Tangerian ghosts” and “Riffian realities” became a nightmare for Spanish action 
in Morocco well after 1912. 
In the end, the health system in Spanish Morocco in the period 1906–1921 
failed to be established on Protectorate/colonial grounds, despite its formal appea-
rance. A protectorate public health seemed to exist through the creation of a 
General Health Inspection into the Delegation of Native Affairs of the High 
Commission and its consultative branch composed of a Central Health Board and 
Local Health Boards in which Moroccan authorities were represented. The so-
called Sanidad Majzén comprised port services, urban and countryside dispen-
saries, mixed infirmaries and infirmaries for natives, all exclusively financed by 
the Protectorate’s budget from 1918 on. Moroccan auxiliary personnel were em-
ployed in different institutions. This system managed to reach the Melilla region 
where, for many years, public health was essentially framed within a specific 
Native Affairs Administration of the army with a kind of colonial “flavour”. Here, 
Moroccans enrolled as soldiers of the Native Police and Regulares were assisted 
in countryside dispensaries, as well as their families and relatives. 
However, appearances were deceiving. The higher responsibility for public 
health was not merely an intervention imposed by Spanish authorities but was 
directly assumed by the Delegate of Native Affairs and the High Commissioner 
from 1918 on to avoid constant interference from Tangier and from the dangers of 
French expansionism. This was an act of diplomatic force that had started with the 
strategy of the local boards and was accelerated by the German defeat in World 
War I. So the Sanidad Majzén was not based on “protection” but on “seizure”. On 
the other hand, the increase of military operations in the Protectorate from 1918 
on led to mounting confrontation with local opposition in what seemed more a 
war than colonisation. Both tendencies were confirmed after 1921 with the almost 
simultaneous closure of the Tangier and Rif questions. The Tangier Statute was 
then negotiated directly by Great Britain, France, Spain and Italy without the 
participation of the Sultan of Morocco or its delegate. The Rif War became a 
“European style” campaign (Gershovich 2000) with tens of thousands of deaths 
on each side, with the first aero-naval joint operations in history and merciless 
gas-bombings. Despite Gustavo Pittaluga’s and Francisco Ruiz Morote’s 
opinions, dispensaries for natives had not succeeded in their tasks of “civilisation” 
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and “pacification”, but rather could only be established throughout Spanish 
Morocco as a result of harsh combat and diplomatic force. 
Therefore, the degree of diplomatic and military force used against Morocco 
and the Rif makes the terms “protectorate” and “colony” inadequate. The Spanish 
zone was rather an occupied or conquered area, with an authoritarian admini-
stration. Conversely, the tremendous effort required to finally achieve “pacifica-
tion” had serious consequences for Spain, namely the establishment of the dicta-
torship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923–1930), which had important 
effects in the field of public health. This impact at home is just another proof of 
why Spanish action in Morocco can hardly be defined as “colonisation”. 
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